# UNION OF INDIA AND ORS v. KRISHAN LAL ARNEJA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2004] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 801
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2004-04-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2735 of 2004
- **Bench:** Shivaraj V. Patil, D.M. Dharmadhikari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-and-ors-v-krishan-lal-arneja-and-ors-20044
- **Pages:** 34

## Headnote

B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Ss. 4 and 17(1)(4)/Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953/Defence of India Rules:
Acquisition proceedings in respect of certain properties-Issuance of C
Notification-Challenge to-Quashed by High Court-On appeals, Held:
The property/properties could be acquisitioned by the Government on ground
of urgency-However, existence of exigency could be ascertained on the
basis of surrounding circumstances and available material on record and to
the subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned-While applying D
urgency clause the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility--
Invoking of urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity,
lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration-There was
no material circumstances to support invoking of urgency clause by the
authorities concerned
Appeals filed in other connected matters on ground that facts and
circumstances are distinguishable-Held:-The Notification was common
and composite in respect of all the properties-Since facts and circumstances
in the connected cases are similar, the ratio of the decision could appropriately
be applied
Section 17-Acquisition of immovable properties on ground of urgency
-Exercise of extra-ordinary power-Held: It could be resorted to only in
exceptional case of real urgency for public purpose since it not only deprives
a land owner of his right to file objections in respect of the property proposed
E
F
to be acquisitioned but also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5A. of G
the Act.
.
Section 5(A)(3)-Acquisition proceedings-Tenants-Right to
challenge-Held: A tenant having sufficient subsisting interest in the land/
property could challenge it.
801
H
802
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A
The properties in question were requisitioned by the appellants-Union
of India and Ors. under the Defence of India Rules and Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act for the purposes of Offices and
residential quarters to its Officers. The provisions of the Act were to lapse
on March 10, 1987. The appellants instead of releasing the properties (14 in
number) notified them on March 6, 1987 for acquisition. Some of the owners
B of the properties challenged the validity of the Notification by filing Writ
Petitions. Notifications and also acquisition proceedings were quashed by the
High Court holding that there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) and ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act which denied
the owners of the properties of their rights of raising objections under Section
C S(A) of the Act; and that the authorities had no explanation for the noncompliance of provisions of Law under Section 17(3A) of the Act by not making
payment of compensation in terms of Award passed by the Court in lieu of
acquisition of the properties. Aggrieved, Union of India filed appeals which
were dismissed, and later Review Petitions were also dismissed by this Court.
Union of India filed appeals in the present cases on the ground that the
D decisions in the decided connected matters are distinguishable and not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the cases in these appeals.
It was contended by the appellants that the correctness of the decision
in Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ (1991) Suppl.
317, one of the connected matters, was not considered in Union of India and
E Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., (2002) 7 SCC 98, the other connected
matter, and that the decision in that case is distinguishable from the facts of
the present cases/appeals.
Respondents submitted that since decision in the connected matters fully
cover the case against the appellants. They cannot re-agitate on the same
F issue; and that the Notification as well as ground of urgency clause therein
was composite one in respect of all the 14 tJroperties sought to be
acquisitioned.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD

## Text

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UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
A
v.
KRISHAN LAL ARNEJA AND ORS.
APRIL 28, 2004
[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Ss. 4 and 17(1)(4)/Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953/Defence of India Rules:
Acquisition proceedings in respect of certain properties-Issuance of C
Notification-Challenge to-Quashed by High Court-On appeals, Held:
The property/properties could be acquisitioned by the Government on ground
of urgency-However, existence of exigency could be ascertained on the
basis of surrounding circumstances and available material on record and to
the subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned-While applying D
urgency clause the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility--
Invoking of urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity,
lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration-There was
no material circumstances to support invoking of urgency clause by the
authorities concerned
Appeals filed in other connected matters on ground that facts and
circumstances are distinguishable-Held:-The Notification was common
and composite in respect of all the properties-Since facts and circumstances
in the connected cases are similar, the ratio of the decision could appropriately
be applied
Section 17-Acquisition of immovable properties on ground of urgency
-Exercise of extra-ordinary power-Held: It could be resorted to only in
exceptional case of real urgency for public purpose since it not only deprives
a land owner of his right to file objections in respect of the property proposed
E
F
to be acquisitioned but also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5A. of G
the Act.
