# UNION OF INDIA v. RAM CHARAN & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 467
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1962
- **Bench:** K. SuBBA R.i.o, Raghubar Dayal, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-ram-charan-others-2909
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Abat•mtnl of apptal-Dtath of re•pondent-A.pplicalio11 by
apptllant to bri1!Jl legal repreJ<entatives of respondent on rteordApplication fil•a after lapse of thr<e months after death-Whal
i• "•uffloient cause"-Limihtion for application to ••t aoide
abatement •tarls from dalt of death and not from date of apptllant' •knowledge of death-Scope of•. 151 O.P.0.-lndia Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) Art, 171- Oodt of Oillil Procadvro
1908 (Acl. 5 of 1908), 0.22, a. 151, "· 4,9,11.
Ram Charan obtained a money decree against the Union
of India. An appeal was filed against that decree in the High
C'.ourt. Ram Charan respondent died onjuly 21, 1957. On
March 18, 1958, an application was filed in the High Court
under 0.22, R.4 read with s. 151 of the Code by Civil Procedure
stating that the respondent had died on July 21, 1957 and the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, learnt of his death on February
3, 1958 and the deceased had left his widow and an adqpted son
as his legal representatives.
A prayer was made to bring the
legal respresentatives of the deceased on record. The High·
Court dismissed the applicati•m on the ground that the appellant had failed to show sufficient cause for not bringing the
legal representatives of the deceased on record within time.
The appeal was also di •missed. In the appeal before this
Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the
mere ignorance of death of the respondent was sufficient cause
for the appellant's inability to apply for the implcading of
legal representatives within time unless the appellant was guilty
of some negli-:ence or some act or omission which led to delay
in his making the application, that once the respondent was
served no duty was cast on the appellant to make fmther enquiries ab<>ut the state of health of the respondent, that expression 'sufficient .cause' should be liberally construed in order to
advance the cause of justice, that the Court itself had inherent
power to add legal representative• to do justice to the party and"
that the High Court misapplied the decision of the Full Bench
191/J
Union of lndi2
\. v.
Rmn Char•n
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
in Firm Dittu Ram Eyedan v. Om Pres• Co. Ltd. to the facts of
the present case.
Held that limitation for an application to set aside the
abatement of an appeal starts on the death of the respondent
and not from the date of the
knowledge thereof.
Held also that the Court is not to invoke its inherent
powers under s. 151 C.P:C. for the purpose of impleadinl!
legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had
abated on account of the appellant not
appropriate
steps within time to bring
representatives of the deceased
on the record and when its application for setting aside abatement was not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the
court that there was sufficient cause for. not impleadin<: the
legal representatives <>f the deceased in time and for not applying for setting aside of the abatement within time.
He1il also that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not to
be liberally construed either because the party in default was.
the Government or because the question arose in connection with
the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The Court should not rea 1ily accept whatever is
alleged to explain a way the default. The delay in making the
application should not be for reasons which indicate the negligence of the party making the applicati0/11 in not taking certain steps which he could have and should have taken. The
court has to be satisfied that there were certain valid reasons
for the ..applicant not knowing the death within a reasonable
time. The bare statement of the applicant is not enough.
Firm Dittu Rann Eyedan v. Om Press Co. Ltd. ( 1960) I
l.L.R. Punjab. 935 (F.B.), State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram
[1962] 2 S.C R. 636 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh
C. A. No. 344 of 1956 dated 10.4.62, referred to.

## Text

3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
UNION OF INDIA
v.
RAM CHARAN & OTHERS
(K. SuBBA R.i.o, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Abat•mtnl of apptal-Dtath of re•pondent-A.pplicalio11 by
apptllant to bri1!Jl legal repreJ<entatives of respondent on rteordApplication fil•a after lapse of thr<e months after death-Whal
i• "•uffloient cause"-Limihtion for application to ••t aoide
abatement •tarls from dalt of death and not from date of apptllant' •knowledge of death-Scope of•. 151 O.P.0.-lndia Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) Art, 171- Oodt of Oillil Procadvro
1908 (Acl. 5 of 1908), 0.22, a. 151, "· 4,9,11.
