# UNIVERSITY OF POONA & ORS v. SHANKAR NARHAR AGESHE & ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 597
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-05-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1971
- **Bench:** J. l\t. SHELAT, A. N. Ray, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/university-of-poona-ors-v-shankar-narhar-ageshe-ors-5375
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Election-System of proportional representation by single transferable
vote by ballot-Equality of votes in second count-Exclusion of candidate
by reference to votes on firsi count-Propriety.
Affiliation of Colleges to University-Delay In publication of notification-Effect on voting rights.
Under s. II of the Poona University Act, 1948, the Vice Chancellor
shall be elected by the Court of the University, from among three persons
recommended by the Executive Council, and the election shall be made by
the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable
vote by ballot: In ·the present case, the result of the ballot papers was
that one candidate secured 58 first preference votes, the second secured 53
first preference votes, and the third candidate secured 37 first preference
votes. The third candidate was eliminated on the first count on the basis
of his securing the lowest number of first preference votes, and his second
preference votes were distributed between the other two.
This resulted
in both o·f them securing an equal number of votes on the second count.
and the candidate who bad the majority in the first count was declared
elected. The election was set aside by the High Court.
On the questions: (1) Whether the tie should have been resolved by
drawing of lots; and (2) Whether the principals of four colleges voted
wrongly at the election because those colleges had not been duly affiliated
at the date of election.
HELD: (1) It is an established principle in the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote by ballot, that
where for one vacancy there are three candidates and one of them is excluded at the first count and the other two candidates continue and secure
in the second count an equal number of votes. then the one who had dte
lower number of votes in the first count shall be excluded. Determination
by lot in case of equality of votes is neither a principle of universal application nor is it a common law principle. It is only permissible when
there is a specific statutory provision to that effect. In the absence of such
a statutory provision the method of decision by lot is not resorted to when
there is another rational method. The principle of decision by lot is dependent on chance and accident whereas the principle of exclusion with
reference to difference of vote~ on the original count is based on reason
and legislative principles.
The principles of exclusion are not to be found in any statutory enactment in the present case. On the other hand there is the support Of legislative measures embodying the principle of exclusion by reference to original count [6050, H; 606A-C]
(a) Rule 75(4) of the Conduct of Election Rules indicates that wht-n
two or more candidates have been credited with the same value and stand
lowest on the poll the candidate for whom the lowest number of original
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votes are recorded shall be excluded.
The rule applf..: · ·;. :i_en there are
tv;o or more candidates and not only when there are more than two candidates. The words 'stand lowest on the poll' qualify 'two or more candidates \vho have been credited with the same value'. The High Court overlooked the rational of the principle embodied in this rule that in the case
of two continuing candidates each having the same value of votes to fiU
in one vacancy the tie between the two would be resolved by having regard
to their original votes in the first count. [604B, F]
(b) Rule 6 in the Schedule to the Presidential and Vice·Presidential
Election Rules, 1952, and Statute No. 158 framed under the Poona University Act, though it does not in terms apply to the election of a Vic~-Chan
cellor, also embody this prjnciple. [603B]
(c) The High Court's reliance on r. 81(13) of the Conduct of Elec·
tion Rule, 1961, in support of the conclusion that the only system of exclusion in a case of the present type should be by lot is erroneous.

## Text

UNIVERSITY OF POONA & ORS.
v.
SHANKAR NARHAR AGESHE & ORS.
Apri~ 30, 1971
[J. l\t. SHELAT,A. N. RAY AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Election-System of proportional representation by single transferable
vote by ballot-Equality of votes in second count-Exclusion of candidate
by reference to votes on firsi count-Propriety.
Affiliation of Colleges to University-Delay In publication of notification-Effect on voting rights.
Under s. II of the Poona University Act, 1948, the Vice Chancellor
shall be elected by the Court of the University, from among three persons
recommended by the Executive Council, and the election shall be made by
the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable
vote by ballot: In ·the present case, the result of the ballot papers was
that one candidate secured 58 first preference votes, the second secured 53
first preference votes, and the third candidate secured 37 first preference
votes. The third candidate was eliminated on the first count on the basis
of his securing the lowest number of first preference votes, and his second
preference votes were distributed between the other two.
