# UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THROUGH LRS - **Citation:** [2017] 14 S.C.R. 68 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2017 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 16949-16950 of 2017 - **Bench:** Kurian Joseph, A. M. Khanwilkar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/union-of-india-v-vijay-krishna-uniyal-d-through-lrs-31728 - **Pages:** 39 ## Headnote Government Land: Land in possession, on 'Old Grant' terms - Notice for C resumption of the land - Suit for permanent injunction - Seeking order restraining the State (defendant) and its officials from dispossessing him from suit property - Claiming title/ownership of the property vide registered sale deed - Also asserted occupancy rights and ownership rights on account of long and undisturbed possession - Plea of the defendant-appellant was that the land in D question was covered by Old Grant for national defence requirement, ownership whereof belonged to the defendant-appellant - Trial court as well as first appellate court held that the defendant was the owner of the land and possession of the plaintiff was limited to occupancy rights - High Court dismissed the second appeal upholding E concurrent finding of fact on the factum of ownership - However, the High Court·observed the plaintiff would have liberty to raise the issue of title during eviction proceedings - Review petition by the defendant dismissed - Appeal by the defendant to Supreme Court seeking that the observation made by the High Court in the impugned judgment be set aside - Plaintiff interalia took the plea that courts F below were not expected to decide the question of title in an injunction suit simpliciter and that the defendant had failed to prove its title - Held: Mere possession of suit property by itself cannot be reckoned as an evidence on the issue of ownership - From the facts of the case, it is evident that it was well within the knowledge of the G plaintiff that the suit property belonged to Government (defendant) and the right which was transferred to him was only the right of enjoyment of possession of the said land granted under the Old Grant to his predec(!ssor-in-interest - Therefore, the observation made by the High Court is effaced as that observation was the foundation to give liberty to the plaintiff to agitate the question of H 68 UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 69 title - The issue of 'ownership' cannot be called an ancillary issue . A examined by civil court to limited jurisdiction called upon to consider the relief of perma,nent Injunction simpliciter - It was a direct and substantial issue considered by all the courtsbe/ow - The finding ojfact is binding on the plaintiff' and would operate as constructive res judicata - In the facts of the case, the defendant was able to B prove its title - The plaintiff in absence ofchallenge to the High Court order, can neither succeed nor can be permitted to agitate before Supreme Court about the correctness of the findings recorded by courts below on the issue of ownership - The only issue that was left open by appellate courts was about determination of compensation for the structure in terms of Old Grant and C Regulations - Principle of Res Judicata. Constitution of India: Art. 136 - Scope of- Held: Plenary jurisdiction of Art. 136 is not limited to the dispensation provided in Or. XL! r. 22 of CPC - However. the Court cannot make an order, direction or decree placing D the party appealing to it, in a position more disadvantageous than in what it would have been, had it not appealed. Maxim: "Nemo dat quod non habet" - Applicability of Allowing the appeals, the Court E HELD: 1. The High Court has failed to analyse the matter in the manner it ought to have done whilst dealing with second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 at the stage of final hearing. The High Court in the present case has not even adverted to the two substantial questions of law as F were framed in terms of its order nor has it analysed the matter appropriately. [Para 21] [94-C-D] 2.1 The High Court rejected the plaintiff's challenge to the concurrent finding on the issue of ownership and then finally concluded that the second appeal lacked merit and dismissed G the same. It is unfathomable how it could then observe that the evidence in the shape of registered sale deed dated 14'h ## Text _Characters 0–39,981 of 91,156. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39981 for what follows._ A B [2017] 14 S.C.R. 68 UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THROUGH LRS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 16949-16950 of 2017) OCTOBER23,2017 [KURIAN JOSEPH AND A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.] Government Land: Land in possession, on 'Old Grant' terms - Notice for C resumption of the land - Suit for permanent injunction - Seeking order restraining the State (defendant) and its officials from dispossessing him from suit property - Claiming title/ownership of the property vide registered sale deed - Also asserted occupancy rights and ownership rights on account of long and undisturbed possession - Plea of the defendant-appellant was that the land in D question was covered by Old Grant for national defence requirement, ownership whereof belonged to the