.
Section 5(A)(3)-Acquisition proceedings-Tenants-Right to
challenge-Held: A tenant having sufficient subsisting interest in the land/
property could challenge it.
801
H
802
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A
The properties in question were requisitioned by the appellants-Union
of India and Ors. under the Defence of India Rules and Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act for the purposes of Offices and
residential quarters to its Officers. The provisions of the Act were to lapse
on March 10, 1987. The appellants instead of releasing the properties (14 in
number) notified them on March 6, 1987 for acquisition. Some of the owners
B of the properties challenged the validity of the Notification by filing Writ
Petitions. Notifications and also acquisition proceedings were quashed by the
High Court holding that there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) and ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act which denied
the owners of the properties of their rights of raising objections under Section
C S(A) of the Act; and that the authorities had no explanation for the noncompliance of provisions of Law under Section 17(3A) of the Act by not making
payment of compensation in terms of Award passed by the Court in lieu of
acquisition of the properties. Aggrieved, Union of India filed appeals which
were dismissed, and later Review Petitions were also dismissed by this Court.
Union of India filed appeals in the present cases on the ground that the
D decisions in the decided connected matters are distinguishable and not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the cases in these appeals.
It was contended by the appellants that the correctness of the decision
in Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ (1991) Suppl.
317, one of the connected matters, was not considered in Union of India and
E Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., (2002) 7 SCC 98, the other connected
matter, and that the decision in that case is distinguishable from the facts of
the present cases/appeals.
Respondents submitted that since decision in the connected matters fully
cover the case against the appellants. They cannot re-agitate on the same
F issue; and that the Notification as well as ground of urgency clause therein
was composite one in respect of all the 14 tJroperties sought to be
acquisitioned.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. The issue of urgency could be justified on the basis of the
surrounding circumstances and the records available at the time of subjective
satisfaction of authorities while invoking Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land
Acquisition Act. This Court had held in Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs.,
one of the connected matters, that the expression of urgency in the common
notification being general to all the properties could not be sustained in
H respect of any particular property, on the ground that the expression of
. . -
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA
803
urgency being one and the same cannot be partly good and partly bad. Pursuant A
to the impugned notification, neither any award was passed nor any
compensation was determined and paid on the ground that the impugned
notification was quashed and set aside in Banwari Lal case. This only indicates
that even the appellants understood the impugned notification as a common
and composite notification in respect of all the properties. Since the ground B
of urgency also being common, it can not be accepted that the decision
rendered earlier in the cases of Banwari Lal or Shakunta/a Gupta on the
question-of urgency was properties specific. The decisions are binding as
precedents on question of validity of the notification. Hence, urgency claims
could not have been invoked on the facts and circumstances of the present
cases. [817-H; 818-A-B-C-D-E-F]
C
Union of India and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002) 7
SCC 98 and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ
[19911Suppl.317, relied on.
1.2. Section 17 of the Act confers extraordinary powers on the D
authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down
under Section SA of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers
cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the
Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired
for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be, by itself is E
not sufficient to take aid of the Section to use this extraordinary power as
use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable
property to file objections for the proposes of acquisition and it also dispenses
with the inquiry under Section SA of the Act. The authorities must have
subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause keeping in
mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands F
and the time factor as to whether taking possession of the property can wait
for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the
land owners and the inquiry under Section SA of the Act could be completed.
Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly
or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise· unexpectedly, G
exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations where the delay is
likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property
can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine
urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and
just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the
acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should H
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot
be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part
of the State Administration. [822-D-E-F-G-H; 823-A)
1.3. There was no urgency of taking immediate possession nor there
was any immediate threat of dispossessing the appellants from the properties.
B At the most, after the lapse of the Requisition Act on 10.3.1987, appellants'
possession over the properties would have been unauthoriud, may be so long
they continued in unauthoriud possession of the properties, they were liable
to pay damages for their occupation for few months during which period they
could have completed acquisition proceedings in the normal course without
C resorting to provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act The submissfons
of the appellants -Union of India and Ors., that they did not want to ·remain
in the unauthorized possession of the properties, is not convincing so as to
justify invoking of urgency clause to acquire the properties. [827-B-C-D)
HD. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., [1984) 2 SCR 693, referred
D to.