Ram Charan obtained a money decree against the Union
of India. An appeal was filed against that decree in the High
C'.ourt. Ram Charan respondent died onjuly 21, 1957. On
March 18, 1958, an application was filed in the High Court
under 0.22, R.4 read with s. 151 of the Code by Civil Procedure
stating that the respondent had died on July 21, 1957 and the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, learnt of his death on February
3, 1958 and the deceased had left his widow and an adqpted son
as his legal representatives.
A prayer was made to bring the
legal respresentatives of the deceased on record. The High·
Court dismissed the applicati•m on the ground that the appellant had failed to show sufficient cause for not bringing the
legal representatives of the deceased on record within time.
The appeal was also di •missed. In the appeal before this
Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the
mere ignorance of death of the respondent was sufficient cause
for the appellant's inability to apply for the implcading of
legal representatives within time unless the appellant was guilty
of some negli-:ence or some act or omission which led to delay
in his making the application, that once the respondent was
served no duty was cast on the appellant to make fmther enquiries ab<>ut the state of health of the respondent, that expression 'sufficient .cause' should be liberally construed in order to
advance the cause of justice, that the Court itself had inherent
power to add legal representative• to do justice to the party and"
that the High Court misapplied the decision of the Full Bench
191/J
Union of lndi2
\. v.
Rmn Char•n
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
in Firm Dittu Ram Eyedan v. Om Pres• Co. Ltd. to the facts of
the present case.
Held that limitation for an application to set aside the
abatement of an appeal starts on the death of the respondent
and not from the date of the
knowledge thereof.
Held also that the Court is not to invoke its inherent
powers under s. 151 C.P:C. for the purpose of impleadinl!
legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had
abated on account of the appellant not
appropriate
steps within time to bring
representatives of the deceased
on the record and when its application for setting aside abatement was not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the
court that there was sufficient cause for. not impleadin<: the
legal representatives <>f the deceased in time and for not applying for setting aside of the abatement within time.
He1il also that the expression 'sufficient cause' is not to
be liberally construed either because the party in default was.
the Government or because the question arose in connection with
the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The Court should not rea 1ily accept whatever is
alleged to explain a way the default. The delay in making the
application should not be for reasons which indicate the negligence of the party making the applicati0/11 in not taking certain steps which he could have and should have taken. The
court has to be satisfied that there were certain valid reasons
for the ..applicant not knowing the death within a reasonable
time. The bare statement of the applicant is not enough.
Firm Dittu Rann Eyedan v. Om Press Co. Ltd. ( 1960) I
l.L.R. Punjab. 935 (F.B.), State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram
[1962] 2 S.C R. 636 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh
C. A. No. 344 of 1956 dated 10.4.62, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 115 of 1962.
Appfals by special leave from the judgments
and orders dated February 16,26, 1960, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Misc. No.
of 1959
. and Regular First Appeal No. 44 of 1955.
D.R. Prem and P.D. Menon, for the appellant.
j
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
Veda Vyas", K. K. Jain, for P.O. Khanna, for
respondent.
1963. April 30. The Judgment of the Court
was. delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-The facts leading to
this appeal, by special leave, against the orders, of
the High Court of Puujab are these. Kam Charan
obtaiued a decree for money against the Union of
India on January 6, 1955. The Union of India pre·
sented an appeal on April 6, 1955, in the High Court.
Ram Charan, the sole respondent, filed a cross-objection on July 31, 1955. On February 6, 1956 the High
Court passed an order in connection with the surety
bond. Ram Charan was represented at the pro·
ceedings. Ram Charan died on July :!l, 1957.
On March 18, 1958 an application was presented to the High Court on behalf of the appellant
under O. XXII, r. 4, read with s. 151, Code of Civil
Procedure, stating that Ram Charan died on July 21,
1957, that the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs,
Ambala Cantonment, learnt of his death on February
3, 1958, and that the deceased had left as his legal
representatives, an adopted son and a widow. It
was prayed that these legal representatives be brought
on record in the place of the deceased respondent.
The affidavit filed in support of this afJplication did
not convey any further information and it was solemnly affirmed by the deponent that the averments
in the affidavit were true to his belief.
The depo·
nent was no other than the Divisional Engineer,
Telegraphs, Ambala Cantonment.
·
On May 13, 1958; the widow of Ram Charan
applied that she alone was the legal representative
of Ram Charan under a will and that the alleged
adopted son was not the legal representative.
Th.e
appellant's application for ,bringing on record. the
1963
U•itn of Indio
v.'
