# UNION OF INDIA v. JUBBI AND DUNIA, ETC

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 447
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-09-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 957 of 1964
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, S. M. Sikri, J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-jubbi-and-dunia-etc-4118
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and
Land Reforms Act (15 of 1954}-If applicable to State as landlord.
The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and
Land Reforms Ad, 1953, Jays down a scheme for the abolition of
proprietary rights of landowners: (1) under s. 11 there would be a
direct transfer of the rights of a landowner from the landowner to
C the occupancy tenant: (2) under s. 15, in respect of lands situate in
an area specified by Government, there would be a transfer to the
State Government, the tenants of such lands becoming the tenants
of the Government; and (3) under s. 27, in the case of large holdings
the ownership would be first transferred to the State Government
and thereafter by the State Government in favour of the tenant.
The respondent made an application under s. l1 of the Act for
acquiring proprietary rights in certain lands as he was the occuD pancy tenant of those lands, the Union of India being the landowner.
On the question whether the Act was intended to affect land
owned or held by the Union or State Government,
HELo: There is nothing in the provisions of the Act suggesting,
expressly or by necessary implication that the Act v.'89 not applicable to the State, or any distinction between lands owned and held
E by citizens and lands owned and held by the State. [454C]
The object of the Act was to abolish big landed estates and
alleviate the conditions of occupancy tenants by abolishi'IS the proprietary rights of landowners in them and vesting such rights in the
tenants. If discrimination between the State and the citizen in
the matter of the application of the Act is made it would result in
the anomaly that whereas occupancy tenants of lands owned by
p citizens would have the benefit of such a beneficent legislation,
occupancy tenants of lands owned and held by the State would not
get such benefit. An intention to bring about such a discrimination cannot be attributed to the legislature whose avowed object
was to do away, in the interest of social and economic justice landlordism in the State. [454-D-G]
·
'
Superintendent and Legal
Remembrancer v. CoTPOration of
G Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 170, followed.
Civn:. APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No. 957 of
1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 12 1963
of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Himachal Pradesh i~ Civil
B Misc. 2nd Appeal No. 15 of 1961.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. N. Sachthey and S. P .. Nayar, for the
appellant
D. R. Prem and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.
448
Slll'llEJIJii OOUllT llliiPOBTS
[1968] l s.c.a.
The· Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.
Slaelllt, J. The Himachal Pradesh State legislature passed
the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land
Reforms Act 1953 !hereinafter referred to as the Act) on June 17,
1953 and the Act was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1955. The validity of the Act was thereafter successfully
impugned (cf. Shri Vinod Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh)('). B
The Parliament then passed the Validating Act, 56 of 1958. That
·
Act was itself then challenged in ladab Singh v. Himachal Pradesh Administration(') but the challenge was rejected and the Act
·since then remains on the statute book as a valid piece of legislation.
On June 4, 1959 the respondent made an application under
s. 11 of the Act for acquiring proprietary rights in the lands set out C
therein claiming to be the ·cultivating tenant of those lands and
produced a copy of lamabandhi in support of his claim. He
stated that he was the tenant of the Union of India in respect of
the said lands, that he was cultivating the said lands, that he was
paying Rs. 35/5/- annually as rent and Rs. 23/8/- as annual land
revenue and other rates and cesses assessed on the said lands and D·
that he was willing to pay compensation as provided by the Act.
On November 26, 1959 the Forest Department on behalf of the
Union filed objections alleging that the application was incompetent, tha

## Text

A
447
UNION OF INDIA
v.
JUBBI AND DUNIA, ETC.
September 5, 1967
[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.]
The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and
Land Reforms Act (15 of 1954}-If applicable to State as landlord.
The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and
Land Reforms Ad, 1953, Jays down a scheme for the abolition of
proprietary rights of landowners: (1) under s. 11 there would be a
direct transfer of the rights of a landowner from the landowner to
C the occupancy tenant: (2) under s. 15, in respect of lands situate in
an area specified by Government, there would be a transfer to the
State Government, the tenants of such lands becoming the tenants
of the Government; and (3) under s. 27, in the case of large holdings
the ownership would be first transferred to the State Government
and thereafter by the State Government in favour of the tenant.
