# V. N. SARIN v. MAJOR AJIT KUMAR POPLAI

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 349
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-08-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 468 of 1965
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah Ands. M. S!Kri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/v-n-sarin-v-major-ajit-kumar-poplai-3576
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

·Delhi Rent Control Act, !958 (Act 59 of 1958), s. 14(6)-'Acquisition by transfer', meaning of-Allotment of share on partition of Hindu
undivided family-Whether transfer within meaning of section.
The appellant became tennant of premises owned by a Hindu undivided family of which respondent No. 2 was the head.
On partition of
the family property, the said premises fell to the share of respondent
No. I. An application was thereafter made to the Rent Controller
by respondent No. 1 under s. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958, seeking on the ground of personal need, the eviction of the appellant from the premises. The appellant resisted the application, inter alia,
on the ground that as respondent No. 1 had acquired premises by 'transfer' within the meaning of s. 14 ( 6) of the Act he was precluded from
taking advantage of s. 14(1) (e) of the Act. After passing through various
stages the matter went to the High Court which held that a share
acquired on partition of a Hindu undivided family was not an 'acquisi·
tion by tran•fer' contemplated by s. 14(6) of the Act.
The appellant
came to the Supreme Court by Special Leave .
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under s. 53 of
the Transfer of Property Act, and s. 17 ( 1 )(b) of the Indian Registration Act it had been held that partition of a Hindu undivided family
was transfer within the meaning of those sections. and the same construction should be placed on the word 'transfer' in s.,
14(6)
of the
Delhi Rent Contr.ol Act.
HELD : ( i) Partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the
family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate
titles of the individual co-paroeners in respect of several ttems of properties allotted to them respectively.
If [bat be the true nature of partition it cannot be held ,that partition of an undivided Hindu family property must necessarily mean transfer of the property to lhe
individual
co-parceners. [354 D-EJ
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundlra/ and_ Others, 43 I.A. !SI, relied on.
(ii) Cases decided under s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act ~nd
s. 17 (! )(b) of the ·Indian Registration Act are not decisive of
the
meaning to be given to the word 'transfer' in s. 14(6) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act.
(35 5 D-E]
Soniram Raghushet & Others v. Dwarkabai Shridharshet & Another
A.I.R. 1951 Born. 94; Naramsetti Venk<;iapyala Narasimhalu and Anr. v.
H
Naramsetli Someswara Rao, A.I.R. 1943 Madras 505 and Gutta Radhakrishnayya v. Gutta Sarasamma, A.I.R. 1951 Madra• 213, referred to.
(iii) Having regard to the object of s. 14(6) which is to prevent
lamllords from using transfer of leased premises as a device for obtaining
L6Sup.CI/6S-8
350
SUPJlBMB COUl.T J.BPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
advantage under s. 14(1) (e), it cannot be held that a person who acquired property by partition can fall within the scope of its provisions
even though the propeny which he acquired by partition did in a sense
belong to him before such tran.,fer.
The transfer contemplarcd by
s. 14( 6) is to a person who had no title to the premises and in that sense
wu a stranger. The High Cour: was right in coming to the conclusion
thats. 14(6) was not a bar to the application filed by respondent No. 1
for the eviction of the appellant. [355 E-H; ~56 BJ
Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat v. I-allubhai Patti. 55 l.T.R.
6:li, relied on.

## Text

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V. N. SARIN
v.
MAJOR AJIT KUMAR POPLAI
August 9, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S!KRI, JJ.)
·Delhi Rent Control Act, !958 (Act 59 of 1958), s. 14(6)-'Acquisition by transfer', meaning of-Allotment of share on partition of Hindu
undivided family-Whether transfer within meaning of section.
The appellant became tennant of premises owned by a Hindu undivided family of which respondent No. 2 was the head.
On partition of
the family property, the said premises fell to the share of respondent
No. I. An application was thereafter made to the Rent Controller
by respondent No. 1 under s. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958, seeking on the ground of personal need, the eviction of the appellant from the premises. The appellant resisted the application, inter alia,
on the ground that as respondent No. 1 had acquired premises by 'transfer' within the meaning of s. 14 ( 6) of the Act he was precluded from
taking advantage of s. 14(1) (e) of the Act. After passing through various
stages the matter went to the High Court which held that a share
acquired on partition of a Hindu undivided family was not an 'acquisi·
tion by tran•fer' contemplated by s. 14(6) of the Act.
