# UNION OF INDIA v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2005] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 48
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-09-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6825-6826 of 2003
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhan, S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-pramod-gupta-d-by-lrs-and-ors-20901
- **Pages:** 65

## Headnote

Land Acquisition:
c
land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4, 6, 18, 23, 25 and 54.
Compensation-Market value-Methods to determine-Principle of res
judicata-Applicability of-Notification to acquire lands for public purpose
of constructing a Universit;~A portion of land admittedly contained mineralsReference Court awarded compensation for the lands and for minor mineral
D viz. China Clay-High Court dismissed appeals filed by the Central Government
on the ground that judgments and awards granting compensation for the
lands acquired in neighbouring villages which were upheld by it in appeal
would attract principle of res judicata-Central Government's application
under 0. 41 R. 27 CPC for bringing on record a sale deed rejected by High
Court-Held: The principle of res judicata would apply only when the !is was
E inter-parties and had attained finali~Even if the Central Government had
not filed any appeal against the earlier judgments of the High Court it would
not be estopped and precluded from raising the same question in a different
proceeding-The best method to determine compensation would be the amount
which a willing purchaser would pay to the owner-Hence, High Court not
F
justified in rejecting the application under 0. 41 R. 27 CPC-The area of the
land, the nature thereof. advantages and disadvantages occurring therein are
the relevant factors for determining the market value of the land acquiredHence, matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration.
Sections 28 and 34-land acquisition-Compensation-Interest on
G enhanced compensation-Proceedings between the parties remained stayed
for a certain period-Claimants agreed not to claim interest on the enhanced
compensation, if any, during the period of stay-However, High Court awarded
interest for the said period-Correctness of-Held: Grant of interest under S.
28 is discretionary-Only rate of interest is mandatory-Even a mandatory
provision of a statue can be waived-Once a claimant waived his right to
H
48
"
,,
'
\.
·-
U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
49
...
claim interest with a view to obtaining an order of stay he is not entitled to A
any interest for the period of stay-High Court judgment set aside.
Constitution of India, 1950:
~
Article 142-Complete justice between the parties-Land acquisition
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894-0rders disallowing application for B
amendment filed by Central Government as also grant of permission to adduce
j
additional evidence by the claimants not questioned-Effect of-Held: As a
large amount of public money was involved in the land acquisition said orders
set aside with a view to doing complete justice between the parties.
Two notifications dated 24.10.1961 and 23.0l.1965 were issued for c
acquisition of the lands measuring ll05.04 bighas and 3895.07 bighas
respectively for the public purpose of construction of a University. A
portion of the land admittedly contained minerals. Two awards were made
on 2.12.1967 and 8.04.1969. The Reference Court, under Section 18 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, awarded compensation @ Rs. 18,000 per
bigha and Rs. 12,000 per bigha respectively. The Reference Court further D
granted compensation @ Rs. 10.000 per bigha for minor mineral i.e. China
Clay. The respondents were claiming their right, title and interest in the
lands in- question from one 'GS' who was said to be the proprietor of a
Pottery Works having a non-occupancy tenancy right therein. Several
proceedings had been initiated in respect of right, title and interest of E
respective parties after coming into force of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1954. The said 'GS' had allegedly been declared Bhumidhar by the Deputy
Commissioner of Delhi.
On appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the
>
appellants holding that the judgments and awards granting compensation F
for the lands acquired in the neighbouring villages which were upheld by
it in different appeals, would attract the principle of res judicata. The High
Court also refused to en

## Text

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A
UNION OF INDIA
v.
PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.
SEPTEMBER 7, 2005
B
[ASHOK BHAN AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
Land Acquisition:
c
land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4, 6, 18, 23, 25 and 54.
Compensation-Market value-Methods to determine-Principle of res
judicata-Applicability of-Notification to acquire lands for public purpose
of constructing a Universit;~A portion of land admittedly contained mineralsReference Court awarded compensation for the lands and for minor mineral
D viz. China Clay-High Court dismissed appeals filed by the Central Government
on the ground that judgments and awards granting compensation for the
lands acquired in neighbouring villages which were upheld by it in appeal
would attract principle of res judicata-Central Government's application
under 0. 41 R. 27 CPC for bringing on record a sale deed rejected by High
Court-Held: The principle of res judicata would apply only when the !is was
E inter-parties and had attained finali~Even if the Central Government had
not filed any appeal against the earlier judgments of the High Court it would
not be estopped and precluded from raising the same question in a different
proceeding-The best method to determine compensation would be the amount
which a willing purchaser would pay to the owner-Hence, High Court not
F
justified in rejecting the application under 0. 41 R. 27 CPC-The area of the
land, the nature thereof. advantages and disadvantages occurring therein are
the relevant factors for determining the market value of the land acquiredHence, matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration.