This resulted
in both o·f them securing an equal number of votes on the second count.
and the candidate who bad the majority in the first count was declared
elected. The election was set aside by the High Court.
On the questions: (1) Whether the tie should have been resolved by
drawing of lots; and (2) Whether the principals of four colleges voted
wrongly at the election because those colleges had not been duly affiliated
at the date of election.
HELD: (1) It is an established principle in the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote by ballot, that
where for one vacancy there are three candidates and one of them is excluded at the first count and the other two candidates continue and secure
in the second count an equal number of votes. then the one who had dte
lower number of votes in the first count shall be excluded. Determination
by lot in case of equality of votes is neither a principle of universal application nor is it a common law principle. It is only permissible when
there is a specific statutory provision to that effect. In the absence of such
a statutory provision the method of decision by lot is not resorted to when
there is another rational method. The principle of decision by lot is dependent on chance and accident whereas the principle of exclusion with
reference to difference of vote~ on the original count is based on reason
and legislative principles.
The principles of exclusion are not to be found in any statutory enactment in the present case. On the other hand there is the support Of legislative measures embodying the principle of exclusion by reference to original count [6050, H; 606A-C]
(a) Rule 75(4) of the Conduct of Election Rules indicates that wht-n
two or more candidates have been credited with the same value and stand
lowest on the poll the candidate for whom the lowest number of original
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votes are recorded shall be excluded.
The rule applf..: · ·;. :i_en there are
tv;o or more candidates and not only when there are more than two candidates. The words 'stand lowest on the poll' qualify 'two or more candidates \vho have been credited with the same value'. The High Court overlooked the rational of the principle embodied in this rule that in the case
of two continuing candidates each having the same value of votes to fiU
in one vacancy the tie between the two would be resolved by having regard
to their original votes in the first count. [604B, F]
(b) Rule 6 in the Schedule to the Presidential and Vice·Presidential
Election Rules, 1952, and Statute No. 158 framed under the Poona University Act, though it does not in terms apply to the election of a Vic~-Chan
cellor, also embody this prjnciple. [603B]
(c) The High Court's reliance on r. 81(13) of the Conduct of Elec·
tion Rule, 1961, in support of the conclusion that the only system of exclusion in a case of the present type should be by lot is erroneous. Tlie principle in r. 81(3) applies only where more than one seat is to be filled and
only one vacancy remains unfilled with only two continuing candidates and
each of them has the same value of votes at that count. [605C]
(d) The defeated candidate himself made a petition to the Chancellor
under s. 60 of the Act, which provides that if any question arises as to
whether a person bas been duly elected the matter may be referred to the
Chancellor whose decision shall be final, not to confirm the election. The
Court of the University has thus laid down its own procedure for correction. When there is discretion to choose between two principles of exclusion, this Court would not command the University to exercise the discretion in a specific way. [606E]
(2) The four colleges were in fact affiliated before the date of election
but there was delay in the publication of the notification.
Such delay
would not detract from the sanction previously granted. [607 A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1971.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 18, 21;
1970 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.
F
1583 of 1970.
G
H
S. J. Sorabeje, M. 0. Chi11oy, J. R. Gagrat, aild B. R. Agar·
wala, for the appellants.
V. S. Desai and S. B. Wad, for the respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4
and 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ray, J.-This is an appeal by certificate under Article 133(1)
(c) of the Constitution from the judgment dated 18 and 21 Decem·
ber, 1970 of the Bombay High Court.
The Bombay High Court issued a writ of quo warranto d.eclar·
ing that respondent No. 3 Dr. Balkrishna Pandur~ng Apte is not
entitled to act as the Vico-Chancellor of the University of Poona
POONA UNIVERSITY v. S. N. AGESHB (Ray, J.)
is pursuance of the election -held on 9 May, 1970 and further restraining him from acting as the Vice-Chancellor.
H. V. Pataskar, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona
died on 21 February, 1970.
The Governor of Bombay who is
the Chancellor of the University then nominated Maha Mahopadhyaya Datto V aman Potdar to act as the Vice-Chancellor until the
date on which another Vice-Chancellor was elected under sub-section ([) of section 11 of the Poona University Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Under section 12 of the Act the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic officer of the University.
