# Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1043
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-08-25
- **Bench:** Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol, Sandeep Mehta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vasanta-sampat-dupare-v-union-of-india-ors-38468
- **Pages:** 47

## Headnote

Writ petition filed u/Art.32 challenging the continuing validity of the
sentence of death against the petitioner, having been affirmed on
appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy
petitions and seeks its reconsideration in the light of guidelines
laid down in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh; and whether Art.32 authorises this Court to reopen a
capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality,
solely to cure the procedural lapse the petitioner identifies.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Art.32 - Power of the court to revisit
a sentence that has attained finality - Petitioner convicted
u/ss.363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 IPC for committing rape
and murder of four year old girl and awarded death sentence -
Death sentence attained finality upto this Court - Petitioner
exhausted all judicial remedies, including review and mercy
petitions - Writ petition challenging the continuing validity
of the sentence of death affirmed against him, and sought
its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and
judicial developments-guidelines laid down in the case of
Manoj v. State of M.P. whereby this Court mandated the calling
of reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in
arriving at a just and proper sentence:
Held: [per Vikram Nath, J.] (for himself and Sandeep Mehta, J)
Petitioner's request for a new sentencing hearing which is compliant
to Manoj's case falls squarely within Art.32 - Relief sought does
not disturb the conviction or reopen evidentiary findings but merely
insists that the ultimate penalty be imposed, if at all, through
the procedural safeguards now recognised as integral to a fair
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
and individualised sentence - Granting this remedy is thus, a
legitimate, and indeed compelling exercise of the Court's plenary
power u/Art.32 to secure the effective enforcement of fundamental
rights - Contemporary Indian society no longer conceives criminal
punishment purely in retributive terms - It also measures the
quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility
of human reform - Goal of reformation, repeatedly affirmed in our
jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal system will not foreclose
the prospect of moral regeneration unless every procedural
assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been scrupulously
observed - Art.32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but
its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine
pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be
reserved only for those cases where there is a clear, specific
breach of the new procedural safeguards as these breaches are so
serious that, if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused
person's basic rights to life, dignity and fair process - Finding of
guilt recorded against the petitioner is left untouched - Sentence
of death affirmed by this Court set aside - Matter remitted to this
Court for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in
conformity with the directions in Manoj's case - Registry is directed
to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
for assignment to an appropriate Bench. [Paras 26, 27, 32-35]
Held: [per Sanjay Karol, J.] (Concurring): In Manoj's case all
that has been done is that a streamlined and time-bound process
has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the Courts
below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation in
Bachan Singh's case - If the law once declared is not followed
and the same causes a demonstrable detriment to a person, or
a convict, such person will have a legitimate grievance which the
Courts would be then required to remedy - Law declared by the
Constitutional Courts applies retrospectively - Ex-consequenti, the
benefit of Manoj's case applies to the petitioner retrospectively and
the denial of such benefit, which may eventually have the effect
of saving him from

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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2136 : 2025 INSC 1043
Vasanta Sampat Dupare
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 371 of 2023)
25 August 2025
[Vikram Nath,* Sanjay Karol* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Writ petition filed u/Art.32 challenging the continuing validity of the
sentence of death against the petitioner, having been affirmed on
appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy
petitions and seeks its reconsideration in the light of guidelines
laid down in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh; and whether Art.32 authorises this Court to reopen a
capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality,
solely to cure the procedural lapse the petitioner identifies.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Art.32 - Power of the court to revisit
a sentence that has attained finality - Petitioner convicted
u/ss.363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 IPC for committing rape
and murder of four year old girl and awarded death sentence -
Death sentence attained finality upto this Court - Petitioner
exhausted all judicial remedies, including review and mercy
petitions - Writ petition challenging the continuing validity
of the sentence of death affirmed against him, and sought
its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and
judicial developments-guidelines laid down in the case of
Manoj v. State of M.P. whereby this Court mandated the calling
of reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in
arriving at a just and proper sentence:
Held: [per Vikram Nath, J.] (for himself and Sandeep Mehta, J)
Petitioner's request for a new sentencing hearing which is compliant
to Manoj's case falls squarely within Art.32 - Relief sought does
not disturb the conviction or reopen evidentiary findings but merely
insists that the ultimate penalty be imposed, if at all, through
the procedural safeguards now recognised as integral to a fair
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
2137
Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
and individualised sentence - Granting this remedy is thus, a
legitimate, and indeed compelling exercise of the Court's plenary
power u/Art.32 to secure the effective enforcement of fundamental
rights - Contemporary Indian society no longer conceives criminal
punishment purely in retributive terms - It also measures the
quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility
of human reform - Goal of reformation, repeatedly affirmed in our
jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal system will not foreclose
the prospect of moral regeneration unless every procedural
assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been scrupulously
observed - Art.32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but
its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine
pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be
reserved only for those cases where there is a clear, specific
breach of the new procedural safeguards as these breaches are so
serious that, if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused
person's basic rights to life, dignity and fair process - Finding of
guilt recorded against the petitioner is left untouched - Sentence
of death affirmed by this Court set aside - Matter remitted to this
Court for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in
conformity with the directions in Manoj's case - Registry is directed
to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
for assignment to an appropriate Bench. [Paras 26, 27, 32-35]
Held: [per Sanjay Karol, J.] (Concurring): In Manoj's case all
that has been done is that a streamlined and time-bound process
has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the Courts
below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation in
Bachan Singh's case - If the law once declared is not followed
and the same causes a demonstrable detriment to a person, or
a convict, such person will have a legitimate grievance which the
Courts would be then required to remedy - Law declared by the
Constitutional Courts applies retrospectively - Ex-consequenti, the
benefit of Manoj's case applies to the petitioner retrospectively and
the denial of such benefit, which may eventually have the effect
of saving him from the hangman's noose, if it is indeed found that
his socio-economic and psychological background as also other
mitigating factors as may be procured, did play a sufficient role
in the petitioner committing the heinous crime that he did, nonconsideration of these factors would constitute a violation of Art.21,
since the effect thereof would be that his life would be eventually
taken away - Nothing whatsoever under the law can cast a shadow
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[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
or eclipse the fundamental right, whether it be the availability of
a substantive alternate remedy or procedural wrangles - Since
this Court has confirmed the petitioner's conviction, and review
was also dismissed, he has no other avenue other than this
Court where he may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj's
case - It is almost impossible to conceive that the remedy under
this Article would be foreclosed to the petitioner when Art.21 is
the only thing that stands between the petitioner and the rope
of death, only in order to underscore and emphasize the finality
of a judicial determination, which in all cases apart from such
exceptional circumstances, is a cardinal principle to be abided
by - Submission that after dismissal of a review petition, the only
available path is that of the curative petition, cannot be accepted
since this jurisdiction is to be exercised only in those cases where
the circumstances permit the finality of a judicial decision to be
altered with - Art.32 is available to even those who are serving
sentences for the most heinous offences - Given that Manoj's case
was not in operation or did not exist at the time when the petitioner
was sentenced and his review was dismissed, no other recognized
way was available to him to approach this Court seeking benefit
thereof - Judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a
right was conferred upon him to have his sentence re-examined
in the light of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj's
case, it is to exercise such a right which has a direct impact on his
Art.21 rights that a petition u/Art.32 had to be preferred - Thus,
has to be necessarily held to be maintainable in the specific facts
of this case, where a subsequent development in law granted a
benefit to a convict, and there was no other avenue available to
him. [Paras 54-59]
Sentence/Sentencing - Death sentence - Sentencing guidelines
laid down in Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh's
case - Elucidated. [Paras 9, 10]
Constitution of India - Art. 32 - Scope of - Principal lines of
enquiry for determination:
Held: Art.32 is the constitutional conduit through which this
Court may issue "appropriate" writs to secure the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights - It furnishes a direct route for citizen to this
Court whenever a protected Fundamental Right is said to be under
threat - To understand the scope of Art.32, the settled place of Art.32
as a continuing safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