Sections 28 and 34-land acquisition-Compensation-Interest on
G enhanced compensation-Proceedings between the parties remained stayed
for a certain period-Claimants agreed not to claim interest on the enhanced
compensation, if any, during the period of stay-However, High Court awarded
interest for the said period-Correctness of-Held: Grant of interest under S.
28 is discretionary-Only rate of interest is mandatory-Even a mandatory
provision of a statue can be waived-Once a claimant waived his right to
H
48
"
,,
'
\.
·-
U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
49
...
claim interest with a view to obtaining an order of stay he is not entitled to A
any interest for the period of stay-High Court judgment set aside.
Constitution of India, 1950:
~
Article 142-Complete justice between the parties-Land acquisition
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894-0rders disallowing application for B
amendment filed by Central Government as also grant of permission to adduce
j
additional evidence by the claimants not questioned-Effect of-Held: As a
large amount of public money was involved in the land acquisition said orders
set aside with a view to doing complete justice between the parties.
Two notifications dated 24.10.1961 and 23.0l.1965 were issued for c
acquisition of the lands measuring ll05.04 bighas and 3895.07 bighas
respectively for the public purpose of construction of a University. A
portion of the land admittedly contained minerals. Two awards were made
on 2.12.1967 and 8.04.1969. The Reference Court, under Section 18 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, awarded compensation @ Rs. 18,000 per
bigha and Rs. 12,000 per bigha respectively. The Reference Court further D
granted compensation @ Rs. 10.000 per bigha for minor mineral i.e. China
Clay. The respondents were claiming their right, title and interest in the
lands in- question from one 'GS' who was said to be the proprietor of a
Pottery Works having a non-occupancy tenancy right therein. Several
proceedings had been initiated in respect of right, title and interest of E
respective parties after coming into force of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1954. The said 'GS' had allegedly been declared Bhumidhar by the Deputy
Commissioner of Delhi.
On appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the
>
appellants holding that the judgments and awards granting compensation F
for the lands acquired in the neighbouring villages which were upheld by
it in different appeals, would attract the principle of res judicata. The High
Court also refused to entertain an application filed by the appellant under
Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for bringing on
record a sale deed whereby; one of the respondents had obtained
assignment of I/4th share of the amount of compensation. The High Court G
fixed the amount of compensation in respect of land with china clay and
without china clay @ Rs. 56 per sq yd and Rs. 30 per sq yd respectively
in relation to notification dated 24.10.1961 and @Rs. 98 per sq yd and
Rs. 72 per sq yd in relation to notification dated 23. l.1965.
The High Court also awarded interest for the period during which H
50
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A the proceedings were stayed at the instance of the respondents on the
ground that grant of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act being
mandatory in nature could not be waved. For computing the market value
of the lands in question the High Court proceeded on the basis of cost for
development of the lowest category of residential plots. Hence the appeal.
B
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: I. I. While determining the amount of compensation payable
in respect of the lands acquired by the State, indisputably the market value
therfor has to be ascertained. There exist different modes therefor.
[66-D-E)
1.2. The best method would be the amount which a willing purchaser
would pay to the owner of the land. In absence of any direct evidence, the
court, how~ver, may take recourse to various other known methods.
Evidences admissible therefor inter alia would be judgments and awards
D passed in respect of acquisitions of lands made in the same village and/or
neighbouring villages. Such a judgment and award in the absence of any
other evidence like deed of sale, report of expert and other relevant
evidence would have only evidentiary value. [66-F-G)
2.1. Therefore, the contention that as the appellant was a party to
E the earlier awards would not by itself be a ground to invoke the principles
of res judicata and/or estoppel. Despite such awards it may be open to the
appellant to question the entitlement of the claimants-respondents to the
amount of compensation and/or the statut~ry limitations in respect thereof.
It would also be open to the appellant to raise other contentions relying
F
on or on the basis of other materials brought on the records. It was also
open to the appellant to contend that the lands under acquisition are not
similar to the lands in respect whereof judgments have been delivered. The
area of the land, the nature thereof, advantages and disadvantages
occurring therein amongst others would be relevant factors for
determining the actual market value of the property although such
G judgments/awards, if duly brought on records, would be admissible in
evidence. (66-G-H; 67-A-B(
22. Even if the appellant had not preferred any appeal against the
earlier judgment and award, it would not be estopped and precluded from
raising the same question in a different proceeding as in a given case it is
H permissible in law to raise the same keeping in view larger public interest.
..
U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
51
Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, [2004] l SCC 347, relied A
on.
