# V. C. SHUKLA v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) - **Citation:** [1980] 3 S.C.R. 500 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1980-04-11 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 492. 493 and 494 of 1979 - **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. s. KAILASAM, A. D. KosHAL - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/v-c-shukla-v-state-delhi-administration-8067 - **Pages:** 86 ## Headnote c D • G H Criminal Conspiracy, inf;redients of-Section 1201J of the Indian Pena{ Code, evidence required to prove criminal conspiracy explained-Approve;·s ei•idcnce, value of. Words and Phrases-"High Public or political (JjJices''-Meaning of. Special Court's Act 1979, ss. 5, 7, 9 & 11-Constitutional validity nf. Sri Amrit Nahata PW 1 was a member of Parliament and had produced & film titled "Kissa Kursi Ka" ur..der the banner of Dhwani Prakash. The, film ' according to the prosecution was a grotesque satire containing a scathing criticism of the functioning of the Central Government and was open to serious objections which were taken even by the Ceia.tral Board of Film Censors. After the film was ready for release, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, applied for certification of the film on the 19th of April 1975 before the Boord. The film,was viewed on April 24, 1975 by an Examining Committee of the Board and whil.::· three members were of the opinion that certificate for exhihition, with drastic cuts. should b~ given, another member and Mr. N. S. Thapa, Chairman, disngreed with the opinion of their colleagues a-nd accordingly referred the matter to the Revising Committee. The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 :1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under Rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1958, a reference waB made· to the Centrit.l Government on 8-5~1975. In this connection, a letter was addressed to PW 6, Mr. S. M. Murshed, who, was at the relevant reriod Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In charge of film and- T. V. Projects and was appointed, Joint Secretary on 1st of May 1975. Before making his comments PW 6 saw the film some time in the middle of May, 1975. Meanwhile, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, was directed to deposit the positive print of the film comprising 14 reels of 35 mm with the Film Division Auditorium, situate at! 1, Mahadev Road, New Delhi. In pursuance of these directions PW 1 depOsited the positive print and an entry thereof (Ext. 17A) was made by the Librarian-cum-Projectionist of the Auditorium. PW 17, K. P. Sreedharan, who \Vas a Technical Officer incharge· also inspected the reels and found them iit order. Although Murshed, PW 6, after seeing tho film aj!reed with the opinion of the Chairman of the Board that the film may be1 open to objection on tho ground that it was full of sarcasm and contained critici~m of the political functioning of the Governmental machinery yet he was pe!('Sonally of the opinion that certification for exhibition should not be refused. PW 6 accordingly recorded a note and submitted it to Mr. A. J. Kidwai, the then Secretary, !\iinistry of Information and Broadcasting. The matter \Vas then examined by Mr. I. K. GujraJ, the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting but ''· • • • -A" V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 501 no final decision was taken. Meanwhile PW J, Amrit Nahat,., filed a writ petition (Ex. PW I /D) in the Supreme Court. On the 23rd of the June 1975, a notice was issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to PW 1, Amrit Nahata, to show cause why, certification to the film be riot' refused. 1he notice was made returnable by 9-7-75. Thus the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting had taken a tentative decision to refuse- certification to the film because of its objectionable and offensive. nature. Emergency was proclaimed on the night of between 25th and 26th of June, 19i 5 and soon thereafter A 1 took charge as the Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting and he was of thei opinion that the film should be banned. On July 5, 1975, in pursuance of the decision taken by the Central Government, the Coordination Committee directed seizure of the film and that its negatives, positives and all other materisitive print in the Auditorium and its alleged transfer to the personal custody of A 1; (ii) the arrival of thirteen trunks containing negatives and other material related to the film at New. Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A 1 and thelir transfer to I, Safdarjung Road, then to the Maruti Comp1ex: and (iii) the actual orders alleged to have been given B c D E ' G D 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R. .l by A 2 for burning the film in the premises of Maruti Complex which operation according to thei prosecution V.'as carried out by the approver PW 3, Khedkar and other witnesses between the 10th a·nd 24th of November 1975. • c • ' The Sessions Judge, Delhi convicted V. C. Shukla (A-1) appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 494179 under section 120B rend with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 Indian Penal Code and also under section 409· Indian Penal Code in respect of the positive ptint and negative and other materia-1 of the film ''Kissa Kursi Ka' under section 411 read with S. 109 l.P.C.; under section 414 read with section 109 LP.C.; oo.d under section 201 read with section 109 I.P.C. The appellant, &tnjay Gandhi (A 1) in Criminal Appeal No. 493/79 was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi under section 120B read with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201, Penal Ccx!e and further convicted under S.. 435, 411, 414 and 201 Penal Code in regard to the negative and other matcria.J.s of th& film, as aJso under section 409 read with section 109 of the Penal Code. Accused No. I was sentenced under s. 120B read with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to two years rigorous imprisonment; under s. 409 regarding the negative and other materials to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000 and in default further 6 months rigorous imprisonment, under s. 409 regarding the positive print of the film to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000 and in case of default further rigorous imprisonment fer three months; under s~ 411 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment fot one year; under s. 414 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonlnent for one year; under s. 201 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; and under s. 435 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one, year and six months. Accused No. 2 was sentenced under s. 120 B read with ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to rigorous imprisonment for two years; under s. 435 to rigorous imprisonment for one year and six months and a fine of Rs. 10,000 . and in case of default further rigorous imprisonment for four months; under s. 411 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 414 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; unde.r s. 201 in regard to the negaotive, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 201 in regard to 13 trunks, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year and under s. 409 read with s., 109 to rigorous imprisonment for two years. The aforesaid sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently in the case of both the accused. On being convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi, both the accused filed appeals before the Delhi High Court against their convictions and sentences, and wet-e released on bail pending the hearing of the appeals. Meanwhile~ the Special Courts Act of 1979' came into force· and by virtue of a declaration G made under section 7 of the said Act, the appeals stood transferred to the Supreme Court. R The appellants raised the following preliminary objections as to the constitutional validity of Sections 5, 7, 9 and 11 of the Act, apart from the plea that their conviction and sentence were not based on any evidence, legal or otberwile. A. Even having regard to the principles laid down the Supreme Court in the Reference case, the Act fails to pass the tests laid down for a valid classifica- ... • '· . '.k. J • • ' V. C. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 503 tion under Art. 14. 1he decision given in the Reference case upheld the Bill A and rejected the challenge that the Bill violated Art. 14 main1y on the ground that the Bill sought to put a certa'in class of persons, namely, persons holding high public or political offices who had committed offences only during the period of E1nergency. In other \vords, the constitutionality of the Bill was upheld on the ground that the legislation was confined to select offences committed by a particular class of persons during the Emergency period. The impugned Act transgressed the li1nits imposed by the judgment in the ReferB ence ca.."e by bringing within its fold offences rommitted prior and subsequent to the Emergency and thus was in direct conflict with the opinion of this Court rendered in the Reference case. In other words this Court struck down that part of the Bill \Vhicb related to the period bet\veen February and June 1975 on the ground that persons having committed offences during that period could not be clubbed \vith those who had committed offences during the period of Emergency. Thus the Act, by clubbing together persons accused of offences C committed during the Emergency with those alleged to be guilty of crimes per. taining to periods before and after the Emergency (i.e. by dealing with offences committed at any point of time whatsoever), has violated the guarantee under Art. 14 and the. classification . made by the Act is in direct contravention of the opinion given by this Court in the Reference Case. B. Even if the classification was valid, as the procedure prescribed by the Act is extremely harsh and prejudicial to the accused, Articles 14 and 21 are clearly viol~ted. (a) Section 