# V ADJVELU THEV .AR v. THE STATE OF MADRAS

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 981
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-07-25
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 24 and 25 of 1957
- **Bench:** JAGANNADHADAs, B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/v-adjvelu-thev-ar-v-the-state-of-madras-1384
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

981
Murder-Convictio11 on
the
testimony of a
single witnessP,-opriety-Capital sentence,
if appropriate-Extenuating circumstance-Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 134.
The appellants
were charged with murder and convicted
on
the sole testimony of a wimess. The first appellant was sentenced
to death and the second to five years' rigorous
imprisonment. It
was contended
for
them, inter alia,
that
the
conviction
and
sentences
should not be
upheld
because in a case: involving a
charge of murder-the court should not, on the ground of prudence,
convict an accused person upon the testimony of a single witness,
and, in any case, impose the extreme penalty of law.
Held, that the question whether in such a case the court could
convict l::im depended upon the facts and circumstances of the
case and unless corroboration was a statutory requirement, a court
could
act upon
such evidence, though uncorroborated, except in
· cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself
required, as a matter of prudence, that corroboration should be
insisted upon, as
in the case of a child witness, an accomplice or
· any o~hers of an analogous character.
Where the court has
recorded an order of conviction
the
question of sentence must be
determined,
not by
the volume or
character of the evidence adduced, b'.lt on a consideration
of
any
extenuating circumstances
which
could mitigate
the
enormity of
the crime.
Mohamed Sugul Esa
Mamasan Rer Ala/ah
v.
The King,
A.LR. (1946) P.C. 3 and
Vemir~ddy Satyanarayan Reddy and three
others v.
The State of Hyderabad, (1956) S.C.R. 247, distinguished.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 24 and 25 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated July 25, 1956, of the Madras High Court
in
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 247 & 248 of 1956 and
Referred Trial No. 41 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated March 28, 1956 of the Court of
Sessions, East Tanjore Division at Nagapatam, in r.ase
S.C. No. 5 of 1956.
Apiil It.
1957
V odive[u T lunar
v.
TkSt-u~of
Madrru
Sinn• ].
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19571
H.
/. Umrigar
and
S. Subramanian,
for the
appellants.
P. S. Kailasham and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1957. April 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA J.-These two appeals by special leave, which
arise out of the same occurrence. are directed against
the Judgment and Order dated July 25, 1956, of the
Madras High Court, confirming the sentence of death
passed by the Court of Sessions. East Tanjore Division,
at Nagapattinam, under s.
302 of the Indian Penal
Code, against appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of
1957, for the murder of Kannuswami. and modifying
the order of conviction and sentence under s. 302, read
with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code, to one under
s. 326, Indian Penal Code, and reducing the sentence
of imprisonment for life to one for 5 years, in respect
of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1957. In
the .course of this judgment, we shall call the appellant
in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1957, as the "first appeallant", and the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of
1957, as the "second appellant".
The occurrence which was the subject-matter of the
charges against the two appellants took place at about
11-30 p.m. on November 10,
1955, at Muthupet, in
front of the tea stall of Kannuswami, husband of
Shrimati
Dhanabagyam-prosecution
witness
No. 1who will be referred to, in the course of this judgment
as the "first
witness", and who
is the principal
witness for the prosecution, because, as will presently
appear, the prosecution case and the convictions and
sentences .of the appellants depend entirely upon
her
testimony.
The occurrence took place in the immediate vicinity
of a cinema-house in which the second show was in
progress
at the time of the alleged cold-blooded
murder. As there were no customers at that time at
the tea shop run by Kannuswami, his wife called him
for his . dinner to be served to him behind the tea stall,
as the

## Text

s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
V ADJVELU THEV .AR
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(with connected appeal)
(JAGANNADHADAs, B. P. SINHA and
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
981
Murder-Convictio11 on
the
testimony of a
single witnessP,-opriety-Capital sentence,
if appropriate-Extenuating circumstance-Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 134.