The appellant
came to the Supreme Court by Special Leave .
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under s. 53 of
the Transfer of Property Act, and s. 17 ( 1 )(b) of the Indian Registration Act it had been held that partition of a Hindu undivided family
was transfer within the meaning of those sections. and the same construction should be placed on the word 'transfer' in s.,
14(6)
of the
Delhi Rent Contr.ol Act.
HELD : ( i) Partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the
family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate
titles of the individual co-paroeners in respect of several ttems of properties allotted to them respectively.
If [bat be the true nature of partition it cannot be held ,that partition of an undivided Hindu family property must necessarily mean transfer of the property to lhe
individual
co-parceners. [354 D-EJ
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundlra/ and_ Others, 43 I.A. !SI, relied on.
(ii) Cases decided under s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act ~nd
s. 17 (! )(b) of the ·Indian Registration Act are not decisive of
the
meaning to be given to the word 'transfer' in s. 14(6) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act.
(35 5 D-E]
Soniram Raghushet & Others v. Dwarkabai Shridharshet & Another
A.I.R. 1951 Born. 94; Naramsetti Venk<;iapyala Narasimhalu and Anr. v.
H
Naramsetli Someswara Rao, A.I.R. 1943 Madras 505 and Gutta Radhakrishnayya v. Gutta Sarasamma, A.I.R. 1951 Madra• 213, referred to.
(iii) Having regard to the object of s. 14(6) which is to prevent
lamllords from using transfer of leased premises as a device for obtaining
L6Sup.CI/6S-8
350
SUPJlBMB COUl.T J.BPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
advantage under s. 14(1) (e), it cannot be held that a person who acquired property by partition can fall within the scope of its provisions
even though the propeny which he acquired by partition did in a sense
belong to him before such tran.,fer.
The transfer contemplarcd by
s. 14( 6) is to a person who had no title to the premises and in that sense
wu a stranger. The High Cour: was right in coming to the conclusion
thats. 14(6) was not a bar to the application filed by respondent No. 1
for the eviction of the appellant. [355 E-H; ~56 BJ
Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat v. I-allubhai Patti. 55 l.T.R.
6:li, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 468 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March I, I 965 of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Second
Appeal from Order No. 235/D of 1963.
Purushotram Trikamdas and D. Goburdhan, for the appel·
Jant.
A. V. Viswanath Sastri and B. N. Kirpa/, for the respondents.
TI1e Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J.
The short question of law which arises
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in this appeal is whether the partition of the coparcenary property
among the coparceners can be said to be "an acquisition by
transfer" within the meaning of s. 14(6) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958) (hereinafter called 'the
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Act'). This question arises in this way. The premises in question
are a part of a bungalow situate at Racquet Court Road, Civil
Lines, Delhi. The bungalow originally belonged to the joint Hindu
family consisting of respondent No. 2, Mr. B. S. Poplai and his
two sons, respondent No. I, Major Ajit Kumar Poplai and Vinod
Kumar Poplai. The three members of this undivided Hindu family
partitioned their coparcenary property on May 17, 1962, and
as a result of the said partition, the present premises fell to the
share of respondent No. 1. The appellant V. N. Sarin had been
mductcd into the premises as a tenant by respondent No. 2 before
partition at a monthly rental of Rs. 80. After respondent No. 1
got this property by partition, he applied to the Rent Controller
for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he required
the premises bona fide for his own residence and that of his wife
and children who arc dependent on him. To this application, he
implcaded the appellant and respondent No. 2.
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The appellant contested the claim of respondent No. I on
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three grounds.
He urged
that respondent No. 1 was not his
landlord inasmuch as he was not aw~e of the partition and did
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SARIN v. POPLAI (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
351
A not know what it contained. He also urged that even if respondent No. 1 was his landlord, he did not require the premises bona
fide; and so, the requirements of s. 14(1)(e) of the Act were
not satisfied. The last contention raised by him was that if respondent No. 1 got the property in suit by partition, in law it meant
that he had acquired the premises by transfer within the meaning
B of s. 14(6) of the Act and the provisions of the said section make
the present suit incompetent .