defendant-appellant - Trial court as well as first appellate court held that the defendant was the owner of the land and possession of the plaintiff was limited to occupancy rights - High Court dismissed the second appeal upholding E concurrent finding of fact on the factum of ownership - However, the High Court·observed the plaintiff would have liberty to raise the issue of title during eviction proceedings - Review petition by the defendant dismissed - Appeal by the defendant to Supreme Court seeking that the observation made by the High Court in the impugned judgment be set aside - Plaintiff interalia took the plea that courts F below were not expected to decide the question of title in an injunction suit simpliciter and that the defendant had failed to prove its title - Held: Mere possession of suit property by itself cannot be reckoned as an evidence on the issue of ownership - From the facts of the case, it is evident that it was well within the knowledge of the G plaintiff that the suit property belonged to Government (defendant) and the right which was transferred to him was only the right of enjoyment of possession of the said land granted under the Old Grant to his predec(!ssor-in-interest - Therefore, the observation made by the High Court is effaced as that observation was the foundation to give liberty to the plaintiff to agitate the question of H 68 UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 69 title - The issue of 'ownership' cannot be called an ancillary issue . A examined by civil court to limited jurisdiction called upon to consider the relief of perma,nent Injunction simpliciter - It was a direct and substantial issue considered by all the courtsbe/ow - The finding ojfact is binding on the plaintiff' and would operate as constructive res judicata - In the facts of the case, the defendant was able to B prove its title - The plaintiff in absence ofchallenge to the High Court order, can neither succeed nor can be permitted to agitate before Supreme Court about the correctness of the findings recorded by courts below on the issue of ownership - The only issue that was left open by appellate courts was about determination of compensation for the structure in terms of Old Grant and C Regulations - Principle of Res Judicata. Constitution of India: Art. 136 - Scope of- Held: Plenary jurisdiction of Art. 136 is not limited to the dispensation provided in Or. XL! r. 22 of CPC - However. the Court cannot make an order, direction or decree placing D the party appealing to it, in a position more disadvantageous than in what it would have been, had it not appealed. Maxim: "Nemo dat quod non habet" - Applicability of Allowing the appeals, the Court E HELD: 1. The High Court has failed to analyse the matter in the manner it ought to have done whilst dealing with second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 at the stage of final hearing. The High Court in the present case has not even adverted to the two substantial questions of law as F were framed in terms of its order nor has it analysed the matter appropriately. [Para 21] [94-C-D] 2.1 The High Court rejected the plaintiff's challenge to the concurrent finding on the issue of ownership and then finally concluded that the second appeal lacked merit and dismissed G the same. It is unfathomable how it could then observe that the evidence in the shape of registered sale deed dated 14'h August, 1980 would prima facie show the ownership of the suit property of the plaintiff. Merely because the possession of the suit property was with the plaintiff, that by itself cannot be reckoned as an H 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A evidence on the issue of ownership of the suit property. [Para 23) (95-A-C) 2.2 The claim of the plaintiff for grant of permanent injunction was founded on his title and ownership of the suit property because of the registered sale deed dated 141h August, 1980. No doubt, B the High Court made reference to the document dated 141h August, 1980 for recording its prima facie view about the ownership of the suit property of the plaintiff. It is also true that the registered sale deed dated 141" August, 1980, does not make any mention about the fact that the suit property was given to the predecessor C in title of the plaintiff under the Old Grant and classified as "B-3" category or that it belongs to the Government of India. Presumably, the High Court proceeded to record its prima facie view in paragraph 17, relying merely on the said registered sale deed. It completely glossed over the crucial fact that the sale deed was the culmination of the registered agreement to sell, D executed between the plaintiff (original respondent) and his predecessor in title dated 131" September, 1979, to which reference has been made in the registered sale deed. [Para 23) (95-C-E) 2.3 The registered agreement to sell executed in favour of E the plaintiff, in no uncertain terms, admits the fact that the suit property belongs to the Government and the right which is being transferred is only the right of enjoyment of possession of the said land granted under the Old Grant, which enured to the predecessor in title of the plaintiff. [Para 23) (95-G-H; 96-A) F 2.4 This registered agreement to sell refers to the title and interest of the previous owner of the suit property