# UNION OF INDIA v. JAGJIT SINGH

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 163
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-04-01
- **Bench:** M. HroAYATULLAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-jagjit-singh-4731
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

J. C. SHAH,
V. RAMASWAM!,
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G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Police Act (5 of 1861 ), s. 4 and Punjab Police Rules, 1934 rr. 1.8,
16.24 (l)(i) and 16.38 (I) and (2)-Whether 'Superintendent of Police'
and 'District Superintendent of Police' same-Scope of r. 16.24 O )(i).
The respondent, who was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police, was
posted in Delhi in 1949. A Deputy Superintendent of Police, in the City
of Delhi who bad already retired from service was directed to conduct a
departmental inquiry against the respondent.
The enquiring Officer
was
re-employed from the date of retirement as a Deputy Superintendent of
Police (Enforcement Department), and after such re""mployment, had conducted. the enquiry against the respondent and found him guilty.
Thereupon the Superintendent of Police, Delhi Police Force, ordered the dismissal of the respondent. The respondent's suit challenginii the dismissal
was decreed and the decree w3' confirmed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (I) Whether an officer functioning as a Superintendent of Police but was not designated as a District
Superintendent of Police was competent to pass the order of dismissal;
(2) Whether tho officer entrusted with the enquiry was a police officer
competent to hold the inquiry; and (3) Whether the procedure preecribod
by Rule 16.38 (I) and (2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, was fullowed
before holding the departmental enquiry.
·
HELD : (I) Though the Police Act, 1861, um the expression 'District Superintendent of Police' and the Punjab Police Rules use the expression tSuperintendent of Police, the two expres!ions refer to one .and
the oame authority, Under R. 1.8 of the Punjab Police Rules, there could
be more than one Superintendent of Police in a district.
Since the police
force expanded considerably between 1861 when the Act was passed and
1934 when the PUnjab Police Rules were framed, a Magisterial district W3'
divided into smaller areas for the better enforcement of law and order and
a Superintendent was place~ in charge of each such area.
Jn the Delhi
area Ibero were two Supenntendents of Police one for the city of Delhi
and the other for New Delhi.
The Superintendent of Police;
City of
Deihl, would therefore be the District Superintendent of Pollet for the
purposes or the Police Act with jurisdiction over the police station where
the plaintiff was Jl')sted, am! he, was competent to pass the order of dismissal. [167 E; 168 B-C, Fl
(2) Under R. 16.24 (l)(i) the officer conducting the enquiry must be
an officer empowered to punish or such superior officer whom the supe:rin~
tendent might direct to conduct the enquiry. [168 HJ
In the preJCo.t cR8e, the ollicer who co~ducted the enquiry had been
re-employed u a Deputy Superintendent o{ Police in the
Enforcement
Department or tho police forco and had taken over char&• from another
Deputy Superintendent or
Police.
Therefore, he was a police
officer
suoerior to tho re<1nnn~ent. [168 B, C-D, E]
163
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i970Jl~c.Jt.
(3) The file relating to the departmental enquiry against lhe plaintiff
bad been d~troyec:N.!nder the relevant police rule, long before the institution
of ·the suit. There iS thus iio documentary evidence, but the oral evidence
showed that the pr<>cedure'prescribed by R. 16.38 (!) and (2) had been
followed. fl 71 B-CJ
Stat.e of U.P. v. Babu Ram, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 and Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah, [1969] 3 S.C.R .• 653, re'ierred ICY.
Crv1L .APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1111 of
1965.
Appeal by specia 1 leave from the judgment_ and order dat~
April 11, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Ci\'cuit Bench at Delhi
in Letters Patent Appeal No. 36-D of 1963.
B. Sen and R. N. Sachthey,,for the appellant.
Frank Anthony, D. I<. Sehgal and D. D. Sharma,
for the
respondent,

## Text

A
UNION OF INDIA
v.
