# • v. BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR

- **Citation:** [2009] 16 S.C.R. 618
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2009-12-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8452 of 2009
- **Bench:** Tarun Chatterjee, V.S. Sirpurkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/v-bombay-iron-steel-labour-bo-anr-25356
- **Pages:** 68

## Headnote

Labour laws:
t
•
c
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Worl<ers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 - ss.
2(11 }, (12), 21 and 22 -
Term 'unprotected worker' -
Interpretation of - Scope of s. 2(11) - Held: Language of s.
2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear, thus, not capable of
D any other meaning - It means that every worl<er, who is doing
manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any
~ .
scheduled employment, would become an 'unprotected
worl<er' - In the Preamble of the Act, 'unprotected manual
worl<ers' is mentioned in wider sense - It displays the intention
E of State Government to make better provision for such worl<ers
-
lnt~rpretation of term 'unprotected worl<er' not hit by doctrine
of stare decisis - Also, such interpretation not violative of
doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et
Fortissima In Lege - Plea that such worl<ers who were covered
"
F
by other Central Acts could not be covered uls. 2(11), being
a State Act, not maintainable - Interpretation of statutes -
Doctrines - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 254.
In the instant matters, the two concurrent judgments
of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, one by the
G majority that the interpretation by *Century Textile and
Industries Ltd. case of the term "unprotected worker" in
s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare)
Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who come
H
618
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 619
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
• t
within the purview of the Act, is not correct and proper A
and is overruled; and the judgment of Single Judge that
u/s. 2(11) of the Act, 'unprotected worker' means every
manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any
scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is
protected by other labour legislations or not, and the
B
definition is not restricted to those manual workers who
t
-I
are casually engaged, is under challenge.
Dismissing the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. The Full Bench was absolutely correct in c
coming to the conclusions that it did. [Para 42] [684-H]
2.1. The term "worker" is used in the definition of
'unprotected worker' in s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra
Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of
_,.,
;.
Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969. Therefore, while D
considering the s. 2 (11), the scope of the term 'worker'
u/s. 2 (12) of the Act, is to be considered. The definition
of the term 'worker' is an inclusive definition. It includes
a worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or
through any agency and it is not necessary that such E
worker gets the wages or not. The term 'wages' is also
defined in s. 2(13) of the Act. Therefore, even if such
">:
person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in s.
2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work
in any scheduled employment, would be a worker.
F
Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict
sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is
working with the permission or under the agreement with
the employer or contractor, even then such worker
would be a 'worker' within the meaning of s. 2(12) of the
G
t
Act. The only exception is that such worker should not
be a member of employer's family. The definitions of
'worker' and 'unprotected worker' given in ss. 2(11) and
2(12) of the Act would have to be read together for
realizing the scope of the s. 2(1 ~) of the Act. Therefore,
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A the language of s. 2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear
and thus, is not capable of any other meaning. It means
that every worker, who is doing manual work and is
engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment, would be covered by that definition and
8 would become an unprotected worker. The use of the
word 'means' which then positively rules aside any other
meaning than the one which is dependent upon the plain
and unambiguous language of the provision. [Paras

## Text

_Characters 0–37,391 of 132,669. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=37391 for what follows._

[2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 618
A
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD.
j
•
v.
BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8452 of 2009)
8
DECEMBER 17, 2009
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Labour laws:
t
•
c
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Worl<ers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 - ss.
2(11 }, (12), 21 and 22 -
Term 'unprotected worker' -
Interpretation of - Scope of s. 2(11) - Held: Language of s.
2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear, thus, not capable of
D any other meaning - It means that every worl<er, who is doing
manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any
~ .
scheduled employment, would become an 'unprotected
worl<er' - In the Preamble of the Act, 'unprotected manual
worl<ers' is mentioned in wider sense - It displays the intention
E of State Government to make better provision for such worl<ers
-
lnt~rpretation of term 'unprotected worl<er' not hit by doctrine
of stare decisis - Also, such interpretation not violative of
doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et
Fortissima In Lege - Plea that such worl<ers who were covered
"
F
by other Central Acts could not be covered uls. 2(11), being
a State Act, not maintainable - Interpretation of statutes -
Doctrines - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 254.