Rameshwar Solanki v. Union of India, 57 (1995) DLT 410; Gaon Sabha
v. Nathi, JT (2004) 4 SC 36 and Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod
Gupta, [2003[ 3 SCC 272, referred to.
3.1. The principle of res judicata would apply only when the lis was B
inter-parties and had attained finality in respect of the issues involved.
The said principle will, however, have no application inter alia in a case
where the judgment and/or order had been passed by a court having no
jurisdiction therefore and/or in a case involving pure question of law. It
will also have no application in a case where the judgment is not a speaking C
one. [68-B-C]
3.2. The courts while determining the amount of compensation for
the acquisition of land would be bound to take into consideration only the
materials brought on records. However, factors which would be relevant
for determining the amount of compensation would vary from case to case D
and no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. The principle of res
judicata will, therefore, have no application in the fact of the present
matter. [68-C-D[
4. It may be true that the principles of res judicata may be applicable
in respect of the question of title but even for the said purpose it was E
obligatory on the part of the High Court to refer to the previous judgments
whereupon reliance had been placed by the respondents for the purpose
of arriving at a decision as to whether they have been rendered by a
competent court or not. The question as to whether a civil court will have
jurisdiction in respect of declaration and/or cancellation of bhumidhari
right was not adverted to by the High Court. [68-D-E-F]
F
5. From the impugned judgment of the High Court, it does not
appear that it had taken into consideration the relevant factors, viz., (i)
implication of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 vis-avis the nature of the land and/or the source of title; and (ii) the statutory
effect as regards the claim of the respondent on the subsoil mineral right G
in the light of several existing statutes. [69-8-C]
6. The provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 govern the
rights of the tenants. The original deeds under which the right of
proprietorship, if any, said to be created in favour of one 'GS', in terms
whereof she became occupancy tenant as also the deeds of sale/grants made H
•
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A in favour of her predecessors have not been produced before this Court,
in absence whereof it will not be prudent for this Court to venture to arrive
at a conclusion as regards the nature of the right of the proprietor or the
lessee as the case may be. Even the judgments and decrees passed by the
civil courts and the revenue courts are not before this Court and, thus,
B this Court may only briefly indicate the legal position, the application
whereof would depend on a finding of a court of competent jurisdiction
as regards the nature and extent of right..j70-F-G-H; 71-A-BI
F.F. Christian v. Tekaitni Narbada Koeri, (1914) CLJ (20) 527,
Bageswari Charan Singh v. Kumar Kamakhya Narain Singh, AIR (1931) PC
30, Ras Behari Manda! v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhaubal Deb, (1936)
C IC (160) 114, Great Western Railways Co. v. Carpalla United China Clay
Co. Ltd, (1910) AC 83, Jagat Mohan Nath Sah Deo v. Pratap Udai Nath
Sah Deo, AIR (1931) PC 302, Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh,
AIR (1931) PC 89, H. VLow & Co. Ltd v. Raja Bhadur Jyoti Prasad Singh,
AIR (1959) PC 299, Onkannal Agarwal/av. Bireswar Hazra, AIR (1959)
D Cal. 195 and Bejoy Singh Dudhoria v. Surendra Narayan Singh, (1920) ILR
(56) Cal. 1, approved.
7. The lands in question indisputably were governed by the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887 and the Punjab Tenants (Security of tenure) Act,
1950. The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 is still applicable save and
E except those provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act. The claim of the respondents is stated in their
counter-affidavit filed in this Court. The respondents claimed themselves
to be occupancy-tenants. [80-8-Cf
State of Punjab v. Mis. Vishkarma, JT (1993) (1) SC 448, Raja Rajinder
Chand v. Mst. Sukhi, AIR (1957) SC 286, Shakuntala Devi v. Kam/a, JT
F (2005) 4 SC 315, Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy,
(1970) 1 SCC 613, Chief Justice of A.P. v. L. VA. Dixitulu, [197912 SCC 34,
Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N., 120041 3 SCC 1, Management of Mis.
Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh, JT (2005) 2 SC 481,
Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani, (200411 SCC
G 497 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. International Security &
Intelligence Agency Ltd, (20041 3 SCC 250, relied on.
Prem Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR (P & H) 50 (DB), Man Chand
v. State of Haryana, 74 (1972) PLR 508, Chunni Lal v. State·of Harya_.na, 73
(1971) PLR 159, Gram Panchayat v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1973
H HP 7 and Bheemgari Bhaskar v. Revenue Divisional Officer, (2000) l ALT
...
-
j
U.0.l. v. PRAM OD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
53
159, approved.