The appellants
were charged with murder and convicted
on
the sole testimony of a wimess. The first appellant was sentenced
to death and the second to five years' rigorous
imprisonment. It
was contended
for
them, inter alia,
that
the
conviction
and
sentences
should not be
upheld
because in a case: involving a
charge of murder-the court should not, on the ground of prudence,
convict an accused person upon the testimony of a single witness,
and, in any case, impose the extreme penalty of law.
Held, that the question whether in such a case the court could
convict l::im depended upon the facts and circumstances of the
case and unless corroboration was a statutory requirement, a court
could
act upon
such evidence, though uncorroborated, except in
· cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself
required, as a matter of prudence, that corroboration should be
insisted upon, as
in the case of a child witness, an accomplice or
· any o~hers of an analogous character.
Where the court has
recorded an order of conviction
the
question of sentence must be
determined,
not by
the volume or
character of the evidence adduced, b'.lt on a consideration
of
any
extenuating circumstances
which
could mitigate
the
enormity of
the crime.
Mohamed Sugul Esa
Mamasan Rer Ala/ah
v.
The King,
A.LR. (1946) P.C. 3 and
Vemir~ddy Satyanarayan Reddy and three
others v.
The State of Hyderabad, (1956) S.C.R. 247, distinguished.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 24 and 25 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated July 25, 1956, of the Madras High Court
in
Criminal
Appeals Nos. 247 & 248 of 1956 and
Referred Trial No. 41 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated March 28, 1956 of the Court of
Sessions, East Tanjore Division at Nagapatam, in r.ase
S.C. No. 5 of 1956.
Apiil It.
1957
V odive[u T lunar
v.
TkSt-u~of
Madrru
Sinn• ].
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19571
H.
/. Umrigar
and
S. Subramanian,
for the
appellants.
P. S. Kailasham and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1957. April 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA J.-These two appeals by special leave, which
arise out of the same occurrence. are directed against
the Judgment and Order dated July 25, 1956, of the
Madras High Court, confirming the sentence of death
passed by the Court of Sessions. East Tanjore Division,
at Nagapattinam, under s.
302 of the Indian Penal
Code, against appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of
1957, for the murder of Kannuswami. and modifying
the order of conviction and sentence under s. 302, read
with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code, to one under
s. 326, Indian Penal Code, and reducing the sentence
of imprisonment for life to one for 5 years, in respect
of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1957. In
the .course of this judgment, we shall call the appellant
in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1957, as the "first appeallant", and the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of
1957, as the "second appellant".
The occurrence which was the subject-matter of the
charges against the two appellants took place at about
11-30 p.m. on November 10,
1955, at Muthupet, in
front of the tea stall of Kannuswami, husband of
Shrimati
Dhanabagyam-prosecution
witness
No. 1who will be referred to, in the course of this judgment
as the "first
witness", and who
is the principal
witness for the prosecution, because, as will presently
appear, the prosecution case and the convictions and
sentences .of the appellants depend entirely upon
her
testimony.
The occurrence took place in the immediate vicinity
of a cinema-house in which the second show was in
progress
at the time of the alleged cold-blooded
murder. As there were no customers at that time at
the tea shop run by Kannuswami, his wife called him
for his . dinner to be served to him behind the tea stall,
as the husband and wife used to live there. Kannuswami was about to attend to the call for dinner when
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
an old man came into the shop and asked for a cup of
tea. When Kannuswami got busy . preparing the tea,
the two appellants rushed into the premises. The old
man-the
intending
customer-naturally
ran away,
and the two accused dragged Kannuswami out of the
shop on to the road-side ; and the first appellant gave
him several blows on -the front part of his body in the
~egion
of
the chest with
an aruval-a
cutting
mstrument about 2 feet long including the liand1e.
Kannuswami fell down on his back and cried out for
help. His wife, the only other inmate of the house,
tried to come to his rescue by raising and putting his
head into her lap after the
two accused had left him.
