# Union 1,f India v. V.IAi Olollt & Gmml Mills

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 586
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, j. 0. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-1-f-india-v-v-iai-olollt-gmml-mills-2731
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

•
E.xcise Duty-Manufacture of Vanaspaii-'Refined oil'
·if an intermediate product-Liability-'Manufacturing'
and
'prowsing'-Distinction-Oentral Excises and Salt Act, 1944
(1of1944), s. 2 (.f)-First Schedule, !Um 23.
The respondents, who were manufacturers of Vegetable
products known as Vanaspati, were assessed to excise duty under
item 23 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944, on what the taxing authorities called the manufacture of 'refined oi'' from raw oil which according to them fell
within the description of "vegetable non-essential oils, all sorts,
in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is
ordinarily carried on with the aid of power". 1'he co.rrunon
case made by the respondents in their petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution challenging the imposition was that for the
purpose of manufacturing Vanaspati they purchased gTOundnut
and til oil from the market and subjected them to different
processe' before applying hydrogenation to produce Vanaspati
and that nothing that they produced at any stage was covered
by that item. Affidavits by experts were filed by both the
parties aud the High Court found in favour of the respondents
and allowed the
petitions. The Union of India appealed.
It was ur11ed on its behalf that before finally producing Vanaspati the respondents produced at an intermediate stage what
was known as •refined oil' in the market and although they
might not sell it and although Vanaspati, when produced, was
liable to excise duty under another item, that could not affect
their liability.
Held, that excise duty being leviable on the manufacture
of goods and not on their sale, the petitioners would no doubt
be liable if they produced 'refined oil', as known in the market,
at an intermediate stage. But it was clear that there could be no
'refined oil' as known in the market without dcodorisatio,n
according to the specification of the Indian Standards Institute
and the affidavits of the experts. Since, however, the process
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
of deodorisation was admittedly applied in the respondents'
factories only after hydrogenation was complete, they could
not be said to produce 'refined oil' at any stage.
Nor could the respondents be held to manufacture some
kind of 'non-essential vegetable oil'. 'Processing' cannot be
equated to 'manufacture' which nieans bringing into existence
a new substance.
The Legislature by
definin~ the word 'manufacture' in
s, 2(f) of the Act did not intend to make the mere processing
of goods liable to duty.
The words "all sorts" in item 23 are intended only to
make it clear that vegetable non- essential oi!s. whether raw or
refined, from whatever raw material produced, will be liable to
excise duty.
CIVIL APPELLATE jum~mcnoN : Civil Appeals
Nos. 168-170 ofl960.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
April 10, 1958, of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab
High Court at Delhi in Civil Writs N'.:>s. 301, 302 and
347 ofl956.
G. S. Pathak, B. Sen and R. If. !Jhebar, for
the appellants.
N. 0. Ohatterjee, A. N. Sinh1' and P. K.
Mukherjee, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 168/60).
A. V. Viswa'IU!tha
Sostri,
Sardar Bahadur,
S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent in (C.A. No. 169/60).
A. V. Viswa'IU!tha 8astri,
S. f(. Kapnr and
K. K. Jain, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 170/60).
N. A. Palkhivala,
J. 13. lJaduchanji, 0. G'.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain. for the Interveners (in
all the appeals.)
1962. October 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAS
GUPTA, ].-These three appeals are
against the orders of the Punjab High Court allowing
JJ(j2
Union of /11tlia
v.
Delhi C 11th f1f
Gtn1r«l Mills
lJas Guptn, J.
1962
Union 1,f India
v.
V.IAi Olollt &
Gmml Mills
Das Gupt•, J.
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
three petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The three petitions are by three different companies
manufacturing vegetable products known as Vanaspati
and they challenge the legality of the imposition of

## Text

1962
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
UNION OF INDIA
"·
DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
j. 0. SHAH, JJ.)
•
E.xcise Duty-Manufacture of Vanaspaii-'Refined oil'
·if an intermediate product-Liability-'Manufacturing'
and
'prowsing'-Distinction-Oentral Excises and Salt Act, 1944
(1of1944), s. 2 (.f)-First Schedule, !Um 23.