be carried out, must be considered - This Court's power and duty
to set aside procedural finality when that course alone can avert a
breach of the guarantees of equality and life, is to be examined -
Whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj's case has
assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard,
is to be tested - Form and extent of the corrective relief that may
properly be fashioned u/Art.32 be delineated, mindful that any
order is taken must both protect constitutional rights and preserve
the stability of adjudication - Art.32 jurisdiction in capital cases
constitutes a special constitutional continuing safeguard that
survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review and even mercy -
Power to intervene u/Art.32 is meant to prevent the Constitution
from being stymied by formal finality when a human life hangs in
the balance - Procedural finality cannot stand in the way of curing
a constitutional wrong which implicates life or liberty - Procedural
fairness in capital sentencing is an imperative u/Arts.14 and 21 -
Since Manoj's case, an institutional practice emerged whereby
this Court routinely calls for the mandated reports before deciding
appeals in capital punishment cases - Manoj' case protocol has
become an indispensable component of a "meaningful, real and
effective" sentencing hearing - There is plenary power to mould
relief u/Arts.32 and 142 - Court's ability to grant effective relief
is not exhausted by the formal confines of appellate review - In
exceptional situations it empowers this Court to revisit even its own
final orders where doing so is necessary to prevent a continuing
breach of fundamental rights. [Paras 11, 12]
Case Law Cited
In the judgment of Vikram Nath, J.
Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452 :
(2023) 2 SCC 353 - explained and relied on.
Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145
of 2017; Irfan @ Bhayu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021; Harbans Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others [1982] 3 SCR 235 : (1982) 2 SCC 101; Smt.
Triveniben v. State of Gujarat [1989] 1 SCR 509 : (1989) 1 SCC
678; Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [2014] 4
SCR 1138 : (2014) 7 SCC 264; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar,
Supreme Court of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2014)
9 SCC 737; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court
2140
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2019) 9 SCC 404;
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 :
(1988) 2 SCC 602; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka and Another
[1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Rupa Ashok
Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002)
4 SCC 388; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra [2009] 9 SCR 90 : (2009) 6 SCC 498; Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Sanjay
Singh and Another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad
and Another [2007] 1 SCR 235 : (2007) 3 SCC 720; Bilkis Yakub
Rasool v. Union of India and Others [2024] 1 SCR 743 : (2024) 5
SCC 481; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and
Another [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 - referred to.
In the judgment of Sanjay Karol, J.
Manoj v. State of M.P. [2022] 9 SCR 452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353 -
explained and relied on.
Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka [2025] 7 SCR 550 : 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1455; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983]
1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union
of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569; CIT v.
Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 13 SCR 421 : (2008)
14 SCC 171; Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar
Arora, 2025 SCC Online SC 819; Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. State
of West Bengal & Anr. [2025] 2 SCR 1045 : 2025 SCC Online
SC 443; Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India [1981]
2 SCR 52 : (1981) 1 SCC 568; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of
India [1997] 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 3 SCC 261; S.R. Chaudhuri v.
State of Punjab & Ors. [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 621 : (2001) 7 SCC
126; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019)
1 SCC 1; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002]
2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388 - referred to.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S 1 (1986); Graham v. Collins 506, U.S 461
(1993); Tennard v. Dretke, 2004 SCC OnLine US SC 59; Barton
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 2; Attorney
General of Canada v. George Hislop, 2007 SCC OnLine Can SC
10 - referred to.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
Books and Periodicals Cited
William W. Berry, Individualized Sentencing, 76 Wash.& Lee
L. Rev.13 (2019); Kant, I. (2017). Kant: The Metaphysics of
Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans., L. Denis, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; M.Nussbaum, Human Dignity &
Political entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays
Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics 360 (2008).;
M.J.Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the backdrop of
the Eight Amendment, (2016) U.ILL L.REV.2129; 15th Ed. William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England; Constituent
Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948),
at 3-5 (India); Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol.
VII (4 November 1948), at 8-10 (India) - referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016;
Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.