7 depdves a valuable right of af)peal; (b) Section 11 (I) takes away the valuabL.! right of revision against in· D terlocutory orders; E (c) Section 9(3) of the Act prescribes the procedure for the trial of \\'arrant cases before the Magistrate in Sections 238 to 243 a.ad 248 Crl. P.C., while treating the special Court as Court of Sessions. C. Assuming the classification of persons holding high public or political offices to be 1ustified, it suffers from a serious infirmity in that neither the terms "high public or political office" has been defined nor have the offences been deli~ F vered or defined so as to make the prosecution of such offenders a practical . reality. D. Even the nature and character of the offences have not been defined in the Act which introduces an element of vagueness in the classification. E. Parliament was not competent to pass a special Act and create Special Courts for a particular set of offenders . F. The Act seeks to change the situs of the Court and virtually abrogate9 "Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. G. The Act creates an inviQious distinction in as much as persons holding high public or political offices Would have the benefit of trial by such an experi4 enced officer as a sitting judge of a High Court. while the appellants have been deprived of (bat right and were tried by a Special Judge who was only a Sessions Judge. G B A B c D E 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R. H. Section 5 of the Act suffers from several constitutional and legal infirmi~ ties, namely, (a) Section 5 (1) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers so as to violate Article 14 in as much as the discretion conferred on the Central Government is absolute, naked and arbitrary and is clearly discriminatory as it is open to the Central Government to pick and choose persons to n1ake declarations in respect of them while excluding others. (b) The issuance of a declaration ilnder section 5 (1) of the Act depends purely on the subjective· satisfaction of the Central Governn1ent and under sub~ section (2) of section 5 such a declaration cannot be called into question by any court so that there would be an element of inherent bias or malice• ! in an order which the Central Government may pass, for prosecuting persons who are political opponents and that the section is therefore invalid. (c) As the Central Government in a democracy consists of the political party which has the· majority in Parliament, declarations under section 5 ( 1) Of the Act could be used as an engine· of oppression against members of parties who are opposed to !he ideologies of the ruling party. (d) the provisions about declaration contained in Section 5(1) are violative of the principle of natural justice in as much as they do not provide for any bearing being given to the accused before a declaration is made. (e) in an instant case, the declaration dated June 22, 1979 made under sec-- tion 5( I) of the Act per se shows that it had not resulted from any real application of the mind by the Central Government. Once the prosecution of the appellants had culminated in a conviction and an appeal therefrom there was no question of the existence of any "prima facie case" and that the use of such an expression could be intelligible only if the accused were facing criminal pr~ ceedings which had not culminated in a conviction; and (f) the declaration made under section 5 of the Act is non est beca\ise it has not been laid before each House of Parliament as required by section 13 of the Act. · J. The appellant not having held any high public or political office ha• been drawn into this case by virtue of a declaration and has therefore been singled p out for a discriminatory treatment. G H K. Section 5(1) of the Act has no application to the fact,; of the present case because under section 5 ( 1) a declaration has to be made on the basis of the source indicated in the section, namely, inquiries conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or investigations which become otiose and would have rel~ance only if the appellant had not been convicted. L Conviction being a finding of1: guilt cannot be said to fall within the situation contemplated by section 5 ( 1) of the Act. Section 6 is an extension of the scheme contained in section 5, the former does not overrule the entire code of Criminal Procedure but in fact takes in only those cases which are pending at the trial stage when the declaration is made. Once the case ends in a. conviction, section 5 spends itself out and there is no room for the application of section 5. M. Section 7 would not apply to this case because its language embraces only those appeals which arise out of a prosecution which itself is pending at the time when a declaration is made. • • • • • V. C. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 505 N. By providing in section 7 for an automatic transfer of appeals from the A High Court to the Supreme Court, the Legislature has exercised a judicial power which is vested in the Supreme Court alone under s~tion 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the section is invalid as it conflicts with section 406 Cr!. P .C. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: (Regarding Constitutional validity of the Act) 1. In a diverse. society and a large democracy such as ours when: lhe ex· panding needs of the nation change with the temper of the times, it is extremely difficult for any legislature to make laws applicable to all persons alike. Some amount of classification is, therefore, necessary to administer various spheres of the activities of the State. [522 D-Ei 2. It is well settled that in applying Art. 14 mathematical precision or nicety or perfect equaRimity are not required. Similarity rather than identity of treatment is enough. The court<; should not make a doctrinaire approach in construing Art. 14 so as to destroi or frustrate any beneficial legislation. What Art. 14 prohibits is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification for B c the purpose of legislation. Furthermore, the Legislature which is in the best position to understand the needs and requirements of the people must be given D sufficient latitude for making selection or differentiation and so long as such a selection is not arbitrary and has a rational basis having regard to the object of the Act, Art. 14 would not be attracted. That is why this Court has laid down that presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the onus lies upofi the person who attacks the statute to fihow that there has been an infraction of the constitutional concept of equality. It has also been held that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court is E entitled to take into consideration matters of common knowledge, common re·- port, the history of the times and all other facts which may be existing at the time of the legislation. Similarly, it cannot be presumed that the administration of a particular law would be done with an "evil eye and an unequaJ hand". Finally, any person invoking Art. 14 of the C.Onstitution must show that there has been discrimination against a person who is similarly situate or equally cir· cumstanced. [522 E-H, 523 Al P' State cif U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, [1961] 1 SCR 14, followed. 3. The classical tests laid down for the application of Art. 14 are the following: 1. The classification must be founded on an intelligible dif[erentia which distinguishes persons who are placed in a group fro.ni others who are G left out of the group . 2. Such differentiation must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 3. There must b~ a nexus between the differentiation which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act. [523 D-F] 4. It cannot be gainsaid that this Court while dealing with the Reference case was not at all concerned with the provisions of the Act which is of much B 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. A wider application than the Bill considered by the Court in the Reference. It is no doubt true that the Bill contained provisions for punishing only those offen~ ders who, were accused of offences committed during a particular period, namely, the period of Emergency. It is also true that the period of Emergency was ·an extraordinary one in the history of our country a.nd its features have been spelt out in the preamble of the Bill as also in the judgment given by this Court in the aforesaid case. But that by itself does not debar Parliament from passing B a permanent Act to deal with a specified class of persons who occupy high public or politica·l offices (\vhich are offices of trust) and misuse or abuse: the,m. It cannot be doubted that for the estabJishment and continuance. of a Parliamentary democracy and to secure efficiency and purity of administration it is necessary that when such persons commit serious abuse of power and. are guilty of a breach of the trust reposed in them, they would form a special class of offen .. c D F G ff ders. [525 F-H, 526 A] 5. That Purity of life is a desired goal at all times itself is a ·sufficient justification for the classification made by the Act which widens its scope to include offenders of a particular type, whether before, during or after the Emergency. In fact, such persons would undoubtedly form a special class of offenders which would justify the legislative measure singling them out for an expeditious trial. To hold otherwise would be to say that persons bearing the aforesaid attributes would be immune from prosecution unqer any Special Act. Passing of such a Special Act is within the Legislative competence of Parliament. [526 D-E, 527 G-H, 528 BJ 6. The Act does not suffer from any infirmity and the circumstance that it applies to offences committed at any time by a particular set of persons pos~ sessing special characteristics does not render it unconstitutional; for, when it puts into a class a particular set of personS having special characteristics which distinguish them from others who are left out of that class and who are to be tried under the ordinary law,. the classification is eminently