The Rent Controller held that respondent No. 1 was the
exclusive owner of the premises in suit by virtue of partition. As
such, it was found that he was the landlord of the appellant. In
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regard to the plea made by respondent No. 1 that he needed the
premises bona fide as prescribed by s. 14( l)(e), the Rent Controller rejected the case of respondent No. 1. The point raised
by the appellant under s. 14(6) of the Act was not upheld on the
ground that acquisition of the suit premises by partition cannot
be said to be acquisition by transfer within the meaning of the
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said section. As a result of the finding recorded against respondent No. 1 under s. 14(1)(e) however, his application for the
appellant's eviction failed.
·
Against this decision, respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal
to the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. The said Tribunal agreed
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with the Rent Controller in holding that respondent No. 1 was
the landlord of the premises in suit and had not acquired the said
premises· by transfer. In regard to the finding recorded by the
Rent Controller under s. 14 (I)( e), the Rent Control Tribunal
came to a different conclusion. It held that respondent No. 1 had
established his case that he needed the premises bona fide for his
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personal ·use as prescribed by the said provision. In the result;
the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 was allowed and the
eviction of the appellant was ordered.
This decision was challenged by the appellant by preferring a
second appeal before the Punjab High Court. The High Court
upheld the findings .recorded by the .Rent Contflll Tribunal on the
G question of the status of respondent No. 1 as the landlord of the
premises. and on .the plea )llade by him that his claim for eviction
of the appellant w·as justified under s. i4{1.)(e) .. In fact, these
two findings could not be and were.not challenged before the High
Court which was delliing ·with the matter in second· appeal: The
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main contention which was raised before the High Court was in
regard to the construction of s. 14 ( 6); artd on this point, the High
Courrhas agreed with the view taken by the Rent Control Tribunal
and has held that respondent No. 1 cannot be !laid to have acquired
352
SUPllMB COURT REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
the premises in suit by transfer within the meaning of the said
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section. It is against this decree that the appellant has come to
this Court by special leave.
Mr. Purshottam for the appellant
argues that the view taken by the High Court about the comtruc
lion of s. 14(6) is erroneous in law. That is how the only poinr
which arises for our decision is whether the partition of the coparcenary property among the coparceners could be said to be an
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acquisition by transfer under s. 14 ( 6) of the Act.
The Act was passed in 1958 to provide, inter alia, for the
control of rents and evictions in certain areas in the Union Territory of Delhi. This Act conforms to the usual pattern adopted by
rent control legislation in this country.
Section 2(e) defines a c
"landlord" as meaning a person who, for the time being. is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on
his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the
benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver
for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be
entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.
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It has been found by all the courts below that respondent No. I
is a landlord of the premises and this position has not been and
cannot be disputed in the appeal before us.
Section 14(1) of the Act provides for the protection of tenants
against eviction. It lays down that notwithstanding anything to the
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contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree
for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any
oourt or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant.
Having thus provided for general protection of tenants in respect
of eviction, clauses (a) to (I) of the proviso to the said section
lay down that the Controller may, on an application made to him
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in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of
possession of the premises on one or more of the grounds covered
by the said clauses; clause (e) of s. 14(1) is one of such clauses
and it refers to cases where the premises let for residential purposes
are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as therein
descn'bed.
The Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court have
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recorded a finding against the appellant and in favour of respondent No. 1 on this point and this finding also has not been and
cannot be challenged before us.
That takes us to s. 14(6). It provides that where a landlord
has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the
recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section
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(I ) on the ground specified in clause ( e) of the proviso thereto,
unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the
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SARIN v. POPLAJ (Gajendrltgadkar., C.J.)
353
A.
acquisition. It is obvious that if this clause applies to the claim
made by respondent No. 1 for evicting the appellant, his application would be barred, because a period of five years had not
eiapsed from the date of the acquisition when the present application was made. The High Court has, however, held that where
property-originally belonging to an undivided Hindu family is
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allotted to the share of one of the coparceners as a result of partition, it cannot be said that the said property has been acquired by
such person by transfer; and so, s. 14(6) cannot be invoked by
the appellant.