The respondents, who were manufacturers of Vegetable
products known as Vanaspati, were assessed to excise duty under
item 23 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944, on what the taxing authorities called the manufacture of 'refined oi'' from raw oil which according to them fell
within the description of "vegetable non-essential oils, all sorts,
in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is
ordinarily carried on with the aid of power". 1'he co.rrunon
case made by the respondents in their petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution challenging the imposition was that for the
purpose of manufacturing Vanaspati they purchased gTOundnut
and til oil from the market and subjected them to different
processe' before applying hydrogenation to produce Vanaspati
and that nothing that they produced at any stage was covered
by that item. Affidavits by experts were filed by both the
parties aud the High Court found in favour of the respondents
and allowed the
petitions. The Union of India appealed.
It was ur11ed on its behalf that before finally producing Vanaspati the respondents produced at an intermediate stage what
was known as •refined oil' in the market and although they
might not sell it and although Vanaspati, when produced, was
liable to excise duty under another item, that could not affect
their liability.
Held, that excise duty being leviable on the manufacture
of goods and not on their sale, the petitioners would no doubt
be liable if they produced 'refined oil', as known in the market,
at an intermediate stage. But it was clear that there could be no
'refined oil' as known in the market without dcodorisatio,n
according to the specification of the Indian Standards Institute
and the affidavits of the experts. Since, however, the process
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
of deodorisation was admittedly applied in the respondents'
factories only after hydrogenation was complete, they could
not be said to produce 'refined oil' at any stage.
Nor could the respondents be held to manufacture some
kind of 'non-essential vegetable oil'. 'Processing' cannot be
equated to 'manufacture' which nieans bringing into existence
a new substance.
The Legislature by
definin~ the word 'manufacture' in
s, 2(f) of the Act did not intend to make the mere processing
of goods liable to duty.
The words "all sorts" in item 23 are intended only to
make it clear that vegetable non- essential oi!s. whether raw or
refined, from whatever raw material produced, will be liable to
excise duty.
CIVIL APPELLATE jum~mcnoN : Civil Appeals
Nos. 168-170 ofl960.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
April 10, 1958, of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab
High Court at Delhi in Civil Writs N'.:>s. 301, 302 and
347 ofl956.
G. S. Pathak, B. Sen and R. If. !Jhebar, for
the appellants.
N. 0. Ohatterjee, A. N. Sinh1' and P. K.
Mukherjee, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 168/60).
A. V. Viswa'IU!tha
Sostri,
Sardar Bahadur,
S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent in (C.A. No. 169/60).
A. V. Viswa'IU!tha 8astri,
S. f(. Kapnr and
K. K. Jain, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 170/60).
N. A. Palkhivala,
J. 13. lJaduchanji, 0. G'.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain. for the Interveners (in
all the appeals.)
1962. October 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAS
GUPTA, ].-These three appeals are
against the orders of the Punjab High Court allowing
JJ(j2
Union of /11tlia
v.
Delhi C 11th f1f
Gtn1r«l Mills
lJas Guptn, J.
1962
Union 1,f India
v.
V.IAi Olollt &
Gmml Mills
Das Gupt•, J.
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
three petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The three petitions are by three different companies
manufacturing vegetable products known as Vanaspati
and they challenge the legality of the imposition of
Excise duty on what was called by the taxing
authorities as the manufacture of "refined oil" from
raw oil. These petitions raise a common question of
law as regards the liability to excise duty under Item
23 of the first schedule to the Central Excises and
Salt Act l of 1944, on similar facts.
The petitions
were heard together and disposed of by a common
judgment allowing ·the appeals and directing the
excise authorities to withdraw the impugned demand
of excise duty on the petitioners. The present appeals
have also been heard together.
The facts alleged in the three separate petitions
filed by the three petitioners (the respondents herein),
the manufacturers of Vanaspati, are practically the
same. It is said that for the purpose of manufacturing
Vanaspati the petitioners purchased groundnut and
til oil from the open , market or directly from the
manufacturers of such oil. The oils thus purchased
are subjected to different processes in order to tum
them into Vanaspati. It is their case that the only
finished product they manufacture from the raw
materials thus purchased is Vanaspati which is liable
l:o excise duty as a vegetable product. They contend
that at no stage do they produce any new product
which can come within the item described in the
Schedule as " vegetable non-essential oils, all sorts
in or in relation to the manufacture of which any
process is ordinarily carried on
with the aid of
power." Accordingly, it is said, the demand for
excise duty on the ground that they produce from the
raw oils purchased a product which is liable to duty
under item 23 of the Schedule (now item 12) is
illegal.