But soon after, perhaps, realising
that Kannuswami
was not dead as a result of the first blows, as deposed
by the wife, both the accused returned. Kannuswami's
wife who figures in court as the sole witness to the
killing, placed his head on the ground and went and
stood on the steps of the tea stall. The first appellant
this time, made the body of Kannuswami lie with face
downwards and gave a number of cuts in the region of
the head, the neck and back. These injuries were such
as to cause instantaneous death. At the time of the
second ass:mlt, according to the evidence of the first
witness,
Shunmuga
Thevar-Prosecution
Witness
No. 3, one of
the proprietors of the cinema-housecame and remonstrated with the accused but to no
purpose. After inflicting the injuries, both the accused
ran away.
According to the testimony of
the first
witness, it was the first appellant, the second accused
(A-2 in the record), who inflicted cutting injuries with
the ar11vtd~
The second appellant, the first accused
(A-1 in the ·record), was standing nearby at the time
the cutting
injuries were inflicted. There
were
two
electric lights burning in the tea shop, a Panchayat
Board light burning on the road, as also a light burning on the pathway leading to the cinema-house. The
wife
of
the
deceased, finding
her housband thus
murdered,
went
and
told
Ganapathi-Prosecution
Witness No. 4-who had a tea stall on the other side
of the road, and ·informed him as to what had taken
place.
He a~ked her to lodge information
of
the
:l--fil fi. C. Indiai59
1957
1'ad{vd1' Thcr{;1
v.
7 ht Stale oj
Madra>
Si11ha J.
1957
Vodivelu Thevar
v.
The State of
Madras
Sinha J.
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957)
occurrence at the
Police Station.
She then went to
the Mathupet Police Station, but found it shut. She
went
to the house of the Sub-Inspector of Police,
who took her to the Police Station, and recorded her '\
statement as the first information report (Exhibit P. 1 ).
After recording the first information report, the SubInspector came along with the first informant to the
scene of occurrence. He held an inquest early in the
mornmg.
At the trial, the
Prosecution examined, besides the
widow of the murdered man (P.W.1), P.W. 2-an assistant in the tea shop of Ganapathi Thevar, P.W. 3-one
of the proprietors of the cinema-house and P.W. 4Ganapathi who kept another tea stall near the ·cinema_....
house, in support of the prosecution case. P.W. 27
Singaram-testified to the occurrence and stated that
he had seen Vadivelu 'cut' Kannuswami and Chinniah
standing by the side of Vadivelu, a few feet away ; but
he added that the accused persons were not those concerned with the crime though they bore the same names.
The Public
Prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine
this witness who admitted that he knew that the Police
were searching for the accused in the dock and that he
did not tell the Police that these were not the persons
who had committed the murder. He went to the length
of admitting that he did not tell anybody that the
accused in the dock were not the persons who had
committed the murder and that it was in the committal
court that he stated, for the first time, that the accused
persons were not concerned with the crime. He also
arlmitted that at the time of the occurrence, lights
w~re burning at the place of occurrence, in the tea shop
and in the theatre. P.W. 3, one of the proprietors of
the cinema-house, when examined
in
court,
admitted
that he had been examined by the police two days
after the occurrence, but stated that he did not tell the
Police that he had seen the accused assaulting Kannuswami. It appears that, though the record of the
examination-in-chief of
this
witness
would
itself
indicate that the
Public Prosecutor had put questions
to him in the nature
of cross-examination, yet it
is not recorded, unlike the record of the depositions
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
of P.W. 2 and P.W. 4, that .this witness had been
declared hostile and the Public Prosecutor had been
permitted
to
cross-examine
him.
That
appears
to be a slip of the learned Sessions Judge as he had
been so treated even in the committal court. The
Investigating
Sub-Inspector, P.W.
14,
stated, with
reference to his diary, that P.W. 3 had stated before
him that he had seen accused No. 2 ct:tting the
deceased on the head and neck with an aruval, and
accused No. 1 standing by the side of
the second
accused.
Witness No.
4 for the
Prosecution·-Ganapathi-who ran a tea stall
near
the cinema-house,
about 50 to 60 feet away from the tea stall of the
deceased Kannuswami, stated in
court that the first
witness came to him weeping and saying that Chinniah
and Vadivelu Thevar had cut her husband, 'but added
that the two accused in col!rt were not these pers9ns.
