# V. P. GINDRONIYA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-01-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1967
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/v-p-gindroniya-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-5038
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

J. C. SHAH,
K. S, HEGDE,
A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND J. D. DUA, JJ.)
Public Servant-Ai/aster and Servant-Master's right to suspend ser-
•vant pending enquiry--No such right expressly provided in contract or
-statutoril,v-Ef}ect of order of suspension.
A
B
On May 7, 1964, the respondent-State ordered a departmental enquiry
C
against the appellant who was a temporary public servant in its service
and placed him Under suspension pending the enquiry. On June 6, 1964
·the appellant gave a notice to the respondent !resigning from service. On
August I, 1964 the appellant was , asked to file a reply to the charges
against him.
The appellant tiled a writ petition in the High Court to
-quash the proceedings on the ground that, as he was no longer in the
respondent's service, the respondent
could not
take
any departmental
D
action against him.
·r;-ie petition was dismiS3ed.
In appeal to this C'.ourt,
HELD : (I) The general principle is that if the master bas a power
to suspend his -.servant pending an enquiry into his misConduct, either
in the contract of service -or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder
_,governing the service, an order of suspemion passed by the master has
E
the effect. of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant
with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and
1he master iS' not bound to pay any wages during the period of suspenSiOn.
Such a power to suspend the contract of service cannot be implied and
therefore, if in the absence of such a power in the contract, statute or
rules, an order of. suspension is passed by the master it only forbids the
servant ·to work without affecting the relationship of master and servant,
and the master will have to pay the servant's wages. [451 EJ
F
In the present case, the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960, do not provide for
suspension dufing the pendency of an enquiry.
Therefore, the order of
stispetision could not be considered as an order suspending the contract
of service.
It follows that when the appellant issued his notice on June
6, 1964, the contract of service was in force and it was open to him to
G
put an end to it. [452. GJ
(2) In his notice, the appellant unequivocally informed
the respondent that he has terminated his service with the respondent.
He also
intimated that any amounts due from him to the respondent under the
provisos to r. 12(a) '!lay be deducted ,from the salary .due to him duri.ng
the period of suspension.
Therefore, the notice was tn accordance with
the requirements of r. 12. It follows that ever since th.e ~espond~nt re~
H
ceived the notice on June 9, 1964 the appe11ant was not in its service and
therefore, it was not open to the respondent to take any disciplinary pro--
ceedings against him.
[454 CJ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. P. GINDRONIYA v. M. P. STATE (Hegde, J.)
449
The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Ors. v. Hotef
Workers' Union, [1960) I S.C.R. 476, T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem and
Anr., [1961] I S.C.R. 750, R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, [1964] 5 S.C.R.
431and Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 S.C.R.
577, followed.
State of West Bengal v. Nipendra Nath Bagchi,. [1961] 1 S.C.R. 771
and The State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, Civil Appeal No. 1217 of 1966
decided on 6-10-1969, expl•ined.

## Text

448
I
V. P. GINDRONIYA
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
January 29, 1970
(M. HIDAYATULLAH,, C.J.,
J. C. SHAH,
K. S, HEGDE,
A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND J. D. DUA, JJ.)
Public Servant-Ai/aster and Servant-Master's right to suspend ser-
•vant pending enquiry--No such right expressly provided in contract or
-statutoril,v-Ef}ect of order of suspension.
A
B
On May 7, 1964, the respondent-State ordered a departmental enquiry
C
against the appellant who was a temporary public servant in its service
and placed him Under suspension pending the enquiry. On June 6, 1964
·the appellant gave a notice to the respondent !resigning from service. On
August I, 1964 the appellant was , asked to file a reply to the charges
against him.
The appellant tiled a writ petition in the High Court to
-quash the proceedings on the ground that, as he was no longer in the
respondent's service, the respondent
could not
take
any departmental
D
action against him.
·r;-ie petition was dismiS3ed.