Under
section 11 of the Act the Vice-Chancellor shall be elected by the
Court from among three persons recommended by the Executive
Council.
Section 56 of the Act provides that every election to
the office of the Vice-Chancellor and every recommendation for
the nomination to the office of the Vice-Chancellor under the Act
shall be made by the system of proportional representation by
means of a single transferable vote by bal!ot in such manner as
may be prescribed by the Statutes.
At the meeting of the Executive Council held on 28 February,
24 March and 18 April. 1970 the Executive Council recommended a panel of three persons.
They were Dr. Balkrishna Pandu·
rang Apte, Principal Narayan Ramchandra Kulkarni and Principal
Narhar Govind Suru for election to the office of the Vice-Chancellor.
These were the three candidates from amongst whom the
Court of the University had to elect one as the Vice-Chancellor.
The said meeting of the Court of the University was convened under notice dated 22 April, 1970 for 9 May, 1970 for election
of the Vice-Chancellor from amongst those three persons.
At the
election held on '9 May, 1970 the total number of votes tendered
was 149.
One of the votes was invalid.
The valid votes were
148.
The election was in accordance with section 56 of the Act
by the system of proportional representation by 11\eans of a single
transferable vote by ballot.
The result of the ballot papers
appeared to be that Dr. Apte secured 58, Principal Kulkarni 37
and Principal Suru 53 first preference votes.
Principal Kulkarni
was thus eliminated on the first count on the basis of the lowest
number of first preference votes.
8 of the voters who had given
first preference votes to Principal Kulkarni had not exercised second
preference in favour of either of the remaining two candidates Dr.
Aptc and Principal Suru.
The remaining 29 voters gave 12
second preference votes to Dr. Apte and 17 second preference
votes to Principal Suru.
This resulted in both the continuing
candidates Dr. Apte and Principal Suru each securing 70 votes on
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the second count.
Dr. Apte was declared elected because in the
first count, namely, the count previous· to the one in which both
obtained equal number of votes.
Dr. Apte had a clear majority
of 5 votes and therefore Principal Suru was excluded from the
election.
The election of Dr. Apte was challenged in the High Court
on three principal grounds.
First, it was contended that the tie
between Dr. Apte and Principal Suru at the second count was
to be resolved by drawing of lots, because it was the ordinary
practice in elections held under the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote by ballot for election to a single seat that the tie of the above kind must be resolved by drawing of lots.
Secondly, it was said that the Principal
of four Colleges, v1'z. N. D. M. V. P. Samaj's Arts and Commerce
College, Sinnar; V. P. Mandal's Arts, Science and Commerce
College, Thana; Narhar Balwant Thakur Law College, Nasik and
G. E. Society's College for Education, Sangamner which had not
been duly affiliated at the date of the election had acted and voted
at the election as members of the Court, and, therefore, the votes
given by the members of those four colleges were invalid. Thirdly,
it was contended that the meeting for the election of the panel of
respondents Dr. Apte, Principal Kulkarni and Principal Suru for
election to the office of the Vice-Chancellor was an invalid meet·
ing and therefore the election was void.
The High Court upheld the first contention and rejected the
other two.
The High Court held that when upon final count the
continuing candidates Dr. Apte and Principal Suru secured equal
majority of valid votes the system of proportional representation
by means of a single transferable vote by ballot never aimed ~t
1
excluding one of such continuing candidates by reference to any
of the previous counts and I or of original vote. The High Court
held that where only two continuing candidates remained to fill up
only one vacancy and both of them had the same number of votes
the tie of votes between the two continuing candidates was to be
solved by the principle of decision by lot
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H
Section 56 of the Act speaks both of election to the office of
the Vice-Chancellor or any authority of the University by the ~ys
tem of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote by ballot in such manner as may be prescribed by the
Statutes. The authorities of the University are mentioned in section 15 of the Act.
The Vice-Chancellor is not one of the authorities mentioned there.
The Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers
of the University.
The officers of the University are mentioned
in section 8 of the Act.
POONA UNIVERllITY v. B. N. AGESHE (Ray, J.)
Section 18 of the Act contemplated making of Statutes. Statutes No. 142 to 165 are the relevant Statutes for elections to authorities.
These Statutes do not apply lo election of Vice-Chancellor
because he is not an authority.