which was derived by him from the immediate predecessor in title in terms of registered sale deed dated 1S1h December, 1970. Indisputably, even the said registered sale deed dated 1511' December, 1970 restates the fact that the suit property belongs to the Government, G with limited right to enjoyment of possession thereof. There is one more registered sale deed which has come on record, dated 2nd August, 1948. The same has bearing on the issue of ownership of the suit property. Even this sale deed concededly restates that the suit property vests in the Government. [Paras 24, 25) H [96-D-E, H; 97-AJ UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 71 2.5 Indubitably, the plaintiff acquired the suit property under A the registered sale deed dated 14'h August, 1980 on the same terms and, therefore, executed the admission deed and declaration contemporaneously at the time of registration of the sale deed on 19'h August, 1980. [Para 26) [97-C] 2.6 The plaintiff, advisedly, after receipt of the suit notice B dated 19'h August, 1985, wherein it is asserted that the suit property is Government land given under Old Grant classified as "B-3" category and that the Government wants to resume the same, chose to file suit simpliciter for permanent injunction against the appellant (defendant) from dispossessing the plaintiff C from the suit property pursuant to the suit notice. In the wake of clear stand taken in the suit notice, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for a declaration that the claim set-up by the defendant in the suit notice of ownership of the suit property is · illegal. Obviously, the plaintiff was aware that the only right passed on to him was for enjoyment of the suit property granted under D the Old Grant as class "B-3". The land belonged to the Government of India. [Para 27) (98-F-H] 2. 7 The plaintiff did set up a claim of ownership of the suit property, firstly, on the basis of registered sale deed dated 14'h August, 1980; secondly, having occupancy rights in the suit E property which was analogous to ownership rights; and thirdly, that the plaintiff has full ownership rights by adverse possession over the suit property being in long and undisturbed possession without payment of any rent for over 60 years. As regards the claim of absolute ownership of the plaintiff on the basis of rights derived under the registered sale deed dated 14'h August, 1980, F the same cannot be countenanced. In the backdrop of the factual position emerging from the registered agreement to sell dated 13'h September, 1979, which preceded the execution of the subject registered sale deed dated 14'" August, 1980, the plaintiff executed the admission deed and declaration deed contemporaneously with G full understanding and knowledge. The High Court while recording prima facie opinion in paragraph 17; has not adverted to these essential facts and documents. [Para 28) (99-A-D] 2.8 The appellant (defendant) is, therefore, justified in challenging the prima facie opinion noted in. paragraph 17 of the H 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A impugned judgment. That observation has been made despite having upheld the concurrent finding on the issue of ownership of the suit property rendered by two Courts below, as noted in paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment. The appellant must, therefore, succeed in this appeal to the extent that the first B sentence in paragraph 17 should be effaced. As that observation was the foundation to give liberty to the plaintiff to agitate the question of title over the suit property in the event the plaintiff was required to face eviction proceedings, the said liberty would also get effaced. In that event, it will not be permissible for the plaintiff or persons claiming through or under the plaintiff, to raise C the issue of ownership of the suit property in any proceedings henceforth or for that matter in collateral proceeding. [Para 28) [99-D-F] 3. It is not correct to say that since the issue of title and ownership of the suit property was not directly and substantially D involved in the suit for permanent injunction simpliciter filed by the plaintiff, it would be open to the plaintiff or persons claiming through or under him to raise the issue of title of the suit property in collateral proceedings, such as eviction from the suit property. In the present case, the plaintiff challenged the suit notice dated 19th August, 1985, on the assertion that he is the absolute owner E in possession of the suit property on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 14th August, 1980. By this assertion, the plaintiff implicitly denied the claim of the appellant-defendant that the suit property belonged to the Government and was given under Old Grant falling in class B-3. Besides that assertion in the suit F notice, the appellant-defendant had also unambiguously asserted in the written statement filed to contest the suit stating that the suit property belonged to the Government of India and was given to the grantee under Old Building Grants falling in class B-3, amenable to resumption after giving one month's notice. In the backdrop of such pleadings, the Trial Court framed issues, G inclucling relating to ownership of the suit property. Similar contest was carried before the First