# Varadaraja-Swamirari Temple v. Krislmapp7, I. L. R

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 501
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUl'TA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/varadaraja-swamirari-temple-v-krislmapp7-i-l-r-2941
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Estate& Land-Inam grants-" Eswte&"-Whe!her lnam
•houki relate to whale or nam•d village-Burden of proof-If on
peraon who
asBer!B that it i• not "E•wle"-Madra• EBtatu
Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Mad. 30 of 1947), •. 1Madra. EBlate& Land Act, 1908 (Mad. 1 of 1908) •· 3 (2)-
lndian Evidence Act, (1 of 1872), ss. 101, 102, 103.
The appellant held the major portion of certain village•
covered by 5 inam grant• in the District of Vishakapatnam in
the State of Madras. The Inam Commissioner had granted
ftesh inam title deeds in confirmation of the original grants.
The Special Officer appointed by the Madras Government
under s. 2 of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent)
Act, 194 7, decided that the inam lands covered by the fresh
inams were "Estates
withins. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1908 anJ recommenclrd fair and equitable rates of
rent for the raiyati lands
in this estate. Subsequently the
Government of Madras by a notification in the Gazette fixed
rates of rent in accordance with this recommendation. The
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the consti·
tution for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State
to forbear from giving effect to the notification. The High
Com! held that the proper remeay of the appellant Wal by
way of a suit and dismissed the petition.
The appellant thereupon filed a civil suit and the Trial
Court accepted the contention of the appellant that suit land
did not constitute an estate as defined iu s. 3 ( 2) ( d) of the
Madras Estates
Land Act, 1903. On appeal to the High
Court the decision of the Trial Court was reversed and the
appeal was allowed. The present appeal has been filed on a
certificate granted by the High Court.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that there
was no material on ~he record to show that the. original grant
was of a whole village or of a village by name, to bring the
ands within tho definition of "Estate" in s. 3 (2) ( d) of tho
1968
M•n:h 25
1963
Var.:cfa Blia~'Ollara.J•ri•
Ra>
••
State ef Ar1dhra
PrM!t:f,
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. It was further contended
that the burden of proving \vhcthcr the land constituted an
estate lay on the State and the State had failed to discharge
this burden.
The respondent~' contention
\Vas that the scheme
of the Explanation (1) to s. 3 (2) (d) showed that the legislature intended the court 'O presume that
\Vhen a grant as an
inam was expressed to be of a named village the area cdvered
by the grant formed an estate but that it was open to a party
to rebut this presumption.
Held
that the suit land docs not form a whole inam
village within the meaning of the main portion of s. 3 (2) (d).
It can
still be an estate, ho,vevcr, if it comes within th("
explanation.
Varadaraja-Swamirari Temple v. Krislmapp7, I. L. R.
(1958) Mad. 1023, approved.
The present grant which wa< later confirmed by the title
deed was already of a named village.
It is not correct to !'ay that as soon a• it was found that
the ioam grant was of a named village a rebuttable presumption will arise that it formed an estate.
Janakiramaraju v.
Appala•wami, I. L. R. (1954) Mad.
980 and Narayana.•wami Nayrida v. Subramaniy~m, (1915)
I. L. R. 39 Maj, 683, disapproved.
The
legislature has not created :uiy presun1ption either
way. This being the position the question of the burden of
proof depends on ss. 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act.
Applying the principles contained in those sections the burden
to prove that the suit land is noc an esrate is on the plaintiff
and he having failed to discharge this burden, the appeal is
dismiascd.
Diatricl Board Tanjore v. Noor Mohamwul, A. I. R. 1953
S. C. 446, distinguished.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appea!
No. 340 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
November :rn,
l\Jl18,
of
the
Andhra Pradesh
-
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
High Court at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1228
of 1953.
'P. V. R. Tatachari and N. V. Ramadas, for

## Text

2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
VARADA BHAVANARAYANA RAO
ti.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUl'TA JJ.)