&.m C"-ran
R11hu6ar Dayal J.
IM
U•i•,../ lnili•
Y.
R .. c .....
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL
legal representatives of the deceased Ram Charan
came up for hearing on May 14, 1958. The Court
orde1ed the application to be heard at the time of the
hearing of the appeal as it was pointed out that there
was a difference of opinion in the Court as to whether
limitation under 0. XXU of the Code started from
the date of death or from the date of knowledge of
death.
on an application on behalf
of the legal representatives, it was ordered that the
question of abatement be decided first and thereafter
the printing of the record be
on hand. The
application for substitution came up for decision
on Febn.;ary Hi, 1960. It was dismissed, the Court
holding that the Union of India had failed to show
that it was prevented from any sufficient cause from
continuing the appeal. On February 26, 19150, the
appeal itself was dismissed as having abated.
On May 14, 1960, an application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court was presented to the
High Court. The heading of the application was described to be one for leave to the Supreme Court from
the judgment dated February 16, 1960, in C.M.No.
1212/C of 1959 in R.F.A. No. 44 of 1955. This appli·
cation was rejected on May 17, l9ti0. Thereafter, an
application Cor special leave was filed in this Court.
Special leave was prayed for appealing from the judg·
ment of the High Court of Punjab in R.F.A.No.44 of
1955 and C.M. No. 121:2-C/59 dated February I 6/26
of 1960. The order granting special leave said:
''That special leave be and is hereby granted to
the petitioner to appeal to this Court from the
j11dgment and order dated 16th day of February,
1960 and 26th day of February, 1960 of the
Punjab High Comt in Civil Miscellaneous No.
1212-C of 1959 and Regular First Appeal No.
44 of 1955."
A preliminary objection was taken to the effect
that the appellant having not applied to
the·
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4'71
High Court for leave to appeal against the order dated
February 26, 1960 in Regular First Appeal, that
order had become final and special leave could not
be asked for
this Court in view of Order XIII,
r. 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, the rule
heiag:
I
"Where an appeal lies to the Supreme Court
on a certificate issued by the High Court or
other tribunal, no application to the Supreme
Court for special leave to appeal shall be entertained unless the High Court or tribunal con·
cerncd has first been moved and it has refused
to grant the certificate."
We do not see any force in this objection and reject
it. The application for
leave to appeal, though
descnbed as one against the judgment in the miscellaneous case and not against the order in the
regular appeal, stated in paragraph 1 that the regular
first appeal had been ordered to have abated and in
paragraph 3 that it was a fit case in which necessary
certificate for filing an appeal against the judgment
passed by the Court in regular first appeal No. 44
of 1955 be granted. Both these statements refer to
the proceedings in connection with the regular first
appeal and not of the order on the miscellaneous
application for substitution. Ground No. 2 referred
to those proceedings. The application, therefore,
was really an application for leave to appeal against
both the orders.
The High Court docs appear to have construed
that application in this manner. Its order dated
· May 17, 1960 stated :
"The appeal was decided as · having abat.
ed
because the appellant failed to show
sufficient cau:ie for not bringing the legal
,,,,
J nitm of lnth'•
••
Ram '4'h•r•n
l!Jf3
Union oj !nditt
v.
Rom Choran
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
representatives of the deceased respondent within time."
·
To appreciate the real contention between the
parties before us, we may now give in brief, the
reasons for the order of the High Court dated
February 16, 1960. It .may be pointed out that in
the narration of facts the High Court stated that the
application dated March 1 7, 1958, was filed under
0. XXII, rr. 4 and 9 read with s. 151 of the Code.
'J he application, as printed ou the record, did not
purport to be under r. 9 of O. XXII, C.P.C. · There
is not a word in the application that the appeal had
abated and that the abatement be set aside.
The
error in this respect seemed to have further led,to 1he
error in stating that the reason for the delay given
in the application was that the Divisional Engineer,.
Telegraphs, came to know about Ram Charan"s
deaih on February 3,. l 958, there being no reason
mentioned in the application. It was just stated as
a matter of fact that the Engineer had come to know
of the death on February 3, 1958.
The order states
that some application was presented by the Union of
India on May 14, and that it was stated therein that
the interval betwern February 3 and March 17, l!J58,
was spent in collecting information about the legal
representatives of the deceased.