1.4. The High Court was not right in holding that without expression of
urgency in the impugned notification itself, it could not be sustained, but then
the High Court did not rest its conclusion only on this. Having examined the
facts and circumstances of the case, it was found that there was no material
E and the circumstances even to have subjective satisfaction by the authorities
to invoke urgency clause. The finding of fact that there was no urgency for
invoking Section 17 of the Act, has become final. This finding holds good
even for thes_e appeals. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances
and the material available on record, the invocation of urgency clause was
without justification and untenable. 'Urgency' for invoking of the Section
F should be one arising naturally out of circumstances, which exist when the
decision to acquire the land is taken and not such, which is the result of
serious lapse or gross delay on the part of Acquiring Authority. However, ~he
position may be different where the delay is caused or occasioned by the
landowner himself. Failure to take timely action for acquisition by the
G authorities of the Union of India, cannot be a ground to invoke the urgency
clause to the serious detriment of the right of the landowners to raise
objections to the acquisition under Section SA of the Act.
(829-C-D-E; 831-F-G-HJ
Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1998) 6 sec 1 and
H Narian Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1977) 1
sec 133, relied on.
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA
805
Union of India and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., (2002) 7 A
SCC 98 and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India and Ors. DRJ
(19911Suppl.317, referred to.
Deepak Pahwa and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., (1984) 4 SCC
308; Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 549 and
Union of India v. Ghanshyam Das Kedia, (1996) 2 SCC 285, distinguished. B
2. In the Objects and Reasons of the amended Act (Act No. 20of1985),
it is stated that all the properties which were requisitioned prior to the
amendment of the Act in 1970, were required to be released from requisition
or acquired by March 10, 1985. Thus, it is clear that the authorities were
aware that the properties were to be released or acquired and the maximum C
period was extended up to two years for the purpose. From the year 1985 to
1987, they had sufficient time to acquire the properties in question in the
usual course. They had enough time to provide opportunity for filing objections
and holding inquiry under Section SA of the Act There was no need to invoke
Section 17 of the Act. [827-F; G-H; 828-A)
D
3. Since ground of delay was not raised by the appellants in the SLP,
the contention of the appellants that the writ petition ought to have been
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, cannot be accepted. (832-C)
4. Since the order appointing arbitrator in the other connected cases of E
Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta was upheld by this Court, there exists
no good reason to take a different view. (833-C)
5. It cannot be said that in no case, the tenant of the land which is sought
to be acquired under the provisions of the Act, could challenge the acquisition
proceedings. It is clear from Section 5A(3) of the Act that a person shall be F
deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in
compensation if the land was acquired. In an appropriate case, a tenant having
sufficient subsisting interest in the land can challenge the acquisition
proceedings. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, single Judge
of the High Court did not dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable on the
ground that the tenant could not maintain the writ petition. The Division Bench G
of the High Court also affirmed the order of the Single Judge. This apart, the
very same notification being common was quashed at the instance of other
writ petitioners. Hence, at this stage the contention that the writ petition filed
by a tenant, was not maintainable, cannot be accepted. [834-B-C-DJ
H
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 501, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2735 of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.2002 of the Delhi High Court
B in LPA No. 36/94.
c
D
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 2736, 2738 and 2739 of2004.
Rajeev Dhawan, G.L. Singhvi, V.R. Reddy, R.F. Nariman and Sudhir
Chandra, Ms. Geeta Luthra, D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Pinky Anand, Sanjev Sahai,
Ms. Jhumjhum Sarkar, Amit Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Janesh Singh, Ms. Eliza
Rumthao, Siddartha Dave, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, C. Mukund, Ashok
Kumar Jain, Panjak Jain, Bijoy Kumar Jai, Neeraj Malhotra, Nikhil Nayyar and
Achintya Dvivedi for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL, J. Leave granted.
In these appeals, common order dated 22.32002 passed in Letters Patent
E Appeals by the Olvision Bench of High Court of Delhi, is under challenge.