The respondent made an application under s. l1 of the Act for
acquiring proprietary rights in certain lands as he was the occuD pancy tenant of those lands, the Union of India being the landowner.
On the question whether the Act was intended to affect land
owned or held by the Union or State Government,
HELo: There is nothing in the provisions of the Act suggesting,
expressly or by necessary implication that the Act v.'89 not applicable to the State, or any distinction between lands owned and held
E by citizens and lands owned and held by the State. [454C]
The object of the Act was to abolish big landed estates and
alleviate the conditions of occupancy tenants by abolishi'IS the proprietary rights of landowners in them and vesting such rights in the
tenants. If discrimination between the State and the citizen in
the matter of the application of the Act is made it would result in
the anomaly that whereas occupancy tenants of lands owned by
p citizens would have the benefit of such a beneficent legislation,
occupancy tenants of lands owned and held by the State would not
get such benefit. An intention to bring about such a discrimination cannot be attributed to the legislature whose avowed object
was to do away, in the interest of social and economic justice landlordism in the State. [454-D-G]
·
'
Superintendent and Legal
Remembrancer v. CoTPOration of
G Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 170, followed.
Civn:. APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No. 957 of
1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 12 1963
of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Himachal Pradesh i~ Civil
B Misc. 2nd Appeal No. 15 of 1961.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. N. Sachthey and S. P .. Nayar, for the
appellant
D. R. Prem and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.
448
Slll'llEJIJii OOUllT llliiPOBTS
[1968] l s.c.a.
The· Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.
Slaelllt, J. The Himachal Pradesh State legislature passed
the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land
Reforms Act 1953 !hereinafter referred to as the Act) on June 17,
1953 and the Act was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1955. The validity of the Act was thereafter successfully
impugned (cf. Shri Vinod Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh)('). B
The Parliament then passed the Validating Act, 56 of 1958. That
·
Act was itself then challenged in ladab Singh v. Himachal Pradesh Administration(') but the challenge was rejected and the Act
·since then remains on the statute book as a valid piece of legislation.
On June 4, 1959 the respondent made an application under
s. 11 of the Act for acquiring proprietary rights in the lands set out C
therein claiming to be the ·cultivating tenant of those lands and
produced a copy of lamabandhi in support of his claim. He
stated that he was the tenant of the Union of India in respect of
the said lands, that he was cultivating the said lands, that he was
paying Rs. 35/5/- annually as rent and Rs. 23/8/- as annual land
revenue and other rates and cesses assessed on the said lands and D·
that he was willing to pay compensation as provided by the Act.
On November 26, 1959 the Forest Department on behalf of the
Union filed objections alleging that the application was incompetent, that the said lands formed part of the protected· forest, that
the relationship between the respondent and the Union was not
that of landlord and tenant, that the Union being the paramount :s·
owner could not be characterised as landlord qua the respondent,
that a number of trees stood on the said lands, that the respondent was merely a lessee of the said lands which· were a forest
area, that the entries in the revenue record in respect of the said
lands were incorrect and could not be relied on in an application
under section 11 and consequently the
Compensation Officer,
Mahasu, had no jurisdiction to grant it. The Compensation Offi· Y
cer held that the said area was not a forest area, that there were
no trees on the said lands as alleged and that since the respondent
was mentioned as an occupancy tenant in the lamabandhi he was
entitled to proprietary rights in the said lands on his paying
compensation which he fixed at Rs. 76.40 np. The Forest Department thereupon filed an appeal before the District Judge, Mahasu, G
principally on the ground that the Compensation Officer had not
followed the procedure laid down in the Act and had not given
to the Forest Department reasonable opportunity to put forward
its case. The Forest Department did not dispute in the said
appeal that the appellant held the said lands as a tenant of the
Government On July 26, 1960 the District Judge allowed the B.
appeal and remanded the case to the Compensation Officer directing him to raise proper issues and decide the matter in accordance with law. Accordingly, the Compensation Officer raised
('l f
1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 160.