This application,
however, is not printed in the paper book.
The High Court relied on the Full Bench case
of its Court reported in Firm Dittu Ram Eyedan v.
Om Press Co. Ltd.,('), which held that ignorance·
of the death of the defendant was not a sufficient
cause for-setting aside the abatement when an application to bring the legal representatives of the
deceased on the record was made after the expiry of
the period of limitation, as the law imposed an obliga·
tion on. the person applying for bringing the legal
representatives of the deceased on .the record and he
had, therefore, to show absence of want of care. The
(lJ (196D) IJ. L. R.P1lllj 935
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
High Court held that the Union of India did not
state either in its application dated March 17, 1958,
· or in the other application dated May 14, l958, that
the Government had not been careless in the matter
and had been vi_gilant in keeping itself informed
regarding the whereabouts of Kam Charan and that
it would not have been difficult for the Government
to have come to know of Ram Charan 's death,
who lived in Ambala Cantonment, to which place
the appeal related.
The contentions raised for the appellant in this
Court are :
( 1) That mere ignorance of death of the respondent was sufficient cause for the appellant's inability to apply for the impleading
of the legal representatives within time,
unless it be that the appellant was guilty
of some negligence or some act or omission
which led to the delay in his making the
application.
( 2)
Once the respondent is served in the first
appeal; no duty is cast on the appellant
to make regular enquiries about the state
of health of the respondent.
(3) The expression 'sufficient cause,.should be
liberally construed in order to advance the
cause of justice.
(4) The Court itself has inherent power to
add
representatives to do full justice
to the party.
( 5) The High Court misapplied the decision
of the Full Bench of its Court to the facts
of the present case.
We may s11.y at once that there is no force in the
fourth point. The Court is not to invoke its inherent
1963
Union of India
v.
Ram CluJran
Raghubar Day•/ J.
1963
Union of In&
•.
Rmn Ch•r•n
474
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
powers under s. Hil, C.P.C. for the purposes of
impleading the legal representatives of a deceased
respondent, if the suit had abated on account of the
appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to
bring the legal representatives of the deceased party
on the record 'and when its application for setting
aside the abatement is not allowed on account of
its failure to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient
cause for not impleading the legal representatives
of the deceased in time and for not applying for the
setting aside of the ahatement within time.
There is no questidn of construing the expres·
sion 'sufficient cause' liberally either because'the party
in default is the Government or because the question
arises in connection with the impleading of the
. legal representatives of the deceased respondeut.
The provisious of the Code are with a view to
advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court,
in considering
the appellant has established .
sufficientcause for his not continuing the suit in time
or for noLapplying for the settiug aside of the abatement within time, need not be O'(er-strict in expect·
ing such proof of the suggested cause as it would
accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the
dispute· between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be
determined while, 'if the abatement is not set aside,
the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim . on
account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance.
This, however, does not mean that the Court should
readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to
explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and
would be fully justified in considering the merits of
the evidence led to establish the cause for the appellant's default in applying within time for the impleadiug of the legal representatives of tJ:i.e deceased or for
setting aside the abatement.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
4'75
It is true, as contended, that it is no duty of the
appellant to make regular
from time to time
about the health or existence of the- opposite party,
but it does not mean that the mere fact of the appellant's coming to know of the respondent's death
belatedly will, by itself, justify his application for
setting aside the abatement.
fhat is not the law.
Rule 9 of O. XXII of the Code requires the plaintiff
to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient
cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation
about his not coming to know of the death of the
opposite party is not sufficient. He had to state
reasons which, according to him, led to his not knowing of the dl!ath of the defendant within reasonable
time and to establish those reasons to the satisfaction
of the Court, specially when the com:ctness of those
.reasons is challenged by the legal representatives of
the deceased who have secured a valuable right on
the abatement of the suit.
It is not necessary to consider whether the
High Court applied its earlier Full Bench decision
correctly or not when we are to decide the main
question urged in this appeal and that being the
tirst contention. Rules, 3 and 4 of 0. XXII, C.P.C.
lay down respectively the procedure to be followed
I in case of death of one of several plaintiffs when the
right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiffs
alone or that of the sole plainti.ff when the right to
sue survives or of the death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant in similar circumstances.