The question which we have to decide in the
present appeal is whether this view of the High Court is right.
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Before construing s. 14(6), it may be permissible to enquire
what may be the policy underlying the section and the object
intended to be achieved by it. It seems plain that the object wbich
this provision is intended to achieve is to prevent transfers by
landlords as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenants
from the premises Jet out to them. If a landlord was unable to
make out a case for evicting his tenant under s. 14 (I) ( e), it was
not unlikely that he may think of transferring the premises to a
purchaser who would be able to make out such a case on his own
behalf; and the legislature thought that if such a course was
allowed to be adopted, it would defeat the purpose of s. 14 ( 1).
In other words, where the right to evict a tenant could not be
claimed by a landlord under s. 14(1 )( e), the legislature thought
that the landlord should not be permitted to create such a right by
adopting the device of transferring the premises to a purchaser who
may be able to prove his own individual case under s. 14(1 )(e).
It is possible that this provision may, in some cases, work hardship, because if a transfer is made by a landlord who could have
F
proved his case under s. 14(1) (e), the transferee would be precluded from making a claim for the eviction of the tenant within
five years even though he, in his tum, would also have proved
his case under s. 14(l)(e). Apparently, the legislature thought
that the possible mischief which may be caused to the tenants by
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transfers made by landlords to circumvent the provisions of s. 14
( 1) ( e) required that an unqualified and absolute provision should
be made as prescribed bys. 14(6). That, in our opinion, appears
to be the object intended to be achieved by this provision and
the policy underlying it.
Mr. Purshottam, however, contends that when an item of
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property belonging to the undivided Hindu family is allotted to
the share of one of the coparceners on partition, such allotment
in substance amounts to the transfer of the said property to the
354
SUPllEMB COUil T llEPOR TS
[ 1966) I S.C.R.
said person and it is, therefore, an acquisition of the said property
A
by transfer. Prima facie, it is not easy to accept this contention.
Conununity of interest and unity of possession arc the essential
attributes of coparcenary property; and so, the true effect of partition is that each coparcener gets a specific property in lieu of his
undivided right in respect of the totality of the property of the
family. In other words, what happens at a partition is that in lieu
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of the property allo1ted to individual coparcencrs they, in substance, renounce their right in respect of the other properties; they
get exclusive title to the properties allotted to them and as a consequence, they renounce their undefined right in respect of the
rest of the property. The process of partition, therefore, involve>
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th.e transfer of joint enjoyment of the properties by all the coparceners into an enjoyment in severality by them of the respective
properties allotted to their shares.
Having regard to this basic
character of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied
that each coparcener has an antecedent title to the said property,
though its extent is not detennined until partition takes place.
0
That being so, partition really means that whereas initially all the
coparccners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of
the family jointly, that joint title is by partition transfonned into
'Separate titles of the individual coparccners in respect of several
items of properties allotted to them rcspxtivcly. If that be the
true nature of partition, it would not be easy to uphold the broad
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contention raised by Mr. Purshottam that partition of an undivided Hindu family property must necessarily mean transfer of
the property to the individual coparceners. As was obs~rved by
the Privy Council in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj and
Others.(') "Partition does not give him (a coparcener) a title or
create a title in him; it only enables him to obtain what is his own
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in a definite and specific fonn for purposes of disposition independent of the wishes of his fonner co-sharers".
Mr. Purshottam, however, strongly relics on the fact that there
is preponderance of judicial authority in favour of the view that a
partition is a transfer for the purpose of s. 53 of the Transfer of
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Property Act. It will be recalled that the decLsion of the question
as to whether a partition under Hindu Law is a transfer within the
meaning of s. 53, naturally depends upon the definition of the
word "transfer" prescribed by s. 5 of the said Act. Section 5 provides that in the following sections. "transfer of property" meam
an act by which a livin~ oerson conveys property, in present or in
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future. to one or more other living persons, or to himself, or to
(I) 43 I.A. ISi at p. t61.
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SARIN v. POPLAI (Gajendragadkar., C.J.)