The system of election by proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote by
ballot is the prescribed system of election to authorities.
The
relevant Statute for election to authorities on which counsel for
the appellants relied is Statute No. 158 in support of the proposition that it embodied the rule of exclusion of one of the two continuing candidates both of whom secured equal number of votes
in the second count by reference to the principle as to which of
the two continuing candidates had the lowest number of votes at
the first count.
There is no doubt that Statute No. 158 does not
in terms apply to the election of Vice-Chancellor but it is manifest
that Statute No. 158 embodies a rule of exclusion of one of the
candidates at the second count on the ground that that candidate
had the lowest number of votes at the first count.
Election by· proportional representation by means of a single
transferable vote by ballot is often described as the Hare system
of proportional representation named after the English political
reformer Thomas Hare.
This system of election is based on a
quota determined by the following formula. The total votes cast
is divided by the number of seats to be filled plus one, and one is
added to the quotient.
If 100.000 votes are cast and 4 seats are
to be filled, divide by 5 to get a quotient of 20,000 then add 1
to get 20,001, which is the quota.
A candidate receiving the quota
of first-choice of votes is elected.
Under this system electors
express first, second. third or additional choices according to the
number of candidates. An elector does not waste his vote. If the
candidate for whom he has expressed his choice, does not need
his vote, the surplus votes are distributed in accordance with the
indicated second choices among candidates whose quotas have not
been filled.
If enough candidates are not elected by this process
the candidate with the smallest number of choices is then excluded
and his votes are distributed in the same way.
This process of
exclusion or elimination goes on until enough candidates have filled their quotas or until the successive eliminations have left no
more than enough to fill the vacancies.
In working out the method of election in the present case, it
has to be noticed whether the manner in which Principal Suru has
been excluded at the second count and Dr. Apte has been declared
elected at the second count is a principle of exclusion which has
been recognised in the system of proportional representation by
means of a smgle transferable vote by ballot.
Counsel for the
appellants contended that there was legislative recognition of this
principle in three cases.
The first is rule 75 of the Conduct of
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Elections Rules, 1961.
The second is rule 6 in the Schedule to
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Rules; 1952. The
third is Statute No. 158 in the Statutes of the Poona University
Act. - Rule 75 of the Conduct of Elections Rules is applicable
in the case of counting of votes where only one seat is to be filled.
The two sub-rules of Rule 75 on which reliance was placed by
counsel for the appellants for the legislative recognition of the principle of exclusion are (3) and (4) which are as follows :-
"(3). If, at the end of any count, no candidate can be
declared eleeted, the returning officer shall-
(a) exclude from the poll the candidate who up
to that stage has been credited with the lowest value;
(b) examine all the ballot papers in his parcel
and sub-parcels, arrange the unexhausted papers in
sub-parcels according to the next available preferences recorded thereon for the continuing candidates.
count the number of papers in each sub-parcel and
credit it to the candidate for whom such preference
is recorded, transfer the sub-oarcel to that candidate.
and make a separate sub-parcel of all the exhausted
papers; and
(c) see whether any of the continuing candidates
has, after such transfer and credit, secured the quora.
(4) If, when a candidate has to be excluded under
clause (a) of sub-rule (3), two or more candidates have
been credited with the same value and stand lowest on the
poll, the candidate for whom the lowest number of original votes are recorded shall be excluded, and if this number als<> is the same in the case of two or more candidates
the returning officer shall decide by lot which of them shall
be excluded".
Sub-rule (4) indicates that if when a candidate has to be excluded
two or more candidates have been credited with the same value
and stand lowest on the poll the candidate for whom the lowest
number of original votes are recorded shall be excluded. In the
present case at the first count Principal Kulkarni was excluded
because he received the lowest number of votes on the first count.
At the second count Dr. Apte and Principal Suru were the two
continuing candidates. · Of these two one had to be excluded.
Therefore the principle of exclusion is that the candidate for whom
the lowest number of original votes are recorded shall be excluded.
The original first preference votes indicated that Dr. Apte
POONA UNIVERSITY V. S. N. AGESHE (Ray, J.)
had 58 votes and Principal Suru had 53 votes.
Therefore, Dr.
Apte had larger first preference votes.