JAGJIT SINGH
April 1, 1969
B
[M. HroAYATULLAH, C.J.,
J. C. SHAH,
V. RAMASWAM!,
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G
H
G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Police Act (5 of 1861 ), s. 4 and Punjab Police Rules, 1934 rr. 1.8,
16.24 (l)(i) and 16.38 (I) and (2)-Whether 'Superintendent of Police'
and 'District Superintendent of Police' same-Scope of r. 16.24 O )(i).
The respondent, who was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police, was
posted in Delhi in 1949. A Deputy Superintendent of Police, in the City
of Delhi who bad already retired from service was directed to conduct a
departmental inquiry against the respondent.
The enquiring Officer
was
re-employed from the date of retirement as a Deputy Superintendent of
Police (Enforcement Department), and after such re""mployment, had conducted. the enquiry against the respondent and found him guilty.
Thereupon the Superintendent of Police, Delhi Police Force, ordered the dismissal of the respondent. The respondent's suit challenginii the dismissal
was decreed and the decree w3' confirmed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (I) Whether an officer functioning as a Superintendent of Police but was not designated as a District
Superintendent of Police was competent to pass the order of dismissal;
(2) Whether tho officer entrusted with the enquiry was a police officer
competent to hold the inquiry; and (3) Whether the procedure preecribod
by Rule 16.38 (I) and (2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, was fullowed
before holding the departmental enquiry.
·
HELD : (I) Though the Police Act, 1861, um the expression 'District Superintendent of Police' and the Punjab Police Rules use the expression tSuperintendent of Police, the two expres!ions refer to one .and
the oame authority, Under R. 1.8 of the Punjab Police Rules, there could
be more than one Superintendent of Police in a district.
Since the police
force expanded considerably between 1861 when the Act was passed and
1934 when the PUnjab Police Rules were framed, a Magisterial district W3'
divided into smaller areas for the better enforcement of law and order and
a Superintendent was place~ in charge of each such area.
Jn the Delhi
area Ibero were two Supenntendents of Police one for the city of Delhi
and the other for New Delhi.
The Superintendent of Police;
City of
Deihl, would therefore be the District Superintendent of Pollet for the
purposes or the Police Act with jurisdiction over the police station where
the plaintiff was Jl')sted, am! he, was competent to pass the order of dismissal. [167 E; 168 B-C, Fl
(2) Under R. 16.24 (l)(i) the officer conducting the enquiry must be
an officer empowered to punish or such superior officer whom the supe:rin~
tendent might direct to conduct the enquiry. [168 HJ
In the preJCo.t cR8e, the ollicer who co~ducted the enquiry had been
re-employed u a Deputy Superintendent o{ Police in the
Enforcement
Department or tho police forco and had taken over char&• from another
Deputy Superintendent or
Police.
Therefore, he was a police
officer
suoerior to tho re<1nnn~ent. [168 B, C-D, E]
163
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i970Jl~c.Jt.
(3) The file relating to the departmental enquiry against lhe plaintiff
bad been d~troyec:N.!nder the relevant police rule, long before the institution
of ·the suit. There iS thus iio documentary evidence, but the oral evidence
showed that the pr<>cedure'prescribed by R. 16.38 (!) and (2) had been
followed. fl 71 B-CJ
Stat.e of U.P. v. Babu Ram, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 and Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah, [1969] 3 S.C.R .• 653, re'ierred ICY.
Crv1L .APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1111 of
1965.
Appeal by specia 1 leave from the judgment_ and order dat~
April 11, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Ci\'cuit Bench at Delhi
in Letters Patent Appeal No. 36-D of 1963.
B. Sen and R. N. Sachthey,,for the appellant.
Frank Anthony, D. I<. Sehgal and D. D. Sharma,
for the
respondent,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order dated April 11, 1963 of the Punjab High. Court
(Circuit Bench at Delhi) in a Letters Patent Appeal whiCh summarily qismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant from a
judgment and order in a Second Appeal upholding the decree in
favour of the respondent passed 'by the Additional District_Judge,
Delhi.