In appeal to this C'.ourt,
HELD : (I) The general principle is that if the master bas a power
to suspend his -.servant pending an enquiry into his misConduct, either
in the contract of service -or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder
_,governing the service, an order of suspemion passed by the master has
E
the effect. of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant
with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and
1he master iS' not bound to pay any wages during the period of suspenSiOn.
Such a power to suspend the contract of service cannot be implied and
therefore, if in the absence of such a power in the contract, statute or
rules, an order of. suspension is passed by the master it only forbids the
servant ·to work without affecting the relationship of master and servant,
and the master will have to pay the servant's wages. [451 EJ
F
In the present case, the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960, do not provide for
suspension dufing the pendency of an enquiry.
Therefore, the order of
stispetision could not be considered as an order suspending the contract
of service.
It follows that when the appellant issued his notice on June
6, 1964, the contract of service was in force and it was open to him to
G
put an end to it. [452. GJ
(2) In his notice, the appellant unequivocally informed
the respondent that he has terminated his service with the respondent.
He also
intimated that any amounts due from him to the respondent under the
provisos to r. 12(a) '!lay be deducted ,from the salary .due to him duri.ng
the period of suspension.
Therefore, the notice was tn accordance with
the requirements of r. 12. It follows that ever since th.e ~espond~nt re~
H
ceived the notice on June 9, 1964 the appe11ant was not in its service and
therefore, it was not open to the respondent to take any disciplinary pro--
ceedings against him.
[454 CJ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. P. GINDRONIYA v. M. P. STATE (Hegde, J.)
449
The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Ors. v. Hotef
Workers' Union, [1960) I S.C.R. 476, T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem and
Anr., [1961] I S.C.R. 750, R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, [1964] 5 S.C.R.
431and Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 S.C.R.
577, followed.
State of West Bengal v. Nipendra Nath Bagchi,. [1961] 1 S.C.R. 771
and The State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, Civil Appeal No. 1217 of 1966
decided on 6-10-1969, expl•ined.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 990 of
1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 3, 1966of the Madhya Pradesh· High Court in Misc. Petition No. 514 of
1964.
G. L. Sanghi, P. N. Tiwari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
I. N. Shroff, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J.
The appellant was a probationary Naib Tehsildar.
He had been appointed tc:mporarily.
While he was working at
Bilaigarh in 1961, the Commissioner of Raipur Division directed
an enquiry against him on as many as 13 charges.
By his order
dated August 3, 1961, the Commissioner placed him under suspension pending enquiry. Sometime later, the State Government
taking the view that the enquiry ordered by the Commissioner may
not be legal, revoked his orders viz. the order directing a departmental enquiry against the appellant as well as the order placing
him under suspension.
But on the same day, it ordered a departmental enquiry against him and at the same time it placed him
under suspension pending that enquiry.
In this connection a show
cause notice was issued to the appellant on August 1, 1964.
But
even before that show cause notice was issued, on June 6, 1964,
the appellant gave a notice to the Government terminating his
services.
After the issue of the afore-mentioned show cause notice,
he moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to quash the orders
passed by the State Government on the ground that as he was no
more in the service of the Go-vemment, the Government cannot
take any departmental action against him.
The State Government resisted that application on two grounds
viz. ( 1 ) the order of the State Government suspending the appellant during the pendency of the departmental enquiry amounted
to a suspension of the contract of service and hence the appellant
could not have unilaterally terminated his services and (2) the
notice given by him on June 6, 1964 was invalid as it did not
conform to the rules.
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
The High Court accepted the aforesaid contentions of the State
Government and dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal
by special leave.
Mr. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellant pressed for our
acceptance the two contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant before the High Court. He urged that the view taken by the
High Court both as to the effect of the order of suspension made
on May 7, 1964 as well as to the validity of the notice issued by
the appellant on June 6, 1964 are erroneous in law.
According
to him the impugned order of suspension merely forbade the appellant from renC:.::ring service and it did not amount to a suspe.nsion
of the contract o.f service. As regards the notice issued by the
appellant he urged that it was in accordance with rule 12 of the
Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and QuasiPermanent Service) Rules, 1960 (in short 'Rules').
