# VASANTLAL MAGANBHAI SANJANWALA v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS •

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 341
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 147 & 148 of 1955
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vasantlal-maganbhai-sanjanwala-v-the-state-of-bombay-and-others-2167
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Agricultural Tenancy, Regulation of-Enactment emptn11ering
Government to fix lower rate of maximum rent by notification-If
vitiated by excessive delegation-Notification, validity of-Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, r948 (Bom. LXV II of z948),
s. 6(2),
Section 6(1) of the Bombay Tenancy anc;I Agricultural Lands
Act, 1948 (Born. LXVII of 1948), provided that the maximum
rent payable· by a tenant shall not in the case of irrigated land
exceed one-fourth and in the case of any other land exceed one
third of the crop of such land or its value as determined by the
prescribed manner. Section 6(2) of the Act read as follows,-
" The Provincial Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable
by the tenants of lands situate in any particular area or may fix
such rate on any other suitable basis as it thinks fit."
By a notification under that section the Government of Bombay,
in supersession of all other notifications prescribed a rate of
maximum rent which was very much lower than the one previously fixed. The petitioners challenged the vires of the said
section and the validity of the notification under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, but the High Court found against them. The
. question for determination in these appeals was whether s. 6(2)
conferred unguided power 011 the Government and was void by
reason of excessive delegation of legislative power.
Universal
Imports Agency
v.
Chief Controller
of Imports~
Exports
Shah ],
342
S'CPRE:llE COURT REPORTS
[1961)
1960
H cld
(per Sinha, C. J., Kapur, Gajendragadkar
and
Wanchoo, JJ.l that although the power of delegation is a conVosa•tlal
stituent clement of the legislative power, it is well-settled that
Maga•bhai
a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in
Sonjauwala
any case and before it can delegate any subsidiary or ar,cillary
v.
powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislaThe State of
tive policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper
Bombay 6- Othm guidance in implementing the same. A statute challenged on
the ground of excessive delegatio~ must, therefore, be subjected
to two tests, (1) whether it delegates essential legislative function or power and :2) whether the legislature has enunciated its
policy and principle for the guidance of the delegate.
It is in
that light that the preamble of the statute and its provisions
relating to delegation should be considered.
Harishankar Bag/av. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1
S. C. R. 288 and The Edward Mi,'.ts Co. Ltd., Bemrnr v. Stale of
Ajmer, [1955] l S.C.R. 735, referred to.
·
The preamble and the material provisions of the Act show
that it seeks to improve the economic and social condition of the
peasants and with that end in view fixes maximum rent payable
by the tenants and provides a speedy machinery for fixation of
reasonable rent. This being the legislative policy and regard
being had to the specific provisions laid down by s. 12(3) of the
Act for determining reasonable rent, it is impossible to hold that
the power delegated to the Prov'ncial Government bys. 6(2) was
vitiated by excessive delegation. The fact that no minimum
was prescribed by the section could not alter the position.
Held, further, that since the Act itself is within the protection of Art. 31-B of the Constitution and there can be no question as to the validity of s. 6(2), the notification issued in
exercise of the power conferr.,d by that section cannot be
challenged as infringing Art. 31 of the Constitution.
Nor was it correct to say that the power delegated bys. 6(2)
could be used only once and no more.
Per Subba Rao, J.-The essential legislative function is the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a
rule of conduct. Obviously the legislature cannot abdicate its
functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious
activities of a welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all
the details to suit the vary

## Text

_Characters 0–39,947 of 48,860. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39947 for what follows._

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
For reasons set o~t in the principal petition, petitions Nos. 124 and 125 of 1957 and 118of1959 should
also be dismissed with costs.
BY COURT: In view of t.he majority Judgment,
the petitions are allowed.. The petitioners in a.II the
petitions will have their costs.
Petitions allowed.
VASANTLAL MAGANBHAI SANJANWALA
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS •.
(AND CONNECTED APPEAL)
(B. P. SINHA, c .. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Agricultural Tenancy, Regulation of-Enactment emptn11ering
Government to fix lower rate of maximum rent by notification-If
vitiated by excessive delegation-Notification, validity of-Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, r948 (Bom. LXV II of z948),
s. 6(2),
Section 6(1) of the Bombay Tenancy anc;I Agricultural Lands
Act, 1948 (Born. LXVII of 1948), provided that the maximum
rent payable· by a tenant shall not in the case of irrigated land
exceed one-fourth and in the case of any other land exceed one
third of the crop of such land or its value as determined by the
prescribed manner. Section 6(2) of the Act read as follows,-
" The Provincial Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable
by the tenants of lands situate in any particular area or may fix
such rate on any other suitable basis as it thinks fit."