The questions canvassed in this appeal were : whether the
clismissal of the respondent from service in the police force was
illegal on the ground that the officer entrusted with the departmental enquiry against the respondent was not a police officer;
secondly, whether the order of dismissal passed by Shri Jagannath was invalid because he was not a District Superinendent of
~olice; and thirdly, whether the dismissal was void on accollllt
of non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules.
In order to appreciate the points raised, it is necessary to state
the foJJowing relevant facts. The respondent had been .appointed
-rr Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector-General of Police in
Sind before the partition of India and was thereafter .posted in
Delhi by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police Delhi after his
migration ~o Tndi~. In the year 1949 he was posted ail Sub
Insl?ectoi;. of Police in. Police Station Daryaganj, Delhi. A depart.
mental enquiry was launched against him on the charge of acceptance of ·bribe in connection with a criminal case in the same
year. The officer entrusted with the enquiry was one Diw11nchand
P\atia who was employed up to April 1949 as a Deputy SupeA
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t!NION v. JAGJIT SINGH (Mitter, i.)
165
rintendent of Police in the City of Delhi. He retired from. service
in that month but was re-employed from the date of retirement
as a Deputy Superintendent of Police (Enforcement Department).
The enquiry against the respondent had taken place after tb:e retirement of the said Diwanchand but during the period of his reemployment. The respondent was found guilty of the charge and
was dismissed from service by the order dated December 8,. 1949
passed by one J agannath, a Superintendent of Police in the Delhi
Police Foice. The appellant filed a suit challenging his dismissal
on the grounds already mentionec'. in the court of the Subordinate
Judge Delhi on January 12, 1954. The defendant-Union of India
filed its written statement disputing the contentions of the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge framed several issues; the principal
ones relate to the competency of Jagannath to pass the order of
dismissal and of Diwanchand .· Bhatia
to condu:t the enquiry
against the plaintiff.
Finding in favour of the plaintiff on both
the issues, he decreed the suit.
This decree was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Delhi and in Second Appeal by a single Judge of the Punjab High Court who modified
the decree by an alteration ir. the figure of the salary claimed by
the plaintiff but upholding his claim on the main issues. The
Letters Patent Appeal, as already stated, was dismissed summarily.
The first contention on behalf of . the appellant was that
Jagan!J.ath who was functioning as a Superintendent of Police
but not designated as a District Superintendent of Police was quite
competent to pass t.he order of dismissal against the respondent.
Under s. 4 of the Police Act V of 1861, an Act for the regulation of Police,
"The administration of the police throughout a
general police-district shall be vested in an officer to
be styled the Inspector-General of Police, and in such
Deputy
lnspectors-Gen~ral and Assistant InspectorsGeneral as to th~ State Government shall deem fit.
The administration of the police 'throughout the
local jurisdiction of the Magistrate of. the district shall,
under the general control and direction of such Magistrate, be vested in a District Superintendent and such
Assistant District Superintendent as the State Government shall consider necessary."
Section 3 reads :
"The superintendence of the· Police throughout a
general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised
by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; and except as authorised under the provisions
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SUPJlEME COUJ.T Ril'OllIS
[1970] l S.C.R
of this Act, no person, oflicer or Coun shall be empowered by the Stale Government 10 supersede or control any pohce functionary"
Section i provides for the appointment, dismissal elc., of inferior
officers. The relevant portion thereof reads :
"Subject to the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution, and to such rules as the State Government may
from time to time make under this Act, the lnspectorGeneral, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General ana District Superintendents of Police may
at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any poli(»()tlicer of the subordinate ranks whom they sllall think
remiss or negligent in tbe discharge of his duty, or unfi\
for the same, . . . "
The difference between the texts of the sections, after the coming
into force of ·!he Comtitution and that before January 1950 i>
immaterial for our purpose.