The other part of sub-rule
(4) of rule 75 is that if both at the first count and at the second
count they had equal number of votes then one of them was to
be excluded on the principle of decision by lot.
Rule 6 in the Schedule to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Rules, 1952 on which counsel for the appellants
relied embodied the same principle ~hich is as follows : -
"If, when a candidate has to be excluded under
clause (a) above, two or more candidates have been credited with the same number of votes and stand lowest
on the poll, exclude that caudiate who had secured the
lowest number of first preference votes, and if that number also was the same in the case of two or more candidates, decide by lot which of them shall be excluded".
Statute No. 158(3) on which counsel for the appellants relied
is as follows : -
"If, when a candidate has to be excluded, two or
more candidates have each the same number of votes, and
are lowest on the poll, the candidate with the lowest number of votes at the first count at which the candidates
in question have an unequal number of votes shall be
excluded and, when the number of votes credited to the
candidates are equal at all counts, the Registrar shall
determine by lot who shall be excluded".
These provisions were referred to and relied on by counsel
for the appellancy only for the limited purpose of establishing that
where two continuing candidates at the second count have equal
number of votes in the second count and there is one vacancy
to be filled up the candidate who had the lower number of votes
at the first count shall be excluded.
The High Court held that the words "two or more candidates"
and the other words "stand lowest on the poll" in rule 75(4) of
the Conduct of Elections Rules indicated that the principle embodied in that rule would apply only where the contest continued
between three and more continuing candidates and the question
could not arise when the contest was only between two candidates
left over as continuing candidates. The other reason given by
the High Court was that when there were two continuing candidates they could never stand lowest on the poll and the two candidates, according to the High Court, could stand lowest on the poll
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only if there were other remaining or continuing candidates with
larger and better value of votes. The interpretation of rule 75(4)
by the High Court is erroneous. The rule itself speaks of two or
more candidates and does not speak of more than two candidates
as the High Court construed it. The words "stand lowest on the
poll" occur along with two or more candidates who have
been credited with the same value. It is because they have tlie
same value that both of them stand lowest on the poll. There"
fore, rule 75(4) resolves that tie by adopting the principle of exclusion of one of the candidates with regard to the number of original
votes at the first count.
The High Court held that the principle in rule 75(4) would
not apply in the present case with only two continuing candidates
for filJing in one vacancy because there would be no possibility
of transfer of the excluded candidate's votes in favour of the other
candidate. The High Court therefore relied on rule 81(3) of the
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 to support the conclusion that
the only system of exclusion in a case of the present type would
be decision by lot.
Rule 81(3) is as foliows : -
"When at the end of any count only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two continuing candidates and each of them has the same value of votes and
no surplus remains capable of transfer, the returning officer shall decide by lot which of them shall be excluded;
and after excluding him in the manner aforesaid, declare
the other candidate to be elected".
The High Court overlooked the rational of the principle
embodied in rule 75(4) that in the case of two continuing candidates each having the same value of votes to fill in one vacancy
the tie between the two would be solved by having regard to their
original votes in the first count.
There would be no occasion
for transfer of excluded candidate's votes in such a contingency.
Where two or more candidates continued for one vacancy and eaoh
of the candidates would have the same value of votes at the end
of a count the tie between the two or more candidates having
equality of votes would be solved by excluding the one who had
the lowest number of votes on the first count and thereafter the
excluded candidate's second choice would be transferred to the
continuing candidates until the vacancy would be filled· up by the
principle of exclusion embodied in rule 75(4).
The principle in rule 81(3) is applicable where more than one
seat is to be filled and only one vacancy remains unfilled with
only two continuing candidates and each of them has the same
POONA UNIVERSITY V, S. N. AOESHE (Ray, J.)
60&
value of votes at that count.
In such a case the exclusion of one
of the candidates is decision by lot.
The reason for decision
by lot in rule 81(3) is that the two continuing candidates by reason
of the transferred votes at the last count have the same value of
votes.
The values of their votes in the previous counts have
already been worked out by rule 80(7) of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 which embodied the principle of exclusion of
a candidate where two or more candidates have the same value
of votes by having regard to the original votes of each candidate
and excluding the candidate for whom fewest original votes are
recorded.