(') 1960] 3 S.C.R. 755.
UNION v Jl'llBI IShelat, .T.\
449
A four issues, viz,, whether there were trees on the said lands, whether the lands formed part of the forest, whether the respondent
was a tenan~ in ·respect of the said ~ands an~ wheth~r there ~as
any impediment in the way of grantmg proprietary nghts to hun.
The Compensation Officer held that the· respondent was a tenant,
that there was no impediment in granting proprietary rights to
I him and allowed _once. a~ain the rel!pondents' application .. T~e
a(ipcal by the Union agamst the said order before the D1stnct
Jndge failed. The District Judge held that _the respond~nt was
~:tenant of the Union and that the Act applied to the said lands
aa· lllSo to the Union. The Union filed a Second Appeal before
the Judicial Commissioner challenging the correctness of the Dis-
. er trjcit Judge's _said order. Both the Compensation Officer and the
District Judge having held on the strength of the Jamabandhi
tl!at the respondent. Wils the ·occupancy tenant in respect of the
said lands, tile only questions raised. in the Second Appeal were
(I) that the Act did not bind the Union or the State Government
and (2) that the respondent's application under s. 11 could not
lie against .the Union in. respect of lands owned by it. The JudiD cial .. Ci:ommissioncLfollowed the ·ratio laid down in Director of
Riuidning' v.' '(:orporation of Calcutta(') which was the law then
preVailing and in view of that decision posed the question whether
the .Act applied to and was binding on the Union. He held that
thoup the. Act did not contain any express provision to that
ell'ect, an examination of sections It, 15, 27 and 54 showed that
Jt the Act applied to· Government land and was by necessary implication binding on. the Union. He observed that the object of the
Act.and:the1acquisition of right, title and· interest of the landowner
in· the land of. any tenancy held under him by a tenant was that
sdch. ·:interest should ultimately be tral'ISferred to the tenant. He
held :that on a .consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act
-r· '.'the'.i:oJ;ii:lusion to w~ch I have. been driven is that by necessary
implicatiDn the Act binds the Government and an application under siction .JI ?f..the.Act by a tenant is competent in respect of
land hdhtby hlDl. under .the Government." In that view he dismissed the ~nion's !!Ppeal. The Union of India filed this appeal
after ·obtainmg. certificate under Art. 133(J)(c) of the Constiiution. After this appeal• had gone on for some time we felt that
9 as it involved a. q~on of some public importance it was de.Sicable that !e •. sJio~d have. the assistance of some senior counsel.
We acc:oi:dmgly dtrected the 'Registrar to appoint a Senior Counsel_ amicus cwiae. Accordingly, Mr. D. R. Prem appeared bef~ us. .We gratefully acknowledge the assistance re ·, "•ed by
him.
B
. , Mr., ,Gana.Pat/Ir Iyer for the Union of l~dia took us througt
the ililferent proVJs1ons. of the Act and submitted that considering
the scheme and .the obi~ !'f the ~ct the conclusion was inescapable that the legislature whtle enacting the Act. did not intend that
(') [1961] 1 'S.C.R. l~.
,JJ( N)GllCI~,
SUPREME COURT UEPOR1'S
(1968] l S.C.R,
it should apply to the ;Government ,or to lands owned by the A
Government. To appreciate the contention it is necessarv to
examine some of the provisions of the Act.
But before ,,.1.; do
t~at it would be. ex~e,ctient to clear the ground regarding the ques·
lion of the apphcab1hty of statutes on the State and its immunity
if any. from such statutes.