Thus, whatever
may
have
been
the previous statements of the prose::ution witnesses 2 to 4, aforesaid,
their evidence in court does not directly support the
prosecution
case.
The orders of
conviction
and
sentence, as passed by the courts
below, as
indicated
above, rest solely on the testimony of the first witness.
It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
appellants
that the conviction and sentences of the
appellants should not be upheld because they rest on
the s0le
testimol'.\' of the first witness,
particularly,
because, it is further argued, her testimony is not free
from all
blemish. In this connection. her statement
in court that it was the second accused (first appellant)
who gave the rumber of cut iniuries with the aruval
to the deceased
Kannuswami, was challenged in cross--
examination.
She
has
been
cross-examined
with
reference to her statement
(Exhibit D-2) recorded by
the ·committing Magistrate,
and she has categorically
stated :
"Accused 1 had no weapon of any kind with him.
He did not give any cut. I have not stated in the
committal court that accused 1 continued to cut even
after
Shanmugham Thevar asked him not to cut."
Exhibit D-2 is in these terms :
1957
Vadivelu Ther,ar
v.
The State of
Madras
Sinha],
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
1957
"Even while
he was asking
not to cut, accused l
was cutting.
Soon
after, accused 1 stopped
cutting
Vadivelu T/u:v(Jr
and went away~"
v.
Tht State of
Madras
Sinha J.
With reference to the statement of the first witness,
as recorded in Exhibit D-2, the learned Sessions Judge
has observed that it was a mistake of recording by the
committing
Magistrate.
We have looked into the
whole evidence of the first witness, as recorded by the
committing Magistrate-not printed in the record, but
supplied
to
us by the learned counsel for the appellants-and in our opinion, there is no doubt that the
learned
Sessions Judge was correct in his conclusion
that the recording by the Magistrate is defective in
the sense that accused I has been recorded in place of
accused, 2, inasmuch
as,
throughout
her
deposition,
the first witness had consistently stated that it was
accused 2 who actually used the deadly weapon against
her husband and that
accused 1 was
only aiding and
abetting
him and lending
him strength
by
his
presence. That this conclusion is
well-founded, is also
substantiated by the state of the record
of the appeal
in the High Court. Each of the two appellants in the
High Court filed a separate
Memorandum of Appeal
through his own counsel. In neither of tl1e Memoranda
of Appeal, any ground has been taken that the first
witness
had
materially
contradicted
herself
with
reference to her previous statement in the committal
court. Her testimony was
assailed
•mly as 'interested,
artificial
and unnatural'.
It is not even suggested
that the learned Sessions Judge's conclusion in respect
of the recording by the committing Magistrate (Exhibit
D-2) was not based on any material. When the matter
was argued before a Bench of the High Court, tl1ere
is no indication in the judgment that any point was
sought to be made of this alleged serious discrepancy
rn
the statement of the first witness
at different
stages. In the High Court, it w:rn sought to be argued
only that she
was an interested
witness though her
testimony
throughout had
been
consistent,
as
will
appear from tl1e
following
obset vations of the
High
Court
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
"To prove that it was . the
two accused that
caused these injuries
to the deceased, the prosecution
put forth as many as four witnesses. On these four
witnesses, P.¥l s. 2, 3 and 4 turned hostil ·both
in the
committal court as also in the Sessions Court. The
only witness that remained constant throughout was
P.W. 1 who is no other than the wife of the deceased."
The same was the position with reference
to the
petition for leave to appeal to this Court filed in the
High Court. It was a joint petition on behalf of both
the appellants, and as many as 13 grounds had been
taken. There is
not even a
suggestion
that the
testimony of the first
witness was vitiated by any
such discrepancy as has been· sought to be made out
in this Court. It was after the High Court refused to
grant the necessary certificate that for · the • first time,
in the petition for special leave to appeal, filed in this
Court, the ground is taken that the High Court failed
to appreciate that the
test~mony of the first witness
was untrustworthy for the reason that there was the
alleged
discrepancy between her
statement
~n the
committal court and in the Court of Sessions. Thus,
it is abundantly clear that the finding of the learned
Sessions Judge about the mistake in recording the
evidence of the first witness, by the committal court,
has not been challenged at any stage in the court
below.