In resisting these petitions the Union of India
contended, in substance, that in the course of the
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
manufacture of Vanaspati, the vegetable product from
raw groundnut and til oil, the petitioners bring into
existence at one stage,
after carrying out some
processes with the aid of power, what is known to the
market as "refined oil". This "refined oil" falls
within the description of "vegetable non-essential oils,
all sorts,. in or in relation to the manufacture of which
any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of
power," and so is liable to excise duty. The affidavit
filed bv l\tfr. P. S. Krishnan, Chief Chemist, Central
Revenue, Central Laboratory, Government of India,
in support of this contention of the appellant, describes
the process by which raw oil is manufactured into
Vanaspati thus:-
"The manufacture of vegetable product
consists in hydrogenating oils using a catalyst.
The catalyst is a sensitive material and is liable
to be poisoned and made ineffective if certain
impurities like mucilaginous matter, free oxidised
fatty acid and moisture are present. In order
therefore, to successfully manufacture vegetable
product the hydrogenation has to be done on a
refined vegetable non-essential oil. The refined
vegeta hie non -essential oil (an oil free from
major impurities mentioned in paragraph 2
above) is the penultimate raw material for the
manufacture of. vegetable product .
The vegetable non-essential oils as obtained
by crushing containing the impurities mentioned
earlier are raw vegetable non-essential oils.
The process of refining them consists in adding
an aqueous solution of an alkali which will
combine with the free fatty acids to form a
soap and S!'ttle down with it a large amount of
suspended and mucilaginous
matter; after
settling the clear supernatant layer is drawn off
and treated with an appropriate quantity of
bleaching earth and carbon is then filtered. In
1962
Unwn •f bun•
v;
D1/lti Clolh &
Ci'1tru•l Mitis
DasGu;ltl, J.
191i2
Uni111 of India
v.
Drllii CMh Vt
Genct•l Mills
lhs Gu;ta, J,
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
this process the colouring matter is removed
and the moisture that was originally present in
the neutralised oil will also be removed. At this
stage the oil is a refined oil and is suitable for
hydrogenation into vegetable product. This
process of refining generally involves the use of
power and machinery."
He then goes on to say :-
"Depending upon the quality of the seed
used for crushing and that of the original raw
oil this refined oil will now generally be suitable
for edible purposes of discriminating users and
for the manufacture of toilet goods like hair
oils and high class soaps.
For certain users
who are even more discriminating this oil may
be subjected to a further process of deodorisation.
The difference between raw vegetable nonessential oils and refined vegetable oils wili
clearly be seen on examination of the two
products. The refined oil will generally be
colourless or only slightly coloured. It will be
perfectly clear and in many cases it may have
no odour. The raw oil, on the other hand,
will have a certain amount of turbidity or
sediment at the bottom and will also be somewhat deep in colour. I further say that sometimes refined oil obtained above is subjected
to a process of further deodorization. Such
oil can be corrl'ctly described as refined and
deodorised oil.
As far as known to me, the two grades of
oils are separately marketed in the country; as
for example,
'groundnut oil'
and 'refined
groundnut oil' the latter generally with a
distinctive label when marketed in containers
of approximately 4 gallons or less."
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
The experts who have filed affidavits in sup·
port of tht petitioners' case agree with Mr. Krishnan
that common oils, like groundnut, sesame, mustard,
cottonseed, etc., in their raw stage always contain
varying amounts of impurities and these impurities
have to be removed by different processes before
hydrogenation for the purpose of producing Vanaspati can be applied. There is however this important difference between the view of Dr. Homi Ruttonji Nanji who has filed an affidavit in support of the
petitions, and that of Mr. Krishnan that while according to Mr. Krishnan the raw oil which has been
freed from impurities but not deodorised is sold in the
market as refined oil, Dr. Nanji is definite in his
statement that refined oil for edible purposes, as
understood hy the manufacturers as we!J as by the
trade, is oil to which all the three processes, viz.,
neutralization, bleaching and deodorisation have been
applied.