The procedure requires an application for the
making of the legal representatives of the deceased
. plaintiff or defendant a party to the suit. It does
not say who is to present the application. Ordinarily
it would be the plaintiff, as by the abatement of the.
suit the defendant stands to gain. However, an
application is necessary to be made for the purpose.
If no such application is made within the time
allowed by Jaw, the suit abates so far as the deceased
1961
cr.u. •f r"';.
.. .
R..,C/aar,.
R•1hobn Do,,.Z J.
19b3
Union of India
v.
Ram Charan
Roghub11r Doyal }.
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Plaintiff is concerned or as against the deceased
defendant. The effect of such an abatement on the
suit of the surviving plaintiffs or the suit against
the surviving defendants depends on other considerations as held by ithis Court in State of Punjab v.
Nathu Ram (') and Jhanda Singh v. Gu.rmukh
Singh (2).
Any way, that question does not arise in
this case as the sole respondent had died.
It may be mentioned that in view ofr. 11 of
0. XXII, the words 'plaintiff', 'defendant' and 'suit'
in that Order include 'appellant', 'respondent' and
'appeal' respectively.
The consequence of the abatement of the suit
against the defendant is that no fresh suit can be
brought on the same cause of action. ::.ub-rule (.1)
of r. 9 bars a fresh suit. The only remedy open to
the plaintiff or thie person claiming to be the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff is to get the
abatement of the suit set aside and this he can do
by making an application for that purpose within
time. The Court will set aside the abatement if it is
proved that the applicant was prevented by any
sufficient cause from continuing the suit .. This means
that the applicant had to allege and establish facts
which, in the view of the Court, be a sufficient
reason for his not making the application ·for bring·
ing on record the legal representatives of the deceased
within time. · If no such facts are alleged, none can
be established and, :in that case the Court cannot set
aside the abatement of the suit unless the very
circuffistances of the case make it so obvious that
the Court be
a position to hold that there was
sufficient cause for the applicant's not continuing
the suit by taking necessary steps within the period
of limitation. Such would be a very rare case. This
means that the bare statement of the applicant that
he came to know of the death of the other party
more than three months after the death will not
( 1) I 1962] 2 S. C. R, 636.
(2) C. A. No. 544 of 1956 decided oo April 10, 1962.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
ordinarily be sufficient for the Court's holding that
the applicant had sufficient cause for not impleading
the legal representatives within time. If the mere
fact that the applicant had known of the death
belatedly was sufficient for the Court to set aside the
abatement, the legislature would have expressed
itself differently and would not have required the
applicant to prove that he was prevented by any
sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The period
of limitation prescribed for making such an appli·
cation is three months, under Art. 171 of the Fir,t
Schedule to the Limitation Act. This is a sufficiently
long perhd and appears to have been fixed by the
on the expectancy that ordinarily the
plaintiff would be able to learn of the death of the
defendant and of the persons who are his legal
representatives within . that period. The legislature
might have expected that ordinarily the interval
between two succes•ive hearings of a suit will be
much within three months and the absence of any
defendant within that period at a certain hearing
may be accounted by his counsel or some relation to
be due to his death or may make the plaintiff inquisitive about the reasons for the other party"s absence.
The legislature further seems to have taken into
account that there may be cases where the plaintiff
may not know of the death of the defendant as
ordinarily expected and, therefore, not only provided
a further period of two months under art. 176 for
an application to set aside the abatement of the suit
but also made the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation
Act applicable to such applications. Thus the
plaintiff is allowei sufficient time to make an application to set aside the abatement which, if exceeding
five months, be considered justified by the Court in
the proved circumstances of the case. It would be
futile to lay down precisely as to what considerations
would constitute 'sufficient cause' for setting aside
abatement or for the
not applying to
bring the legal representatives of the deceased
1963
Union of India
••
Rum Charan
[(.Gghubar Day:tl J,
Unin ef Indio
v.
a... ch., ..
114••har Doyal I.
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
defendant on the r,ecord or would be held to be
sufficient cause for not making an application to
set aside the abatement within the time prescribed·.
But it can be said that the delay in the making of
such applications should not be for reasons which
indicate the plaintiffs negligence in not taking
certain steps which he could have and should have
taken. What wouldl be such necessary steps would
again depend on the circumstances of a particular
case and each case will have to be decided by the
Court on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Any statement of illustrative circumstances or facts
can tend to be a curb on the free exercise of its mind
by the Court in determining whether the facts and
circumstances of a particular case amount to
'sufficient cause' or not. Courts have to use their
discretion in the matter soundly in the interests of
justice.