Estate& Land-Inam grants-" Eswte&"-Whe!her lnam
•houki relate to whale or nam•d village-Burden of proof-If on
peraon who
asBer!B that it i• not "E•wle"-Madra• EBtatu
Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Mad. 30 of 1947), •. 1Madra. EBlate& Land Act, 1908 (Mad. 1 of 1908) •· 3 (2)-
lndian Evidence Act, (1 of 1872), ss. 101, 102, 103.
The appellant held the major portion of certain village•
covered by 5 inam grant• in the District of Vishakapatnam in
the State of Madras. The Inam Commissioner had granted
ftesh inam title deeds in confirmation of the original grants.
The Special Officer appointed by the Madras Government
under s. 2 of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent)
Act, 194 7, decided that the inam lands covered by the fresh
inams were "Estates
withins. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1908 anJ recommenclrd fair and equitable rates of
rent for the raiyati lands
in this estate. Subsequently the
Government of Madras by a notification in the Gazette fixed
rates of rent in accordance with this recommendation. The
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the consti·
tution for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State
to forbear from giving effect to the notification. The High
Com! held that the proper remeay of the appellant Wal by
way of a suit and dismissed the petition.
The appellant thereupon filed a civil suit and the Trial
Court accepted the contention of the appellant that suit land
did not constitute an estate as defined iu s. 3 ( 2) ( d) of the
Madras Estates
Land Act, 1903. On appeal to the High
Court the decision of the Trial Court was reversed and the
appeal was allowed. The present appeal has been filed on a
certificate granted by the High Court.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that there
was no material on ~he record to show that the. original grant
was of a whole village or of a village by name, to bring the
ands within tho definition of "Estate" in s. 3 (2) ( d) of tho
1968
M•n:h 25
1963
Var.:cfa Blia~'Ollara.J•ri•
Ra>
••
State ef Ar1dhra
PrM!t:f,
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. It was further contended
that the burden of proving \vhcthcr the land constituted an
estate lay on the State and the State had failed to discharge
this burden.
The respondent~' contention
\Vas that the scheme
of the Explanation (1) to s. 3 (2) (d) showed that the legislature intended the court 'O presume that
\Vhen a grant as an
inam was expressed to be of a named village the area cdvered
by the grant formed an estate but that it was open to a party
to rebut this presumption.
Held
that the suit land docs not form a whole inam
village within the meaning of the main portion of s. 3 (2) (d).
It can
still be an estate, ho,vevcr, if it comes within th("
explanation.
Varadaraja-Swamirari Temple v. Krislmapp7, I. L. R.
(1958) Mad. 1023, approved.
The present grant which wa< later confirmed by the title
deed was already of a named village.
It is not correct to !'ay that as soon a• it was found that
the ioam grant was of a named village a rebuttable presumption will arise that it formed an estate.
Janakiramaraju v.
Appala•wami, I. L. R. (1954) Mad.
980 and Narayana.•wami Nayrida v. Subramaniy~m, (1915)
I. L. R. 39 Maj, 683, disapproved.
The
legislature has not created :uiy presun1ption either
way. This being the position the question of the burden of
proof depends on ss. 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act.
Applying the principles contained in those sections the burden
to prove that the suit land is noc an esrate is on the plaintiff
and he having failed to discharge this burden, the appeal is
dismiascd.
Diatricl Board Tanjore v. Noor Mohamwul, A. I. R. 1953
S. C. 446, distinguished.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appea!
No. 340 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
November :rn,
l\Jl18,
of
the
Andhra Pradesh
-
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
High Court at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1228
of 1953.
'P. V. R. Tatachari and N. V. Ramadas, for the
appellant.
P. Rama Reddy and P. D. Menon,
for
respondent No. 1.
1963. March 25. The judgment of the Court
was delivered by
J96J
Yarada Bh:.wanarayani
Rao ..