He goes on to say: "In fact I would not
regard any oil as refined oil unless it was also deodorised, since the failure to deodorise oil leaves behind
in the oil certain impurities in the shape of compounds which give off bad odours." (Vide para. 5 of his
affidavit in the petition filed by the Delhi Cloth &
General Mills Co., Ltd.).
As already stated the High Court accepted the
petitioners' contention that the oil in their hands
after some amount of refinement in the course of being converted into Vanaspati was not liable to excise
duty under item 23 (Now item 12) and so allowed
the petitions.
In support of the appeals, Mr. Pathak has
advanced a two-fold argument.
He first argues that
the respondent concerns after they buy the raw oil
1with all its impurities, manufacture by the application of certain processes of refinement, a refined oil
which is the same as the refined oil available in the
market, and the aid of power is taken in some of these
1962
Union of lnt!ia
v.
Delhi Clot/I &
Central Mills
Das Gupta, /.
19P2
Uni .. of lniiA
v.
D<lhi Cloth &
6-r•l Mil/1
Das Gupta, J.
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
processes; and that it is "refined oil" thus produced
that becomes after further processes "vegetable
product". When the vegetable product comes into
existence it becomes liable to excise duty as vegetable product under the present cl. 13, which appears
to be the-same as old cl. 11. That however cannot
alter the position that at an earlier stage, these same
respondents have manufactured "refined oil" as is
known to the market. That substance comes squarely within cl. 23 (now cl. 12) and is therefore liable
to duty under this clause; and the fact that they do
not put this "refined oil" on the market but use it to
produce a· finished product known as vanaspati pro·
duct cannot affect this liability.
Excise ·duty is on the manufacture of goods and
not on the sale. Mr. Pathak is therefore right in his
contention that the fact that the substance produced
by them at an intermediate stage is not put in the
market would not make any difference. If from the
raw material has been brought into existence a new
substance by the application of processes one or more
of which are with the aid of power and that substance is the same as "refined oil" as known to the
market an excise duty may be leviable under Item
23 (the present item 12). But has it been shown that
the substance produced by the petitioners is at any
intermediate stage before Vanaspati comes into existence, "refined oil" as known to the market? We are
not satisfied that this has been shown.
As already
stated, a summary of the numerous processes necessary
to turn the raw groundnut or til oil into vegetable pro·
duct ha& been given in the affidavits sworn to by the
experts on both sides. It does not
appear to be
disputed that the process of deodorisation is applied
in the petitioners factory
after hydrogenation is
complete. The appellant's case is that before hydrogenation has started the substance in the hands of
these petitioner& is "refined oil" as known to the market. That raises the important question whether any
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
oil is known as 'refined oil' in the market before
deodorization has taken place.
As already indicated,
the appellant's case is that deodorization is not necessary for "refined oil" to come into existence; the
respondents' case on the other hand is that without
deodorisation the substance is not "refined oil".
We have already referred to the affidavits on
this question as sworn to by .Mr. Krishnan on behalf
of the appellant and Dr. Nanji on behalf of the respondents-petitioners.
In his affidavit Dr. Nanji has
also referred to the specification of "refined oil" by
the Indian Standards Institution and has given these
in an annexure to his affidavit.
From this annexure
we find the following specification by the Indian
Standards Institution:-
" Refined groundnut oil:-Groundnut oil which
has been refined bv neutralisation with alkali
bleached with fuiler earth and/or Activated
Carbon, and deodorised with steam, no other
chemical agent being used.
Refined Cotton Seed Oil:--Cotton seed oil which
has been refined by neutralisation with alkali,
bleached with alkali, bleached with
fullers'
earth and/or Activated Carbon and Deodorised."