Appellate Court. Even the First Appellate Court after analysing the documents held that it has been admitted by the plaintiff that the suit property vests in the Government of India which was amenable to resumption on H payment of compensation for construction to the grantee/ UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D} THR. LRS. 73 occupant. The First Appellate Court, in no uncertain terms, A concluded that the suit property belonged to the Government of India and the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit property but merely enjoyed right to possession thereof under the Old Grant as derived by him from his predecessor in title. Thus, it is not a case of ancillary issue examined by the civil court of limited B jurisdiction called upon to consider the relief of permanent injunction simpliciter. It was a direct and substantial issue considered by the Trial Court and upheld by th,e First Appellate Court and for that matter, even by the High Court, while dismissing the second appeal on the ground that it lacked merit. [Para 29) [99-G-H; 100-A-G) . C 4.1 In the fact situation of the present case, it was not a complicated issue on facts or law, considering the indisputable recitals in the registered agreement to sell and the registered sale deeds coupled with the admission deed and the declaration deed contemporaneously executed by the plaintiff. In such a D situation, the finding of fact recorded against the plaintiff will bind . the plaintiff and operate as constructive res judicata in a subsequent suit for declaration of title or otherwise. [Para 29) [100-G-H; 101-A) Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 594 : (2008] 5 SCR 331 ; Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 543; Purshottam Das Tandon (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. Military Estate Officer & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 344 : [2014] 7 SCR 1085; Sajjadanasltin Sayed Ji,'D. B.E. EDR (D) by LRs. v. Musa Dada~hai Ummer and Ors. (2000) 3 SCC 350 : (2000] 1 SCR 1095 - distinguished. 4.2 The liberty given by the High Court to the plaintiff is limited to raise the issue of title relating to the suit property in E F the event any eviction proceedings are resorted to by the G appellant. Such liberty, will be hit by principles of constructive res judicata in the fact situation of the present case. Further, it is certainly not a liberty to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and ownership, which the plaintiff ought to have filed earlier or at least amended the suit by seeking appropriate declaration. [Para 36] [105-G-H; 106-A) H 74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A 5. It is true that in the present case, the appellant (defendant) did not produce the Old Grant in relation to the suit property, but had produced the GLR extract. It is well settled that GLR extract is conclusive of the fact that the land is covered by Old Grant and the rights enjoyed by the plaintiff were merely possessory or B occupancy rights in respect of the structures thereon. [Para 33) [105-B-C] c Usha Kapoor and Ors. v. Government of India and Ors. (2014) .16 SCC 481 : [2014) 9 SCR 401 - relied on. Satyendra Kumar (Dead) through LRs. v. Mast Ram Uniyal (Dead) though LRs (2013) 14 SCC 367; Union of India v. Purushotam Dass Tandon and Anr: (1986) Suppl. SCC 720 - referred to. Cantonment Laws by J.P. Mittal - referred to. 6.1 The appellant (defendant) alone has assailed the D impugned judgment. The plaintiff (original respondent) has acquiesced of the decree rejecting the relief of permanent injunction, having failed to file cross appeal or for that matter cross objections against the impugned judgment. In absence of any challenge to the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in second appeal rejecting the second appeal on the ground E that it lacked merit, the respondents (successors in title of the plaintiff) can neither succeed nor can be permitted to agitate before this Court about the correctness of the finding recorded by the Courts below on the issue of ownership of the suit property of Government of India and that the plaintiff is not the absolute F owner thereof. The finding of fact so recorded will bind the respondents. The only issue that has been left open in terms of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court and upheld by the High Court consequent to rejection of the second appeal, is about determination of compensation for the structure in terms of the Old Grant and regulations in relation thereto. G Determination of appropriate and reasonable compensation can be done even later by referring the matter to the Arbitrator as per the regulations. That, therefore, cannot come in the way of the appellant to proceed further on the basis of the suit notice dated 19th August, 1985, the validity whereof is unassailable. H [Paras 21, 34 and 35) [99-D-E; 105-C-H) UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 75 Union of India and Ors. v. Harish Chand Anand (1995) A Suppl. 