The second ground of attack against the veracity of
the first witness is
tl1at she had stated that Shanmugham
Thevar-Prosecution Witness
No. 3-had
also seen the first appellant giving the deadly blows
to her
husband, and
that the
assailant
continued
giving his blows in spite of protests of P.W. 3. This
argument proceeds upon the assumption that Prosecution . Witness
No. 3 is
telling the truth and that,
therefore, his evidence effectively contradicts
that of
the
first witness. P.W.
3 was, as
indicated above,
cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor with reference
to his
previous statement before the
Investigating
Police Officer (P. W. 14). P. W. 14 has stated that
before him P.W. 3 had stated just the contrary of
what he stated in court. The statement of P.W. 3 at
1957
Vadivelu~ T/Jnlar
v.
T /,. Stale of
Madras
Sillha ].
1957
V adivelu The'f)(lr
v.
The State of
Madras
Si11ha J.
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957]
the earlier stage, before the Police,
and later
when
examined in court, may or may not have been false,
but certainly both cannot be true. Hence, it cannot
be said that the evidence of P.W. 3 in court was the
true version. That being w, his evidence in court is
not strong enough to wipe out the evidence of the first
witness on the ground
that it
is
contrary to what
P.\V. 3 had stated. It is, thus, clear that none of the
grounds urged in support of
the contention that the
evidence of
the first wimess
i·s unreliable, has been
made out. On the other
hand,
the first witness,
being the most important witness from the point of
view of the prosecution, was put to a severe test in
her cross-examination.
She has frankly made admissions in her cross-examination, which throw
a very
lurid light on the past life
of her deceased
husband.
She admitted
that he had been transported for
life
for having committed a murder and
that after his
release also,
he had been sent
to
jail twice for
having caused cut injuries
to others.
If the first
witness
wer~ inclined to tell falsehoods or at least to
conceal
her husband's
past,
she could
have
taken
shelter behind failing memory or want of informationnot
an
uncon11r1on
characteristic
of
prevaricating
witnesses. Her evidence. read as a whole. rings quite
true, and we have no hesitation in acting upon
it.
It is true that her evidence in court has been sought
to be
contradicted by
the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4,
but the latter set of witnesses have been shown to be
not reliable
become thcv appear to have made different
statements at different stages for reasons of their own.
Their testimony does not inspire confidence and we
cannot. therefore. hrush
asi<le
the
testimony of
the
first witness
as com oared to the evidence of P.\V s. 2
to 4. The testimony of the first witness is consi>tent
with
what she has
state<l
m
her first
information
report at the
Police
Station
without • any
avoidahle
dealy, within less than an hour of the occurrence. It
cannot, therefore, be s.1i<l
that her statement in conn,
is an afterthought, or the result of
tutoring hy other
interested
persons.
Her
story
of
the double attack,
first on the front. and subsequently on the back and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
side of the
victim, is also consistent with the medical
evidence as deposed to bv the Medical Oflicer-P.W. 8.
It is not necessary to set our in detail the doz<'.n
incised gaping wounds on the Derson of the deceased.
which ·arc all set out in extrnso in the imhmcnt of the
karne<l
Sessions Judge who has written
;~ verv careful
a11d satisfactory judgmenr.
.
Alternatively, it has been argued
0;1 behalf of the
appellants that it is
not safe to convict the appellants
on the
testimonv of a sinl!k
witness
even
tl10u-rh
she may not have been demonstrated to have
b~~n
a lying
witness.
It has not
c::vcn
been claimed
by
counsel for the appellants that this is a ruk of hw.