List of Keywords
Writ petition filed u/Art.32; Continuing validity of the sentence of
death; Affirmed on appeal; Review; Mercy petitions; Manoj and
others v. State of Madhya Pradesh's case; Capital sentencing;
Procedural lapse; Power of the court to revisit sentence that has
attained finality; Rape and murder of four year old girl; Death
sentence; Judicial remedies; Subsequent legislative and judicial
developments; Benefit of revisiting sentence.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 371 of 2023
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini,
Shourya Dasgupta, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Pradyut Kashyap, Ms.
Shreya Rastogi, Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Syed Faraz Alam,
Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Aggarwal.
2142
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Advs. for the Respondents:
K.M.Nataraj, A.S.G., Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav
Singh, Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey, Vatsal Joshi, Sanjay Kr.
tyagi, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Ms. Agrmaa Singh, Raman Yadav,
Arvind Kumar Sharma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1.
The majesty of our Constitution lies not in the might of the State but
in its restraint. When the Court contemplates the ultimate punishment,
i.e. the Capital Punishment, it enters a domain where justice must be
tempered by conscience and guided by the unwavering promises of
equality, dignity and fair procedure. A Constitution that proclaims liberty
and dignity as its first commitments cannot permit the State to end
a human life unless every safeguard of fairness has been honoured
and every civilising impulse of the law has been heard. The question
is never only what penalty a crime might merit, it is first whether the
machinery of the Republic has honoured every safeguard that makes
punishment lawful in a constitutional democracy. In the narrow space
between guilt and the gallows, a robust Constitution demands that we
pause, look again, and ask whether the process itself has measured
up to the high bar that humanity and the rule of law together set.
2.
The present writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, assails the continuing validity of the sentence of death
affirmed against the Petitioner, and seeks its reconsideration in the
light of subsequent legislative and judicial developments, particularly
with reference to the guidelines laid down in the case of Manoj and
others v. State of Madhya Pradesh1.
3.
The facts giving rise to this writ petition are as follows:
3.1 The prosecution case in brief is that on 03.04.2008, the Petitioner
allegedly lured a four-year-old girl away from her home in Wadi,
1
(2023) 2 SCC 353
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
Nagpur, transported her to a secluded spot, thereafter, sexually
assaulted and strangled her to death and then attempted to
conceal the body among nearby shrubs. An FIR (Crime No. 71
of 2008) was registered at Wadi Police Station the same day.
The Petitioner was arrested on 04.04.2008, and a charge-sheet
was filed for offences under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302
and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602.
3.2 On 29.09.2010 the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, in
Sessions Trial No. 252 of 20083 convicted the Petitioner under
Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 of the IPC and, on
the same day, imposed the death sentence on him. During the
original trial, the Petitioner, who was unable to afford private
counsel, was represented by legal-aid counsel whose absence
on crucial dates resulted in four material witnesses remaining
un-cross-examined.
3.3 In confirmation proceedings the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur
Bench4, by judgment dated 24.03.2011, set aside the conviction
and sentence on the ground that the Petitioner had been denied
an effective defence, and remanded the matter for the limited
purpose of cross-examining the said witnesses.
3.4 Upon remand, the same legal-aid counsel represented the
Petitioner. The four witnesses were cross-examined, but
counsel was absent at the hearing on sentence. By judgment
dated 23.02.2012, the Trial Court again convicted the Petitioner
of the aforesaid offences and re-imposed the sentence of
death, recording the Petitioner's age being around 45 years at
the time of the incident and family dependants as mitigating
circumstances.
3.5 On 27.03.2012, the High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 112
of 2012 and Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2012, affirmed both
conviction and sentence, relying principally on the nature and
manner of the crime and finding no sufficient mitigating factors.
2
IPC
3
Trial Court
4
High Court
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3.6
This Court, by judgment dated 26.11.2014 in Criminal Appeal
Nos. 2486-2487 of 2014, dismissed the Petitioner's appeal,
and confirmed the death sentence as the only mitigation
circumstances placed before this Court at that time were
related to the Petitioner's youth and the probability of
reformation.