By a notification under that section the Government of Bombay,
in supersession of all other notifications prescribed a rate of
maximum rent which was very much lower than the one previously fixed. The petitioners challenged the vires of the said
section and the validity of the notification under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, but the High Court found against them. The
. question for determination in these appeals was whether s. 6(2)
conferred unguided power 011 the Government and was void by
reason of excessive delegation of legislative power.
Universal
Imports Agency
v.
Chief Controller
of Imports~
Exports
Shah ],
342
S'CPRE:llE COURT REPORTS
[1961)
1960
H cld
(per Sinha, C. J., Kapur, Gajendragadkar
and
Wanchoo, JJ.l that although the power of delegation is a conVosa•tlal
stituent clement of the legislative power, it is well-settled that
Maga•bhai
a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in
Sonjauwala
any case and before it can delegate any subsidiary or ar,cillary
v.
powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislaThe State of
tive policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper
Bombay 6- Othm guidance in implementing the same. A statute challenged on
the ground of excessive delegatio~ must, therefore, be subjected
to two tests, (1) whether it delegates essential legislative function or power and :2) whether the legislature has enunciated its
policy and principle for the guidance of the delegate.
It is in
that light that the preamble of the statute and its provisions
relating to delegation should be considered.
Harishankar Bag/av. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1
S. C. R. 288 and The Edward Mi,'.ts Co. Ltd., Bemrnr v. Stale of
Ajmer, [1955] l S.C.R. 735, referred to.
·
The preamble and the material provisions of the Act show
that it seeks to improve the economic and social condition of the
peasants and with that end in view fixes maximum rent payable
by the tenants and provides a speedy machinery for fixation of
reasonable rent. This being the legislative policy and regard
being had to the specific provisions laid down by s. 12(3) of the
Act for determining reasonable rent, it is impossible to hold that
the power delegated to the Prov'ncial Government bys. 6(2) was
vitiated by excessive delegation. The fact that no minimum
was prescribed by the section could not alter the position.
Held, further, that since the Act itself is within the protection of Art. 31-B of the Constitution and there can be no question as to the validity of s. 6(2), the notification issued in
exercise of the power conferr.,d by that section cannot be
challenged as infringing Art. 31 of the Constitution.
Nor was it correct to say that the power delegated bys. 6(2)
could be used only once and no more.
Per Subba Rao, J.-The essential legislative function is the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a
rule of conduct. Obviously the legislature cannot abdicate its
functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious
activities of a welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all
the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation.
It must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the
executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent
in sach a process of delegation. It may not lay down any
policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general
terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of
the executive, it may confer an arbitrary power.on the executive
to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This selfeffacement of legislative power in favour of another agency
.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of
i960
delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generons and
-
liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislaVasantlal
ture exceeded such limits. But the said liberal construction
Maganbhai
should not be carried by the courts to the extent of always
Sanjanwala
trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to
v.
sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities.
The State of
In re The Delhi Laws Act, r9r2, [1951] S.C.R. · 747, Rajnarain Bombay & Othm
Singh v. The Chairman. Patna Administration Committee, Patna,
(1955] r S. C. R. 290, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, [1955] l S. C.R. 380, The Edward Mills Co., Ltd., Beawar
v. The State of Ajmer, [1955] l S. C.R. 735 aud Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671, referred to.
The whole scheme of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 (LXVII of 1948), excluding s. 6(2), is a selfcontained and integrated one. The legislature fixes the maximum rentlinked with crop having regard to the nature of the
land, and the other provisions enable the appropriate authorities to fix reasonable rent subject to that maximum. But under
s. 6(2) the legislature in clearest terms abdicated its essential
functions in favour of the executive authority without laying
down any standard for its guidance. In effect it permitted the
Government to amends. 6(1) of the Act. Whiles. 6(1) overrides
other provisions of the Act, s. 6(2) derogates from s. 6(1) itself.
Section 6(2) is capable of being exercised in such a way that_the
object of s. 6(1) is itself frustrated. Section 6(1) in effect is
made subject to s. 6(2).