The principle of Rule 81(3) does not apply to the
present case because that rule applies to counting of votes where
more than one seat is to be filled.
This is not the case here.
Rule 81(3) resolves tie on count of votes between the last two
contesting candidates at the last count on transfer of votes from
the previous count.
It is an established principle in the system of proportional
representation by means of a single transferable vote by ballot that
where for one vacancy there are three candidates and one of them
is excluded at the first count and the two candidates continued ·and
in the second count both of them have equal number of votes then
one of the two candidates who had the lower number of votes than
the other continuing canddate in the first count shall be excluded.
The present election was held on this principle.
Section 56 of
the Act only speaks of election by the system of proportional
representation by means of a single transferable vote.
It cannot
be said in the present case that there is any statutory infringement
of election by the system of proportional representation by means
of a single transferable vote.
The two rival contentions were that
according to the University authorities Principal Suru was to be
excluded at the second count because his votes on the original
count were lower than that of Dr. Apte whereas according to the
persons who impeached the election the only method of exclusion
was decision by lot.
It appears that there is legislative sanction
in support of the contention on behalf of the University authorities that resolving equality of votes by reference to first preference
or original votes is a known recognised method in the system of
proportional representation by means of a
single transferable
vote.
Even if Statute No. 158 of the Poona University does not
in terms apply, Statute No. 158 furnishes a valuable guide regarding the working of the system of proportional representation mentioned in section 56 of the Act and principles analogous to Statute
No. 158 are applicable and have been applied by the authorities
who conducted the election in the present case.
Determination by lot in case of equality of votes in neither a
principle of universal application nor is it a common law principle.
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It is only permissible when there is a specific statutory provision
to that effect.
In the absence of a statutory provision the method
of decision by lot is not resorted to when there is other rational
method.
The principle of decision by lot is dependent on chance
and accident whereas the principle of exclusion with reference to
difference of votes on the original count is based on reu:, ·'-· ... '.
legislative principles.
In the present case the Statute imposed a
duty of election by the system of proportional representation by
means of a single transferable vote.
The principles of exclusion
are not to be found in any statutory enactment in the present case.
On the one hand there is the support of legislative measures embodying the principle of exclusion by reference to original count.
The principle of exclusion by lot on the other hand is adhered
to only if the Statute has a compelling force to that effect.
In
the present case there is no such statutory compulsion of deciding
by lot in the eventuality which happened. If there are two principles of exclusion and the authority has a discretion in the mode
of performing the duty, the authority cannot be commanded to a
duty in a specific way (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Third
Edition, Vol. 11, Para. 160, page 85).
The election was held by the continuing Vice-Chancellor. The
Court of the University was master of its own procedure. It adopted one of the principles of exclusion by reference to votes on the
original count.
In following that procedure it cannot be said
that there is violation of statute. It is not out of place to mention
here that Principal Suru himself made a petition to the Chancellor
under section 60 of the Act asking him not to confirm the election.
Under section 60 of the Act if any question arises as to whether a
person has been duly elected or appointed the matter may be refer·
red on a petition to the Chancellor who shall decide the question
and his decision shall be final. We are not basing our decision on
the finality of the decision of the Chancellor in the present case but
this is a feature which is not to be lost sight of by reason of the
fact that the candidate who lost at the election made representation for redress of his grievances to the Chancellor.
Counsel on behalf of the respondents repeated the contention
which had been advanced in the High Court that Principals of 4
unaffiliated Colleges attended the Court meeting and therefore the
election was bad.
The High Court rightly rejected that contention.
There is evidence to show that in the month of June, 1969 the
Government sanctioned the recommendation of the University for
affiliation of these Colleges to the University.
The affiliation was
for three years from 1969.
In these orders it was stated that the
final Government notification would be issued after the University
submitted a report to the Government of fulfilling the conditions.
The respondents' contention was that the notification was publish·
ed after the month of May, 1970. The High Court rightly held
POONA UNIVERSITY v. S. N. AOESHE (Ray, J.)
that the sanction was granted by the Government.
Delayed publication of the notification would not detract from the sanction
previously granted.
The third contention which had been urged
in the High Court was not pressed here.
For these reasons, we accept the appeal and set aside the
judgment of the High Court. Each party will pay and bear its own
costs in this Court.
V.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
607
A
B