The facts leading to the filing of these appeals, in brief, are that:
In all, 14 properties including the properties in question in these appeals,
were notified for acquisition on 6th March, 1987, under the provisions of
Section 4 and Section 17(1) and ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
F short 'the Act'). Earlier these pr:operties were requisitioned by the appellants
under the Defence of India Rules. The provisions of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short '1952 Act') were
going to lapse on 10th March, 1987. These properties were occupied either
for offices or for providing residential quarters to the officers. Out of these
G 14 properties, Banwari Lal and Sons and Shakuntala Gupta had questioned
the. validity of acquisition proceedings pertaining to property no. 6, Ansari
Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi and property no'. 2, Underhill Road, Delhi,
respectively by filing separate writ petitions. The writ petitions were allowed
and acquisition proceedings were quashed including the above-mentioned
notification of 6th March, 1987. These matters attained finality having reached
H this Court. The respondents in these appeals filed writ petitions challenging ·
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.]
807
the acquisition of their properties under the very notification. Learned Single A
Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions. The appellants questioned
the correctness and validity of the orders made by learned Single Judge. in
the Letters Patent Appeals, which were dismissed by the impugned order
mainly following earlier judgments in the cases of Banwari Lal and Sons and
Shakuntala Gupta.
The learned senior counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary
objection as to the very maintainability of these appeals on the ground that
the controversy raised and the contentions sought to be urged in these
appeals are fully covered against the appellants by the judgment of this Court
B
in Union of India and Ors. v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002] 7 SCC C
98. The learned senior counsel for the appellants, however, did not agree and
sought to argue these appeals on merits raising various contentions stating
that the decisions in Shakuntala Gupta (supra) and Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt
Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., DRJ (1991) Suppl 317, are distinguishable on
•
facts and that certain questions of law, which go to the root of the matter,
were neither urged nor decided in the aforementioned two cases. Hence, we D
heard the learned counsel for the parties on either side at length.
The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants were: ( 1) Banwari
La/'s fase was wrongly decided and further it was on its own facts being
property specific; Banwari Lal 's case was not a precedent as no reasoned
order was made by this Court inasmuch as the petition was dismissed at the E
SLP stage itself; (2) Non-mentioning of the nature and existence of urgency
in the notification issued under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act does not vitiate
the notification; subjective satisfaction as regards urgency could not be
determined solely on the basis of the expressions used in the notification and
such urgency could be gathered looking to the surrounding circumstances F
and the records which would show the urgency for the acquisition; (3) pre
and post notification delay would not affect the notification on account of
lethargy of the officers and such delay would not ren4er the exercise of power
to invoke urgency clause invalid where there was a grave urgency on account
of shortage of Government housing; (4) the High Court committed a serious
error in appointing the arbitrator to determine the damages in the absence of G
any arbitration agreement and there being no prayer in that regard in the writ
petition; (5) correctness of the order in Banwari Lal 's case was not considered
in Shakunta/a Gupta's case; paras 11, 12 and 15 in Shakuntala Gupta's case
in review must be read together to understand the correct legal position; and
(6) alternatively, notification as regards Section 17(1), could be quashed H
808
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A sustaining it only to the extent of Section 4(1) of the Act.
The learned senior counsel for the respondents made submissions
supporting the impugned judgment. They contended that Banwari Lal 's case
was correctly decided. The orders of this Court in Shakuntala Gupta affirm
the legal position stated in Banwari Lal. Hence the same result rightly
B followed in the writ petitions filed by the respondents in these appeals. The
High Court was right and justified in passing the impugned common judgment
affirming the order of the learned Single Judge having regard to the decision
already rendered in Banwari Lal's case in regard to the same common
notification; if a different view is taken at this stage, particularly after the
C decision in Shakuntala Gupta's case in the main appeal as well as in review,
it will lead to anomalous result leading to conflict of decisions, i.e., the very
same notification stands quashed in respect of some writ petitioners which
has attained finality by virtue of affirmation of the said order by this court
in Banwa,ri .Lal 's case and Shakuntala Gupta's case and in regard to other
writ petitions filed by the present respondents, it will have to be sustained.
D If that be so, it will result in treating similarly placed persons differently on
same set of facts. The learned senior counsel further urged that non-compliance
of Section l 7(3A) is_ yet another ground for quashing notification; strict
compliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 is mandatory. According to
them, in these cases even on the facts and circumstances found, there was
E neither material nor justification to invoke urgency clause; they f!lade
submissions distinguishing decisions relied on behalf of the appellants having
regard to the facts of those cases and the points that arose for consideration.