He has only put it on the ground of prudence that,
ordinarily, the court should not, in a case
involving a
charge of mmder, convict an accused person
upon tht:
testimony of a single witness. In this connection. our
attention
was drawn
to the
observations
of
their
Lordships
of
the
Judicial
Committee
of the
Privy
Council in the Cise of Mnliaml'd
Sut,al E_,a Mmilasan
Re·;· . //,dalz v. T lie Ki11g ( 1 ). In that case, their Lordships looked
for corrolioration of the testimony of a
single \':jtness in a
murder case. It is
true that in
th::it case. the court had to look for and found corroboration of the
testimony of the single witness in support
of the murder ch::irge, hut the testimony of th::it witness
sulkred from two infirmities. nameiv :
(I) The witness was a girl of ;bout 10 or
11 1·e:m
at the time of occurrence.
(2) The girl
witness
had
not
lx:cn admi:1istncd
oath becmse the Court did not consider that >he 11·as
able: to understand
the nature o_f
the oath though s!ic
was compctt"llt to testify.
That was a ca>c from
Som::ililand to which the provisions of the Indian faidnKt Act <I of 1872) and of the
Indian Oaths Act (X of 1873). had been made applicable.
Special
lea1·c
had
been
gr:m~eJ to appeal
to
His
Ma jestv-in-Council on the i!fOUll<i that the local courts
h::id atimitteJ and acted
upon the unsworn evidence of
:i girl of 10 or 11
vears of age. Their Lordships upheld
the conviction and sentence of death, holding that the
\t) .\.I.R. (1916) P.C. 3.
1957
V adil:e/ll T htl ar
v.
The State q(
A1adras
Sinha J.
1957
Vadiuetu Tilevar
v.
The State of
Madras
Sinha J
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957)
evidence, such as it was, was admissible. In the course
of their
Judgment, they
made the following
observa-
"\
tions (at pp. 5-6) which are pertinent to the present
controversy :
"It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant
that assuming the unsworn evidence was admissible
the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England where provision has been made
for the reception of unsworn evidence from a child it
has always been provided that the evidence must be
corroborated in some
material
particular implicating
the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such
provision and the evidence is made admissible whether
~
corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence
a court can act upon it; corroboration, unless required
by statute, goes only to the weight and value of the
evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on
the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn
or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of
law."
The decision of this Court in the case of Vemireddy
Satyanarayan Reddy and three others v. The State of.
Hyderabad (') was also relied
upon
in support of the
contention that in a murder case the court insists on
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness. In
the said reported decision of this Court P.W. 14 has
been described as "a dhobi boy named Gopai". He
was the only person who had witnessed the murder and
his testimony had been assailed on the ground that
he was
an accomplice. Though this Court repelled
the contention that he was an accomplice, it held that
his position was analogous to that of an accomplice.
This Court insisted on corroboration of the testimony
of the single witness not on the ground
that his was
the only
evidence
on which
the
conviction
could
be based but on the ground that though he was not
an accomplice, his evidence was analogous to that of
an accomplice in
the
peculiar circumstances
of that
case as would be clear from the following observations
at p. 252:
(1) (1956) S.C.R. 247.
y
'·
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
" .... Though he was not an accomplice, we would
still want corroboration on material particulars in this
particular case, as he is the only witness to the crime
and as it would be unsafe to hang four people on his
sole testimony .unless we feel convinced that he is
speaking the truth.
Such corroboration
need
not,
however, be on the question of the actual comm1ss10n
of the offence ; if this was
the: requirement, then we
would have independent testimony on which to act and
there would be no need to rely on the evidence of one
whose position may, in this particular case, be said to
be somewhat analogous
to that of
an accomplice,
though not exactly the same."
It is not necessary specifica 11 y _ to notice the other
decisions of the different High Courts in India in which
the court insisted on corroboration
of
the
testimony
of a single witness, not as a proposition of law, but in
view of the circumstances of those cases.
On
a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions
of the Indian Evidence Act, the following propositions
may be safely stated as firmly established :
(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act . on
the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweights the testimony
of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.
(2) Unless
corroboration
is
insisted
upon
by
statute, courts
should
not ms1st
on
corroboration
except in cases where the nature of the testimony of
the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence,
that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example
in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose
evidence is that of an accomplice or of
an analogous
character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a
single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon
facts and circumstan<ies of each case and no general
rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much
depends
upon the judicial discretion
of
the Judge
before whom the case comes.