This sp~cification by the Indian Standaras Institution furnishes very strong and indeed almost incontrovertible support for Dr. Nanji's view and the respondents' contention that without deodorisation the
oil is not "refined oil" as is known to the consumers
and the commercial community. Further support,
if any was needed, is found in the s~veral affidavits of
several concerns who market refiued groundnut oil
under the brand names-Falika, Tripti, Kitchen,
Kiran, Temple, Sovereign, Lotus, Nirmal, Dilkhus,
Kamdhenu, Radio, Deer, Dog,
Sepoy, Cocogem,
Tushar and Ginutol. They agree in asserting thai
1962
Union of India
y.
Delhi Cloth &
c,,...a/ Mills
DasG.;fa, J
1962
Union of India
v.
Dtlhi C/olh &
Gmer.Z Mills
DM Gupta, J.
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
the oil is always deodorised before it is marketed as
refined oil under these brand names.
As against this
it has to be noticed that the appellant could not
produce evidence of one single case of marketing of
refined oil without deodorisation.
Instead of that
Mr. Pathak produced before us copies of extracts of a
book by Alton Bailey of the name "Cottonseed and
Cottonseed Products" and another book by the same
author of the name "Industrial Oil and Fat Product5"
and a third book of the name "Vegetable Fats and
Oil" by G. S. Jamiesom.
Mr. Jamiesom's statement
does not at all make it clear that refined oil is put on
the market without deodorisation. Mr. Bailey appears
to have stated in his book on "Industrial Oil and Fat
Products" that the term "refining" refers to any
purifying treatment designed to remove free fatty
acids, phosphatides or mucilaginous material, or other
gross impurities in the oil; it excludes "bleaching"
and also "deodorisation". The extracts from this
book also do not clearly show that before deodorisation
the oil which has been refined by the purifying treatment, is put on the market. The extract from
Bailey's book on "Cottonseed and Cottonseed Products" contains a passage in these words :-
"In a discussion of the composition and
characteristics of cottonseed oil, three kinds of
oil are to be distinguished. They are: (a)
crude oil,. which is the oil as it is expressed
from the seed, and the commodity shipped from
the oil mills; (b) refined oil, or oil which has
been freed of most of its nonglyceride consti·
tuents by treatment with alkali, with or without
subsequent bleaching or deodorisation, and (c)
hydrogenated oil."
Mr. Pathak has relied on Bailey's statement
that the oil which has been freed of most of its non·
glyceride constituents by treatment with alkali, with
or without subsequent bleaching or deodorization is
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
"refined oil", for his contention that even without
deodorisation the oil is known as "refined oil".
It will be unsafe however to base any conclusion
on this extract without knowing the entire context in
which the statement has been made or what has been
made or what has been said in other parts of the same
book. The book itself was not produced before us.
It is worth noticing that while the above statement
is made by Mr. Bailey in respect of cottonseed oil
the oil with which we are concerned is produced from
groundnut oil and til-neither of which is cottonseed.
Apart from all this we are of opinion that the view
of the Indian Standards Institution as regards what is
refined oil as known to the trade in India must be
p(eferred to the opinion of this author. In this connection it has also to be mentioned that the affidavits
filed on behalf of the respondents are clear and categorical, while Krishnan's affidavit on which reliance
was placed on behalf of the appellant is somewhat
vague, halting and not categorical.
On a consideration of all these materials we
have no doubt about the correctness of the respondents' case that the raw oil purchased by the respondents for the purpose of manufacture of V anaspati
does not become at any stage "refined oil" as is known
to the consumers and the commercial community.
The first
branch of Mr. Pathak's argument must
therefore be rejected.
The other branch of Mr. Pathak's argument is
that even if it be held that the respondents do not
manufacture "refined oil" as is known to the market
they must be held to manufacture some kind of "nonessent~al vegetable oil" by applying to the raw
matenal purchased by them, the processes of neutralisation by alkali and bleaching by activated earth and/
or carbon.
According to the learned Counsel "manufacture" is complete as soon as by the application
l!Ji2
Union of India
••
De/Ai Cloth ff
Glneral Mills
Das Cupt•, J.
1962
Union of J ,1iia
....
Delhi Clot h &
Glftltal Mills
Das Gtlflta, J.
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
of one or more
processes,
the raw material
undergoes some change. To say this is to equate
"processing" to "manufacture" and for this we can
find no warrant in law.