The interpretation clause is section
I under which (a) 'police' shall include all persons who shall be
enrolled under this Act; (b) the words 'general police-district"
shall embrace any presidency (State) or place, or any part of
any presidency (State) or place, in which this Act shall be ordered to take effect; (c) .. District Superintendent" and "District Superintendent of Police" shall include any Assistant District Superintendent or other person appointed by general or special order of
the State Government to perform all or any of the duties of a
District Superintendent of Police under this Act in any district;
and (d) 'Magistrate of lhe district' shall mean tbe chief officer
charged with the executive administration of a district and exercising the powers of a Magistrate, by. whatever designation the
Chief officer charged with such executive administration is styled.
Under s. 2 of the Act the entire police establishment under a
State Government shall, for the purposes of tbis Act, be deemed
to be one police-force, and shall be formally enrolled; and shall
consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner as shall from t!me to time be ordered by
the State Government.
It is to be noted that the words "Superintendent of Police"
do not occur anywhere in tbe Act.
In the Act this expression is
always prefixed by the words "District" or "Assistant District".
Under Ruic I. I of the Punjab Police Rules, I 934 framed under
the Police Act, lhc Punjab was divided into general police di<·
tricts. vie., the Proviucial Police District. and Railway Police district and all rank< nf police emplnyed in the province were appointed or enrolkd unda s. 2 of 1h~ Act Rule I .2 shows that the
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UNION v. JAGJIT SINGH (Mitter. 1.)
167
responsibility for the command of the poHc~ force, its recruit- ,
ment, discipline, internal economy and adm1mstrat1on throughout :
the general police districts vested in the Inspector -G~neral ~f Police who was to be assisted in the control and adnurustrat1on of
the police force by such number of Deputy Inspectors-General and
Assistant Inspectors-General as the Provincial Gov.er;"filCI~l mi~t
from time to time appoint. Rule 1.4 gave the admm1Strabve dlVlsion of the police force. Rule 1.6 gives the functions of the Dep~ty
Inspectors-General of Police and Jays down that in the exer~ISC
of such responsibility they were to interfere as little as possible
with the executive authority of the Superintendents under them.
Under R. 1.3.
"The Superintendent of Police is the executive head
of the district police force.
He is directly responsible
for the matters relating to its internal economy, training
and management, and for the maintenance of its dis·
cip line and the efficient performance of all its duties.
In every district there shall be one or mcii:e Supe·
rintendents and such number of Assistant Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents,
inspectors,
sergeants,
sub-inspectors, assistant sub-inspectors, head constables
and constables as the Provincial Government may direct."
The important thing to note in this connection is that the expresE
sion "District Supe_rintendent of Police" is not used in the rules
and the last mentioned rule shows that it was possible to have
more than one Superintendent of Police in a district.
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Chapter XII of the Rules deals with appointments and enrolments in the police force. Rule 12.1 contains a table summarising
the directions given by the Provincial Government under cl. (b)
of sub-s. (I) of s. 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935
in regard to the authorities competent to make appointments to
the non-gazetted ranks.
In respect of sub-inspectors the auth"-
nty to whom the power of appointment is delegated is :
"Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police and
Assistant Superintendent, Government Railway Police."
This. ~uthority is ~iven full powers subject to rules governing the
cond1t1ons of service as defined in the Police Rules.
C_hapter XVI deals with punishments and sub-r. (1) of R.16.1
of this Chap'.er lays down that no police officer shall be depart·
mentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. Subr. (2) of R.16. I gives. a table showing the departmental punish-
!nc~ts which can be mflictcd •md the authorities competent to
rnlhct the sumc.
The tnble shows that the order of dismissal of
168
SUPll.EME COUllT llBPOllTS
[1970] 1 S.C.ll.
a Sub Inspector can be passed by a Superintendent of Police: and
Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway
Police.
·
The question therefore arises whether the" w~r~ "Sup..~!n
tendent of Police" in the Rules and the words DJStr1ct Supenntendent of Police" in the Act refer to one and the same authority,
or whether there is any distinction or difference between the two.
