# Union of India v. Abdul la/ii Ayyangar 1

- **Citation:** [1964] 8 S.C.R. 178
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-05-05
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta, J. C. Shah, Raghuhar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-abdul-la-ii-ayyangar-1-3245
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Octroi-Tax on refund-/lnposition if valid-Tax, if becon1es fee-Who
can clain1 refund-Suit for recovery-Limitation-Avaflability of
8 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
benefit-Bo1nbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Bom.
59 of 1949), SS. 127, 487.
The respondent. who had been carrying on the business of securing
refund of octroi duty on behalf of persons who had paid duty and \'1ere
entitled to refund, claime'd the refund of money paid as octroi duty by
his principals in respect of the period commencing from February 15,
1950, the date from which the appellant became a Municipal Corporation
under the Provincial hfunicipal Corporation, Act, 1949. i\fter deducting
ten percient of the amount in accordance with r.
18(3) of the
Octroi
Rule~. framed
by
the
Municipal
Authorities,
the
ap·
pellailt-Corporation paid
the balance to
the
respondent.
The
representation of the respondent that from the date from
which
the
Corporation had come into existence, the deduction had become invalid
in law. was turneO down by the appellant. , Thereupon the respondent
filed a suit for retovery of the balance with interest. The defence was
that the deduction was valid; that· in any case, the respondent who was
not the person ·who paid the amount, was not entitled to bring the suit,
and that the su;t was bc.rred by limitation. The trial court held the resM
pendent was entitled to bring the suit and also that it was not barred by
limitation but the deduction was valid and it dismissed the suit. On
appeal, the District Court disagreeing with the trial court, held that the
deduction \\'as not valid in law, but the plaintiff was not entitled to bring
such a suit and that the suit was barred by limitation and it dismissed
the appeal.
On a further appeal the High Court found in favour of the
resPondent on all the three points and allowed the appeal.
HELD:-(i) A tax
on
octroi refund is not
one of
the
taxes
which the Bo1nbay Municipal Corporation could impose. Apart from the
absence of power to impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier
parts of s. 127 of the Bombay Act of 1949 there is the categorical prohibition in sub-s. ( 4) against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation.
(ii) Assuming, without deciding, that such a levy can be validly made
hy way of fees under s. 466, since no standing order was made under
s. 466 prescribing any fee, it is not passible to justify the deductions as
a levy of fee.
(iii) The tax did not become a fee merely because the new Act (Born.
Act 59 of 1949), prohibited the imposition of such a tax.
(iv) Cl. 5(a) of Appendix IV furnishes no
justification
for
the
levy of te,n percent Ueduction after Feb1uary 15, 1950 when the Act S9
of 1949 with its categorical prohibition in s. 127(4) against the imposition by the Corporation of a tax which the State Legislature had no
power to impose under the Constitution became applicable.
(v) The respondent having made the claim in accordance with the
rules was the person entitled to receive what amount was legally refundable, and so he was also entitled to bring the suit.
1964
Poona
M~nicipal
Corporation
v.
D. N. Deodher
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
(vi) The suit was not barred by !imitation. The benefit of s. 487
-
. .
of Act 59 of 1949 would be available to the Corporation only if it was
Poot/' M';'!u:ipal held that this deduction was "an act done or purported to be done in
orpo;_a .wn
pursuance or execution or inten'ded execution of the Act."
D. N. Deodh.r
Das •1~/110 J.

## Text

1964
Union of India
v.
Abdul la/ii
Ayyangar 1.
1964
May 5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
such right was vested when
the
notification
was issued; and no fresh clearings
for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made
in such land except in accordance with such
rules as ma;: be made by the State
Government in this behalf."
in the absen~e, therefore, of such a notification the accused
could not have been held guilty of a contravention of s.
26(1)(a). Coming next to els. (d) and (h), the question
for consideration would be whether if these were not offences under the Tripura law, the accused could be prosecuted by reason of (a) the extension of the Forest Act to the
Tripura State and (b) the notification. under th_e Tripura
law being "deemed to be a notification" under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act. We consider it unnecessary to examine this problem or to express any opiniOll on this matter in view of the conclusion that we have
reached that the notification under s. 5 of the Tripura Act
would constitute the area in question only as a protected
forest under Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act and not as a
"reserved" forest under s. 20 contained in Ch.
II of that
Act.
The appeals fail and are dismissed.
The appellant had
undertaken to pay the cgsts of the respondents at the time
of the admission of the appeals. In accordance with that
undertaking the appellant will pay the costs to the respondents. One hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
v.
DATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,
K. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Octroi-Tax on refund-/lnposition if valid-Tax, if becon1es fee-Who
can clain1 refund-Suit for recovery-Limitation-Avaflability of
8 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
benefit-Bo1nbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Bom.
59 of 1949), SS. 127, 487.
The respondent. who had been carrying on the business of securing
refund of octroi duty on behalf of persons who had paid duty and \'1ere
entitled to refund, claime'd the refund of money paid as octroi duty by
his principals in respect of the period commencing from February 15,
1950, the date from which the appellant became a Municipal Corporation
under the Provincial hfunicipal Corporation, Act, 1949. i\fter deducting
ten percient of the amount in accordance with r.
18(3) of the
Octroi
Rule~. framed
by
the
Municipal
Authorities,
the
ap·
pellailt-Corporation paid
the balance to
the
respondent.
The
representation of the respondent that from the date from
which
the
Corporation had come into existence, the deduction had become invalid
in law. was turneO down by the appellant. , Thereupon the respondent
filed a suit for retovery of the balance with interest. The defence was
that the deduction was valid; that· in any case, the respondent who was
not the person ·who paid the amount, was not entitled to bring the suit,
and that the su;t was bc.rred by limitation. The trial court held the resM
pendent was entitled to bring the suit and also that it was not barred by
limitation but the deduction was valid and it dismissed the suit. On
appeal, the District Court disagreeing with the trial court, held that the
deduction \\'as not valid in law, but the plaintiff was not entitled to bring
such a suit and that the suit was barred by limitation and it dismissed
the appeal.
On a further appeal the High Court found in favour of the
resPondent on all the three points and allowed the appeal.
HELD:-(i) A tax
on
octroi refund is not
one of
the
taxes
which the Bo1nbay Municipal Corporation could impose. Apart from the
absence of power to impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier
parts of s. 127 of the Bombay Act of 1949 there is the categorical prohibition in sub-s. ( 4) against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation.
(ii) Assuming, without deciding, that such a levy can be validly made
hy way of fees under s. 466, since no standing order was made under
s. 466 prescribing any fee, it is not passible to justify the deductions as
a levy of fee.
(iii) The tax did not become a fee merely because the new Act (Born.
Act 59 of 1949), prohibited the imposition of such a tax.
(iv) Cl. 5(a) of Appendix IV furnishes no
justification
for
the
levy of te,n percent Ueduction after Feb1uary 15, 1950 when the Act S9
of 1949 with its categorical prohibition in s. 127(4) against the imposition by the Corporation of a tax which the State Legislature had no
power to impose under the Constitution became applicable.
(v) The respondent having made the claim in accordance with the
rules was the person entitled to receive what amount was legally refundable, and so he was also entitled to bring the suit.
1964
Poona
M~nicipal
Corporation
v.
D. N. Deodher
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
(vi) The suit was not barred by !imitation. The benefit of s. 487
-
. .
of Act 59 of 1949 would be available to the Corporation only if it was
Poot/' M';'!u:ipal held that this deduction was "an act done or purported to be done in
orpo;_a .wn
pursuance or execution or inten'ded execution of the Act."
D. N. Deodh.r
Das •1~/110 J.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 582
Qf 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August
:!5, 1959 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 774
of 1956.
S. G. Patwardhan, S. B. Tarkunde, J. B. Dadachanji,
0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, M. R. Kotwal and Naunit
J~al, for the intervener.
May 5, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
DAS GUPTA J.-This appeal is by t~e defendant, the
Municipal Corporation for the City of Poona, in a suit for
recovery of money. The Poona Municipality was formerly
a Municipality under the Bombay District Municipal Act of
l901 (Act 3 of 1901). In 1925 it became a Municipal
:Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act of
1925
(Act XVIII of 1925). Later, under the Bombay
P.rovincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Municipal
Authority for the City of Poona became a Corporation
known by the name of Municipal Corporation for the City
•>f Poona.
It appears that from the time when the City was
a
Municipality under Act 3 of 1901, an octroi duty was being
levied on goods imported within the Municipal limits of
the City. When such goods were exported out of the city
municipal limits within specified periods, refund used to be
given in respect of the duty so recovered.
The respondent has for many years been carrying on
business of securing refund of octroi duty on behalf of
persons who had paid the duty and were entitled to refund.
Tn respect of the period from the 15th February, 1950 to
the 14th September, 1950, the respondent made a claim on
behalf of his principals, for the refund of Rs. 73,650/-
to
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RERORTS
181
which, according to him, they were entitled.
