# UNION OF INDIA & ORS v. K. RAJAPPA MENON

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 343
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-10-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1064 of 1966
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-ors-v-k-rajappa-menon-4501
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

•
B
.. .._
c
-
D
E
F
•
G
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
v.
K. RAJAPPA MENON
October 7, 1968
(J. C. SHAH, G. K. MITTER, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, //.]
Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, r.
1713-Disciplinary
authority
whether required to give detailed reasons for confirming finding established
at departmental enquiry.
Constitution of India, Art. 3Il(2)-Second show cause
notice-If
authority can make up mind tentatively before receipt of explanation.
After the reply of the respondent-a railway employee-in respect of
certain charges preferred against him was received, a departmental enquiry
was held. The Enquiring Officer found all the charges proved. A show
cause notice. was then served stating that it had been tentatively decided
by the Chief Commercial Superintendent that the respondent should be
dismissed from service. This notice was served after the Chief Commercial Superintendent had recorded an order stating that he had seen the
enquiry proceedings, that the procedure had been correctly followed, and
that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer. The respondent
submitted his explanation; thereafter his dismissal was ordered. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court. The single Judge allowed
the petition holding that the Chief Commercial Superintendent was bound
to pass a detailed order expressing his views about each of th~ charges
and that a general agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer did
not satisfy the requirements of r. 1713 of the Conduct and Disciplinary
Rules. This decision was affirmed by the Division Bench. In appeal,
this Court.
HELD : The appeal must be allowed.
(i) Rule 1713 does not lay down any particular form or manner in
which the disciplinary authority should record its findings on each charge.
All that the Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on
each charges.
This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on
the disciiplinary authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in detail and write as if
it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal. The rule certainly
requires the disciplinary authority to give consideration to the record of
the proceedings which was done by the Chief Commercial Superintendent.
When he agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer that all
the
charges mentioned in the charge sheet had been established it meant that
he was affirming the findings on each charge and that would
certainly
fulfil the requirement of the Rule. [345 H-346 DJ
(ii) There was no force in the respondent's contention that the disciplinary authority was not entitled to have finally made up its
mind
before the explanation to the second show cause notice had been received
by it and at a stage prior to the issuance of the notice. The procedure
which is to be followed under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of affording
a reasonable opportunity includes the giving of two notices, one at the
enquiry stage and the other when the competent authority as a result
of the enquiry tentatively determines to inflict a particular punishment.
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
It is quite obvious that unless the disciplinary or the competent authority
A
arrives at some tentative decision it will not be in a position to determine
•
what particular punishment to inflict and a second show cause notice cannot be issued without such a tentative determination. [346 El
Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors,, [1958] S.C.R. 1080, followed.