4 SCC 113 : [1995] ·2 Suppl. SCR 347 - relied on. 6.2 Moreover, permitting the respondents to argue beyond the facts admitted in the registered agreement to sell and the registered sale deeds and the admission deed as well as the B declaration deed, will be to encourage an argument that the plaintiff has derived title in the suit property more than what his predecessors in title have had enjoyed - of occupancy/possessory rights alone. The maxim - Nemo dat quod non habet must be borne in mind, which means no one gives what he does not possess. There is no legal basis to relegate the parties before the High . C Court for fresh consideration of the second appeal. (Para 32) [104-D-E) 6.3 The plenary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not limited to the dispensation provided in Order XLI Rule 22 of CPC. However, permitting the respondents D to assail the findings of the Courts below on the issue of ownership of property would be to overlook the cardinal principle that the Court would not ordinarily make an order, direction or decree placing the party appealing to it in a position more disadvantageous than in what it would have been, had it not appealed. Further, the impugned judgment of the High Court E dismissing the second appeal was certainly not in favour of the plaintiff. It was to uphold the decree and order rejecting the relief of permanent injunction. Therefore, the argument now canvassed by the respondents will not be for sustaining the operative order or decree passed by the High Court as such. For, if accepted, it will inevitably entail in not only reversing the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below on the issue of ownership but would also necessitate reversal of the decree passed by the Courts below rejecting the relief of permanent injunction. That could be done ·only if the plaintiff were to challenge the decree of rejection of F the relief of permanent injunction in reference to the suit notice. G Absent such a challenge by way of an appeal or cross objection, the decree to be sustained will be that of the First Appellate Court of partly allowing the appeal of the plaintiff (original respondent) to the extent of claim of compensation on the premise that the plaintiff will get compensation towards construction in terms of the regulations. [Para 32) [103-F-H; 104-A-C) H 76 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 435 : [1999) 2 Suppl. SCR 339; S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 75 : [2007] 1 SCR 843 ; Balbir Kaur and Am: v. Uttar, Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad and Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 1 : [2008) 9 SCR 130; Management of Sundaram Industries Limited v. Sundaram Industries Employees Union (2014) 2 SCC 600 : [20131 16 SCR 1090 - relied on. 7. A priori, in furtherance of notice dated 191" August, 1985 the appellant is free to take possession of the suit property in C accordance with law. However, the respondents are granted time to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property. [Para 401 [l06·F) D E F G H State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmeda and Am: (1973) 2 SCC 547 : [1974) 1 SCR 344 ; Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 555 : [1999) 2 SCR 118 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Kam/a Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511 : [2012) 6 SCR 960 ; Azim Ahmad Kazmi and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Am: (2012) 7 SCC 278 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Robert Zomawia Street (2014) 6 SCC 707 : [2014) 4 SCR 156 ; Purshottam Das Tandon (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. Military Estate Officer and Ors. (2014) 9 sec 344 : [20141 7 SCR 1085; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif and Ors. [1968) 3 SCR 862; National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 626 ; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 133 : [1985) 3 Suppl. SCR 382 ; Muhammad Imam Ali Khan v. Sardar Husain Khan (1897-98) 25 IA 161; Nagubai Ammal and Ors. v. B. Shama Rao and Ors. [1956) 1 SCR 451 ; Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai (19591 1 Suppl. SCR 698 - referred to. Case Law Reference [19951 2 Suppl. SCR 347 [19741 1 SCR 344 relied on referred to Para 14 Para 14 UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 77 [1999) 2 SCR 118 referred to Para 14 A [2012) 6 SCR 960 referred to Para 14 (2012) 1 sec 278 referred to . Para 14 [2014) 4 SCR 156 referred to Para 14 [2014] 7 SCR 1085 distinguished Para 14 [2014] 9 SCR 401 relied on Para 14 B [2008) 5 SCR 331 distinguished Para 16 [2000) 1 SCR 1095 distinguished Para 16 c2000) 7 sec 543 distinguished Para 16 · (1986) Suppl. sec no referred to Para 16 c (2013) 14 sec 367 referred to Para 16 [1999) 2 Suppl. SCR 339 relied on Para 16 [2007) 1 SCR 843 relied on Para 16 [2008) 9 SCR 130 relied on Para 16 [2013) 16 SCR 1090 relied on Para 16 D [1968] 3 SCR 862 referred to Para 17 (1988) 1 sec 626 referred to Para 17 [1985) 3 Suppl. SCR 382 referred to · Para 17 (1897-98) 25 IA 161 referred to Para 17 E [1956) 1 SCR 451 referred to Para 17 [1959) 1 Suppl. SCR 698 referred to Para 30 [2014] 7 SCR 1085 referred to Para 32 CNILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1694916950 of2017. F From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2008 and 19.06.2008 of the High Court of Nanital in Second Appeal No. 206 of 200 l and Review Petition No. 668 of2008. A. K, Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Alka Agrawal, Mukesh Kumar G Maroria, Advs. for the Appellant. U. U. Singh, Sr. Adv., Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Namit Saxena, Ms. Taruna Ardhendumauli Prasad, Nirmal Kumar Ambastha, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam, Advs. for the Respondents. H 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals emanate from the judgment and decree dated 281h February, 2008 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Second Appeal. No.206of2001 and also the order dated l 9'h June, 2008 B in Review Application No.668 of2008. 