355
A himself and one or more other living persons. It must be conceded that in a number of cases, the High Courts in India have
held that partition amounts to a transfer within the meaning of
s. 53, vide, for instance, Soniram Raghushet & Others v. Dwarkabai Shridharshet & Another('), and the cases cited therein. On
the other hand, there are some decisions which have taken a conB
trary view, vide Naramsetti Venkatappala Narasimhalu and Anr.
v. Naramsetti Someswara Rao and Anr.,( 2 ) and Gutta Radha-
'
krishnayya v. Gutta Sarasamma( 3 ).
In this connection, Mr. Purshottam has also relied on the
fact that under s. 17 ( 1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act, a deed
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of partition is held to be a non-testamentary instrument which purports to create a right, title or interest in respect of the property
covered by it, and his argument is that if for the purpose of s. 17
( 1) (b) of the Registration Act as well as for the purpose of s. 53
of the Transfer of Property Act, partition is held to be a transfer
of property, there is no reason why partition should not be held
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to be an acquisition of property by transfer within the meaning
of s. 14( 6) of the Act.
In dealing with the present appeal, we propose to confine our
decision to the narrow question which arises before us and that
relates to the construction of s. 14(6). Whats. 14(6) provides
is that the purchaser should acquire the premises by transfer and
E that necessarily assumes that the title to the property which the
purchaser acquires by transfer did not vest in him prior to such
transfer. Having regard to the object intended to be achieved by
this provision, we are not inclined to hold that a person who
acquired property by partition can fall within the scope of its
provision even though the property which he acquired by partition
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did in a sense belong to him before such transfer. Where a property belongs to an undivided Hindu family and on partition it
falls to the share of one of the coparceners of the family, there is
no doubt a change of the landlord of the said premises, but the
said change is not of the same character as the change which is
effected by transfer of premises to which s. 14 ( 6) refers.
In
G regard to cases falling under s. 14(6), a person who had no title
to the premises and in that sense, was a stranger, becomes a landlord by virtue of the transfer. In regard to a partition, the position
is entirely different.
When the appellant was inducted into the
premises, the premises belonged to the undivided Hindu family
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consisting of respondent No. 1, his father and his brother. Aftec
partition, instead of the undivided Hindu family, respondent No. 1
(1) A.l.R. 1951 Born. 94.
(2) A.I.R. 1943 Mad. SOS.
(3) A.LR. 1951 Mad. 213.
356
SUPl.EMB COURT REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
alone had become landlord of the premises.
We are satisfied
that it would be unreasonable to hold that allotment of one parcel
of property belonging to an undivided Hindu family to an individual coparcener as a result of partition is an acquisition of the
said property by transfer by the said coparcener within the meaning of s. 14 ( 6). In our opinion, the High Court was right in
coming to the conclusion that s. 14 ( 6) did not create a bar against
the institution of the application by respondent No. 1 for evicting
the appellant.
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In this connection, we may refer to a recent decision of this
Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Keshavla/
La//11bhai Patel. (1)
In that case, the respondent Keshavlal had
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thrown all his self-acquired property into the common hotch-pot
of the Hindu undivided family which consisted of himself, his
wife, a major son and a minor son. Thereafter, an oral partition
look place between the members of the said family and properties
were transferred in accordance with it in the names of the several
members. The question which arose for the decision of this Court
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was whether there was an indirect transfer of the properties
allotted to the wife and minor son in the partition within the
meaning of s. 16( 3) (a) (iii) and (iv) of the Indian Income-tax
<\ct, 1922. This Court held that the oral partition in question was
not a transfer in the strict sense and should not, therefore, be said
to attract the provisions of s. 16(3)(a)(iii) and (iv) of the said
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Act. This decision shows that having regard to the context of the
provision of the
Income-ta\ Act with
which the
Court was
dealing. it was thought that a partition i< not a transfer. Considerations which weighed with the Court in
determining the true
effect of partition in the light of the provisions of the said section,
ar.ply with equal force to the interpretation of s. 14(6) of the Act.
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In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Before we part with this appeal, we would like to add that on the
appellant undertaking to vacate the suit premises within three
months from the date of this decision, Mr. Sastri for respondent
No. I has fairly agreed not to execute the decree during the said
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period.
Appeal dismissed.
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(t) 196S 2 S.C.R. 100.
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