8.1. One of the modes of computing the market value may be based
on a judgment or award in respect of acquisition of similar land, subject
of course to such increase or decrease thereupon as may be applicable
having regard to the accepted principle laid down therefor and as may
A
be found applicable. (85-G-Hf
B
Delhi Development Authority v. Bali Ram Sharma, (2004) 6 SCC 533,
land Acquisition Officer v. Nookala Rajamallu, (2003) 12 SCC 334, Lila
Ghosh v. State of W.B., [2004) 9 SCC 337 and V. Hanumantha Reddy v. Land
Acquisition Officer and Manda! R. Officer, (2003) 12 SCC 642, relied on.
Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR (1959) SC 519, Hingri Rampur Coal
Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa, (1961) 2 SCR 537, India Cement Ltd. v. State of
Tamil Nadu, [1990) I SCC 12, Bhagirath Ram Chandv. State of Punjab, AIR
(1954) Punj 167 and State of Punjab v. Keshar Singh, AIR (1959) Punj. 8,
referred to.
8.2. It is also well-settled that for the purpose of determining the
market value of the acquired lands, the comparable sales method i.e. the
lands sought to be compared must be similar in potentiality and nature
may be adopted. [86-G-H)
c
D
Panna Lal Ghosh v. Land Acquisition Collector, [2004) I SCC 467, E
relied on.
8.3. It is also trite to state that the market value of agricultural land
is lower than that of land suitable for commercial purposes.
Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2004) IO SCC 627, relied on.
F
Shaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corporation ltd.,,(2001) 7 SCC 650, P.
Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, [1995) 2 SCC 305, K.S.
Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, (19961
2 SCC 62 and Basavva v. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer, [1996) 9 SCC 640,
referred to.
9. The High Court without assigning any reason discarded the
method of valuation adopted by the reference court. Before the reference
court, the respondents only relied upon the judgments and awards
granting compensation for acquisition of similar lands. The High Court
G
.....,
while allowing an application for adduction of additional evidence referred H
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A only to certain notifications issued by the appellant in the year 1965 which
were meant for the residential plots whereby allegedly the market value
was stated to be 150 per sq. yd. for lands situated at Vasant Vihar wherefor
certain deductions were made@ 12% per annum therefrom in respect of
the lands acquired under the notifications dated 24.10.1961. There is no
B basis on which the High Court took recourse to the said method wholly
ignoring the other materials on records. 190-C-D-E-F)
Jawajee Nagnataham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 11994) 4 SCC 595,
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Bipin Kumar, 12004) 2 SCC 283, DDA v.
Joginder S. Monga, (20041 2 SCC 296 and Shakuntalabai v. State of
C Maharashtra, 11996) 2 SCC 152, referred to.
10.1. The present case merited a different treatment at the hands of
the High Court. The land in question was acquired for a University. The
University was constructed in a large area. By reason of the two
notifications in question alone, about 5,000 bighas of lands were acquired.
D Out of the said 5,000 bighas, the lands needed for actual construction of
the building may be a few bighas only. A large portion of the land must
have been kept vacant for future development as also for other purposes
e.g. sport and other activities. The area consisting of stones might not have
been utilized for the purpose of raising any construction. A portion of land
admittedly contained minerals. A number of minerals were said to be
E deposited in the land in question, namely, mica, berill quards and china
clay. The respondents, however, having regard to the materials on records
confined their claim only to China clay.19% of the total minerals-bearing
land is said to have been exploited. How far these minerals bearing land
were suitable for raising construction is a matter of guess. As per the
F evidence on record the minerals can be up to a depth of 60 ft. It is not
necessary for this Court to go into this question in detail as the High Court
did not advert thereto; But suffice it to say that for the purpose of carrying
out mining operation, the respondents were required to comply with the
safety provisions contained in the Mines Act, 1952 and the rules and
regulations framed thereunder. 191-E-F-G-H; 93-A-B)
G
10.2. The Reference Court and the High Court did not consider the
question as to what amount was required to be expended for bringing the
said area back to the normal so as to enable the University authorities to
raise construction thereon. Minerals were evidently taken out by taking
H to recourse to the quarry method, but there is no evidence adduced by
,__
/
U.0.1. v. PRAM OD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
55
the respondents to show that the pits caused by such mining activities have A
been filled up. [93-8-C-D)
10.3. In fact the Reference Court or the High Court did not address
themselves on the question that the market value of the acquired lands
was required to be determined having regard to the largeness of the area
and the purpose for which they are required, namely, for the University B
and not for the development of the township or the residential colony
wherefor different standards may have to be adopted. The Reference
Court and the High Court should have also taken into consideration the
fact that the lands in question being of different categories would fetch
different prices and same price might not have been available for all types C
of lands. Recourse taken by the High Court to the circulars issued for the
lands acquired for residential purpose only, therefore, will have no
application in the facts and c'rcumstances of the present case. [93-F-G[
11.1. It may not, thus, be correct to contend that Sections 28 and 34
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 are so imperative in character that D
waiver thereof is impermissible in law or would be against public interest.