3.7
Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of 2015 was thereafter
filed. Pursuant to order dated 31.08.2016, the Petitioner
placed limited additional material regarding his education,
prison activities and disciplinary record. By judgment dated
03.05.2017, this Court upheld the earlier decision, observing
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances adduced.
3.8
A mercy petition under Article 161 of the Constitution of
India was submitted to the Governor of Maharashtra on
26.12.2017 and was rejected on 01.02.2022. The rejection
was communicated to the Petitioner on 30.03.2022.
3.9
It is argued by the Petitioner that while the mercy petition
was pending, this Court, on 06.10.2017, admitted in Rishi
Malhotra v. Union of India5 challenge to hanging as the mode
of execution which matter remains sub judice.
3.10 It is further argued that on 29.03.2022, in Irfan @ Bhayu v.
State of Madhya Pradesh6, this Court highlighted the necessity
of comprehensive mitigation material in death penalty cases
and directed registration of Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
1 of 2022 to frame guidelines for sentencing.
3.11 Meanwhile, it is claimed by the Petitioner that detailed medical
records obtained from Nagpur Central Jail revealed that
the Petitioner was receiving treatment for major depressive
disorder, psychotic features, hypertension, chronic frontal-lobe
infarct and cervical myelopathy, with repeated prescriptions of
antidepressant and antipsychotic medication. It is further stated
that 3 independent psychiatrists, on the basis of interview
transcripts supplied by the Petitioner's legal team in 2017,
5
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145 of 2017
6
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021
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Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
gave preliminary opinions indicating intellectual disability,
psychosis and organic brain pathology.
3.12 It is further argued that on 20.05.2022 this Court delivered its
judgment in Manoj (supra), formulating practical, time-bound
guidelines obliging Trial Courts and the State to place extensive
mitigation circumstances on record including psychiatric,
psychological, social-history and jail-conduct reports. Pursuant
to Manoj (supra), this Court and several High Courts have
consistently called for probation-officer reports, psychological
assessments by independent institutions, jail-conduct
certificates and access for defence mitigation investigators
in ongoing death-sentence matters.
3.13 Acting on the Manoj (supra) protocol, it is argued that the
Petitioner's legal team engaged Mr Swapnil Bhopi, Clinical
Psychologist, who on 17.06.2022, conducted psychometric
testing. The assessment disclosed a Specific Learning
Disability (SLD) and low intellectual functioning, together with
long-standing trauma and organic brain injury. A second mercy
petition under Article 72 of the Constitution of India, enclosing
the new medical records, Mr. Bhopi's report, and supplementary
submissions referencing Manoj (supra) and Suo Motu W.P.
(Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, was lodged with the President of India
on 01.07.2022, and was rejected on 10.04.2023, and the
intimation reached the Petitioner on 15.06.2023.
3.14 On 19.09.2022, in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, a
Constitution Bench reference was made to evolve a uniform
sentencing framework and to delineate modalities for
psychological evaluation and collection of mitigating material,
the Petitioner's case was cited as illustrative of inconsistencies
in existing practice.
3.15 On 02.05.2023, in Rishi Malhotra (Supra), the Union of India
informed this Court of its proposal to constitute an expert
committee on alternate modes of execution. The petition
remains pending before this Court.
4.
In this backdrop, the Petitioner has approached this Court invoking
the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India seeking reconsideration of the death sentence
affirmed on 03.05.2017.
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5.
Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner, has advanced the following submissions:
5.1 It is primarily submitted that the death sentence was affirmed
in 2017 without the benefit of the sentencing protocol
subsequently mandated in Manoj (supra). The judgment in
Manoj (supra) requires Trial Courts and the State to place
before the Judge comprehensive mitigation circumstances,
including family history, socio-economic background, psychiatric
and psychological evaluation, jail-conduct data, and probation
reports and to afford the defence an equal opportunity to
rebut. It is submitted that none of this material was elicited or
considered either by the Trial Court, the High Court, or this
Court in review, and the Petitioner was denied the "principled
and individualised" sentencing required by Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India.