.ltatt! of Andhra
Pr1desh
DAS GUPTA J.-ln the district of VishakhapatDas Gupta I.
nam in the State of Madras there is a village known
by the name of Vandrada. The entire area of this
village is now covered by 5 inam grants, by far the
major portion being comprised in the inam held
by the appellant, Varada Bhavanarayanarao. In
1864 the loam Commissioner granted fresh inam
title deeds in confirmation of the existing iuam grants,
the total area of the village was recorded as 768.60
acres. Out of this 66.12 acres were unassessed
poramboke; 690.13 acres of dry and wet lands were
included in a title deed which is numbered 1082; 9.25
acres were included in title deeds Nos. 940 and 941;
two other title deeds Nos. 940 and 9!1 granted by
the Inam Commissioner covered an area of 3.04
acres. The question in controversy in the present
litigation is whether the
inam created by the
original grant in confirmation of which title deed
No. 1082 was issued by the Inam Commissioner forms
an "estate" to which the Madras Estates Land
(Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX ofl947)
applies. This Act will be later referred to in this
judgment as "the Reduction of Rent Act". It is
necessary to mention here that s. l of this Act
provides that it applies to all estates as defined in s.3
(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The
relevant portion of s.3(2) of the Madras Estates
Land Act runs thus:-
IJ63
Vardda Rh11ra11ara)".2n'1
Rao
v.
Stat4 of Andf,ra
Pratk.Jh
Das Gupta J.
50-1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
"(d) any inam village of which the grant
has been made, confirmed or recognised by the
Government, notwithstanding that subsequent
to the grant, the village has been partiuoned
among the grantees or the successors in title of
the grantee or grantees".
Explanation (1) : Where a grant as an inam is
expressed to be of a named village, the area
which forms the subject-matter of the grant
shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstandin!!'
that it did not include certain lands in the
village of that name, which have already been
granted on service or other tenure or been
reserved for communal purposes ............ "
The Special Officer appointed by the Government of Madras under s.2 of the Rent Reduction
Act decided that the inam lands in respect of which
title deed 1082 had been issued and which now
admittedly are held in inam by the appellant formed
an "estate". Accordingly the officer, acting under the
Act recommended fair and equitable rates of rent
for the raiyati lands in this estate. On June 27, 1950,
the Government of :\1adras published in the Gazette
a notification fixing the rates of rents payable in
respect of lands in the vi II age in accordance with
these recommendations.
Aggrieved by this action of
the Government the appellant moved the High Court
of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying
for a writ of Jl1mdamus directing the State to forbear
from giving effect to the notification.
The High
Court held that the remedy of the petitioner was by
way of a suit and dismissed the application, on an
undertaking given by the Government that it would
waive its right to the notice under s.80 of the Code
of Civil
Procedure. It was after this that the
appellant filed in the Court of the Subordinate
Judge, Srikakulam, the suit out of which this appeal
has arisen.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
In his plaint the appellant averred that for the
land; comprised under title deed No. 10~2, there was
neither the grant of a whole village nor of a named
village. It was also stated by the appellant that the
lands now covered by the single title deed of 1082
originally formed the
subject·niatter of several
separate grants.
The plaintiff further averred that
out of the lands of the village not included in any
of the earlier grants, further grants were made subsequently which were separately confirmed and separate
title deeds-Title deeds Nos. 940, 941 and Nos. 179
and 180 -were issued in respect of them.
It was
mainly on the basis of these averments that the plain·
tiff contended that his land~ covered by the title deed
No. 1082 were not at all an estate and prayed for a
declaration to this effect. 1 he State of .v'ladras was
the main defendant in the snit. and contested the
plaintiff's claim. In its written statement the State
pleaded that there was in respect of the suit land a
single grant of a named village and that it was not
true that from out of any reserved lands further
grants were made subsequently.
Accordingly, it was
urged that the plaintiffs contention that these lands
did not form an estate should be rejected.
Similar
pleas were raised also by defendants 2 to 31 who
were impleaded as the tenants cultivating some of the
lands covered by the title deed 1082.
The Trial Court held that as the original grant
is shown by the entries in the Inam Fair Register to
have been made to a number of persons and there
wer.! deduction for poramboke and for personal and
service inams, and further because even though the
original grant may have been under a single transact·
ion the confirmation was not by one title deed, the
suit lands did not constitute an estate as defined in
s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras &tates Land Act.