The parties are agreed that the appellant was a temporary
public servant at the relevant time. His service was neither made
permanent nor quasi-permanent. It is also admitted that the c_onditions of his service are exclusively governed by the 'Rules'.
Therefore to find out the true effect of the order of suspension made
on May 7, 1964, we must look to those 'Rules'.
Three kinds of suspension are known to law.
A public servant
may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order
appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide
for such suspensions.
Lastly he may merely be forbidden from
discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against
him, wliich act is also called suspension.
The right to suspend as
a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract
of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both reguhited
by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the
conditions of service.
But the last category of suspension referred
to earlier is the right of the mastec to forbid his servant ,from doing
the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of
service or the provisions governing his conditions of service. at the
same time keeping in force the maMer's obligations under the contcact.
Jn other words the master may ask his servant to rdrain
from rendering his service but he must fulfil his part of the contract.
The legal position as regards a master's· right to place hisservants under suspension is now well settled by the decisions of this
Court.
In The Management of Hotel Inweria/, New Delhi and
ors. v. Hotel Workers' Union('), the question whether a master
could suspend his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came
(!) 11960] 1 S.C.R. 476.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. P. GINDRONIYA v. M, P. STATE (Hegde, J.)
451
up for consideration by this Court. Therein this Court observed
that it was well. settled that under the ordinary law of master and
servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not
be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between
the master and the servant but must arise either from an express
term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such
contract.
It was further observed therein that ordinarily in the
absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or
under the rules framed under some statute would mean that the
master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if
he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work be
will have to pay the wages during the so called period of suspension.
Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the
ccntract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the
relationship of master a.I1d the servant with the consequence that
the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not
bound to pay.
The same view was reiterated by this Court in T. Cajee v. U.
Jormanik Siem and anr. ('). The rule laid dO\\lll in the above
decisions was followed by this Court in R. P. Kapur v. Union of
India('). The Jaw on the subject was exhaustively reviewed in
Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra(•). Therein the
legal position was stated thus : The general principle is that an
employer can suspend an employee of his pendinll an enquiry into
his misconduct and the only question that can anse in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period
of such suspension.
It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a employee to work, is not
an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a
statute.governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract
itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as
an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some
statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that
he forbids the employee to work, be will have to pay the ~mp!oyee's
wages during the period of suspension.
Where, however, there is
power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the
statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension bas
the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and
servant with the consequence that the servant is tiot bound to
render service and the master .is not bound to pay. It is equally
well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed
(I I [1961] 1 S.CR. 750.
(2) (1964] S S.C.R. 431.
(1) (1968] 2 S.C.R. 577.
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct
even though then: is no such term in the contract of employment
or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled
to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no
statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. · The distinction
between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and
suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the
basis that the contract is subsisting is important.
The suspension
in· the latter case. is always an implied term in every contract of
service.
When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means
that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should
not do the service required of him during a particular period. In
other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the
employee wi1ich because the contract is subsisting, the employee
must obey.
In support of the decision of the High Court, the learned Counsel for the Respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in the
State of West Be11ga/ v. Nipe11dra Nath Bagchi(1) and The State
of Punjab v. Khemt' Ram('). He did not rely on the other decisions referred to :in the judgment of the High Court. Hence it is
not necessary to e~:amine them.
In Bagchi's casf:('), one of the questions that arose for decision
was whether on the strength of rule 75 (a) of the West Bengal
Service Rules, an officer may be retained in service even after his
superannuation for the purpose of holding a departmental enquiry
against him.
This Court held that the rule in question was not
designed to be used for the purpose of retaining a person in service
for enquiry. against him but to keep in employment persons with
a meritorious record of service who although superannuated can
render some more service and whose retention in service is considered necessary on puhlic grounds. This ~ecision does not bear
on the point unde.r consideration.