reasonable. The classification made has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Separate grouping of holders of high offices for purposes of expedition~ crimi .. nal action to be taken by superior courts is a reasonable· and vf the nation. [534 C-E] The rationale behind, the classification of persons possessing the aforesaid ,characteristics is that they wield wide powers which, if exercised improperly by reason of corruption, nepotism or breach of trust, may mar or adversely mould the future of the country and tarnish its image. It cannot be said, therefore, with any conviction that persons who possess special attributes could be equated with ordinary criminals who have neither the power nor the resources to comp mit offences of the type described above. The term 'persons holding high pubG ]ic or political offices~ is self-explanatory and admits of no difficulty and that mere absence of definition of the expression would not vitiate the classification made by the Act. Such persons are· in a position to take major decisions regarding social, economic, fii:tancial aspects of the life of the community and other far-reaching decisions On the· home front as also regarding external affairs and if their actions are tainted by breach of trust, corruption or other extraneous consideration, they would damage the interest<; of the country. It is, therefore, H not only proper but essential to bring such offenders to book at the earliest ·poSFible opportunity. [534 F-H, 535 Al 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] J S.C.R. A 9. Clause 4 of the preamble to the Special Courts Act clearly indicates the B nature of the oll'ences that would be tried under the Act. [535 BJ The \Vords 'power being a Trust' clearly indicate that any act which amounts. to a breach of the trust or of the powers conferred on -the person concerned would be an offence triable nnder the Act. Clause ( 4) is wide enough to include any offence committed by holders of high public or political offices which amounts to breach of trust or for which they are accountable in law and does not leave any room for doubt. Section 5 which confers powers on the Central Goverμment to make a declaration clearly refers tO the guidelines laid down in the preambie and no Central Government would evei think of prosecuting holders of high public or political offices for petty offences. [535 o-.GJ 10. Sections 7 and 11 of the Special Courts Act are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. That is to say Parliament has the competence: C to provide for the creation of Special Courts and to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court by providing that an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of Special Court to the Supreme COUrt both on fact and on law. [536 A-DJ In re. Special Courts Bill [1979] 2 SCR 476; applied. 11. The Act neither seeks to change the situs of the Court nor virtually D abrogates Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [536 E] E ' G H In re. Special Court Bill, (1979] 3 SCR; followed. 12. The question of the appellants beiag tried by the Special Judge appointed under the Special Courts Act could not arise because the said Special Court did not exist at all even whet the trial of the appellant was concluded. The First Information report against the appellants was lodged on 13th April 1977 and the chargesheet was submitted before the Special Judge who convicted the appellants by his order dated February 27, 1979. The Act, however, came into force on Ma·y 16, 1979, that is to say, three months after the conViction and about two months afte"r the appellants bad filed their appeals before the High Court. The existence of such fortuitous circumstances cannot attract Article 14. [536 G-H, 537 A-Bl Khandige Sham Bhatt and Ors. v. The Agricultural Income Tax (1963] 3 SCR 809; Dantuluri Ram Raiu and Ors, v. State of Andhra and Anr., [1972] l SCR 421; applied. (l{ficer, Pradesh 13. Section 5(1) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of powers so as to violate Article 14. No unguided or uncanalised power has been conferred on the Central Government. A basic condition imposed on, the Cettitral Government is that there must be a proper application of mind regarding the existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence. Secondly, the discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the" guidelines contained in the preamble. The various clauses of the preamble lay down clear guidelines and provide sufficient safe-guards against any abuse of power. Thirdly, clause ( 4) of the· preamble' clearly lays down that the power under s. 5 is exercisable only after the Commission of an offence by the holder of a high public or political office: ha6 been disclosed as a result of an inquiry conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or of an investigation conducted by the Government through its agencies. It is well settled: that discretionary power is not the same thing as power to discriminate nor • • ' V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 509 can