5.2 Furthermore, it is contended that the evolution of sentencing law
in Manoj (supra) and the pending Constitution Bench reference
in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 together constitute a
"substantial change in law". Applying the settled rule of beneficial
construction, those developments must operate retrospectively
in favour of a condemned prisoner whose sentence is yet to
be executed.
5.3 It is further argued that the prison medical records, 3 independent
psychiatric opinions of 2017, and the detailed psychometric
evaluation of the Petitioner by Clinical Psychologist, Mr. Swapnil
Bhopi, on 17.06.2022, now demonstrate that the Petitioner
suffers from a Specific Learning Disability coupled with low
intellectual functioning; chronic frontal-lobe infarct and cervical
myelopathy; and major depressive disorder with psychotic
features. These conditions attract the protective umbrella of the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20167 and the Mental
Healthcare Act, 2017. However, no reasonable accommodation
or specialised assistance was provided at any stage of trial or
appeal. The absence of such accommodation is claimed to
infringe Sections 3, 6 and 12 of the RPwD Act, 2016 (equality,
dignity and access to justice) and Section 20 of the Mental
7
RPwD Act, 2016
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Healthcare Act, 2017 (right to equal legal protection). The
Petitioner, therefore, was unrepresented at the sentencing
hearing and was incapable of articulating mitigating material,
with the result that the death sentence was imposed on a
procedurally defective foundation.
5.4 It is lastly submitted that Rishi Malhotra (supra), challenging
hanging as the mode of execution, remains pending before
this Court, and in that matter, the Union has proposed
appointment of an expert committee to explore alternate modes
of execution. Executing the Petitioner before the conclusion of
those proceedings and the Constitution Bench reference would
expose the Petitioner to irreversible prejudice.
6.
Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the Union of India and Dr. Birendra Saraf, learned Advocate General
for the State of Maharashtra, have rendered the following submissions:
6.1 It is submitted that the present petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India is an impermissible attempt to reopen the
judgment of this Court dated 26.11.2014, which has attained
finality after dismissal of Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of
2015, and later rejection of mercy petitions by both the Governor
and the President of India. Article 32 of the Constitution of
India may be invoked only to redress a subsisting violation of
fundamental rights and a duly pronounced decision of this Court
cannot itself be characterised as such a violation.
6.2 It is contended that all aggravating and mitigating factors were
exhaustively examined at three judicial tiers. All three Courts,
i.e. the Trial Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court,
have found that no mitigating circumstance of weight escaped
scrutiny. Moreover, the Courts have concluded that the Petitioner
being a history-sheeter with multiple pending cases, is devoid
of remorse, and poses a continuing menace to society. Those
findings were reaffirmed in review after considering the additional
material later tendered by the defence.
6.3 It is further submitted that the sentencing guidelines spelt
out in Manoj (supra) are prospective in operation. They are
directed to Trial Courts going ahead as can be deduced from
reading the judgement, and they do not authorise the wholesale
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reopening of cases finally decided years before, especially after
rejection of constitutional clemency. To hold otherwise would
undermine certainty in criminal justice and flood the system
with stale challenges.
6.4 It is argued that the Petitioner seeks to rely on medical records
and psychological opinions generated long after conviction. Even
assuming their correctness (which is denied), such post-hoc
material cannot displace the contemporaneous judicial finding
which were made upon expert evidence then adduced. The
Courts found that the crime was not committed under mental
stress or emotional disturbance and that rehabilitation was
improbable.
6.5 It is submitted that the RPwD Act, 2016 and the Mental
Healthcare Act, 2017 do not confer a right to nullify a sentence
validly imposed and confirmed before their enactment. Nor do
they compel retrospective reopening where, as here, the courts
have already evaluated mental capacity and rejected it as a
mitigating factor.
6.6 It is lastly contended that pendency of Rishi Malhotra (supra) or
of the Constitution Bench reference in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No.
1 of 2022 does not create any legal impediment on execution
of a sentence that has survived every level of scrutiny. Until
those proceedings culminate in a binding change in law, the
existing framework, including hanging as the prescribed mode,
remains operative.