The Munici1964
pality however paid to him only 90 per cent of this amount. Poona Municipal
The remaining 10 n~r c·ent was
deducted in- accordance
Corporation
~
-
~
with Rule 18C'1 . '.
.~e :__.ctroi Rules
which had been D. N. Deodher
framed by the .¥-u,ii~;p,,; Authorities.
The respondent then represented to tlie Corporation
that with effect from the 15th February, 1950, the date
from which the Corporation came into existence under the
Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, this deduction
of 10 per cent had become invalid in law and claimed that
this amount should be paid to him.
The Corporation
however refused to concede this
claim.
The respondent
then brought this suit for recovery of Rs. 7,364\15\- (being
10 per cent of Rs. 73,650/- the amount ·alleged to have
been illegally withheld) with interest.
The main defence raised by the Corporation to the
plaintiff's claim was that the deduction of 10 per cent was
legally valid.
It was further urged that, in any case, the
plaintiff who was not the person who paid the amount. was
not entitled to bring the 5uli. Lastly, it was contended that
the suit was barred by limitation.
The trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
bring the suit and also that it was not barred by }imitation.
lt held however that the deduction of 10 per cent from
what was paid as tax was valid. Accordingly, it dismissed
the suit.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the District Court, Poona,
held, disagreeing with the trial Court, that the deduction
of 10 per cent of what had been realised was not valid in
law.
It was however of opinion that the plaintiff was not
1intitled to bring such a suit. It was also of opinion that
the suit was ba~red by limitation. In this view, it dismissed
the appeal.
The plaintiff then appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court has found in favour of
the plaintiff on all the three points raised. It held that the
deduction of 10 per cent was invalid in law, that the
plaintiff was entitled to sue, and that the suit was not barred
Das ·.Jupta J.
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
by limitation. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the
Poona
Municipal appeal, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for
Corporation
Rs. 7,364/ 15/- with interest thereon at 4 per cent from
D. N. ~eodher the date of the suit and interest at the same rate from the
date of the judgment, with costs throughout.
Das Gupta J.
The appellant Corporation challenges
the correctness
of the High Court's decision on all the three points.
The principal question for decision in this appeal is
whether the deduction or" 10 per cent as provided for in
Rule 18(3) is invalid at least from the 15th February, 1950.
The Rule runs thus:-
"A deduction of ten per cent shall in all cases be
made before refunding the
amount of octroi
duty on exportation of goods either in transit
as per rule 13 or otherwise under rule
11(2)."
It is necessary to mention here that the legality of such
a deduction prior to February 15, 1950 is not in controversy before us.
We shall proceed on the basis tliat this
provision in Rule 18 (3) was valid in law prior to the 15th
February, 1950.
The question is whether even
though
valid then, it has ceased to be valid in law. To find the
correct answer to this question it is necessary to be clear
first as to the legal basis on which this levy by way of
deduction was being made prior to 15th February, 1950.
It appears from Ex. D 72, the copy of the Government
resolution dated the 6th March,
1922, that the Poona
Municipality started this practice of levying this 10 per cent
deduction from February
1921.
The question
of its
legality appears to have been raised quite early. The Legal
Remembrancer to the Government
of Bombay expressed
his view on this question in these words:-
"The special powers conferred in the last sentence
of clause (f) of section 48 ( 1) of the Bombay
District Municipal Act see111s to negative the
power of the Municipality
(of Shirpur)
to
make any deduction from the refunds by means
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of rules regulating the system, for
making
1964
refunds referred to in the earlier part of the Poona -;;;micipal
clause.
The charge on refunds appears, howCorporation
ever, to be a kind of tax which may be imposed D. N. vDeodher
under s. 59(b) (xi) of the Act."
On this, the Councillors of the Municipality passed a
resolution that a 10 per ~ent tax shouJd be levied on all
octroi refund, under
section 59 (b) (xi). This proposal
was submitted to the Government of Bombay for sanction
and was duly approved. It may be mentioned here that
s. 59 (b )(xi) of Act 3 of 1901 which deals with the question of a Municipality's powers to impose taxes s.ets out in
the els. ( i) to ( x) various taxes which the Municipalities
can impose and then mentions in cl. (xi) the words "any
other tax". The Government appears to have accepted the
view of the Legal Remembrancer that the levy by way of
deduction of 10 per cent from the amount to be refunded
should be authorised as a tax on octroi refund, this being
"any other tax" within the meaning of s. 59(b)(xi). It is
no longer open to dispute that after Government's sanction
was received, the Municipality could under the old Act
legally levy such tax. It is also not disputed that the
deductions that continued to be made under Rule 18 ( 3)
were all along made under $is authority, as a tax levied
under s. 59(b )(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act,
1901. The levy of the tax continued even after Act 3 of
1901 ceased to be applicable to Poona and it became a
Municipal Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs
Act, 1925. The validity of such continuation does not also
appear to have been challengeg:
The Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act 1949 was applied to Poona on
the 15th February, 1950. From that date therefore
the
powers of taxation of the municipality became governed by
s. 127 of the Act.