Grant of interest in terms of Section 28 of the Act is discretionary. Only
rate of interest specified therein is mandatory. Section 34 of the Act ex
facie, however, appears to be imperative in character as the word 'shall'
has been used. A discretion vested in the court, it is trite, may not be
exercised where the right to claim interest has been waived expressly by E
the parties and/or their counsel. Even a mandatory provision of a statue
can be waived. [95-C-D-E)
Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Vilar Pradesh Government, AIR (1967)
SC 465 and State of Assam v. Jitendra Kumar Senapati, AIR (1981) SC 969, F
relied on.
11.2. If a person alters his position pursuant to the representation
made by the other side, the principles of estoppel would be applicable and
by reason thereof, the person making the representation would not be
allowed to raise a plea contra thereto. [96-H; 97-A)
G
Krishna Bhadur v. Purna Theatre, [2004) 8 SCC 229, Vijay Cotton and
Oil Mills Ltd. v. State a/Gujarat, [1969) 2 SCR 60 and State of Karnataka
v. Sangrappa Dvavappa Biradar, [2005) 4 SCC 264, relied on.
Supdt. a/Taxes v. Mis. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust, AIR (1975) SC 2065, H
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A held inapplicable.
12.I. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that there cannot be any
waiver of the right to claim interest. Statutory provisions are made for
payment of interest with a view to compensating a party who had suffered
damages owing to a positive action or inaction of the other resulting in
B blockade of money which he would otherwise have received. A party who
himself represents before the court of law that he would not claim interest
with a view to obtaining an order of stay which would be for his own
benefit, could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
(98-G-H; 99-A-B)
C
Sushi/ Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673 and Laxminarayan
D
R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 5 SCC 413, relied on.
Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003( 8 SCC 319 and Board of
Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741,
· referred to.
12.2. Therefore, the High Court committed a manifest error in
allowing interest for the period during which the proceedings before the
Reference Court remained stayed. (99-C-D)
13. It is not in dispute that in the proceeding before the Reference
E Court the respondent claimed compensation to the extent of I/4th share
in the entire land. It has also not been disputed that Section 25 of the Land
Acquisit!on Act, 1894 contains a substantive provision of law and not a
procedural one and, thus, the statutory provision as it existed prior to its
amendment in the year 1984 shall apply. (99-E-F)
p
Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO, A.P. v. B. V. Reddy, 12002) 3 SCC
463 and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal, 12000( 7 SCC 756;
relied on.
'
14. It becomes obligatory upon the State to pay compensation on the
basis of the market value of the land acquired. (100-E(
G
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory a/Chandigarh, AIR (1985) SC 1576 and
H
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, JT (1989) 2 SC 427, relied on.
15. Service of notice upon the recorded persons whose names appear
in the revenue records only would sub serve the purpose for which notice
is required to be served. (101-D-E)
...
'
f
);•
U.0.1. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS.
57
State of Punjab v. Sawaran Singh, (2005) SCALE 601 and A
Sureshchandra C. Mehta v. State of Karnataka, (19941 Supp. 2 SCC Sil,
relied on.
W.B. Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta, [1997) 6 SCC 297,
referred to.
Uggar Sen Kashyap v. Union of India, (1973) 9 DL T 59, approved.
16. It is now well settled that if an owner himself has purchased the
land the same would be the best evidence for determining the amount of
compensation. (103-CJ
Shakuntalabai v. State of Maharashtra, [1996) 2 SCC 152, referred to.
17. The pleadings before the trial court are the basis for adduction
of evidence either before the trial court or before the Appellate Court.
By amending the memo of appeal the original pleadings cannot be
B
c
D
amended. The claimants-respondents made their claim before the
Reference Court claiming compensation for the lands acquired under two
different references at a certain rate. They are bound by the said pleadings.
Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 merely provides for
applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
including the one under Order 6 Rule 17 thereof. Order 6 Rule 17 of the E
Code postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings.
Before an amendment can be carried out in terms of Order 6 Rule 17 of
the Code the Court is required to apply its mind on several factors
including viz., whether by reason of such amendment the claimant intends
to resile from an express admission made by him. In such an event the
application for amendment may not be allowed. [104-A-B-C-D)
F
Mis. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Mis. Ladha Ram &
Co., AIR (1977) SC 680, Heerala v. Kalyan Mal, 11998) 1 SCC 278,
Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, JT (2005) I SC 581
and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal, [2000) 7 SCC 756, relied
on.