'
In Director of Rationing v. The Corporation of Ca/cutrat') B
the majority judgment held that the law applicable to India
before the Constitution was as authoritatively laid down in
the Province o.f Bombay v. Municipal Corp. of Bombayl'I that
the Constitution has not made any change in the legal position
and that on the other hand it has clearly indicated that the laws
in force before January 26, 1950, shall continue to have validity c
eyen in the new set up except in so far as they were in conflict
with the express provisions of the Constitution. The
majority
also held that the rule of interpretation of statutes that the State
was not bound by a statute unless it so provided in exprqss terms
or by necessary implication was still good law. Wanch6o J. !as
he then was) in his dissenting opinion. however. held that the rule D
of construction which was based on the royal prerogative as known
to the common law of England could not be applied to India
now that there was no crown in India and when the common law
of England was not applicable and that therefore the State was
bound by a statute unless it was exempted expressly or by necessary implication. The rule · ih that decision is no longer good
law.
In Supdt. & Legal Remembrancer.
West Bengal v. State E
of West Bengal(') this Court considered the correctness of that
decision and disagreeing with the majority view accepted as correct the minority opinion. The Court held· that the common law
rule of construction that the
crown was not, unless expressly
named or clearly intended, bound by a statute was not accepted
as a rule of construction throughout India and even in the Presi- F
dency towns it was not regarded as an inflexible rule of construction. It was not statutorily recognised either by incorporating it
in different Acts or in any General Clauses Act; at the most it was
relied upon as a rule of general guidance in !iome parts of the
country. The legislative practice established that the various
legislatures of the country provided. specifically exemptions in G
favour of the crown whenever they intended to do so indicating
thereby that they did not rely upon any presumpt!on but only .on
express exemptions.
The Court also observed that the Privy
Council in Prorince of Bombay v. Corp. of Bombay(') gave its
approval to the rule mainly on concession made by Counsel. Th~
Court then held that the archaic rule based on the prerogative and
perfection of the crown could h~ve no releva~ce to a democratic H
republic; that such a rule was 111cons1stent with the rule <>f law
1 ') [196J] 1 S.C.R. 158.
(') 73 I.A. 271.
< · l [1967J 2 s.c.R. 110.
UNIOJ; V JUBBI (S/ielat, J.)
451
.A based on the doctrine of equality and introduced conflicts and
an-J:nalies. Therefore, the normal L'Onstruction, that an enactment
applies to citizens as well as to the State unless it expressly or by
necessary implication exempted the State from· its operation,
steered clear of all the anomalies and· was consistent with the
.philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution. The posiB tion now therefore is that a statute applies to State as much it does
to a ciliLen unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts
the State from its operation.
It is conceded that neither s. l l nor any other provision in the
Act contains any express exemption. Broadly stated, if the legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Act to the State it
{) could have easily stated in section 11 itself or by a separate provision that the Act is not to be applied to the Union or to lands
held by it In the absence of such a provision, in a constitutional
set up as the one we have in this country and of which the overriding basis is the broad concept of equality. free from any arbitrary discrimination. the presumption would be that a law of
which the avowed object is to free the tenant of landlordism and
D to ensure to him security of tenure would bind all landlords irrespective of whether such a landlord is an ordinary individual or
the Union.
The question then is whether in the absence of any express
exemption the statute exempts the State by necessary implication?
The preamble of the Act declares that its object is not only to
E abolish big landed estates but also to. reform the law relating to
tenancies.
Section 2(3) provides that
the expression "estate",
"land-owner" trnd "holding" will have the meanings respectively
assigned to them in the Punjab Land Revenue Act. 1887. Turning. therefore to the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 .we !ind that
section 3(1) of the Act defines "estate" as,meaning any area for
F which a separate record-of-riuhts has been made or which has
been separately assessed to' 1and revenue or which tlie State
Government may by general rule or special order declare to be an
estate.
Section 3\2) provides that "landowner" does not include
a tenant or an assignee of land revenue, but includes a person to
whom a holding has been transferred: or an estate or holding has
Q been let in farm under the Act for the recovery of an arrear of
land revenue or of a ~um recoverab~e as such an 1~rrear and every
other person not herembefore m tins clause mentioned who is in
possession of an estate or any share or portion thereof. or in the·
enjoyment of any part of the profits of an estate.