This section first authorises a Corporation under the Act to impose, (a) property taxes; (b) a tax
on vehicles, boats and animals. It then mentions in the
second sub-section certain other taxes which the Corporation may impose. Jn els. (a) to (f)-(a) is octroi, (b) a
profession tax, ( c) a tax on dogs, ( d) a theatre tax, ( e) a
toll on animals and vehicles and ( f) mentions "any other
Das Gupta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
tax which the State Legislature
Poona M:.nicipal Constitution to impose in the
Corporation
provides:-
has power under the
State". Sub-section ( 4)
v.
D. N. Deodher
Das Gupta I.
"Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has
no power to impose in the State under the
Constitution."
A tax on octroi refund is not thus one of the taxes
which the Bombay Municipal Corporation could impose.
It is not one of the specified taxes. Nor is it a tax which
the State Legislature has power under the Constitution to
impose in the State. Apart from this absence of power to
impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier parts of
s. 127, we have the categorical prohibition in sub-section 4
against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation.
Mr. Patwardhan next tried to persuade us that even if
this levy could not be made under the new Act as a tax, it
could be made as a fee.
In support of his argument he.
drew our attention to s. 14 7 and s. 466 of the new Act.
The first sub-section of section 466 provides that the Commissioner of the Corporation may make standing orders
consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules and
bye-laws in respect of the matters specified.
One of the
matters specified is "determining the supervision
under
which, the routes by which and the time within which the
goods intended for immediate exportation shall be conveyed
out of the City and the fees payable by persons so conveying the goods." [s. 466(1)A(f)]. Section 147 dealing with
a controversy, that may arise, whether the importation of
some goods into the City has been for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, says: "Until the contrary is
proved any goods imported into the City shall be presumed
to have been imported for the purpose of consumption,
use or sale therein, unless such goods are conveyed from the
place of import to the place of export by such routes. within
such time, under such supervision and on payment of such
fees therefor as shall be determined by .the standing orders."
It is obvious that reference to fees in this section is to
such fees as may be prescribed by standing orders
under
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
the provisions of s. 466(1 )A(f). It is unnecessary for us
1964
to decide for the purpose of the present appeal, whether the Poona Municipal
provision of s. 466 for determination of fess payable by
Corporntion
persons conveying goods imported into the City is valid D. N. vDeodher
in law or not. Assuming, without deciding, that such
a
Das Gupta 1.
levy can be validly made by way of fees under s. 466, what
we find is that in fact there has been no standing order
prescribing any fees.
It may be mentioned in this connection that sub-section 2 of s. 466 lays down that no order
made by the Commissioner under cl. A of sub-section ( 1 )
shall be valid unless it is approved by the Standing Committee ·and confirmed by the State Government. It is not
the case of the appellant Corporatfon
that any Standing
Order was made at all under s. 466 prescribing any fees. It
is not possible therefore to justify the deductions that were
made in the present case as a levy of fee.
The appellant relied next on cl. 5 (a) of Appendix IV
to the Act read with s. 493.
Section 493 provides that
provisions of Appendix IV shall apply to constitution of the
Corporation and other matters specified therein. Appendix
IV is headed "Transitory Provisions" and is plainly intended to deal with the position that arose as
a result of the
repeal of the old Act.
(s. 490). The relevant portion of
cl. S(a) is in these words:-
"Save as expressly provided by the provisions of
this Appendix or by a notification issued under
paragraph 22 or order made under paragraph
23,
(a) any appointment,
notification,
notice,
tax,
order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted
under the Bombay
District
Municipal Act,
1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,
1925 or any other law in force in any local
area constituted to be a City immediately
befor~ the appointed day shall, in so far as it
is not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, continue in force until it is superseded by
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
Poo~ .Municipal
Corporation
any appointment,
notification,
notice,
tax,
order, scheme, licence,
permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted
v.
D. N. Deodher
under this Act or any other law as aforesaid as
the case may be;"
Das Gupta J.
Mr. Patwardhan readily conceded that the 10 per cent
deduction, as a tax on octroi refund could not get the protection of cl. 5 (a) for the simple reason that such taxation
is on the face of it inconsistent with s. 127 ( 4) of the Act.