It was also their contention that the appellants having been in possession of
the properties, there was no reason to invoke .urgency clause to take immediate
possession; at best, after the expiry of the 1952 Act as amended by Act No.
F 20 of 1985, the appellants continuing in unauthorized possession, could be
made to pay damages or compensation for the period during which they
unauthorisedly continued to be in possession. They also submitted that this
Court sustained the appointment of arbitrator to determine the damages made
in earlier decisions and having taken note of the same, as can be seen from
the impugned common judgment in these appeals; almost after 17 years, it ·
G may not be just and equitable to direct the parties to approach civil court for
claiming damages. The learned counsel submitted that Shakunta,la Gupta's
case is concluded on facts and in law in relation to the very same notification
against the appellants. In SLP No. 9264/2003, the ground of delay in filing writ
petition is' not raised; the learned Single Judge did not find delay as a good
H \round for rejecting the writ petition on the facts and circumstances. The
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.]
809
Division Bench in the LPA agreed with the learned Single Judge.
A
In reply, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that noncompliance of sub-section (3A) of Section 17 may affect the possession and
not the acquisition; on account of such non-compliance, party may be entitled
for interest under Section 23A of the Act; it would also not lead to returning
possession (}f the property.
B
We have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties. The notification issued on 6.3.1987 which was
the subject matter of challenge in the writ petitions, reads :
"NOTIFICATION
Dated 5.3.1987
c
No. F.7(9)/86-L&B: (l) Whereas it appears to the Governor of
Delhi that the lands/properties are likely to be required to be taken by
the government at the public expense for the following public purposes. D
It is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is
likely to be required for the above purpose.
SI.
No.
1.
This notification is made under the provisions of Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, to all whom it may concern.
In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section, the
Lt. Governor is pleased to authorize the officers for the time being
engaged in the undertaking with their servants and workmen to enter
upon and survey any land in the locality and do all other acts required
or permitted by that section.
The Lt. Governor, being of the opinion that the provisions of subsection ( l) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to this land,
is further pleased under sub-section 4 of the said section, to direct
that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply.
SPECWICA TION
Property
Total Area
Field or
Purpose of
boundaries No. acquisition
2
3
4
5
95, Lal Kothi
321 sq. mts.
East Kutab Road, Residential use
E
F
G
IrI
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A
Jatwara Mohalla
West Hosue of
of Govt.
Sh. Tej Ram,
servants
North Gali, South
Shops.
2 8 A. Kamla Nagar 285 sq. mtrs.
East Road, West
Housing the
B
Delhi
G.T. Road, North
govt. offices
Property No. 7A
South Property
No.9-A
3. 30I, OkhlaNew
106 sq. mtrs.
East Gali West
Setting up of
c
Delhi
Hosue No. 76/I,
dispensary
Dispensary, North
Road, South
HouseNo. 30I-A
4.
I5, Alipur Road
Big - Bis
Khasra No. 537
Housing the
D
and Civil Station
7 - I2.
Min. 7 bigha 6 I 0
govt. offices
Min. I2 Biswas
5.
I Rajpur Road
.10-I3·
98 I/500 big-bis
Housing the
Civil Station
0- 05
govt. office &
I0-08
govt. servants
E 6.
I 5 Rajpur road
475
I I - IO
Housing the
Civi Station
govt. offices
7. 2, Under Hill
ll-740 sq. mts. East Kothi No. I6,
Housing the
Road, Delhi
Alipur Road, West
govt. office
K. No. 4 Road,
F
South K. No. 4 & 6
Under Hill Road
8. 6012 I, Ramjas.
475 sq. mts.
East Ramjas Raod
Residential use
Road, Delhi
West 60/2, North
of govt.
Street, South Road
servant.
G 9. 30, Rohtak Road
1087 sq. mts.
East Plot No. 29
Residential use
1087 Delhi
West Plot No. 31
of govt.
North Road South
servants.
Gali
10. I I , Lencer Road
1125 sq. mts.
East K. No. 1
Housing the
H
U.O.l. v. K.L. ARNEJA (PATIL, J.]
&11
Delhi
11. 3, Tilak Marg
12. 6 Ansari Road,
Daryaganj, Delhi
13. 97, Daryaganj
Delhi.
West K. No. IO-A
govt. offices
A
North service
Land South Road
East Old Qila East Old Qila Road
Road, West
West Tilak Marg
Road North Police ,
Station South
Rajdootawas
Kothi No. 1
Housing the
govt. offices
5592 sq. yds.