In the instant matters, the two concurrent judgments
of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, one by the
G majority that the interpretation by *Century Textile and
Industries Ltd. case of the term "unprotected worker" in
s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare)
Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who come
H
618
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 619
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
• t
within the purview of the Act, is not correct and proper A
and is overruled; and the judgment of Single Judge that
u/s. 2(11) of the Act, 'unprotected worker' means every
manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any
scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is
protected by other labour legislations or not, and the
B
definition is not restricted to those manual workers who
t
-I
are casually engaged, is under challenge.
Dismissing the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. The Full Bench was absolutely correct in c
coming to the conclusions that it did. [Para 42] [684-H]
2.1. The term "worker" is used in the definition of
'unprotected worker' in s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra
Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of
_,.,
;.
Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969. Therefore, while D
considering the s. 2 (11), the scope of the term 'worker'
u/s. 2 (12) of the Act, is to be considered. The definition
of the term 'worker' is an inclusive definition. It includes
a worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or
through any agency and it is not necessary that such E
worker gets the wages or not. The term 'wages' is also
defined in s. 2(13) of the Act. Therefore, even if such
">:
person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in s.
2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work
in any scheduled employment, would be a worker.
F
Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict
sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is
working with the permission or under the agreement with
the employer or contractor, even then such worker
would be a 'worker' within the meaning of s. 2(12) of the
G
t
Act. The only exception is that such worker should not
be a member of employer's family. The definitions of
'worker' and 'unprotected worker' given in ss. 2(11) and
2(12) of the Act would have to be read together for
realizing the scope of the s. 2(1 ~) of the Act. Therefore,
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A the language of s. 2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear
and thus, is not capable of any other meaning. It means
that every worker, who is doing manual work and is
engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment, would be covered by that definition and
8 would become an unprotected worker. The use of the
word 'means' which then positively rules aside any other
meaning than the one which is dependent upon the plain
and unambiguous language of the provision. [Paras 14
and 19] [654-D-H; 655-A-B; 658-A-B]
C
*Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. 2006
Ill LLJ 824 Born; Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana
vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. 2008 (10) SC 166;
O Cable Corporation of India vs. Addi. Commissioner of Labour
2008 (7) SCC 680; Feroz N. Dotivala vs. P.M. Wadhwani
2003(1) SCC 433; P. Kasilingam & Ors. vs. P.S.G. College
of Technology & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1395; Bhaiji vs. SubDivisional Officer, Thandla & Ors. 2003(1) SCC 692; Baldev
E Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini 2005(12) sec 778; Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.
1994 (2) Sec 434; K. V. Muthu vs. Angamuthu Ammal
1997(2) SCC 53; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. vs. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. 1980(2) SCC 593,
F referred to.
2.2. Where the language is clear and admits of no
doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision
on the basis of the external aids. It is possible that the
plain meaning runs counter to the objects or creates
G absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. It
is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or
contradiction if the plain language of the s. 2(11) is
accepted and acted upon for the purposes of
interpretation. It must be noted that in spite of s. 2(11 ),
H which included the words "but for the provisions of this Act
I
•
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 621
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
• +
is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and A
benefits of the labour force in the State", these precise words
were removed by the legislature and the definition was
made limited as it has been finally legislated upon. The
legislature being conscious of the fact and being armed
with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with B
the factual data, deliberately avoided those words. This
' ...
is clear pointer to the legislative intent. What the appellants
are asking was to read in that definition, these precise
words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted
from the definition. But that would amount to supplying c
the casus omissus and it is not possible, in the instant case.
Though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would
be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of
this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to
the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature, but D
..
that is not the case here. [Paras 19 and 24] [657-8; 662-
. F-H; 663-A-E]
Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors.