This is clearly an abdication by the
legislature of its essential legislative function and the delegation
must be held void .
. It was not correct to say that the factors specified bys. 12(3)
afforded a standard for fixing the maximum rent. It wa:s not
permissible to re!id them into s. 6(2) of the Act.
No legislature can be legally permitted lo lay down a broad
policy in general terms and confer arbitrary powers on the
executive for carrying it out. Such a law must obviously be
contrary to the decisions of this Court and cannot be vali<;I.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 147 & 148 of 1955 .
. Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1953, of the former Bombay High Court in
Special Civil Applications Nos. 1008 and 1611of1953.
: V. M. Limaye, Mrs. E. Udayaratnam and S. S.
Shukla, for tho appellants (in both the appeals).
• H. N~ Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. Ganapathy Iyer, K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for
the respondent.
·
V asanllal
Maganbhai
Sa11janwala
344
SUPREME COGRT Rl';PORTS
' [1961]
1960. August 25.
The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.,
Kapur, Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. Subba Hao, J., delivered a separate judgment.
The 5~~ 1, of
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The appellants in these two
Bom/J•v &- Othm appeals had filed two separate petitions under Art. 226
·
of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court in
Gaj1nd.agadkar f· which they had challenged the vires of s. 6(2) of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
(LXVII of 1948) (hereafter ca.lied the Act) and the
validity of the notification issued by the Government
on October 17, 1952, under the provisions of the said
s. 6(2). It appears that on June 23, 1949, in exercise
of the powers conferred by s. 6(2) of the Act, the
Government had issued a notification fixing " in the
case of an irrigated land 1/5 and in the case of any
other land 1/4 of the crops of such land or its value
as determined in the prescribed manner as the maximum rent payable by the tenants of the lands situate
in the area.a specified in the schedule appended thereto". Amongst the areas thus specified was the area
in which the appellanta' lands are situated. Subsequently, on October 17, 1952, by virtue of the same
powers and in supersession of all other earlier notifications issued in that behalf the Government purported to proscribe a rate as the lower rate of maximum
rent at which the rent shall be payable by the tenants
in respect of the lands situate in _the areas specified in
Schedule I appended to it. It is unnecessary to set out
the rates thus prescribed; it would be enough to state
that the rate of maximum rent prescribed by this
notification is very much lower than the rate which
had been fixed by the earlier one. By their petitions
filed in the Bombay High Court the appellants contended that s. 6(2) was ultra vires, and that even if
s. 6(2) was valid tho impugned notification was invalid.
Accordingly they prayed for a. writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any
other appropria.te direction or order against the
Government, the M.nmlatdar of the area concerned
and their respective tenants prohibiting them or 11ony
one of them from giving effect to the said notification.
I
1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
345
They also claimed a direction or order to the opponz960
ents directing them to cancel or withdraw the impugned notification. These two petitions were heard
;;;:~~:!;
by the High Court along with other companion
sanjanwala
matters in which the same points were raiSed, and in
.v.
the result the High Court dismissed the petitions. It
The State of
held that s. 6(2) was intra vires and the impugned Bombay & Others
notification was legal and valid. The appellants G . d-dk 1
h
I• d r
'd
b • d
'fi
f
h
"I'" raga
ar .
t en app 1e JOr an
o tame
a cert1 cate rom.t e
High Court, and it is with the said certificate that
they have come to this Court by their two appeals.
At the.outset it may be relevant to state that, subsequent to the decision under appeal, in 1956 the Act
has been substantialy amended and now s. 8 of the
new Act provides for the rent and its maximum and
minimum. Shortly stated this section incorporates
the provisions of the impugned notification and adds
to it the further provision that in no case shall the
rent be less than twice the assessment. In consequence
the point raised in the present appeals has ceased to
be of any importance; at best it may affect just a
few cases between landlords and tenants that may be"
pending in respect of the rent payable by the latter
to the former for a period prior to 1956. At the time
when the certificate was granted the questions raised
by the appellants were undoubtedly of general importance ..
We would first read s. 6 of the Aot. Section 6(1)
provides that notwithstanding any agreement, usage,
decree or order of a court or any law the maximum
rent payable by a tenant for the lease of any land
shall not in the case of an irrigated land exceed onefourth and in the case of any other land exceed one.
third of the crop of such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner. Section 6(2) provides
that the Provincial Government may by notification
in the official gazette fix a lower rate of the maximum
rent payable by the tenants of lands situate in any
particular area or may fix such rate on any other
suitable basis as it thinks fit.