"Holding" has
been defined as me.ai!ing a share or portion of an estate h~ld by
B one lm1d-owner or Jotntly by two nr more landowners.
Si11ce the
land in question is admittedly assessed to land revenue as i·; clear
from the copy of the. Jamabandlri
pro~uced by the resp:indent
the~c ~an be no question that tl1e land 1s estate and the Union of
India 1s ~he landowner thereof. Reverting now to the Abolition
Act, section 2(5). defines "land" as meaning land which is not
SUP.REM.E COU.RT REPORTS
[1968] I s.c.R.
occupied as a site of any building in a town or village and is A.
occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or purposes
subservient to agricultm;e, br for pasture. Section 2(61 defines "land·
lord" as a person under whom a tenant holds land and to whom
the tenant is or but for a contract to the contrary would be liable
to pay rent for that land. Clause 13 defines "rent" as meaning
whatever is payable to a landlord in money, kind or service by B
a tenant on account of the use or occupation of land held by him.
Clause 17 defines a "tenant" as meaning a person who holds land
under another person. and is or but for a contract to the contrary
would be liable to pay rent for that land to that other person and
clause 19 defines "tenancy'' as meaning a parcel of land held by a
tenant of a landlord· under one lease or one set of conditions. Irr
view of these definitions there can be no doubt that the respondent C
was a tenant having a right of occupancy within the meaning of
·sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Indeed, all throughout the proceed·
ings the position that he was a tenant and the Union was his
landlord and the landowner of the land in question was accepted
without any dispute. Section 3 defines a tenant as having a right
of occupancy in the land and section 8 provides that a tenant who D·
immediately before the commencement of the Act had a right of
occupancy in any land under the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, as
applied to Himachal Pradesh shall on the commencement of the
Act be held to have for all purposes a right of occupancy in the
land. Chapter III of tho Act deals with acquisition of proprietary
rights by tenants. Sections 9 and 10 provide for the appointment Jll
of compensation officers to ·carry out the purposes of the Act and
'
confer power on the State Government to exercise control and
superintendence . over such officers, to issue instructions for the
guidance of compensation officers and to capcel or revise any of
the orders, acts and proceedings of such officers other t~an those
in respect of which an appeal lies under this Act. Section 11 deals
.
with t~e right of a tenant to acquire the interests of a landowner P
and provides inter alia that a tenant shall on application made to
the compensation officer at any time after the commencernent of
this Act be ent_itled to acquire on payment of compensation, the
right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy
held by him under such landowner. Sub-section 2 contains certain
exemptions with which we are not concerned in this appeal. Sub- G
section 3 enjoins upon the Compensation officer on a tenant mak·
ing an application under sub-section (}), to determine the amount
of compensation payable to the landowner in respect of the land
in accordance with the provisions of secti1tns 12 and 13. Under
sub-section 5 the applicant has to deposit the amqunt of compen- .
sation in a Government treasu_ry and thereupon the Compensation a:
Officer has to issue a certificate declaring the tenant to be the
landowner in respect of the land specified in. tl\e certificate. Subsection 6 provides that on and from the· diltl: of the grant of tJ_ie
certificate the tcna!lt shaJJ &etomc the owner of the land compnscd in the tenancy and !hi: riGfit, title and interest of !lie llnxfowner
t:NION t> JUBB! (Slieiat, J:)
. .A in the said land shall determine. Sections 12 and 13 deal, as aforesaid, with compensation payable by the tenant. Section 14 provides that a tenant holding a tenancy exceeding 12 acres of land
can surrender I /4th of such land to the landowner whereupon
the tenant would become the owner of the rest of the land of his
tenancy.
B
There is nothing in these sections which would indicate that
they or any of them impliedly exempt the State or its lands from
their operation. Sections i I to 14 thus contain provisions whereunder the tenant, as a result of their operation, acquires the right,
title and interest in the land held by him as a: tenant on his paying
compensation to the landowner as fixed by the Compensation
C Officer.