2003(1) SCC 692; State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Govind
Singh 2005 (10) sec 437, relied on
E
2.3. The definition is not to be read in isolation and it
must be read in the context of the phrase which would
'I(
define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous and the
definition of the words must be given a meaningful F
application; where the context makes the definition given
in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the saine
meaning cannot be assigned. The ratio Will not apply
since the definition given in section 2(11) of the Act is
extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity G
about it. The omission of the words as proposed earlier
from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act
on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to
provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who
were the manual workers and were engaged or to be
H
engaged in any scheduled emplcvment. Therefore, there
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge
~ •
the scope of the definition and once it is accepted, all the
submissions regarding the objects and reasons, the
Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary
to the expressed language, are relegated to the
B background and are liable to be ignored. (Para 24) (663F-H; 664-A·D]
U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr.
~ .
2004(8) SCC 402; Maharashtra State Road Transport
c
Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2003(4) SCC
200; The State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Mis. Chhotabhai Jethabhai
Patel and Co. & Anr. 1972 (1) SCC 209; R.D. Goyal & Anr.
vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. 2003 (1) SCC 81, Held
inapplicable.
D
Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. 2004
(5) sec 409, refe"ed to.
2.4. It was suggested that only where the other
legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the
better conditions, then alone the Mathadi Act would be
E brought Into and, therefore, necessarily the unprotected
workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of
the better conditions of service. The argument that if the
workers were adequately protected, they cannot be
covered under section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is
F Incorrect for the reason that the mention of "unprotected
manual workers" In the Preamble is clearly mentioned in
the wider sense and even the Preamble of the Mathadi
Act displays the intention of the State Government to
make better provision for the unprotected manual
G workers. Merely because some workmen are manual
workers and not casual workers, would not make any
difference. In the Preamble, terminology of "casual
workers" Is not to be found. Therefore, even on this basis,
the definition cannot be restricted. [Para 26) (666-A·D]
H
Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior Divisional Manager, UC
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 623
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
~
t
2004(8) SCC 387; State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical A
Association 2002 (1) SCC 589; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr.
vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 434,
Held inapplicabfe.
Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Anr.
B
2007(1) SCC 467; Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi
2004 (5) sec 409, referred to.
.
~
2.5. Section 22 of the Act provides that the State
Government may exempt from the operation of all or any
of the provisions of the Act or any scheme, all or any of c
the classes of unprotected workers employed in any
scheduled employment or the establishment or part of
any establishment, if in the opinion of the State
Government, all such unprotected workers are in the
enjoyment of benefits, which are, on the whole, not less
D
J.
favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits
provided by or under the Mathadi Act, of course, subject
to certain conditions and after the consultation with
Advisory Committee. It cannot be said that by the
acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider definition
E
given out in section 2(11) of the Act, there would be
creations of contradictions. A Statement of Objects and
Reasons for introducing the Bill is an external aid, which
should be of no consequence if the language is clear.
Even if the Statement of Objects and Reasons is read, it F
does not further the case of the appellants~ Appellants,
while relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons
j
submitted that it was because the workers in various
employments were not receiving adequate protection and
benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation that
G
this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement of Objects
•
& Reasons. If inspite of this, the legislature went on to
~
delete those words, the intention of the legislature must
be loud and clear and it cannot persuade to hold that
there is anything contradictory to the definition in the
H
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
• •
A Statement of Objects and Reasons. Even if that was so,
when the legislature consciously deletes certain words,
then there will be no question of relying and insisting
upon those words. [Paras 29 and 30) [668-A-H; 669-A-B)
B
2.6. The submission that when all the persons
working in a scheduled industry, doing manual work,
become the unprotected workers, then there is no
question of the Inspector examining any such person,
~
because everybody would be an unprotected worker, is
c
clearly wrong. What is required is that every unprotected
worker has to be registered with the Board. If the
Inspector suspects that any such worker, though an
unprotected worker, is either not registered or does not
get the protection of the Board and is engaged by the
employer, then he can examine such a person. Section
D 15 would not become unworkable. [Paras 30 and 31) [669-
,,.