The word "manufacture"
used as a verb is generally understood to mean as
"bringing into existence a new substance" and does
not mean merely "to produce some change in a substance", however minor in consequence the change
may be.
This distinction is well brought about in a
passage thus quoted in Permanent Edition of Words
and Phrases, Vol.. 26, from an American Judgment.
The passage runs thus :-
'Manufacture'
implies a change, but every
change is not manufacture and yet every change
of an article is the result of treatment, labour
and manipulation. But something more is
necessary and there must be transformation; a
new and different article must emerge having a
distinctive name, character or use."
It is helpful to consider also in this connection
the ordinary meaning of the word "goods". For, by
the verv words of the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944, e"xcise duty is leviable on "goods". The Act
itself does not define "goods" but defines "excisable
goods" as meaning "goods specified in the First
Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise and
includes salt." On the meaning of the word "goods"
an interesting passage is quoted in the Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 18, from a judgment ofa New York Court thus:-
"The first exposition I have found of the
word 'goods' is in Bailey's Large Dictionary
of 1732, which defines it simply 'merchandise';
and by Johnson, who followed as the next
lexicographer, it is defined to be movables in a
house; personal or immovable estates; wares;
freight; merchandise.''
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
Webster defines the word "goods" thus :-
"Goods, noun, plural; (I) movables; household
furniture; (2) Personal or movable estate, as
horses, cattle, utensils, etc., (3) Wares; merchandise; commodities bought and sold by merchants
and traders."
These definitions make it clear that to become
"goods" an article must be something which can
ordinarily come to the market to be bought and
sold.
This consideration of the meaning of the word
"goods" provides strong support for the view that
'manufacture' which is liable to excise duty under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, must be the
"bringing into existence of a new substance known
to the market." "But," says the learned Counsel,
"look at the definition of 'manufacture' in the
definition clause of the Act and you will find that
'manufacture' is defined thus: 'Manufacture' includes any process incidental or ancillary to the
completion of a manufactured product (s.2(f))". We
are unable to agree with the learned Counsel that by
inserting this definition of the word "manufacture"
in s. 2 ( f) the legislature intended to equate "processing" to "manufacture" and intended to make mere
"processing" as distinct from "manufacture" in the
same sense of bringing into existence of a new substance known to the market, liable to duty. The sole
purpose of inserting this definition is to make it clear
that at certain places in the Act the word 'manufacture' has been used to mean a process incidental to
the manufacture of the article. Thus in the very
item under which the excise duty is claimed in these
cases, we find the words : "in or in relation to the
manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried
on with the aid of power". The definition of
'manufacture' as ins. 2(f) puts it beyond any possibility of controversy that if power is used for any of
1962
Union of ln4i4
v.
LWii ClllA "'
Gmlf'al Milu
DuG•pflJ,J.
1962
Utei1111 of India
v.
D1lhi Glolh &
G1nw•I Mills
Das Gupta, J,
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
the numerous processes that are required to turn the
raw material into a finished article known to the
market the clause will be applicable; and an argument
that power is not used in the whole process of manufacture using the word in its ordinary sense, will not
be available. It is only with this limited purpose
that the legislature, in our opinion, inserted this
definition of the word 'manufacture' in the definition
section and not with a view to make the mere
"processing" of goods as liable to excise duty.
Mr. Pathak wanted to derive some assistance
for his argument from the words "all sorts" as used
in the clause.
According to him, the words "all
sorts" will be superfluous unless interpreted to mean
"whether bringing into existence a new substance or
not." The reasoning is clearly fallacious.
The words
"all sorts" have been used to make it clear that
"vegetable non-essential oils" whether raw or refined
and from whatever raw material produced will be
liable to excise duty.
Refined oil is one sort; raw oil
is another sort. But as the duty is on the manufacture of goods, that is, on the bringing into existence
a new substance kno''lll to the market, the raw oil or
the refined oil must be some substance known to the
market before it can be subjected to duty.
We are therefore of opinion that the High Co•irt
was right in its conclusion that there was no legal
basis for the demands of excise duty which were made
on the petitioners and in directing the authorities to
withdraw these demands.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed with
costs.
Appeals dismM8ed.
,