3. The central issue involved in these appeals is: whether the High Court, while dismissing the second appeal filed by the plaintiff (original respondent) being devoid of merit and despite upholding the concurrent finding of fact recorded by two Courts below on the factum of ownership C of the land, was justified in making an observation which has the potential of reopening the already settled issue of title in respect of the suit property? 4. The original respondent Vijay Krishna Uniyal, claiming to be the owner and in possession of the immovable property admeasuring D 3.398 acres, known as Wolfsbum Estate, situated at Survey No.11, Landour Cantonment, Mussoorie (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property"), on which a building existed, consisting of many rooms in which a block for watchman and other structures existed, was served with a notice dated 19' 11 August, 1985 issued by the Under Secretary to E the Government of India, for and on behalf of President of India, bearing No. 701/64/R&D/ L&C/74/1805/D(Lands), to quit and deliver possession of the land together with structures standing thereon, to the agent of Government (Defence Estate Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cantonment), on the expiry ofone month's notice from the date of its receipt. It was also made amply clear that on expiry of the said period, F any right regarding occupation or easement and interest in the said property shall cease to exist. The said notice reads thus: G H "No. 70I164/R&DIL&C/7411805/D(Lands) Government of India, Ministry of Defence. To Shri. Vijaya Krishan Uniyal, Sy. No. 11, Wolf Burn Estate, Landour Cantonment New Delhi 19'h Aug, 1985 UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 79 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.) NOTICE A WHEREAS the land comprising Sy. No.11 the site of B. No. known as Wolf Burn Estate, Landour Cantonment measuring 3.398 acres and bounded as follows: On the North by Sy. No.13 On the South by Sy. No.173 and 163 On the East by Sy. No.170 On the West by Sy. No.163 B Belongs to the President of India (hereinafter called the Govt.) C and is held by you on 'old Grant' terms under the Governor Genera/order No.179 of 12.9.1836 under hw Government are entitled to resume the said land. 2. AND WHEREAS Government has decided to resume the said land and the buildings standing thereon. 3. NOW therefore, in exercise of the power hereinafter mentioned, the Government hereby give notice to you to quit D and deliver possession of the aforesaid land together with structures standing thereon to the agent for government E (Defence Estates Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cant!), on the expiry of the one month notice from the date of receipt of this notice. Please note that on the expiry of one month from the date of service of this notice your occupation and any right easement and interest you may have in the said land F . and buildings standing thereon shall cease as from that date. 4. TAKE NOTICE further that Government are prepared to pay and so offer you the sum of Rs.17,2751- (Rupees Seventeen thousand two hundred and seventy five) only as the value of the authorised erections standing on the aforesaid land. A G cheque for this amount is enclosed herewith. Sd/- (A.K. GOYAL) Under Secretary to the Government of India For and on behalf of President of ·India" (emphasis supplied) H -, - . 80 SUPl MB COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A 5. After receipt of the said notice, the original respondent filed a civil suit before the Court of Civil Judge, Court No. l, Dehradun, Mussoorie, being Suit No.484of1985, for simpliciter permanent injunction restraining the appellants, its officers' or representatives and servants from dispossessing him from the suit property pursuant to the B aforementioned notice dated 19'h August, 1985. An alternative relief was prayed that a reasonable and adequate compensation in respect of the suit property be determined by the appellant on the principles laid down by law, for acquisition of the immovable property after giving an opportunity to the plaintiff (original respondent) of being heard before he is compelled to deliver possession of the suit property to the appellant. C The reliefs claimed in the said suit read thus: D E F G H "The plaintiff therefore, begs to claim a decree against the defendant for:- 1. Permanent injunction restraining the defendant, its officers, representatives and servants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the immovable property known as Wolfsburn Estate, situate at Survey No.11, Landour Cantonment, Mussoorie in pursuance of the notice No. 701164/R&DIL&C/ 7411805/D Lands dated 1911' August 1985 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of lndia. Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. In the AlternatiFe a reasonable and adequate compensation for Wolfsburn Estate be determined by the defendant on the principles laid down by law for the acquisition of the immovable property after giving an opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard and paid to the plaintiff before he is made liable to deliver possession of the said property to the defendant. 2. Full costs of this suit against the defendant. 3. Any other relief or reliefs which in the opinion of the learned Court the plaintiff is entitled to. Vijay Krishan Uniyal Plaintiff By the pen of (lndu Mouli Uniyal) Duly constituted attorney" 6. From the tenor of the plaint, it is amply clear that the suit was filed on the basis of title acquired by the plaintiff in the suit property vide UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 81 . [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] ·registered Sale Deed dated 14'h August, 1980. On that assertion, it is A pleaded that the defendant has no right to take possession of the ~uit property in the guise of being owner thereof. The plaintiff claimed to be in settled occupation of the suit property. The plaintiff also asserted that he has occupancy rights in the suit property which were analogous to the ownership rights vested in him. On that basis, it was pleaded that B possession of the suit property can be taken over only by way of acquisition and payment of reasonable compensation therefor to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also set up an alternative plea that he has acquired full ownership rights in the suit property on account oflong and undisturbed possession, without payment of any rent for over 60 years. 7. The assertions made by the plaintiff were contested by the C appellant by filing written statement. It was categorically stated that the plaintiff, under the registered sale deed, had purchased only occupancy .rights from the previous holder and was not the absolute owner of the property. The property belongs to the appellant and it was open to the appellant to resume the same in terms of Old Grant for national defence D requirement. The appellant categorically denied the assertion of the plaintiff that the occupancy rights were analogous to ownership rights or that the plaintiff had become the absolute owner of the suit property by · adverse possession. It was asserted by the appellant that it wanted to resume the land which was granted originally on Old Grant terms to a private occupancy holder. It is not a case of acquisition of the suit property E but resumption thereof, in terms of the stipulations in the· Old Grant. Regarding the prayer for awarding reasonable compensation, the appellant stated that it was open to the plaintiff (original respondent) to request the Government to constitute a Committee of Arbitration for determination of reasonable compensation in terms of the Old Grant regulations issued by the then Governor General in Council vide General Order No.179 dated 12th August, 1836. It was also asserted by the appellant that it was incorrect to contend that the plaintiff was not offered any compensation at all. Further, the plaintiff will be entitled for suitable compensation only in respect of the structures and not in relation to the land as such. The appellant, thus, prayed that the suit deserves to be dismissed. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court fra!'ned four issues which read thus: "1. Whether the plaintiff is absol11te owner of the property in disp11te and as such the property cannot be res11med? F G H 82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A 2. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice u/s 80 of B C.PC.? 3. Whether the defendant has right to resume the property and the plaintiff is entitled only for the compensation? 4. Relief? " (emphasis supplied) 8. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective stand. The Trial Court, however, answered the issues against the plaintiff (original respondent) and has held that the C suit property belongs to the Government of India. Further, the possession of the plaintiff (original respondent) was limited to occupancy rights therein derived from the Old Grant in favour of his predecessor in title. The Trial Court held that the defendant had right to resume the property and the plaintiff (original respondent) was entitled only to get compensation for the structure. Accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit in entirety D vide judgment and decree dated 16th October, 1997. E 9. Aggrieved, the plaintiff (original respondent) filed Civil Appeal No.69of1997 before the Court of Additional District Judge-II, Dehradun. The Appellate Court formulated four points for its consideration, which read thus:- " I. Whether appellant/plaintiff happens to be owner of suit property? 