East Land, West
Residential use
B
Electric Transfonn~rs of govt.
C
Station and Ansari
servants
Road, North Masjid
Ghat Road, South
K.No.5
320 sq. yds.
East Road, West
Sham Lal Road
for residential D
use of govt.
North-Kothi No. 96
servants.
South-Kothi No. 98
14. M.C. No. 500 to
1595 sq. yds
507, Ward No.
East-House, West
Gali, North-Gali
South-Gali
Housing the
govt. offices
E
IX/6062, Gandhi
Nagar (4 set of
Old Police Station,
Gandhi Nagar,
Seelarnpur)
By order F
Sd/-
(Mrs. Neeru Singh)
Joint Secretary (L&B)
Delhi Administration,
Delhi". G
Under this notification, 14 properties were sought to be acquired.
Banwari Lal and Sons filed writ petition No. 2385/88 seeking quashing
of the aforesaid notification in respect of property 6, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
Delhi. The purpose of acquisition of this property was mentioned as for
"residential use of government servants". This property No. 6 Ansari Road, H
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A Darya Ganj, measures 5592 sq. yds., with built up area of about 6,000 sq. ft.
It is situated in the main commercial centre of Delhi and was being used all
along for commercial purpose by Bharat Bank and then by the American
Embassy for running the United States Information Centre. On 27 .9.19.50, four
flats out of the said building were acquisitioned by the Delhi Administration
under the provisions of Requisitioning and Acquisition oflmmovable Property
B Act, 1952. Further on 13.3.1959, remaining building along with the garages,
warehouses and other structures was requisitioned by . the Administration
under the same Act. The building continued under the requisition till the said
Act lapsed on 10.3.1987. It may be recalled that notification under Section 4
read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act was issued on 6.3.1987 for acquiring
C 14 properties including this building, 6 Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi. On
10.3.1987, Delhi Administration issued notification under Section 6 of the Act
and issued a letter to the Collector to take possession of the property within
15 days. Thereafter the Administration proposed to the writ petitioners that
the building be given on lease and the negotiations for lease were continued
for long. The officers of the Administration continued to stay in the building
D for over 20 months. Suddenly, the Administration decided to proceed with
land acquisition after a period of 20 months. At that stage, the abovementioned writ petition was filed. On 25.11.1988, the High Court directed that
the possession of the building was not to be taken by the Administration
under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act but the acquisition proceedings
E could go on. Thereafter, award was passed fixing compensation at Rs.
77, 11,230.60. Petitioners were ready to receive the compensation under protest
but the Administration did not make the payment. It also did not offer the
payment of 80% of the proposed compensation under Section l 7(3A) of the
Act. Mainly three grounds were urged in the writ petition : (l) The notification
issued under Sections 4 and 17 did not indicate the urgency for taking
F possession and, therefor~, the same was vitiated in law; petitioners were
illegally deprived of their right to raise objections and inquiry under Section
5A of the Act; (2) the Administration could not acquire commercial building
for residential purpose; and (3) that the whole exercise of acquisition of the
building was a fraud on the powers under the Act. On behalf of the
G Administration, it was contended that the building was urgently needed for
the residence of the officers, the building was being used for residential
purpose for a long time and for payment of amount under sub-section (3A)
of Section 17, steps had been taken for securing the sanction. The High Court
dealing with the contentions raised in the said writ petition held that there
was no whisper in the notification as to what was the urgency to take
H immediate possession and to deny the right of raising objections under
U.0.I. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.]