F-H]
2. 7. Section 17G provides that the provisions of
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 would be
E applicable in case of trial of offences under this Act.
Section 18 provides that provisions of Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 shall mutatis mutandis apply to
registered unprotected workers and they shall be
deemed to be workmen within the meaning of that Act.
F Section 19 makes the similar provision regarding the
Payment of Wages Act, 1936 to the workers, while
Section 20 provides the application of Maternity Benefit
•
Act, 1961. These sections are not of any relevance to
arrive at the correct meaning of section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act. In all these Sections, the words used are
G 'registered unprotected workers'. There is a provision for
-
creation of the Boards under section 6 of the Mathadi Act
J
and every unprotected worker has to register himself with
the Board. Therefore, the reliance on these provisions
would be no consequence. The terminology of 'registered
H
r 1
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 625
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
unprotected workers' in sections 18, 19 and 20 of the A
Mathadi Act was brought into force by Maharashtra Act
No. 40 of 1974 .and under that, these words deemed
always to have been substituted for the original
terminology of 'unprotected workers'. Therefore, there is
no reason to take any different view in the light of these B
sections. [Para 32) [670-A-E]
2.8. It is accepted thats. 2(12) is a general provision
and s. 2(11) is a specific provision. So long as that
language of section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is clear
enough, there will not be any question of cutting the C
scope of the term 'unprotected workman'. As regard the
submission that this interpretation would lead to absurd
results, whereby ss. 2(11) and 2(12) would be identical,
there is no such possibility. The Sections have to be read
together. Section 2(12) specifies the worker, which in turn D
is used in Section 2(11) further. Therefore, they would not
be identical under any circumstances. [Para 33) [670-FH; 671-A-B]
2.9. Once a workman is engaged to do the manual E
work, he automatically becomes an unprotected
workman and would have to be registered with the
Board. The interpretation that is proposed to be given,
does not make any of the provision absurd c,nd does not
lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity. [Para 34)
[671-E-F; 672-A]
F
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 2007(8) SCC 705, referred
to.
2.10. The golden rule of interpretation is that the G
statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical
. and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or literal
meaning
unmindful of consequence of such
interpretation. It was only when such grammatical and
H
626 SUPREME COURTREPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the
legislature never intended that the said rule has to give
place to the 'rule of legislative intent'. In the instant case,
the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any
B
injustice. [Para 35] (672-C-O]
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut 2007
(3) SCC 700; Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay
Environmental Action Group & Ors. 2006(3) SCC 434,
referred to.
c
2.11. No absurdity, inconsistency or any contradiction
with the other provisions of the Act is found. It will be
seen that the absurdity which the appellants are referring
again and again has to be such that it should be contrary
to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include a
0
result, which is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless,
artificial or productive of a disproportionate countermischief. There would arise no absurdity of any kind if the
literal interpretation is given. Once the literal construction
E is accepted, there will be no further question of holding
otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature.
[Para 35) [67 4-A-C]
3. The application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot
help the appellants in the instant case. While rejecting the
F arguments, those thousands of workmen who are
otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mu.kadams and at tim~s.
the employers are in mind. The enactment is a beneficial
enactment, providing the protection to such workers, who
do not have the honest representation and it is with this
G lofty idea that a progressive State like State of
Maharashtra has brought about this legislation. The
definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing
maximum area to the advantage of a workman. [Para 38)
[680-F-H; 681-A]
H
,
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 627
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
'
iState of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat A
& Ors. 2005 (8) sec 534, relied on.
I
Mishri Lal (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by
Lrs. & Ors. 1999 (4) SCC 11; Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs.
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. 2002 (5) SCC 111; B
Union of India & Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 2004
(10) SCC 1; C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra Misc.