7.
Having considered the submissions of both the parties and the material
on record before us, the central question before us is whether, in a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, this Court may
revisit a death sentence that stands concluded, having been affirmed
on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy
petitions, on the strength of the sentencing framework propounded
in Manoj (supra).
8.
Before moving ahead, the reason we are primarily focusing on the
threshold issue framed above is that the very maintainability of
the petition hinges on it. Unless the doorway of Article 32 of the
Constitution of India permits reopening a death sentence that has
attained finality, any examination of fresh medical evidence, alleged
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mitigating factors, or the ramifications of the pending references in
Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 and Rishi Malhotra (supra)
would be premature. Those references will be decided on their own
merits in due course and unless and until they culminate in a binding
change of law, they do not alter the jurisdictional bar the State is
pleading before us. Our task, therefore, is confined to determining
whether Article 32 of the Constitution of India itself empowers this
Court to revisit a sentence that has attained finality.
9.
At the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce below the pertinent
guidelines laid down in Manoj (supra) which the Petitioner invokes
as the fulcrum of his claim. The relevant paras from Manoj (supra)
are as follows:
"247. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society must
strive towards - there are many references to it peppered
in this Court's jurisprudence across the decades - but what
is lacking is a concrete framework that can measure and
evaluate it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored by the failure to
implement prison reforms of a meaningful kind, which has
left the process of incarceration and prisons in general, to
be a space of limited potential for systemic reformation.
The goal of reformative punishment requires systems that
actively enable reformation and rehabilitation, as a result
of nuanced policy-making. As a small step to correct these
skewed results and facilitate better evaluation of whether
there is a possibility for the accused to be reformed (beyond
vague references to conduct, family background, etc.), this
Court deems it necessary to frame practical guidelines
for the courts to adopt and implement, till the legislature
and executive, formulate a coherent framework through
legislation. These guidelines may also offer guidance or
ideas, that such a legislative framework could benefit
from, to systematically collect and evaluate information
on mitigating circumstances.
Practical guidelines to collect mitigating circumstances
248. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating
circumstances are considered at the trial stage, to avoid
slipping into a retributive response to the brutality of the
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crime, as is noticeably the situation in a majority of cases
reaching the appellate stage.
249. To do this, the trial court must elicit information from
the accused and the State, both. The State, must-for an
offence carrying capital punishment-at the appropriate
stage, produce material which is preferably collected
beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused.
This will help establish proximity (in terms of timeline), to
the accused person's frame of mind (or mental illness,
if any) at the time of committing the crime and offer
guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled
out in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] . Even for the
other factors of (3) and (4)-an onus placed squarely
on the State-conducting this form of psychiatric and
psychological evaluation close on the heels of commission
of the offence, will provide a baseline for the appellate
courts to use for comparison i.e. to evaluate the progress
of the accused towards reformation, achieved during the
incarceration period.
250. Next, the State, must in a time-bound manner,
collect additional information pertaining to the accused.
An illustrative, but not exhaustive list is as follows:
(a) Age
(b) Early family background (siblings, protection of parents,
any history of violence or neglect)
(c) Present family background (surviving family members,
whether married, has children, etc.)
(d) Type and level of education
(e) Socio-economic background (including conditions of
poverty or deprivation, if any)
(f) Criminal antecedents (details of offence and whether
convicted, sentence served, if any)
(g) Income and the kind of employment (whether none,
or temporary or permanent, etc.);
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(h) Other factors such as history of unstable social
behaviour, or mental or psychological ailment(s), alienation
of the individual (with reasons, if any), etc.
This information should mandatorily be available to the trial
court, at the sentencing stage. The accused too, should
be given the same opportunity to produce evidence in
rebuttal, towards establishing all mitigating circumstances.