813
Section 5A of the Act; the building was already in occupation of the officers A
of the Delhi Administration and the Administration knew that the Requisitioning
and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 was to lapse on I 0.3.1987;
they had sufficient time to make alternate arrangements for the residence of
the officers and that there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act. The court also held that B
Section 17(1) could not beiutilized to cover up the laxity and lethargy of the
Administration in taking appropriate steps for securing alternate accommodation
for its officers. The notification was also held bad in law for non-compliance
of the requirement of Section l 7(3A) of the Act, in that the Collector did not
tender 80% of the compensation of the land as estimated by him before taking
possession of the land and that the Delhi Administration had no explanation C
for the non-compliance of Section l 7(3A) except saying that process of
sanction had been initiated by them. The High court also held that issuing
of notification under Section 17(1) was a fraud on the powers. In that view,
the notification was quashed and direction was given to hand over the
peaceful physical possession of the building to the petitioner. An arbitrator
also was appointed to determine the damages payable by Administration D
having taken note of the facts and to avoid further delay. The Union of India
and Ors., filed SLP No. 4458/91, aggrieved by this order of the High Court
dated 4.2.1991 made in the writ petition. The SLP was dismissed on 21.3.1991
by passing the following order : -
"In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any good
ground to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The
Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
E'
Although we have dismissed the petition but having regard to the
fact that public servants are residing in the premises in dispute and
their immediate dispossession may cause injury to public interest, we F
allow the petitioners to continue in possession till 31.3 .1993 9rovided
the petitioners file an undertaking in this Court within thr~e weeks
with usual conditions to hand over the vacant possession of the
premises including the servant quarters on or before 31.3.1993, we
further make it clear that the Arbitrator appointed by the High G
Court may give award and the same may be filed before the High
Court for appropriate orders. "
(emphasis supplied)
Shakuntala Gupta filed writ petition No. 894 of 1987 inter alia raising H
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A similar contentions as were raised in Banwari Lal case (supra). The High
Court allowed the said writ petition and quashed the notification following the
order made in the case of Banwari Lal and Sons aforementioned. The Union
of India and Ors., filed Civil Appeal No. 518 of 1998 before this Court by
special leave. This Court disposed of the said appeal on 14.11.2000 observing
thus:-
B
c
D
"The High Court quashed the impugned notification by following its
earlier decision in Banwari Lal & Sons v. Union of India decided on
4th February, 1991 in which this very notification was quashed. It is
not in dispute that subject matter including the notification under
Land Acquisition were the same except that in Banwari Lal it was the
government housing for the officers while in the present case it is
housing for the offices. The said deeision of the High Court stood
confirmed when this Court dismissed the SLP filed by the Union of
India. We do not find any sustainable ground raised in the present
appeal to make any distinct or difference from the one in the case of
Banwari Lal and Sons. Accordingly, there is no error committed by
the High Court in making the decision and dismissing the same.
Accordingly the present appeal has no merits and it is dismissed."
Further Union of India and Ors., fil~d a review petition (c) No. 74 of2001 in
aforementioned appeal No. 518/98. The review petition was disposed of on
E 27.8.2002 by a considered order in the light of contentions urged and arguments
advanced extensively. The said order is reported as Union of India and Ors.
v. Shakuntala Gupta (Dead) by Lrs., [2002] 7 SCC 98.
The learned counsel for the respondents heavily relied on this decision
and contended that it fully covers the case against the appellants; in view
F of the same, it is not open to the appellants particularly being the partfos to
the said decision, to re-agitate on the same issue again when the notification
being composite one in respect of all 14 properties sought to be acquired
under it and when the ground of urgency was also common in respect of all
the 14 properties. But according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the
G correctness of decision in Banwari Lal is not decided in this case and it is
clearly distinguishable in applying to the facts of the cases in these appeals.
In other words, the decision in Shakunta/a Gupta is confined to its own
facts. In the light of these submissions and that this decision will have great
bearing on the question in deciding these appeals whether urgency clause
could be invoked under Section 17( l) and ( 4) of the Act, the notification being
H
l
1
U.0.1. v. K.L. ARNEJA [PATIL, J.]
815
composite one in respect of all 14 properties including the properties which A
are the subject matter of these appeals, we will refer to the decision in greater
details. In the case of Shakuntala Gupta, part of the premises known as
Grand Hotel situated at No. 2, Underhill Road, Delhi, had been requisitioned
on 3.4.1980 under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, which lapsed on 10.3.1987. On 6.3.1987, the very same notification, B
which is also the subject matter of these appeals, was issued under Section
4 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act. In this notification, 14 properties
were specified to which it applied. This notification also indicated purpose for
which each property was sought to be acquired, the purpose being either
"housing the Govt. office" or "for residential use of Govt. servants".