On appeal by the State of Madras, the High
Court of Madras came to a contrary conclusion.
1963
V •rtrda Rhav1Jnaray{}.na
Rao
••
State of Andhra
P"ulesh
Du Gupta J.
1963
••
Stau of Aodlira
PradeJh
Das Gupta J.
t>06
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL
The High Court pointed out that the opinion of the
Trial Judge that to constitute an estate the confir·
mation must be under one grant was unsupportable.
In the opinion of the High Court the entries in the
Inam Fair Register showed that the grant consisted
of a named village and it was the inam as granted
that was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner.
The High Court also expressed its view that "the
whole Inam Inquiry proceeded on the footing that
it was the whole village, excepting the two minor
inams, that was given in inam to Chaui Venkata·
char Ju etc." The High Court accordingly allowed
the appeal and dismissed the suit with costs.
Against this decision of the High Court the
present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff on a
certificate granted by the High Court.
In support of the appeal, Mr. Tatachari has
contended that there were no materials on the record
to show that the original grant was of a whole of the
village or of a village by name.
His next contention
is that even if it be held against his client that the
original grant that was ultimately confirmed by the
title deed 1082 was of a named village the burden
still lay on the defendants to show further that the
portion of the village now covered by the minor
grants (in respect of which title deeds Nos. 940, 941
and title deed Nos. 179 and 180 were issurd)had been
granted prior to the date of that original grant.
Learned Counsel contends that the defendants have
failed to discharge this burden and so the plaintiff's
case that these lands do not form an estate should be
accepted.
The several questions of fact that arise in this
case have to be decided on the meagre evidence
furnished by the. Inam Fair Regist~r of Vandrada
village.
For, as It usually happens m mo~t of such
cases neither the original grant which was confirmed
2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
by the title deed No. 1082 nor the originals of the
other grants which were the basis of the other four
title deeds are available. On an examination of the
entries in the Inam Fair Register it appears that the
inam grant which was conferred in 1864 by title
deed No. 1082 was originally granted by Nabob
Mofuz Khan in the year 1739. The area covered
by this grant was estimated to be 40 garces in the
year 1797. But a few years later-in an account of
1816-the area was calculated as 100 garces.
It is
not possible to say on the basis of this statement of
area that the entire area of the village was included
in the original grant by the nawab. Clearly, there·
fore, the suit land does not form a whole inam
village within the meaning of the main portion of
cl. (d) which has been set out above. It can. still
be an estate however if it comes within the Explana ·
tion. The effect of the Explanation was succinctly
put in a full Bench Judgment of the Madras High
Court in Varadaraja·Swamivari Temp/,e v. Krish·
nappa (1), thus :
" ................................... Where the grant
in inam was of a named village; what was
granted would constitute an estate even though
the grantee did not have the benefit of the
minor inams that lay within the geographical
limits of that village, provided it was proved
that the grant of the minor inams preceded
in point of time the grant of the rest of the
village as a named village."
In our opinion, the High Court was clearly right in
its view that the original grant has been shown to
be of a named village.
Apart from the fact that the
inam itself is described
in Col. 8 of the Inam
Register as Vandrada Shrotriem and Agrahar of
Vandrada, we get a further fact from the entries in
Col. 20 that Mr. Scott's Register of 1207 Fasli shows
that the village Vandrada was originally granted in
(I) f, L. R. (1958) Mad. !023.
1963
Varada Bhav1nau1yana
Rao
v.
State of Andhra
Pr,,d,sh
Das GujJta J.
1963
Vt.rada Rha~tJntuay2!".a
Rao
v.
Sl•lt of Andhra
Praduh
DtJJ Gup1a J.
•
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (196!] VOL.
Inam to Chatti Venkatachari and others in A.D.
1739 for subsistence. This grant which was later
confirmed by the title deed No. 1082 was thus clearly
of a named village.