'
.\
Petition No. 150 of 1973 decided on 19.4.1974; S.B. More
& Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Misc. Petition No. 414
of 1973 decided on 24.4.197 4; Lal/ubhai Kevaldas & Anr. c
vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Writ Petition No. 119
of 1979 decided on 16.1.1980; lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs.
Bombay Port Trust 1994 I CLR 187; Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279;
Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar
Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1995 Supp. 3 SCC D
;
28; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. 2008 (1) SCC 494; Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors
2003(4) SCC 200; Danial Latifi & Anr. vs. Union of India 2001
(7) SCC 740; Mis. Good Year India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana E
AIR 1990 SC 781; Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat
. 1987 (1) SCC 213; Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar
Mill (P) Ltd. 2003 (2) SCC 111; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
'<
vs. N.R. Vairamani 2004 (8) SCC 579, referred to.
Quinn vs. Leathern 1901 Appeal Cases 495, referred F
to.
Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., referred to.
4. The submission on the basis of the maxim G
Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Forlissima In Lege
-· ~.
that the Full bench should have considered how the
authorities themselves construed and understood the
law, and certain letters were referred for the same; and
that since the State Government itself understood the
H
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL) SC R
A provision in a particular manner, such understanding
should be honoured by the Courts, is erroneous. It is not
the task of the State Government, more particularly, the
Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the task of
the Courts. Even if the State Government understood the
B Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and
correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts.
Therefore, how the State Government officials
understood the Act, is really irrelev<mt. This cannot be
viewed to be an absolute doctrine. Even if the person
c who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular
manner, that does not prevent the Court in giving to the
Court, its true construction. [Paras 11, 39 and 40] [647G; 681-C; 682-E-F-G; 683-D-E]
lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port Trust (1994) I CLR
D 187; Godawat Pan Masala Products l.P. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union
of India & Ors. 2004 (7) SCC 68; Senior Electric Inspector
vs. Laxminarayan Chopra AIR 1962 SC 159; Raja Ram
Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828; J.K. Cotton
Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1988
E SC 191; Doypack Systems Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1988
SC 782; Punjab Traders vs. State of Punjab 1991 (1) SCC
86, referred to.
Clyde Navigation Trustees vs. Laird 1883 (8) Appeal
F
Cases 658; Assheton Smith vs. Owen 1906 (1) Ch 179;
Goldsmiths' Co. vs. Wyatt 1907 (1) KB 95, referred to.
Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.
5. It was submitted that the Article 254 prescribes that
G in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central
legislation, whether made before or after a State
legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both
cover the same field. An exception to this lies in subArticle (2), which preserves and protects a State
enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the
H
y
-
/'
BHlJWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 629
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
Vice President. This challenge is in the nature of a A
challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of
the State Act. Such was not the challenge. Article 254
does not provide a guide for the interpretation of a State
statute. The appellants are also not certain about the
proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was
B
received on 5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not
be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall
to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article
254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact
that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be c
used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this
question was never before the Full Bench and the Full
Bench rightly rejected the said argument on the ground
that this was not the case of the appellants. [Para 41] [684A-F]
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Textile Corporation
Ltd. 2002 (8) SCC 182; Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar
Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and
Charitable Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 1996 (3) SCC
D
15, Held inapplicable.
E
Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. 2006
Ill LLJ 824 Born; Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana
F
vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. 2008(10) SC 166,
referred to.
Case Law Reference:
2000 II CLR 279
Referred to.
Paras 3, 4, 10, 11,
G
12, 13, 15, 36, 37,
38
(2006) Ill LLJ 824 Born Referred to.
Para 10, 13
(1994) I CLR 187
Referred to.
Paras 11, 36, 37,
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
~ .
A
39, 40
1995 Supp. 3 SCC 28 Referred to.
Paras 11, 36, 37
2004 (7) sec 68
Referred to.
Paras 11, 40
B
2008 (10) SC 166
Referred to.
Para 12
2003 (1) sec 692
Relied on.
Para 19
2008 (7) sec 680
Referred to.