18.1. The rights of the parties, it is well-settled, must be determined
on the basis of the case pleaded and proved by leading proper evidence
and just not on the basis of other reported judgments. 1106-C-D)
G
H
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
Surendra Kumar Vakil v. Chief Executive Officer, [2004) 10 SCC 126
and Sanjay Gera v. Haryana Urban Development Authority, [2005) 3 SCC
207, relied on.
Bhooria v. Union of India, 95 (2002) DLT 100 (DB), referred to.
B
18.2. The purported amendments of the Memo of Appeal and the
reference applications, therefore, could not have been the basis for
allowing adduction of additional evidence as has been done by the High
Court. [ 106-E-F)
19.1. It has not been disputed that the claimant-respondent
C purchased 1/4th share of the land in question by a sale deed. The appellant
filed an application under Order 41Rule27 of the Code for bringing the
Xerox copy of the said sale deed on records but the same was rejected
inter alia on the ground that prior thereto no effort was made to rely upon
the said sale deed. [103-8-CJ
D
19.2. It is true that the appellant did not question the orders
disallowing the application for amendment filed by the appellants and
allowing the application for amendment as also adduction of additional
evidence by the respondents but having regard to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case and in particular the fact that a large
E amount of public money is involved, it is a fit case where jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution should be invoked for
the purpose of setting aside the said orders with a view to doing complete
justice between the parties. [111-D-EJ
F
G
H
Deb Narayan Shyam v. State of WB., [2005) 2 SCC 286, relied on.
20. Therefore, the impugned judgments are set aside and the matters
are remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. [112-D-E)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6825-6826 of
2003.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.2001 of the Delhi High Court
in R.F.A. Nos. 85 and 86 of 1987.
With C.A. Nos. 6827-6832/2003, 950, 2661, 5566-5569 of 2005.
WITH
U.0.1. v. PRAMODGUPTA (D) BY LRS. (S.B. SINHA, J.]
59
C.A. Nos. 6827-6832/2003, 950, 2661 of2005, Civil Appeal Nos. 5566- A
5569 of 2005•!arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 14383 of 2004, 17913, 17915,
17916 of2005]. '
Amrendra Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, M.P.S. Tomar, S. Wasim
A. Qadri, Mrs. Kiran Bhardwaj, Mrs. Rekha Pandey, Ms. Pareena Swamp,
Mrs. Asha G. Nair, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar and D.S. Mahra B
for the Appellant.
K. Ramamoorthy, K.N. Bhat, Sriram J. Thalapathy, N.K.
Arulmurugandham, Manish Vashisht, Ashok K. Mathur, Vishnu B. Saharya,
Dhruv Mehta, Mohit Chaudhary, Harshvardhan Jha, Naresh Kaushik, Mrs.
Lalita Kaushik, Parmanand Gaur, S.K. Rout, Naresh Kumar, Jagjit Singh C
Chhabra, S.K. Dhingra, Ms. Shefali Dingra, Dr. Ms. Aparana Bhardwaj, Rajesh
Tyagi and Atishi Dipankar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted in the special leave petitions.
D
INTRODUCTION :
These appeals are directed against a common judgment and order dated
5.10.2001 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in R.F.A. E
No. 85 and 86 of 1987 under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(for short "the Act") whereby and whereunder the amount of compensation
in respect of acquisition of land in village Masoodpur with china clay and
without china clay was fixed @ Rs. 56 per sq. yard and Rs. 30 per sq. yard
respectively in relation to the notification dated 24.10.1961 and Rs. 98 per·
sq. yard and Rs. 72 per sq. yard with China Clay and without China Clay F
respectively in relation to the notification dated 23.01.1965.
The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Two notifications dated
24. I 0.1961 and 23.01.1965 were issued for acquisition of the lands measuring
1105.04 bighas and 3895.07 bigha respectively situated in village Masoodpur
for the public purpose of planned development of Delhi, i.e., for construction G
of Jawahar Lal Nehru University. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act
were issued on 6.08.1966 and 6.12.1966. Two awards being award Nos.
2040 and 2225 were made on 2.12. I 967 and 8.04. I 969. The Land Acquisition
Collector for the purpose of computation of the amount of compensation
payable for acquisition of said land divided the acquired lands in three H
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
categories viz. Blocks A, B & C and awarded compensation @ Rs. l 000 per
..