251. Lastly, information regarding the accused's jail
conduct and behaviour, work done (if any), activities the
accused has involved themselves in, and other related
details should be called for in the form of a report from the
relevant jail authorities (i.e. Probation and Welfare Officer,
Superintendent of Jail, etc.). If the appeal is heard after a
long hiatus from the trial court's conviction, or High Court's
confirmation, as the case may be - a fresh report (rather
than the one used by the previous court) from the jail
authorities is recommended, for a more exact and complete
understanding of the contemporaneous progress made by
the accused, in the time elapsed. The jail authorities must
also include a fresh psychiatric and psychological report
which will further evidence the reformative progress, and
reveal post-conviction mental illness, if any."
10. A bare perusal of these guidelines makes it evident that this Court, in
Manoj (supra), sought to implement the reformative ideal underlying
capital sentencing by replacing ad-hoc impressions of accused
with verifiable data. The directions oblige the State, rather than the
accused, to place before the trial court, at the very sentencing stage,
a structured dossier covering psychiatric assessment proximate
to the offence, socio-economic and family history, educational
attainments, prior conduct, and a contemporaneous report on jail
behaviour. By doing so, this Court intended to prevent sentencing
from defaulting into a purely retributive response to the brutality of the
crime and to supply appellate courts with a baseline against which
genuine progress towards reformation can later be measured. These
guidelines would serve as an interim, judicially crafted framework
pending comprehensive legislative or executive action with respect
to capital sentencing. Whether these guidelines can be enforced to
disturb a sentence that has attained finality, therefore, depends upon
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the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, an issue we shall
now proceed to examine.
11. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is the constitutional conduit
through which this Court may issue "appropriate" writs to secure the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Described in the Constituent
Assembly as the "heart and soul" of the Constitution, it furnishes a
direct route for citizen to this Court whenever a protected Fundament
Right is said to be under threat. The present petitioner invokes that
power on a narrow but grave premise. Although his conviction has
long since become final, the State now proposes to end his life
through a sentencing process that the Petitioner claims ignored
the safeguards later formalised in Manoj (Supra). According to the
Petitioner, that omission offends the twin guarantees of equality and
due procedure embodied in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. The question that consequently arises, and to which we next
turn, is whether Article 32 authorises this Court to reopen a capital
sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality, solely to
cure the procedural lapse the Petitioner identifies.
12. In order to understand the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, in the present case, we must consider four principal lines of
enquiry to help shape our determination. Firstly, we must consider the
settled place of Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a continuing
safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to be carried out.
Secondly, we will examine this Court's power and duty to set aside
procedural finality when that course alone can avert a breach of the
guarantees of equality and life. Thirdly, it becomes necessary to test
whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj (supra) has
assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard.
Finally, we must delineate the form and extent of the corrective relief
that may properly be fashioned under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, mindful that any order we make must both protect constitutional
rights and preserve the stability of adjudication.
A.
Article 32 jurisdiction in capital cases constitutes a special
constitutional safeguard
13. The irreversible character of capital punishment has always obliged
this Court to scrutinise death-sentence cases through a constitutional
lens more gruelling than that applied to any other category of criminal
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cases. Because an execution, once carried out, forecloses every
possibility of correction, Article 32 has been treated as a continuing
safeguard that survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review
and even mercy.
14. The first clear articulation of this principle is found in Harbans
Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and others8. Therein, this Court
was confronted with a situation in which one co-accused had secured
commutation while another had already been executed. If the
petitioner alone were hanged, the result would have been a blatant
disparity. Declining to allow "manifest injustice" to stand, the Court
invoked its powers under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of
India, and its inherent jurisdiction to commute the sentence, thereby
affirming that constitutional relief remains available even after the
conventional judicial process has concluded. The relevant paras for
the same have been reproduced hereunder:
"21. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court
would have been justified in commuting the death sentence
imposed on the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.
As, however, the case of the petitioner had earlier been
considered by the President of India to whom the petitioner
had presented the petition for mercy, I am of the opinion
that propriety and decorum require that the matter should
be referred back to the President instead of this Court
deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner
to one of life imprisonment.
20. Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court
for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from
the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under
Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion
that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power
and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation
in the larger interests of administration of justice and for
preventing manifest injustice being done. This power
must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional
circumstances for furthering the ends of justice.