Para 19
~ ..
2003 (1) sec 433
Referred to.
Para 19
c
AIR 1995 SC 1395
Referred to.
Para 19
2005 (12) sec 778 Referred to.
Para 19
1997 (2) sec 53
Referred to.
Para 20
D
1980 (2) sec 593
Referred to.
Para 20
4
2005 (10) sec 437 Relied on.
Para 24
2004 (5) sec 409
Referred to.
Para 24
2004 (8) sec 402
Held inapplicable.
Para 24
E
2003 (4) sec 200
Held inapplicable.
Para 25
1912 (1) sec 209
Held inapplicable.
Para 25
2003 (1) sec 81
Held inapplicable.
Para 25
r
F
1994 (2) sec 434
Held inapplicable.
Para 28
2001 (1) sec 467
Referred to.
Para 28
2004 (8) sec 387
Held inapplicable.
Para 28
2002 (1) sec 589
Held inapplicable.
Para 28
G
2001 (8) sec 105
Referred to.
Para 34
2001 (3) sec 100
Referred to.
Para 35
2oos (3) sec 434
Referred to.
Para 35
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON &631
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
1999 (4) sec 11
Referred to.
Para 36
A
2002 (5) sec 111
Referred to.
Para 36
2004 (10) sec 1
Referred to.
Para 36
2008 ( 1) sec 494
Referred to.
Paras 37, 38
B
2003(4) sec 200
Referred to.
Para 37
!
~
2001 (7) sec 140
Referred to.
Para 37
AIR 1990 SC 781
Referred to.
Para 37
1901 Appeal Cases 495 Referred to.
Para 38
c
1987 (1) sec 213
Referred to.
Para 38
2003 (2) sec 111
Referred to.
Para 38
2004 (8) sec 579
Referred to.
Para 38
D
2005 (8) sec 534
Relied on.
Para 38
1883 (8) Appeal
Cases 658
Referred to.
Para 40
1906 (1) Ch 179
Referred to.
Para 40
E
1907 (1) KB 95
Referred to.
Para 40
AIR 1962 SC 159
Referred to.
Para 40
AIR 1964 SC 828
Referred to.
Para 40
AIR 1988 SC 191
Referred to.
Para 40
F
AIR 1988 SC 782
Referred to.
Para 40
1991 (1) sec 86
Referred to.
Para 40
2002 (8) sec 182
Held inapplicable. Para 41
G
1996 (3) sec 1s
Held inapplicable. Para 41
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8452 of 2009.
H
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.2006 in WP No.
597/2001 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
WITH
C.A. No. 8453 of 2009
B
SLP (C) ....... CC No. 4065 of 2007
SLP (C) ....... CC No. 4046 of 2007
~
C.A. No. 8454-8455 of 2009
c C.A. No. 8457 of 2009
C.A. No. 8458 of 2009
Jamshed P. Cama (NP), Chander Uday Singh (NP), K.K.
Singhvi, Indira Jaising, Raghvendra S. Srivatsa, T.R. Venkat
D
Subramanium, Abhijat P. Medh, Manish Kumar, Gopal Singh,
Pragya Baghel, Debmalya Banerjee, Animesh Sinha, Manik
Karanjawala, Nandini Gore, P.V. Dinesh, Sindhu T.P. P.S.
Sudheer, Lata Desai, Pallavi Divekar, Vimal Chandra S. Dave,
Nitin S. Tambwekar, B.S. Sai, K. Rajeev, Bharathi, Mehak G.
E Sethi, Naveen R. Nath, Arun R.Pendekar, Sanjay Kharde, Asha
Gopalan Nair, Vishnu Sharma, Shrish Kumar Misra, Rajesh
Kumar for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
"
F
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. This judgment will dispose of SLP
(Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP
(Civil) .... CC No. 4065 of 2007, SLP (Civil) .... CC No. 4046
of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil)
No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008.
G
2. Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP
(Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of
2007, SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600
of 2008
H
3. Two concurrent judgments of the Full Bench of the
;.