## Text

•
B
.. .._
c
-
D
E
F
•
G
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
v.
K. RAJAPPA MENON
October 7, 1968
(J. C. SHAH, G. K. MITTER, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, //.]
Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, r.
1713-Disciplinary
authority
whether required to give detailed reasons for confirming finding established
at departmental enquiry.
Constitution of India, Art. 3Il(2)-Second show cause
notice-If
authority can make up mind tentatively before receipt of explanation.
After the reply of the respondent-a railway employee-in respect of
certain charges preferred against him was received, a departmental enquiry
was held. The Enquiring Officer found all the charges proved. A show
cause notice. was then served stating that it had been tentatively decided
by the Chief Commercial Superintendent that the respondent should be
dismissed from service. This notice was served after the Chief Commercial Superintendent had recorded an order stating that he had seen the
enquiry proceedings, that the procedure had been correctly followed, and
that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer. The respondent
submitted his explanation; thereafter his dismissal was ordered. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court. The single Judge allowed
the petition holding that the Chief Commercial Superintendent was bound
to pass a detailed order expressing his views about each of th~ charges
and that a general agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer did
not satisfy the requirements of r. 1713 of the Conduct and Disciplinary
Rules. This decision was affirmed by the Division Bench. In appeal,
this Court.
HELD : The appeal must be allowed.
(i) Rule 1713 does not lay down any particular form or manner in
which the disciplinary authority should record its findings on each charge.
All that the Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on
each charges.
This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on
the disciiplinary authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in detail and write as if
it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal. The rule certainly
requires the disciplinary authority to give consideration to the record of
the proceedings which was done by the Chief Commercial Superintendent.
When he agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer that all
the
charges mentioned in the charge sheet had been established it meant that
he was affirming the findings on each charge and that would
certainly
fulfil the requirement of the Rule. [345 H-346 DJ
(ii) There was no force in the respondent's contention that the disciplinary authority was not entitled to have finally made up its
mind
before the explanation to the second show cause notice had been received
by it and at a stage prior to the issuance of the notice. The procedure
which is to be followed under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of affording
a reasonable opportunity includes the giving of two notices, one at the
enquiry stage and the other when the competent authority as a result
of the enquiry tentatively determines to inflict a particular punishment.
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
It is quite obvious that unless the disciplinary or the competent authority
A
arrives at some tentative decision it will not be in a position to determine
•
what particular punishment to inflict and a second show cause notice cannot be issued without such a tentative determination. [346 El
Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors,, [1958] S.C.R. 1080, followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1064 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated
August 4, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 205
of 1964.
B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for appellant No. 1.
A. S. Nambiar and Lily Thomas, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the
judgment of the Kerala High Court in which the only point which
arises for decision is whether Rule 1713 of the Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, hereinafter called the Rules, for railway servants
was correctly applied and the dismissal of the respondent, who at
the material time, was an Assistant Station Master was rightly set
aside for non-compliance with that Rule.
B
c
D
The facts lie within a narrow compass. In July 1963 the respondent, who was working as an Assistant Station Master at
Chalakudy railway station was served with a statement containE
ing charges relating to certain matters after an inspection report
had been submitted to the authorities concerned. After the reply
of the respondent had been received a departmental enquiry was
held and the Enquiring Officer submitted a report finding all the
four charges which had been preferred against the respondent
·proved. A show cause notice was then served in September 1963
giving the findings of the Enquiring Officer (Assistant Co=ercial Superiintendent) and it was stated that it had been tentatively
decided by the Chief Commercial Superintendent that the respondent should be dismissed from service. This notice was served
after the Chief Commercial Superintendent had . recorded the
following order (Exh. R. 8) :
"The employee, in his reply dated 3-8-1963 to this
charge sheet, has not accepted the charges contained
in the same. An enquiry, therefore was arranged. It
was held by the Assistant Commercial Superintendent/
Olavakkot from 22-8-63 to 29-8-1963.
I have seen
the enquiry proceedings.
I find that the procedure
has been followed correctly; that the accused has been
. given every reasonable opportunity for his defence
and I agree with the findings of the Enquiry Oificer
F
G
H
•
.-
,
.; .,
" '
. ~
•
•
' .
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
UNION v. K. R. MENON .(Grover, I.)
that all the charges mentioned in the charge-sheet have
been established.
Since these are serious charges, it
is tentatively decided to impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on Shri K.
Rajappa Menon,
Assi>tant
Station Master/Chalakudi.
He should, therefore, be
asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed
from service accordingly."
345
He was given a week for showing cause why the proposed penalty
should not be inflicted on him. After the explanation of the respondent had been received his dismissal was ordered by the
Chief Commercial Superintendent.
The respondent filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Consti·
tution in the High Court and a number of points were raised before the learned Siingle Judge.
The only point which prevailed
with him was that the Chief Commercial Superintendent had not
recorded an order as required by Rule 1713.
He examined the
other contention raised on behalf of the respondent before him
that at the stage of the second show cause notice the Chief Commercial Superintendept had finally made up his mind which he
could not or ought not to have done unlil the reply or the explanation of the respondent had been received and considered by
him.
In view of a bench decision of the Kerala High Court he
did not rest his decisiqn on the second point but decided
in
favour of the respondent on the first point holding that the Chief
Commrcial Superintendent had not given findings
on each of
the charges. In his opiniqn the rule contemplated that the evidence which had been adduced at the enquiry in relation to each
charges should be examined and considered by the punishing
authority and
he should give his own assessment and finciltig
relating to each individual charge which was not done in the
present case.
The division Bench on appeal by the present appellant affirmed the judgment of the lea111lecl Single Judge.
H
Now Rule 1713 provides that if the disciplinary authority is
not the Enquiring Authority it shall consider the record of the
enquiry and record its findings on each charge.
The argument
which prevailed with the High Court was that the order embodied
in Exh. 8 did not comply with the aforesaid rule because findings relating to each charge were not given after a proper discussion and analysis of the evidence produced at the departmental enquiry. In other words, the Chief Commercial Superintendent was bound to pass a detailed order expressing his views
about each charge and that a general agreement with the findings
of the Enquiry Officer did not satisfy the requirements of Rule:
1713 .
We are altogether unable to agree with the view expressed by·
the High Court.
Rule 1713 does not lay down any particular·
L3 Sup. CI/69-5
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS '!\
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
form or manner in which the disciplinary authority should record
its findings on each charge.
All that the Rule requires is that
the record of the enquiry should be considered and the disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on each charge.
This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on the disciplinary authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry ih detail and
write as if it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal.
The rule certainly requires the disciplinary authority to give con-
:sideratiOill to the record of the proceedings which, as expressly
. stated in Exh. R. 8, was done by the Chief Commercial Superintendent.
When he agreed with the findings
of the
Enquiry
Officer that all the charges mentioned in the charge sheet had
been established it meant that he was affirming the findings on
· each charge and that would certainly fulfil the requirement of the
Rule. The Rule after all has to be read not in a pedantic manner
but in a practical and reasonable way and so read it is difficult
to escape from the cqnclusion that the Chief Commercial Superintendent had substantially complied with the
requirements of
·the Rule.
The interference by the High Court, therefore, on the
:ground that there had been non-compliance with Rule 1713 was
not justified.
Learned counsel for the respondent has sought to raise the
second point which the High Court had declined to decide, namely,
that the disciplinary authority was not entitled to have finally
made up its mind before the explanation to the secOl!ld show cause
notice had been received by it and at a stage prior to the issuance
·Of the notice.
Such a contention is wholly untenable in view of
the decisions of this Court. It has been made quite clear in
Khem Chand v. The Union of India & Ors. (1 )•that the procedure
which is to be followed under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution
of affording a reasonable opportunity includes the giving of two
notices, one at tlie enquiry stage and the other when the competent authority as a result of the enquiry tentatively determines to
inflict a particular punishment. It is quite obvious that unless the
disciplinary or the competent authority arrives at some tentative
decision it will not be in a position to determine what particular
punishment to inflict and a second show cause notice cannot be
issued without such a te.ntative determination.
The appeal is consequently allowed and the judgment. of the
High Court is hereby set aside. The petition filed by the respondent under Art. 226 shall stand dismissed. No order as. fo costs.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.
(!) [1958] S.C.R. 1080.
A
\' .
'
B
c
D
E
F
G
H