the constitutional validity of a law ~ tested on the assumption that wherei A a discretion&ry power is conferred on a high authority, the same may or would be exercised in a discriminatory manner. [538 &H, 539 A] The pO\·\rer conferred on the Central Government is controlled by the guidelines contained in the preamble which by virtue of the provisions. of s. 5(1) hecomes a part of that section. As th& po\\•er has been conferred on the Central Government \Vhich is to make a declaration in accordance with the conditions laid down in s. 5 ( 1) and, therefore, in conformity with the guidelines mentioned in the preamble, the attack based on discrimination is unfounded. [541 B-C] Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, [1950] SCR 519, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, [1952] SCR 435; Matajog Dubey v. H. C. Bhari, [1955] 2 SCR 925 In Re. The Kera/a Education Bl'll, 1957, [1959] SCR 995 Jyoti Par.shad v. The Administrator for the Union T~rritory of Delhi, [1968] 2 SCR 125; Moti Ram Dekha etc. v. General Manager, N.E.F., R7iil ... ways, Maligaon, Panda etc. [1964] 5 SCR 683; V. C. Shukla v. The State through C.B.I .. f19801 I SCR 380; followed. B c 14. The power of the Central Go.-ernment to issue a declaration is a statutory power circumscribed by certain conditions. Furthermore, as the power is vested in a very high authority, it cannot be assumed that it is likely D to be abused. On the other hand, where the power is conferred on such a high authority as the Central Government, the presumption will be that the ·power will be exercised in a bona fide manner a.nd according to law. [541 D·-F] Chinta Lingam and Ors. v. Governmt.'nt of India and Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 871; Budhan Chaudhary and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [1955] I SCR 1045; referred to. · 15. The contention that declarations under s. 5(1) of the Act could be1 used as a.n engine of oppression against members of rarties who are opposed to the ideologies of the ruling party is one arising out of fear and mistrust which. if accepted would invalidate practically all Jaws of the land; for, then E even a prosecution under the ordinary law may be considered as politically motivated, which is absurd. Furtheirmore, prejudice. malice or taint is not a matter for presumption in the absence of evidence supporting it. It is well p settled that burden lies on the parties allegingi bias or malice to prove its existence. and if malice or bias is proved in a particular case, the courts would strike down the act vitiated by it, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226, 227 or 136. [542 A·D] In Re. Special Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476 referred to. 16. At the stage when the declaration is sought to 6e made there is no list G pending no'r has any prosecution been 1aunched against the accused. Section 5 deals only with the decision taken by the Central Goveirnment to prosecute and until th<)t decision is notified, the prosecution does not start, and the questioit of Ml accused being heard at that stage~ therefore, does not arise at all. [542 F-GJ Cozons v. N•rth Devon Hospital Management Committee and Anr., [1966) 2 Q.B. 330: quoted with approval. B 17. Undei' section 5(1) of the Act the Government has to be satisfied on two counts bef1 .. re it could issue a decla.ration. It must be satisfied in the first A B c D 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R. instance that there is prima facie ervidence of the comm1ss1on of au offence. Secondly, it must form the opinion in accordance \Vith the. guidelines contained in the preamble that such offence ought to be dealt with· under the Act. l'he condition of the existence of prima facie evidence. is fulfilled in the case of the pre.Bent declaration though the trial in the first Couit had ended in a conviction and an appeal therefrom, the reason being that if conviction is construed as evidence of the existence of something more than a· mere pri1na facie. case, that would not mean that a- prin1a facie case cease to exist. That a prima facie case must be found to exist is only the mininuon requirement for the satisfaction of the Central Government and it would be doubly made out if the evidence available is stronger than is needed to make out only a prinia facie case. A conviction of an accused person cannot mean that there is. no prilna facie evidence against him. AH that it spells out is that not only: a prima facie case is made out against him but that the evidence available is even stronger and is sufficient for a conviction. However, as the Government, while acting under the section, is to satisfy itself only with the existence of pri1na facie evidence, the assertion by it in the declaration that such evidence was available to its satisfaction cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be1 inapplicable to a case in which a conviction: has been: recorded. In this view of the matter the use of the expression 'prin1a facic' evidence in the decJaration is fully justified even though the tri