2. Whether effect of non-issuance of notice of section 80 C.PC. is detrimental? F 3. Whether defendants/respondents have got rights in the G H 4. property and plaintiff is entitled, to get compensation only? ,, Whether the plaintiff is entitled /o get the relief(s) sought?" (emphasis supplied) The Appellate Court, after analysing the evidence and documents and · admission deed executed by the plaintiff, available on record, answered the questions posed before it, in particular regarding the ownership of the suit property. The First Appellate Court upheld the finding of fact UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 83 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] . recorded by the Trial Court - that the suit property belongs to the A Government oflndia and the plaintiff (original respondent) was not the owner thereof. The relevant extract from the decision of the First Appellate Court reads thus: "] heard both the parties and perused the evidence & document available on record. Question before me is as to :B whether appellant/plaintiff happens to be owner of suit property or not? Second question is as to w,hether notice dated 091h August, 1985 which was issued to the appellant, the same was to as per rules or not. Another question is as to whether appellant is entitled to get any compensation or not? C As far as ownership is concerned, document which was filed by the appellant/plaintiff in support of his case, he filed the sale deed 23Al in those documents. According to the same, he purchased this property from S. D Jodh Singh, S. Jogender Singh, S. Harbhajan Singh, S. Ranjit Singh and others. Thus, defendant/respondents if have raised this contention that this land belonged to the Government of India. Appellant/plaintiff does not have ownership right on this property. In support of this case they filed documents vide list 20C and 27C and documents were E filed through 35C also in which 38C is the said admission deed in. which appellant/plaintiff has admitted that a this property vests in the Government of India an in the declaration deed 39C, it has been .admitted that rights of Government of India vest in this Property and it was also F admitted that if its resumption is done, then compensation for the construction would be paid to him. Similarly, Jogender Singh who sold this property to appellant/plaintiff, he too had executed such deed in favour of opposite party. From these documents, it becomes evident that this suit place belongs to the Government of India and appellant/plaintiff G is not owner of the suit land. Thus, this conclusion ·of the learned lower court is as per rules land according to the records." (emphasis supplied) H 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R. A I 0. As regards the question of compensation, the First Appellate Court opined that the plaintiff (original respondent) would be entitled for . compensation for which he must first approach the Government for appointment of an Arbitrator to determine appropriate compensation to be paid to him. Resultantly, the First Appellate Court was pleased to B partly allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court only on the issue of compensation. The operative order passed by the First Appellate Court modifying the decree passed by the Trial Court, reads thus: c D "ORDER Appeal of the appellant is allowed partially and judgment of lower court about compensation is set-aside. Appellant/ plaintiff is entitled to get compensation for the suit property he would submit application to the defendants for this compensation and after hearing, defendant would determine this compensation. Both parties to bear their respective expenses. " 11. Against the decision of the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff (original respondent) approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital by way of Second Appeal No.206 of 2001. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of the High Court vi de order dated 14 111 E July, 1999, was pleased to admit the second appeal by framing two substantial questions oflaw. The said order reads thus: "Heard Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants. It is submitted that by notice dated 19.08.1985 as contained F in annexure-2 to the affidavit, the property in question was resumed by the respondent and an amount of Rs.17,2751was offered as compensation. It is submitted that the amount of compensation was arrived at arbitrarily withou(giving any opportunity to the appellant for determining the amount G of compensation. The submission is that the appellant cannot be dispossessed and the respondent a cannot resume the land on the basis of such a notice. His next submission is tha( no evidence has been adduced to the effect that the land belongs to the respondent. The defendant respondent have relied upon certain admission of the plaintiff/appellant which alone H is not enough. UNION OF INDIA v. VIJAY KRISHNA UNIYAL (D) THR. LRS. 85 [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] Learned Counsel relies upon the Judgment of this Court in A Second Appeal No.286of1978 Purshottam Das Tandon Vs. ·Union of India, decided on 27'h November, 1981. :Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having considered the Judgment reference to in support of his arguments, the appeal is admitted on the following substantial B questions of law:- 1. Whether the notice dated 19.08.1985 would entitle the defendant respondent to resume the land and dispossess the plaintiff appellant without giving· him opportunity of hearing for determining the amount of c compensation? 2. · Whether in the absence of any other evidence adduced by the defendants respondents, on the basi~ of alleged admission of the plaintiff/appellant, alone the property can be held to be belonging t