A
c
bigha for Block A, Rs. 900 per bigha for Block B and Rs. 600 per bigha for
Block C in respect of the acquisition of land under notification dated
24.10.1961 and Rs. 1580 per bigha for Block A, Rs. 1175 per bigha for
Block B and Rs. 600 per bigha for Block C in respect of the acquisition of
B
land under notification dated 23.01.1965. The owners of the lands being
aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said awards filed applications seeking
reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act pursuant whereto and in furtherance
whereof the Reference Court by a judgment and award dated 28.07 .1986
awarded compensation @ Rs. 18000 per bigha for the lands covered by
Award No. 2225 and Rs. 12000 per bigha for the lands covered by Award
~
c No. 2040. The Reference Court further granted compensation @ Rs. l 0,000
per bigha for minor mineral, i.e., China Clay.
On or about 8.12.1986, the Appellants herein preferred appeals in terms
of Section 54 of the Act being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said
judgment and award which were marked as R.F.A. No. 85 & 86of1987. The
D Respondents herein upon service of notice filed cross objections seeking
enhancement of compensation both in respect of land as well as the mineral
China Clay.
HIGH COURT:
E
The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dismissed the
appeals filed by the Appellants herein holding, inter alia, that the judgments
and awards granting compensation for the lands acquired in the neighbouring
villages which were upheld by it in R.F.A. Nos. 567/1990 and 694/1990,
would attract the principle of res judicata and, thus, the appeals filed by the
F Appellants were not maintainable. The High Court, however, allowed the
cross-objections filed by the Respondents h;:rein in part.
The High Court further refused to entertain an application filed by the
Appellants herein under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for bringing on record inter alia a sale deed whereby and whereunder one of
G the Respondents herein obtained assignment of I/8th of the amount of
compensation in the year 1980 for a sum of Rs. 30,000 holding that the same
was not relevant for disposal of the appeals and in any event the same should
have been brought on records by the Appellants before the Reference Court.
The Appellants before the High Court, inter alia, had raised a contention
H that as the proceeding arising out of reference having remained stayed at the
...
U.O.I. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
61
•
instance of the Respondents for the period January, 1972 and May, 1980; A
they were not entitled to any interest which was rejected opining that the
statutory provisions for grant of interest as contained under Sections 28 and
34 of the Act beirig mandatory in nature cannot be waived.
For computing the market value of the lands, the Hi&~ ~curt proceeded
B
on the basis that the lowest category of residential developecfplots, as in the
'
~
year 1965, should be taken to be the base therefor i.e. @Rs. 150 per sq. yd.
f
and directed deduction of 40% therefrom on the premise that some time
would have been necessary for excavating minor minerals and to make the
lands fully developed having regard to their tremendous building potential.
The High Court also directed further deduction of 20% from the wholesale c
price opining that Rs. 72 per sq. yard would be a fair market price for the
acquired land in the year 1965. However, as regard the lands which were the
subject matter of acquisition in tenns of notification dated 24.10.1961, relying
on or on the basis of a decision of the High Court in Rameshwar Solanki and
...,
Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., 57 (1995) DLT 410, further deductions@ D
--
12% p.a. were directed to be made therefrom working out the amount of
compensation at Rs. 30 per sq. yard for lands without China Clay and Rs. 56
per sq. yard with China Clay.
Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order, the
Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority are before us.
E
SUBMISSIONS :
The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Appellants
raised the following contentions in support of these appeals:
./
F
(i) The nature of the lands being 'Gainnumkin Pahad' and 'Banjar
Kadim ', as described in the entries made in the revenue record of rights for
the years 1907 and 1908, the Respondents were entitled to such amount of
compensation only payable to a holder of Bhumidari rights in terms of the
provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and no other, wherefor Sections
5, 6, 7, 11, 22, 23 and 154 thereof were required to be read conjointly.
G
(ii) China Clay being a minor mineral, in tenns of the provisions of the
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 as also the
Punjab Minor Mineral Rules, I 934, the same having vested in the Central
Government; no compensation was payable therefor.
H
'
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
..-
A
(iii) Judgments and awards made in favour of other claimants having
only evidentiary value, the principle of res judicata ·.vas wholly inapplicable.
Q
In any event as such judgments and awards were passed by courts
having no jurisdiction therefor; the principle of res judicata was not applicable.
B
(iv) Even if it hi fo!\ind that any amount of comp~~sation was payable
• r•
to the Respondents herein, the High Court misdirected itself in· passing the
impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the
Respondents having made a claim _of Rs. 25 per sq. yard before the Land
Acquisition Collector were estopped and precluded from claiming any higher
c amount in view of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, as it then stood.
(v) In view of the fact that the Respondents themselves prayed for stay
of the proceedings before the Reference Court, no interest was payable for
the period between 17th January, 1972 and 27th May, 1980.
D
(vi) The High Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the
...
Respondents themselves purchased the land at the rate of Rs. 6 per sq. yard
-
in the year 1960 and I/8th sha"e of the acquired land for a sum ofRs.36,000
in the year 1980 and the market value of the acquired lands should have been
determined only on that basis.