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 633
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
Bombay High Court, one written by Hon'ble J.N. Patel and A
Hon'ble Roshan Dalvi, JJ. and a separate but concurrent
judgment authored by Hon'ble Deshmukh, J. have fallen for
consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on
account of the two Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court,
principally not agreeing with another Division Bench Judgment B
reported in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
'I
State of Maharashtra [2000 II CLR 279] in its interpretation of
the term "unprotected worker" provided by Section 2( 11) of the
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter c
referred to as 'Mathadi Act') and term "worker" provided by
Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of
the opinion that the interpretation given to those two terms in
the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
• Maharashtra (cited supra) was in conflict with the statutory 0
provisions enacted by the Legislature in the said Mathadi Act.
The question referred to the Full Bench was as under:-
"In view of the statutory definition of the expression
"unprotected worker" in Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra
Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of E
Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 is the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench in Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 II CLR 279
on the aforesaid expression that it is only casually engaged
workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct
F
and proper?"
In the two aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High
Court, the Learned Judges, writing the majority judgment,
recorded as under:-
G
"For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench in Century Textile and
Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
2000 II CLR 270 on the definition of the words "unprotected
worker" and "worker" for the purpose of applicability to H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
Mathadi Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who
come within the purview of the Act, is not correct and
proper and it is erroneous which deserves to be ignored
and is overruled."
8
The Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) gave
his final verdict in the following words:-
~
"To conclude, therefore, to my mind it is clear that within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act "unprotected
worker" means every manual worker who is engaged or
C
to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective
of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or
not and "unprotected workers" within the meaning of the
Act are definitely not only those manual workers who are
casually engaged."
D
4. The above two judgments are challenged basically on
the contention that the judgment in the case of Century Textiles
& Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) is
essentially a correct judgment, while the view taken by the Full
Bench and the interpretation put forth by the same of the
E
Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, is erroneous
inasmuch as the impugned judgments have ignored to take into
account the context in which these provisions have been ,
enacted and they also ignored the intention of the Legislature,
which is reflected from the Preamble and the other provisions
F
of this Act.
5. Lengthy arguments were advanced before us. While
arguments on the side of appellants were led by Shri J.P.
Cama, Learned Senior Counsel, the arguments on behalf of
G respondents were led by Shri K.K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira
Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel.
H
6. Before taking up the issue, the short history of the
legislation is a must.
.
t.
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 635
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
7. A Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislature,
A
being Bill No. XCIX of 1968 for regulating the employment of
unprotected manual workers employed in certain employments
in the State of Maharashtra to make provision for their
adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such
employments and for matters connected therewith. This Bill was
B
first introduced in the Winter Sessions of Maharasthra
Legislature at Nagpur. It was then referred to the Joint
:4
Committee for its report. The basic idea behind bringing this
legislation, as it is reflected in Statement of Objects and
Reasons, was that persons engaged in occupations like c
mathadi, hamals, fishermen, salt pan workers, casual labour,
jatha workers and those engaged in similar manual work
elsewhere, were not receiving adequate protection and benefits
within the ambit of existing labour legislation. Therefore, with a
view to studying the conditions of the work of the persons 0
~
engaged in these occupations, the Government had appointed
a Committee on 15.7.1965 to examine whether relief could be
given to these workers within the ambit of the existing labour
legislation and make recommendation as to how such relief
could be given. The Statement of Objects and Reasons E
mentions that report was made by the Committee to the
Government on 17.11.1967. In that report, it was mentioned that
the persons engaged in vocations like mathadi, hamals, casual
workers employed in docks, lokhandi jatha workers, salt pan
workers and other manual workers mostly work outside fixed
premises in the open and are mostly engaged on piece-rate
F
system in a number of cases. They are not employed directly,
but are either engaged through Mukadum or Toliwalas or gangs
as and when there is work and they also work for different
employers on one and the same day. The volume of work is
not always constant. In view of the peculiar nature of work, its G
variety, the precarious means of employment and the system
of payment and the particular vulnerability to exploitation of this
class of labour, the Committee had come to the conclusion that
the application of the various labour laws to such workers was
impracticable and regulation of their working and other H
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
conditions by introducing amendments to the existing labour
'
laws was not possible. Therefore, the Committee
recommended that the working and the employment conditions
B
of such unprotected workers should be regulated by a special
enactment.