It will serve no useful purp'.)Se to refer to the
cases relied on for the appellant in support of its
contention that the: appellant's ignorance of the
death of the respondent is sufficient cause for allowing its application for the setting aside of the
abatement and that in any case it would be sufficient
cause if its ignorance had not been due to its culpable negligence or mala .fides. We have shown
above that the mere statement that the appellant was
ignorant of the death of the respondent, cannot be
sufficient and that it is for the appellant, in the first
instance, to a liege "hy he did not know of the death
of the respondent earlier or why he could not know
about it despite his efforts,' if he had made any efforts
on having some cause to apprehend that the respon·
dent might have died. The correctness of his reasons
can be challenged
by
the
other party. The
Court will then decide how far those reasons have
been established and suffice to hold that the appellant
had sufficient cause for not making an application to
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
bring the legal representatives of the decrased
respondent earlier on the record.
In the present case, the appellant had adopted
a very wrong attitude from the very beginning. In
its application dated March 17, it merely said that·
Ram Charan died on July 21, 1957, and that Shri
Bhatia, the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Ambala
Cantonment, learnt about it on February 3, 1958.
:::.hri Bhatia did not say anything more in his affidavit
and did not verify it . on the basis of his personal
knowledge. Why he did not do so is difficult to
imagine if he came
to know of the death on
February 3, 1958. He was the best person to say
that this statement was true to his knowledge, rather
than true to his belief.
Further, it appears from
the judl(ment of the
Court that no further
information was conveyed in the application d::.ted
May 13, 19.58 which is not on the record. The most
damaging thing for the appellant is that the appli·
cation came up for hearing before the learned Single
Judge and at that time the stand taken by it was that
limitation for such an application starts not from
the date of death of the respondent but from the
date of the appellant's knowledge of the death of the
respondent. The appellant's case seems to have
been that no abatement had actually taken olace as
the limitation started from February 3, 1958, when
the appellant's officer knew of the death of the
respondent and the application was made within
3 months of that date. It appears to be due to such
an attitude of the appellant that the application
dated March 17, 1958 purported to be simply under
r. 4 0. XXII and did not purport to be under r. 9
of the said Order as well and that no specific prayer
was made for setting aside the abatement. The
limitation for an application to set aside abatement
of a suit does start on the death of the deceased
respondent.
Article 171, First Schedule to the
Limitation Act provides that. It does not provide
1963
l!ni'm of lruli•
v.
R.m C,,.,.
1963
Union of India
v.
Ram Charan
ROghUb,,, D(Jyal J.
196S
May 1.
,
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
·
the limitation to start from the date of the appellant's knowledge thereof. The stand taken. by the
appellant was absolutely unjustified and betrayed
complete lack of knowledge of the simple provision of
the Limitation Act. In these circumstances, the High
Court cannot be said to have taken an erroneous view
.about the appellant's not establishing sufficient ground
for not making
an applicatiun to bring on record
the · representatives of the
deceased
respondent
within time or for not making an application to set
aside the abatement within time.
We, therefore, see no force in this appeal and
dismiss it with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RAJABHAI ABDUL REHMAN MUNSHI
v.
VASUDEV DHANJIBHAI MODY
(A. K. SARKAR,
.l\'.{.
HIDAYATULLAH
and J.C. SHAH JJ.)
_87;ecial Leave-Revocation-Jurisdiction of Supreme CourtFal11.e Statement made in Special Leave Petition-Constitution. of
India. Art, 136.
In a .suit filed in l 9j4teriant deposited in Court
Rs. 400/- on October I, 1954. The deposit remained in C•>urt
uptojanuary 19, 1957, when it was withdrawn.
A fresh suit
was filed in SeptP.mber, 1955, for ejectment of the'.:enant. On
janoary 10,1957, the tenant deposed about the deposit of
Rs. 400/· but \Vlthdrew it afrer nine days. The suit was dis·
miss(d by the trial court on Fc:brua.ry 26, l9j7, on the ground
that tl1e am·>unt required had been deposited by the tenant in
Cciurt. The 10,ver appe\l'.lte court accepted the .appeal and
ordered ejectment on the ground that the . amount deposited