That alone is however not sufficient to make
it an estate. It must further appear that the minor
inams which covered part of the village, viz.,
Devadayan 9.25 acres
and the personal inams
for 3.04 acres had bern granted prior to the grant
of the rest of the village as a named village.
There is nothing on the record, however, to
show the dates of the 11rants of the minor inams. It
is therefore necessary to consider the question of
burden of proof.
The decision of this C:iurt in
Dist. Board, Tanjore
v.
Noor Mohd. (1),
has
generally been taken to lay down the law that when
the question arises in any case before the courts
whether certain lands constitute an "estate" the
burden of proving that they constitute an estate is
upon the party who sets up that contention. On a
closer examination however it appears that this
decision cannot be considered to be an authority
for this proposition. The judgment of Mr. Justice
Mahajan (as he then was) states "that it was conceded by Mr. Somayya, the learned Counsel for the
respondent that the burden of proving that certain
lands constitute an 'estate' is upon the party who
sets up the contention." The judgment proceeded
on the basis of this concession by Counsel and contains no discussion on the question and consequently
no pronouncement.
The other learned
Judge,
Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar has also stated
"that the respondent has not successfully discharged
the onus that rests on him to show that Kunanjeri
was an 'estate' within the meaning of the Act."
His view that such onus did rest on the respondent
was also apparently based on the concession made
by Counsel. It will not be proper therefore to treat the
judgment of this Court in Dist. Board Tanjore cast('),
(I) A.(. R. 1953 S, C. "6.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
as a decision on the question of burden of proof
in such cases.
It is now necessary to examine the principle
involved in the question. On behalf of the respondent State, Mr.
Ram Reddy contended that a
consideration of the scheme of legislation in introducing Explanation (1) to s. 3 (:!) (d) shows that
the legislature intended the Court to pre1mme that
when a grant as an inam was expreasoo to be of a
named village the area covered by the grant formed
an estate, but that it was open to a party to rebut
this presumption by showing that the excluded lands
of the village had been granted by the grantor of
the major inam after the date of the major grant.
It appears that long before this Explanation was
added to s.3 (2) (d), the Madras High Court (Wallis
C.J. and Srinivasa Ayyangar J.) held in Narayarv1:-
swami Nayadu v. Subramanyam ('). that as in all the
documents the temple was described as the owner of
the whole village, the burden was upon the plaintiff
to show that the grant was only of the revenue of a
portion of the lands in the village and as this burden
had not been discharged Vcnkatapuram Agraharam
was an estate even though there were minor inams
in the village. This decision was given in 1915 and
was followed in the Madras High Court till 194:3
when in Adema v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru('),
another Bench held that unless every bit of land in
the village was included in the grant, the grant could
not be of the whole village and the land granted
could not have formed an estate. This later view was
followed the same year in Suri Red:li v. Agnihotrudu
(•).
It was after this that the present Explanation
1 to s.3 (2) (d) was added by the Madras Estates
Land (Amendment) Act II of 1945. There was a
provision by which the amendment was to be deemed
to have effect as from the date when the Madras
Estates Land ( Third Amendment ) Act,
1936,
br;nging
in sub-cl. (d) of cl. 2 of s.3
in its
(\) 11915) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 6A3.
(21 [1943] 2 M.L.J. 289.
131 [1943] 2 M.L.J. 528.
1963
Varada Bii;vanaray1na
n..
v.
St•te of Andhr•
Pr•desh
Das Gupta J.
1963
V ctraJa B4ac1211Ct'Oyano
Roo
v.
Slat~ of A.ntllrro
Prad,,h
Das Gupta J.
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
present form came into force.
Mr. Ram Reddy
argues that the intention of the amending Act I 945
was to
restore fully the view taken in Naraya.
naswami's Case ('), and that under th<' definition of
an inam village as explained by the amendment a
named village would be presumed to be an inam
village, and so an "estate"
notwithstanding the
existence of certain minor inams. The presumption
could however be rebutted by showing that these
minor inam.s were created by the grantor of the major
inam subsequent to the creation of the major inam.
The argument is undoubtedly attractive. It also
finds support from the observations of Subba Rao J.