In Khemi Ram's ease(') the·
impu[lned suspension order was made on the strength of statutory
rules governing the conditions o.f service.
Hence this Court came
to the conclusion that the order of suspension in that case amounted
to suspending the contract of service.
In the present case, the 'Rules' do not provide for suspension
during the pendency of an enquiry.
Therefore the impugned order
of suspension cannot be considered as an ·order suspending the
contract of service. From that conclusion it follows that when the
appellant issued the notice terminating his services on June 6. 1964,
the contract of service was in force and it was open to him to put
(I) (19611 I S.C.R. 771.
(2) Civil Appeal No. 1217 /66 decided on 6.10.1969.
A
c
[)
E
F
G
H
;.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. P. GINDRONIYA v. M. P. STATE (Hegde, J.)
453
an end to the same. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold
that the High Court erred in opining that. the true effect of the order
of suspension made by the State Government on May 7, 1964 was
to suspend the contract of service.
This takes us to the legality of the notice served by the appellant on June 6, 1964. That notice was evidently issued under rule
12 of the 'Rules'.
That rule reads:
"12. (a) Subject to any provision contained in the
order of appointment or in any agreement between the
Government and the temporary Government servant, the
service of a temporary Government servant who is not in
quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at
any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the
appointing authority to the Government servant :
Provided that the services of any such Government
servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him
of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice; or as the case may be,
for the period by which such notice falls short of one
month or any agreed longer period :
Provided further that the payment of allowance; shall
be subject to the conditions under which such allowances
are admissible.
( b) The period of such notic~ ,hall be one month
unless otherwise agreed between the Government and
the Government servant."
There is hardly any room for dispute that the notice contemplated by the main cl. (a) of rule 12 can be given either by the
Government or its temporaP• servant. The rule in question specifically says so. It is not necessary for us in the present case to
decide whether the two provisos to that rule or cl. (b) thereof apply
to a notice given by a government servant.
The appellant has
assumed that those provisions also apply to a notice given under
that rule.
We shall for the purpose of this case proceed on the
basis of that assumption and see whether the appellant has satisfied
that part of the rule also.
The material portion o.f the notice given by the appellant on
June 6, 1964 reads thus :
"Whereas the undersigned holds no charge this day
and is not on duty and intends to bring the termination
of his employment with the Government of M.P. forthwith on receipt of this writing and
US•Jp Cl (NP)170-1
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.c.lt.
Whereas as required by the service rules the undersigned do hereby forfeit and relinquish his claim for one
month's pay or allowance whichever is necessary, Now
therefore this notice is hereby served. as required under
the rules on receipt whereof the relationship of employer
and emp1oye10 now existing between the Government of
Madhya Pradesh and the under-signed shall cease to exist
and consequently all rights, duties and obligations arising
from and under the aforesaid refationshlp shall hereafter
absolutely cease."
This notice waB received by the Government on June 9, 1964.
In that notice, the appellant has unequivocally infonneJ the Government that he has terminated his services with the Government.
This part of the notice satisfies the requirements of the_ main part
of rule 12(a). In that very notice he has also intimated that any
amount payable by him to the government under the provisos to
rule 12 (a) may be forfeited from the amounts due to him from
the government.
It may be noted that considerable amount must
have been due to him towards his salary during the period of his
suspension.
By his notice he intimated to the government thai the
amounts due from him to the government under the provisos to
rule 12(a) may be deducted from that.amount. We fail to see
how this notice is not in accordance with the requirements of rule
12. In our opi,nion the High Court was wrong in holding that
the notice in question did not comply with the requirements of the
said rule.
No other ground was urged on behalf of the respondent in
support of the order of the High Court.
I
c
D
I
From the above findings, it follows that ever since June 9, 1964,
the appellant was not in the service of the Government. Therefore
P
it was not open to the government to take any disciplinary proceedings against him.
Hence the impugned orders are liable to be
quashed.
We accordingly allow this appeal and quash those
orders.
No order as to costs.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.