8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons further mentions
that after holding series of meetings with the representatives
of the interests affected by the proposed legislation and after
considering all these suggestions and examining the
recommendations of the Committee, Government had decided
C to bring the Bill which seeks to regulate the employment of
mathadis, hamals and other manual workers employed in
certain employments, to make better provision for their terms
and conditions of employment, to provide for their welfare, for
health and safety measures, where such employments
D require those measures, to make provision for ensuring an
adequate supply to, and full and proper utilization of such
workers in such employments, to prevent avoidable
unemployment and for such purposes to provide for the
establishment of Boards in respect of these employments and
E (where necessary) in the different areas of the State and to
provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.
Ultimately, the Act came on the legal anvil vide Act No. XXX of
1969 after it received assent of the Vice President, acting on
behalf of the President on 5.6.1969. It was extended to the
F
whole State of Maharashtra. It was clarified in Section 1 that it
applies to the employments specified in the Schedule and that
it shall come into force on such date as the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different
dates may be appointed for different areas, and for different
G provisions of the Act. The Act was amended from time to time
by Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977,
62of1981, 28of1987 and 27of1990. To begin with, it came
into force in Thane District in various areas. (Emphasis
supplied)
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 637
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
k
9. It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act.
A
......--'
Section 2, which is the definition clause, defines "Board" in subSection (1), to mean a Board established under Section 6.
Some other sub-Sections of Section 2 runs as under:-
2(2) "contractor", in relation to an unprotected worker,
8
means a person who undertakes to execute any
work for an establishment by engaging such
workers on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such
worker either in groups, gangs (tollis), or as
individuals; and includes a sub-contractor, an agent, c
a mukadum or a tolliwala;
2(3) "employer", in relation to any unprotected worker
engaged by or through contractor, means the
principal employer and in relation to any other
unprotected worker, the -person who has ultimate
D
control over the affairs of the establishment, and
includes ar;iy other person to whom the affairs of
such establishment are entrusted, whether such
person is called an agent, manager or is called by
any other name prevailing in the scheduled
E
employment;
2(4) "establishment" means any place or premises,
including the precincts thereof, in which or in any
part of which any scheduled employment is being
F
or is ordinarily carried on;
2(7) "principal employer" means an employer who
engages unprotected workers by or through a
contractor in any scheduled employment;
'
G
2(11) "unprotected worker" means a manual worker who
is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment;
2( 12) "worker" means a person who is engaged or to be
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
engaged directly or through any agency, whethe~
for wages or not, to do manual work in anr'
scheduled employment, and includes any person
not employed by any employer or a contractor, but
working with the permission of, or under agreement
with the employer or contractor; but does not
include the members of an employer's family;
2(13) "wages" means all remunerations expressed in
terms of money or capable of being so expressed
which would, if the terms of contract of employment,
express or implied were, fulfilled, be payable to an
unprotected worker in respect of work done in any
scheduled employment, but does not include-
(i)
the value of any house accommodation,
supply of light, water, medical attendance; or
any other amenity or any service excluded
from the computation of wages by general or
special order of the State Government;
(ii)
any contribution paid by the employer to any
pension fund or provident fund or under any
scheme of social insurance and the interest
which may have accrued thereon;
(iii)
any travelling allowance or the value of any
travelling concession;
(iv)
any sum paid to the worker to defray special
expenses entailed on him by the nature of his
employment; or
(v)
any gratuity payable on discharge."
Some other Sections of the Act, which were referred to by
the Learned Senior Counsel during the arguments are as
under:-
-
-
~
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 639
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S.