In Janakimmaraju v. Appalaswami ('), where the
learned .Judge stated that the amendment introduced
by the Explanation was intended to restore the well
settled law disturbed by the decision in Ademma's
case (8).
There are other observations in 1he judg·
ment in Janakiramaraju's case('), which appear to
support even more clearly Mr. Ram Reddy's argu·
ment that as soon as it was found that the inam grant
wag of a named village a rebuttable presumption will
arise that it formed an estate.
On closer cxamina·
tion of the que~tion however we find that i1 would
be reading too much into the Explanation 10 think
that the legislature wanted to create such a prrsump·
tion. There are a number of reasons which make
t1S hcstitate to accept the view that such a presump·
tion was created.
The first of these is 1hat "hen
adding the Explanation in 194ii the legislature did
not think fit to make any change in s. ;!;{ of the Act,
under which it shall be presumed where i1 becarrn:
necessary in any suit or proceeding to determine
whether an inam village or a separated part of an
inam village was or was not an es1ate within the
meaning of the Act as it slood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amend men~
Act, I 936, that such village was an rslate.
If when
adding the Explanation to s. 3 (2) (d) in I !l4ii
lh~
legislature had intended to bring into existence a
(I) (1915) 1.L.R. 39 Mad. 689,
121 !.L.R. (195•; Mad 9ll0.
(SJ [19i3J 2 ML J. 289.
..
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
presumption as suggested
by Mr. Ram Reddy,
nothing was easier than to give effect to such intention by omitting from s. 23 the words "as it stood
before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land
(Third Amendment) Act, l!J3ti" or by adding express
terms that "where the grant was expressed to be of a
named village the presumption will be that it is an
estate until the contrary is shown".
Another reason which makes it difficult for us
to accept Mr. Reddy's argument is the actual language used in Explanation (1).
The last portion
of the Explanation clearly indicates that the conclusion that the area is an "estate" can be drawn even
where the whole of the village is not included in the
grant, only if it appears that the portion not included
had already been gifted and was therefore lost to the
tenure.
The addition of the last clause in the
Explanation brings out the fact that the legislature
did not intend to go quite as far as the High Court
had gone in the case of 1\Tarayanaswami Nayudu (').
On a consideration of a history of the language used in the Explanation and also the circumstances in which the Explanation came to be added,
we have come to the conclusion that the legislature
being wdl aware of the difficulties of proving whether
the minor grants had been
granted prior to or
subsequent to the grant of a named village, decided
to leave the matter easy as between the contending
parties and created no presumption either way.
That being the position, the question on which
of the contending parties the burden of proof would
lie has to be decided on the relevant provisions of
the Evidence Act.
Section 10 I of the Evidence
Act provides that whoever desires any court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent
on the existence of facts which he asserts,
must
pr0ve that those facts exist. Section 102 provides
(IJ (1915. J. L. R. 39 Mad. 683.
1969
Varad2 BhauanaYtJJana
Rao
v.
State of Andhra
Pradesh
Das Gupta J.
1963
Var.,{a Rhovonar9am
Jltio
v.
Statt rV ,tndhra
p,.u,h
D"' Gupta J,
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies
on that person who would fail if no evidence at all
were given on either side.
Section 103 provides
that the burden of proof as to any particular fact
lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe
in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that
the burden of proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
Applying these principles, we find that the
plaintiff who asks the Court for a declaration that
the area covered by the title deed I 082 is not an
estate must prove that it is not an "estate." If no
evidence were given on either side the plaintiff
would fail.
For, we have found that there i~ no
presumption in law either that the area in question
is an estate or that it is not an estate. It follows
from this that the plaintiff who is to prove that the
suit lands do not form an estate mmt show that the
minor inams were granted subsequent to the date of
the inam grant of the named village The plaintiff
has clearly failed to discharge this burden.
We have therefore come to the conclusion,
though for reasons different from what found favour
with the
Hi~h Court, that the plaintiff's suit lus
been rightly dismissed.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order
as to costs in this Court.
Appeal dismissed.
...