In our opinion, there is none. Section 4 of the Police Act shows
that the administration of police throughout the local jurisdiction
of the Magistrate of the district under the general control and
direction of such Magistrate is to be vested in a District Superintendent. It is common knowledge that the police force expanded
very considerably in between the year 1861 when the Act was
passed and the year 1934 when the Rules were framed and a
Magisterial district was div~ded into smaller areas for the purpose
of better enforcement of law .and order and a Superintendent of
Police was placed in charge of each such area. This finds suppon from the testimony of Abdul Rehman, D.W. 1, Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Lucknow. He said that he was posted as
Superintendent of Police at the headquarters at Delhi in 1950.
According to him, the District Magistrate was in charge o: the
entire Delhi area including New :0.. ., Old Delhi and rurlil areas.
Further, the police officer in charge of the entire area was the
Inspector-General of Police and there were two Superintendents of
Police,
on~ for Delhi City and the other for New Delhi. Shri
Jagannath was the Superi:itendent of Police, City and all the
police stations of the city were under bis charge. n is nobody's
case that a Superintendent of Police is an authority inferior to
that of a District Superintendent of Police, each Magi!:.:ria! district having in many cases more than one Superintendent of Police. There is thus no incongruity between the Act and the Rules
which have to be read together and as Jagannath, Superintendent
of Police, was undoubtedly the Superintendent of Police, City
of Delhi with jurisdiction over the police station Faiz Bazar where
the plaintiff was posted, he was competent to pass the order of
dismissal on him.
On the question of the competence of Diwanchand Bhatia
the relevant rule is R.16.24 in Chapter XVI of the Punjab Poli~
Rules which lays down the procedure to be followed in departmental enquiries.
Sub-r. (i) of R.16.24(1) provides that:
·"The police officer accused of misconduct shall be
brought be~ore an officer empowered to punish him, or
such supenor officer as the Superintendent may direct
to conduct the enquiry. . . . . . . "
On behalf of the appellant it was contended before us that all
that this rule requires was that the officer conducting the enquiry
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UNION v. JAGJIT SINGH (Mitter, J.)
169
must be superior in status to the person against whom charges
had been levelled and there can be no doubt that Deputy Supe-
~
rintendent of Police was an officer superior to a Sub Inspector
of Police.
According to counsel it was really not necessary to
consider whether he was also .a police officer but on the facts of
this case there can be no doubt that Diwanchand Bhatia was a
police officer. Ex. D-5 is a certificate to the effect that Diwanchand Bhatia had on the forenoon of 28th April [949 received
charge of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Enforcement, Delhi with the designation "Officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police." Ex. D-4, the order of the Inspector-General 'Qf Police, Delhi dated June 6, 1949 shows that Diwanchand
Bhatia-mis "posted to city vice Malik Bodh Raj, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who will take over charge as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Enforcement." There is also the oral testimony of Diwanchand Bhatia to the effect that he had taken over
charge as shown in those documents and that he had conducted
the enquiry against the respondent. It was sought (o be argued
before us by counsel for the respondent that Diwanchand Bhatia,
when he conducted the enquiry had already retired lrom the post
of police officer and he was only re-employed in the Enforcement Department anq this would not make him a police officer.
We see no force in this contention as the Enforcement Department was still a police department and a Deputy Superintendent
of Police (Enforcement) was still a Deputy Superintendent of Police. ' The word 'enforcement' merely specifies the department to
which he was attached and the order Ex. D-4 shows that he was
to take over charge from Malik Bodh Raj who in turn was another
Deputy Superintendent of Police.
The third point canvassed before us does not seem to have
eirlgaged the attention of the courts hearing the matter although
it was raised in the plaint. It was the plaintiff's case in paragraph
6-A of the amended plaint that the departmental enquiry could
only have been started after the taking of certain essential preliminary steps and that it_ was necessary for the- police first to give
immediate information to the District Magistrate of the alleged
commission of- a·-crime by the plaintiff and it was for
that officer to decide whether the enquiry was to be conducted by .
a police officer or by a selected Magistrate First Class and that
in his case the departmental enquiry had been started without
following the above procedure.