E
(vii) In any view of the matter, as the appeal had been held to be not
maintainable by the High Court applying the principles of res judicata, the
cross objections filed by the Respondents were also not maintainable.
Mr. Harish Salve, Mr. P.P. Rao, and Mr. Ramamurthy, learned senior
F
counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on the other hand, would
support the impugned judgment.
At the outset we may notice that Mr. Salve conceded that the principles
of res judicata and/ or issue estoppel were not applicable to the fact of the
present case. The learned counsel would, however, point out that the High
G Court in fact entertained the appeals preferred by the Appellants as regard :
(a) ownership of China Clay, (b) value of the land and (c) application of
Section 25 of the Act.
It was furthermore submitted :
H
(i) The Land Acquisition Act being an existing statute on the date of
.,,
coming into force of the Constitution of India the right to property was a
c:
U.O.I. v. PRAMOD GUPTA (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.)
63
~
fundamental right in terms of Article 19( 1 )( f) and 31 of the Constitution of A
India when the notifications under Section 4 were issued and, thus all the
procedural requirements laid down therein were required to be scrupulously
complied with in fulfillment of the legislative purpose.
(ii) Section 25(2) of the Act has no application in the fact of the matter B
as the High Court has arrived at a finding that 'admittedly no notice under
Sections 9(3) and 10 was served on the Respondents', in which event only
the bar envisaged under Section 25(2) of the Act, would be attracted.
(iii) The Respondents having amended their Memo of Appeal as also
the Reference in terms of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, c
vis-a-vis Section 53 of the Act, the High Court had the requisite jurisdiction
to enhance the amount of compensation in favour of the Respondents.
(iv) The notifications issued by the Union of India were admissible in
evidence as no other admissible evidence was available on record.
,l
(v) In view of the fact that the Respondents are armed with the four
D
decrees passed in their favour by courts of competent jurisdiction, it is not
open to the Appellant to contend that Bhumidhars had no right in the minor
mineral China Clay. Distinguishing the judgment of this Court in Gaon Sabha
and Anr. v. Nathi and Ors., JT (2004) 4 SC 36 : [2004] 12 SCC 555, the E
learned counsel woutCl'::liubmit that the Respondents therein were not
Bhumidhars and, thus, the said decision must be held to have bew;rendered
in the fact situation obtaining therein. In any event, the question as regard
title is not an issue herein as the matters in relation thereto are pending
consideration, if any, before the High Court.
'·1
/
F
(vi) Mineral right contained in the land did not vest in the Government
in terms of Section 41 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 and the said
right would be presumed to have vested in the recorded tenants in terms of
sub-section (2) of Section 42 thereof.
(vii) Punjab Minor Minerals Rules, 1934 and the Mines and Minerals G
(Regulation· and Development) Rules, 1957 or the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1954 do not contain any provision divesting the right of the proprietor in the
minor minerals either expressly or by necessary implication and in that view
of the matter, the ownership on minor minerals continued to remain vested
in the landowners.
H
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
As the fact of the matter has been noticed at some length by a
Constitution Bench in Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.,
etc. v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) Dead) by LRs. and Ors etc., (2003] 3 SCC 272,
it may not be necessary for us to traverse the same over again. Suffice it to
B notice that the Respondents herein claimed their right, title and interest in the
lands in question measuring 4307 bighas, 17 biswas from one Guiab Sundari
who was said to be the proprietor of M/s Kesri Pottery Works having a nonoccupancy tenancy right therein. It is not in dispute that several proceedings
had been initiated before different forums by Guiab Sundari on the one hand
C and the· Gaon Sabha of the village and the Union of India, on the other, in
respect of the right, title and interest of the respective parties after coming
into force of the Delhi Land Reforms Act.
D
The aforementioned Guiab Sundari had allegedly been declared
Bhumidhar by the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi.
It may be noticed that an intervention application has been filed on
behalf of Shri Madan Gopal Gupta and Shri Sudhir Jain contending that there
..
exists an inter se dispute as regard the ownership of the property in question
inasmuch as the applicants therein are proprietors/owners thereof. According
E to the said applicants the principal dispute between the parties is as to whether
· ~
the said Guiab Sundari had had any right, title or interest as Bhumidhar or
otherwise in the said land and the same is pending determination before the
High Court of Delhi in RF A Nos. 309-310 of 1980. Briefly stated the
contention raised on behalf of the said applicants is that a lease was granted
by the proprietor in the year 1939 and the lessee in turn granted a sub-lease
F in favour of M/s Kesri Pottery Works, a partnership firm, in the year 1942.
The period of lease granted in favour of the lessee having expired, Guiab
Sundari ceased to have any interest in the property.