In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation
in holding that the contention that in a murder case,
the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is
1957
V adivelu The11ar
v.
The Slate~(
Madra'
Sinha ].
1957
V adi{lelu T luvar
v.
Tire State qf
Madras
SinJia ].
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
much too broadly stated.
Section
134 of the
Indian
Evidence Act has categorically laid it down
that "no
particular number of witnesses shall in any case be
required for the
proof of any fact". ' The legislature
determined. as long ago as 1872, presumably after due
consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be
necessary for proof or disproof of a fact. to call any
particular
number of witnesses.
In
England,
both
before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, there haYe been a number of statutes as set
out in
Sarkar's 'Law
of Evidence-9th
Edition, at
pp. 1100 and llO!. forbidding convictions on the testimony of a singk witness.
The Indian Legislature has
not imisted on laring down any such exceptions to the
general rule recognized in s. 134 quoted above.
The
section enshrines
the
well
recognized
maxim
that
"Evidence
has to be weighed and not counted". Our
Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact
that administration of iustice
may be hampered if
a
particular
number of witnesses
were
to
be insisted
upon. It
is
not
seldom
that a
crime
has
been
committed in the presence of onlv one witness, leaving
aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence,
where
dctermin:uion
of
guilt
depends
entirely
on
circun1stantial evidence. If the Legislatun: \\'ere to insist
upon pluralit1· of witnesses, cases where
the testimony
of a single witness only couid be available in proof of
the crime, would
go unpunished. It is
here that the
discretion of the presiding iudge comes into play.
The
matter tin" must depend upon
the
circumstances
of
each case and the quaiit1· o:' the evidence of
the sin_!.'le
witness whose testimony has to be either
accepted
or
rejected. Ii such a testimony
is found
by the court
to be entirely rcli=ible, there: is no legal impc<lin1ent
to
the con \'iction of the
3ccui;;ccf person
on
such
proof.
Even as the guilt of an accu<ed person may be proved
by the tc.:stinlony of a singlt: \vitne~s, the
innocence
of
an accused person may be established
on the testimony
of a single witness, even though a considerable
number
of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth
of the c1se for the pr0<ecution.
Hence, in our opinion,
it i< a sound and well-established rule of law
that the
c0urt is concerned with the quality and not with
the
•
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
993
quantity of
the evidence
necessary
for
proving or
disproving a fact.
Generallv
speaking oral testimony
in this context
inay be classific<l
into three categories,
namelv:
(1) Wholly reliable.
(2) Wholly unreliable.
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the first category of proof, the court should have
no difficulty in coming to .its conclusion
either wayit may convict or mav acqmt on the testimonv of a
single witness, if it is found
to be above reproach or
suspicion of
interestedness.
incompetence
or subornation.
In
the
second category,
the court, equally ·has
no difficulty in coming to it> conclusion. It 'is in the
third
category
of
cases,
that
the court
has to be
circumspect
and
has
to look
for
corroboration
m
material particulars
by
reliabk
testimony,
direct
or
circumstantial. There
is another
danger
in
insisting
on plurality
of witnesses.
Irrespective of the
quality
of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts · were
to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact,
they will
be
indirecth•
encouraging
subornation
of
witnesses. Situations mav amc and do arise where
only a single person
is available
to give
evidence in
support of a disputed fact. The court naturally
ha~ to
weigh carefullv such
a testimony and if it
is
satisfied
that the evidence is reliable
and
free
from
all taints
which trnd to render oral testimony open to suspicion,
it becomes its duty to act upon
such testimony. The
law reports contain many precedents where the court
had to depend and act uoon the testimony of a sin.e:le
witness
in. support
of
the
prosecution.
There
are
exceptions to this rule. for example, in cases of sexual
offences or · of the testimony
of
an
approver ; both
these are, cases in which the oral testimony
is, · by its
very nature, suspect, being that
of a participator in
crime.