Although the plaint does not
mention the rule in the Punjab Police Ru1es referred to by the
plaintiff in paragraph 6-A there can be no doubt that ·the reference was to R.16.38 of Chapter XVI, sub-rr. (1) and (2) whereof run as follows :
"(!) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the SqpeL12Sup.q/~-12
.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] l S.C.R.
tintender,t of Police, which indicates the commission by
a police officer of a criminal offence in connection -with
his official reiations with the public. The l'>istrTct Magistrate will decide whether the iD;vestigation of the co.m-
-plaint _shall be conducted by a police officer, or made
over to a selected magistrate hl)Ving First Class powers.
(2) When investigation of such a comy.Iaint est:1bJishes a prima facie· case a judicfaJ_ pros'ecu.tion sh.ill
normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for
reasons to be recorded. When it is decid°ed to proceed
departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24
shall be followed.
An officer found guilty on a char~e
of the nature referred to in this rule shall orqinarily be
dismissed.
(3) to (6)
"
It was the contention of the respondent that there was no
evidence to show complaince witl1 the above rule. ·It was contended that the evidence on record was not suificient for the purpose. Diwanchand Bhatia stat~d in his evidence in chid, that
he Jyi9 received an application for making an enquiry against I he
plaintiff from Jagannath, Superintendent of Police and that alter
mrudng a preliminary enquiry when he found a prima facie ci,se
against the p:aintiff he sent the same to the District Magistrate for
approval. Thereupon the District Magistrate wrote that & departJfa'ntal enquiry be made against the plaintiff and it was only following the direction of the District Magistrate that the enquiry
was made.
The Superintendent of Police,
Jagannath,
stated
in his evidence in chief that he could not say whether the sanction
of the District Magistrate had been obtained for the enquiry by
biwanchand Bhatia.
·
.\fr. Anthony who argued on behalf of the respondent drew
our attention to a judgment of this Court in The State of Uttar
Pmd~sh and others v. Babu Ram (1) where it was observed that
the Police Act and the Rules made thereunder constituted a selfcontoined Code providing for the appointment of police officers
a~1d prescribing the procedure for their removal.
According to
h11n no departure from the rules was possible and in order to justify
a dismissal strict compliance of the rules was mandatory. Observations to a similar effect were·also quoted from the judgment of
this Court in Delhi Administration v. Clzanan Shah (2). There
what was said was :
·
"It is not necessary to decide whether the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules are
(1) !l96IJ 2·s.c.R.679.
(2) [19691 3 S.C.R. 653
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UNION v. JAGJIT SINGH (Mitter, 1.)
mandatory or directory. Even asswiling that the fl!le
is directory, we find that there has been no substantial
compliance with its provisions."
171
We do not think that the saine can be said of the facts of this
case.
We see no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Diwan·
chand Bhatia. The learned trial Judge did not frame an issue on
this point and Abdul Rehman; the Superintendent of Police,
C.I.D. who gave evidence in this case stated that the file relating
to the departinental enquiry against the plaintiff h~ been destroyed under Police Rule 12.35 by his order.
He also referred
to the document Ex. D-2 which is an extract regarding the destruction of Fauji Missals. The order seems tohave been J?a5sed
on 15th January 1953 long before the institution of the plamtilfs
suit. In the circumstances, we see no reason not to· accept the
evidence of Diwanchand Bhatia according to which R.16.38 of
Chapter XVI had been complied with.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order
of the coorts below set aside and the suit filed by the respondent
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dismissed. As the special leave was given in this case on condition that the appellant will in any event pay the costs of the respondent, we make no order as to costs of this appeal and do not
think it necessary to disturb the previous order for costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal allowed •