He asked us, however, t£> regard this levy as a fee, and on
that basis, argued that this should continue in force under
cl. (a) of s. 5 of Appendix IV since the levy of such
a fee is consistent with
the provisions of s. 466 of
the. Act. If in fact a fee was being realised under the old
Act, it may be that levy of such fees could continue in
force until superseded by any order under the new Act as
coming under an order issued "under the District Municipal Act, 1901, or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,
1925". In fact, however, this was not levied as a fee, but
was levied as a tax.
Tqe_ tax did not become a fee merely
because the new Act (Act LIX of 1949) prohibited the
imposition of such a tax. We are clearly of opinion therefor that cl. 5 (a) of Appendix IV furnishes no justification
for the levy of the ten per cent deduction, after the 15th
February, 1950 when the Act LIX of 1949 with
its
categorical prohibition in s. 127 ( 4) against the imposition
by the Corporation of a ta£ which the State legislature had
no power to impose under the Constitution became applicable. The defence that the deduction of 10 per cent of
the amount collected as octroi was legally valid has thus
been rightly rejected by the High Court.
We also agree with the High Court's conclusion that
the plaintiff was entitled to bring the present suit.
The
Poona City Municipality's · octroi Rules
and Bye-laws
under which the claim for refund can be made define "a
claimant" as a person "who produces· the duly receipted
import bill and
the corresponding
export
certificates."
[Rule 2, cl. (g)]. It is not disputed tkat for the several
cases in respect of which this deduction of ten per cent had
been made by the Corporation the plaintiff was the person
s s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
who produced "the duly receipt~d import
bill
and the
1964
corresponding export certificate."
Indeed,
it is
on that Poona Municipal
basis that 90 per cent of the amount paid by different
Corporation
exporters was refunded by the Corporation to the claimant. D. N. "neodher
It is .difficult to understand how if the plaintiff was entitled
Das Guvta 1.
to claim and obtain refund ill respect of 90 per cent of the
amount paid, he was not entitled to make the claim with
respect to the remaining 10 per cent.
It may be pointed out that as the receipted import bill
and the corresponding export ce1tificates in respect of the
goods in question have already been made over by the
plaintiff to the defendant Corporation, it will not be possible for the merchants who actually imported the goods and
then exported them, to make any fresh claim.
For,
no
claim would be accepted without the receipted import bill
and the corresponding export certificates. Mr. Patwardhan
faintly argued that the definition of a claimant in the Rules
is only in respect of 90 per cent of the octroi refund. There
is obviously no substance in this argument. Rule 11 deals
with the procedure of claims to refund and requires
that
claimant should produce a duly receipted import bill and
an export certificate relating to such goods.
[Rule 11 (2)
(iv)]. These provisions are entirely independent of Rule
18 (3) which lays down that a deduction of ten per cent
shall in all cases be made before refunding the amount of
octroi duty in certain cfrcumstances. It is, in our opinion,
clear that the plaintiff having made the claim in accordance
with the rules was the persqn entitled to receive what
amount was legally refundable. , As
we have found that
the deduction of ten per cent could not legally be made, in
other words, the entire amount paid was refundable,
it
follows that the plaintiff was the person entitled to obtain
the refund and so he was also entitled to bring the suit.
There remains for consideration the appellant's plea of
limitation. For this plea, the appellant relies on s. 487 of
Act LIX of 1949.
The material part of the section runs
thus:-
( 1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner,
or
the
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64J
1964
Poona Municipal
Corporation
Transport Manager, or against any municipal
officer or servant in respect of any act done or
purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in
respect of any alleged neglect or default in the
execution of this Act:-
....
D, N. Deodher
Dtu Gupta J.
( a) until the expiration of one month next after
notice in writing has been, in the case of
the Corporation, left at the chief municipal
office and, in the case of the Commissioner
or of the Transport Manager or of a
municipal officer or servant delivered to him
or left at his office or place of abode, stating
with reasonable particularity the cause of
action and the name and place of abode of
the intending plaintiff and of his attorney,
advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the
purpose of such suit, or
(b) unless it is commenced
within six months
next after the accrual of the cause of
action."
The benefit of this section would be available to the
Corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten
per cent was "an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act." We
have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or
execution of the Act. It is equally clear that in view of
the provisions of s. 127(4)
(to which we have already
referred) the levy could not be said to be "purported to be
done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of
the Act." For, what is plainly prohibited by the Act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or
intended execution of the Act. Our conclusion is that the
High Court has rightly held that the suit was not barred by
limitation.
All the points raised in the appeal fail. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.