But; ·· where · there are
no such
exceptional
reasons operating, it becomes the dutv of the court to
convict, . if it is satisfied. that the testimony of a single
witness
is
entirely
reliable. We have, therefore, no
reasons to
refuse · to· act
upon the testimony
of the
1957
V adi11t/u T /revar
v.
T Ju State of
Madras
Sinha].
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
1957
first
witness, which
is
the only rdiable
evidence in
,._
Tht State ef
Madras
support of the prosecution.
Lastly, it was urged that assummg
that
the court
was inclined to
act upon
the
testimony of the first
witness and to .-ccorJ a conviction for murder as against
the first appellant. the
court
S:10u!d nc,t impose
the
extreme penalty of law and in rhe state of the record
as it is, the lesser punishment provided by law should
be deemed
to meet the ends of justice. vV e cannot
accede
to
tl11s
ji'.lt.:
of a:guincnt. 'fhe first question
\vhich the court has to consider in a case like this,
is
whether the accused
has been
proved,
to the satisfaction of the court.
to h1vt: ccinrnitte<l the cri1uc.
If the
court is convinced
about thi.:
truth of the
prostc!1tion
story, conviction lias to follo\v. The question of sent<.:ncc
has to be determinnl, not with reference to the volume
or character of the evidence adduced
by
the
prosecution in support
of the prosecution case, but with
reference to the fact whether there are any extenuating
circumstances
which
can
be said
to
mitigate
the
enormity of the crime. If the court is satisfied that
there are such mitigating circumstances, only
then, it
would be justified in imposing the lesser of the two
sentences provided by law.
In other words, the nature
of the proof has nothing to do with the character of
the punishment. The nature of the proof can only
bear upon the question of conviction-whether or not
the accused has been proved to be guilty. If the court
comes to the conclusion that the guilt has been
brought
home to the accuocd, anJ w;wiction follows, the process
of proof is. at an end. The question as to what punishment should be imposed is for the court to decide in
all
the
circumstances of
the
case
with particular
reference to
any c:..:Lenuating
circu1nstances.
But
the
nature of proof as we have indicated, has nothing to
do
with
the
question u( punishment. In
this
ca~c,
there arc
nr>
sucii
c...:xt~nuati!1g
circu1nstanceS
\\.·hich
can be legitimately urged
in >upport of the view that
the lesser penalty under s. 302
of
the Indian
Penal
Code, should meet the ends of justice. It was a coldblooded. murder. The accused
came for
the second
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
time, determined
to
see
that their victim did not
possibly escape the assassins' hands.
As regards the second appellant, we need
not say
anything more than that he was lucky enough to
escape conviction under s.
302 of the Indian Penal
Code, for the reasons 'given by the High Court, which
may not bear close scrutiny. He amply deserves the
punishment of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under
s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code.
For the reasons aforesaid, both the appeals fail and
are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
(S. R.
DAS c. J.,
]AFER
IMAM, s. K.
DAS,
GOVINDA
MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Gram Cutchet'l'y-Criminal
Jurisdictio11-Concu1-re1,t
jurisdiction
of ordinary ffiminal Courts-Enactment, if discriminatory in
character.-Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihm· Act 7 of 1948),
ss. 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 73-Co11sti1t1tion of India, A1·t. 14.
The appellants
wcr~ coilvicte<l of an offence under s. 379 of
the Indian Penal Code by a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry
constituted under
the
provisions
of
the
Bihar
Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that the convic·
tion was bad on the grounds int<T alia, that s. 62 of the
Act
which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries
ga \'e concurrent jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal Courts and
left it open to a party
to go either to. the ordinary criminal
Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and as the procedure
followed in
the ordinary
criminal
Courts
was
substantially
different from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was
discriminatory in
nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
Held, that
the impugned provisions of the
Act · are
net
discriminatory in nature.
The scheme of the
Act
is
that a case or suit ·cognizable
under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it
unless the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate
or
the
Munsif concerned
chooses to take action under s. 70 or s. 73 of the Act.
The
1957"
V adioelu The var
v.
. The Stak of
Madras
Sinha J.
1957
April 2.