Shakuntala Gupta challenged the notification issued under Section. 4
read with Section 17(1) and (4) as well as the declaration made under Section
6 of the Act under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High
Court. As already stated above, Banwari Lal and Sons Pvt. Ltd., the owner
c
of one of the 14 properties specified in the notification, also filed writ petition D
in the High Court impugning the same notification inter alia urging that there
was no urgency to dispense with the right of the owner to file objections and
inquiry under Section SA of the Act. Banwari Lal's writ application was
allowed on 4.2.1991 quashing the impugned notification upholding the
contentions urged on behalf of Banwari Lal including the issue of urgency.
The SLP filed against the decision of the High Court in Banwari Lal case was E
dismissed by this Court on 21.3 .1991. The appellants vacated the Banwari
Lal's premises pursuant to the order of this Court made on 21.3.1991. The
Division Bench of the High Court disposed of Shakuntala Gupta's writ petition
following Banwari Lal's case quashing the impugned notification. In the SLP
filed against the said order by the appellants, leave was granted on 19.l.1998 F
and hearing of the appeal was expedited. The appeal was duly listed for
hearing from time to time and ultimately on 14.11.2000, the appeal was disposed
of by a reasoned order, relevant portion of which is already extracted in the
earlier paragraph. Later the appellants made an application for recalling the
order dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was disposed of without
hearing them. On 10.1.2001, accepting the request of the appellants, the G
application made for recalling the order dated 14.11.2000 was treated as a
review petition and the review petition was accordingly heard. In support of
the review petition, relying on the decisions of this Court in Ajlatoon and Ors.
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi a'ld Ors., [l 975] 4 SCC 285, Deepak Pahwa and Ors.
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., [1984] 4 sec 308, Satendra Prasad Jain H
816
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1993] 4 SCC 369 and Chame/i Singh and
Ors. v. State ofU.P. andAnr., [1996] 2 SCC 549, it was urged thatthe principles
of Jaw enunciated in Banwari Lat's case no longer held the field. On that
basis, it was contended that the decision of the High Court quashing the
impugned notification by following Banwari Lal's decision was erronecus.
B Opposing the review petition, it was urged that the review petition itself was
not maintainable as there was no error apparent on the face of the record; the
same notification stood quashed in Banwari Lal 's casej since the impugned
notification had been quashed on a general ground which did not specifically
relate to a particular petitioner, the quashing of the notification must enure
to the benefit of all persons affected by ~hat notification. In support of this,
C reliance was placed on Abhey Ram (Dead) by LR. and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors., [1997] 5 SCC 421 and Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uhan
and Ors., [2000] 7 SCC 296. The review petition was disposed of on 27.8.2002
since reported in [2002] 7 SCC 98. To appreciate the rival submissions as to
the implication and understanding of this judgment, it is necessary to reproduce
D paras 12, 13 and 15 of the judgment which read:-
"12. The matter has been argued extensively. We therefore do not
propose to reject the application on the ground that the review
application should not at all be, entertained. It is also not necessary
to consider whether the decision in Banwari Lal (Banwari Lal &
E
Sons (P) Ltd v. Union of India, DLJ 1991 Supp 317) correctly
enunciates the principles of law as to acquisitions under Section 17
of the Act as we are of the view that the order of this Court dated
14-11-2000 was, ir. the circumstances of the case, correct.
F
G
H
13. It appears that the petitioners have proceeded on the~ basis that
the acquisition s~ught to be effected by the impugned notification
under Section 4 had been invalidated in respect of other specified
properties by the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal case. The
statement in the respondent's affidavit that several of the properties
covered by (he same notification have since been returned by the
petitioners to the original owners, has not. been disputed by the
petitioners. Furthermore, the High Court in the decision impugned
before us has also noted:
"It is also not disputed that under the impugned notifications
neither an award has been made nor any compensation is
determined and paid. The reason being that the impugned
notifications were quashed and set aside in Banwari Lal case.
U.OJ .. v. K.L: ARNEJA [PATIL, J.]
817
14 .................................................................... .
A
15. In any event the order dated 14-11-2000 was not legally erroneous.
The notification under Section 4 was a composite one. The "opinion"
of the Lt. Governor that the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act
were applicable, as expressed in the last paragraph of the impugned
notification, was relatable in general to the 14 properties specified B ·
in the notification. The impugned notification was quashed in Banwari
Lal case (Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, DLJ (1991)
Supp 317) inter alia on the ground that the "opinion" of the Lt.
Governor as expressed in the notification was insufficient for the
purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act.