Under sections 15 to 24, notwithstanding the provisions of
sections 11 to 14, the State Government is empowered on a declaration made by it to acquire the right, title and interest of the
landowners in the lands of any tenancy held under him by a tenant in respect of such area or at such time as may be specified by
:D it in a notificatiorl. They also provide that upon such declaration the right, title and interest of such landowner vests in the
Government. Such a landowner is entitled to compensation as
provided in section 16 and onwards on his rights vesting in the
Government. In such cases the tenant becomes the tenant of the
Government and has to pay rent directly to the Government and
s the landowner becomes henceforth exempt from payment of
land . revenue. Section 27 then
provides that notwithstanding
anything contained in section ll and onwards a landowner who
holds land, the annual land revenue of which exceeds Rs. l2S-,
the right, titli: and interest of such landowner in such land exceptsuch land 11/hich is under bis personal cultivation shall be deemed
I to have mn transferred and vested in the State Government. Such
.a landowner also is entitled to compensation determined having
·regard '.to sections 17 and 18 in accordance with the provisions of
SCh. l!I. Sub-section 4 of section 27 provides that the right, title
and interest of the landowner conferred on the Government by subseciins I and 2 shall be transferred by the State Government on
payment of compensation in accordance with Sch. I to such tenant
& who cultivates such land. Sub-sec. S provides for rehabilitation
'1'8nt payable .. to such small landowners whose right, title 8Jlll
-mterest have been extinguished and who do not have any other
means of livelihood.
A reading of sections 11 to 27 reveals that they lay down
• three· parts of the scheme of abolition of proprietary rights of laOO.
l)WDCrs; (I) under s. 11 there would be a direct transfer to and
vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowner in the occupancy tenant on bis paying compensation as assessed by the Compei!sit1ou · ~r\ (2) under section 15 in respect of lands situate
:in .an trea ~ed
by Government, there would be a transfer and
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 1 s.o.R.
vesting of ownership of such lands in the State Government and & .
the tenants of such land becoming the tenants of the Government
and (3) under s. 27 where the holding is large enough to have an
annual assessment of over Rs. 125, the ownership in such lands
would be first transferred and vested in the State Government and
thereafter by the State Government in favour of the tenant.
The contention, however. was that these three ways of abo- •
lishing the landowners' interest and transferring in two out of these
three methods of the proprietary rights to the tenants suggest that
the Act was not intended to affect the land owned or held by the
Union or -tlul State Government. This contention cannot be accepted, for, there. is nothing in these provisions suggestive of their
being not applicable to the State or of any distinction between the C
lands owned and held by citizens and lands owned and held by
the State. There can therefore be no room for any assumption
that the legislature had in mind any such discrimination between
the State and the citizens.
Mr. Ganapathy Iyer drew our attention to sections 48 and
54(ll(g) also but we fail to see how they can be relevant for finding D
out whether the State is by implication exempted from the operation of the Act.
It is clear that the object of the Act was to abolish big
landed estates and alleviate the conditions of occupancy tenants
by abolishing the proprietary rights of the landowners in- them
and vesting such rights in the tenants. That being the paramount B
object of the legislature it is hardly likely that it would make any
discrimination between the State and the citizen in the matter of
the application of the Act. This is especially so because if such
a discrimination were to be brought about through a construction
suggested by the State it would result in an anomaly in the sense
that whereas occupancy tenants of lands owned by citizens would F
have the benefit of such a beneficent legislation occupancy tenants
of lands owned and held by the State would not get such benefit.
An intention to bring about such a discrimination against the
latter class of tenants cannot be attributed to the legislature whose
avowed object was to do away in the interest of social and economic justice landlordism in the State. In view of the decision in G
Supdt. & Legal Remembra11cer v. Corp. of Calcutta(') the State
cannot. also claim exemption on the ground only that the Act does
not expressly or by necessar;: implication make it bindtni on theState.
·-
For the reasons aforesaid, we must hold that the conclusion
arrived at by the Judicial Commissioner was correct. The appeal
is disp1issed. No order as to costs.
B
V.P.S.
Appeal di.<missed.
(') [1967] 2. S.C.R. 170.