For the appellants
Mr. Lima.ye has contended that s. 6(2) suffers from the
vice of excessive delegation. His argument is that
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
the power dolegat~d to the Provincial Government is
unfettered and uncanalised and no guidance has been
Vasa"tlal
Maga>1bhai
afforded to it for exercising the said power.
He has
sa~ja>1wala
also relied on the fact that while giving such wide
v.
powers to the delegate in fixing the lower rate of tho
The State of
maximum rent the Legislature has not prescribed any
Bo••bay <~ Others minimum as it should have done.
The High Court
G . d-dk 1 has held that the delegation invoked ins. 6(2) is with-
•1"' raga
ar · ·
• 'l J J" ·
d
h h
I JI
h
m perm1ss1 > e 1m1ts an as sue t e c ia. enge to t e
vires of the said provision cannot succeed.
It is now well-established by the decisions of this
Court that the power of deleg1~tion is a constituent
clem.ent of the legislative power as a whole, and that
in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to
meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and necessary to
delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of
their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by
their Acts.
The extent to which such delegation is
permissible is also now well.settled. The Legi~lature
cannot delegate its essential legislative function in a.ny
case. It must la.y down the legislative policy a.nd
principle, a.nd must afford guidance for carrying out
the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers
in that ooha.lf. As ha.s been observed by Ma.ha.jan, C.J.,
in Hari8hankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') " the Legislature cannot delegate its function
of laying down legislative polfoy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. The
Legislature must declare the policy of the la.w and the
legal principles which are to control a.ny given cases,
and must provide a. standard to guide the officials or
the body in power to execute the law ". In dealing
with the cha.Henge to the vires of a.ny statute on the
ground of excessive delegation it is, therefore, necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation
involves the delegation of a.n essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy a.nd principlo and given guidance to
the delegate or not.
As the decision in Bagla'8 case(')
shows, in applying this test this Court has taken into
(1) (19'5] 1 S.C.R, 381, 388.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
account the statements in the preamble to the Act,
and if the said statements afford a satisfactory basis
for holding that the legislative policy and principle
Va.~antlal
Magan_bhai
has been enunciated with sufficient accuracy and
sanjanwala
clarity the preamble itself has been held to satisfy the
v.
requirements of the relevant tests. In every case .it
The St~te of
would be necessary to consider the relevant provisions Bombay <!> Others
of the Act in relation to the delegation made and the c . d-dk 1
question as to whether the delegation is intra. vires or "1'" raga •r ·
not will have to be decided by the application of the
relevant tests.
In this connection we may also refer to the decision
of this Court in The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar v.
State of Ajiner (1), where the validity of the notification issued under the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act XI of 1948 was impeached, and the said
challenge raised the question about the validity of the
delegation provided foYny s. 21 of the said Act. The
scheme of the Act was that 4L schedule had been
attached to it which gave a list of employments to
which the provisions of the Act applied; aild s. 27
gave power to the appropriate Government to add to
either part of the schedule any employment in respect
of which it was of opinion that the minimum wages
sha.11 be fixed and this the appropriate Government
was authorised to do by giving notification in a. broad
manner, and thereupon the schedule shall, in its
application to the State, be deemed to be amended
according If. . The argument was that the Act had
nowhere formulated a legislative policy according to
which an employment should be chosen for being
included in the schedule ; no principles had been prescribed and no standards laid down in that behalf, and
so the . delegation was unfettered and uncana.lised.
This argument was rejected by this Court on the
broad considera.tio9, that the legislative policy was
apparent on the face of the Act itself.
" What the
Act aims at ",observed Mukherjee., J ., as he then was,
"is the statutory fixation of minimum wages with a
view to obviate the chance of exploitation of la.hour •
. (1) [1955] I S.C.R. 735, 750.
45
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
The Legislature undoubtedly intended to apply this
Vosantlal
Act not to a.II industries but to those industries only
Maganhhai
whero by reason of unorganiscd labour or want of pros.,,1.1iu·ala
per arrangements for effective regulation of wages or
v.
for other causes the wages of labourers in a particular
The State 01 industry were very low". The learned Judge then
Bombay~ 01""' pointed out that conditions of la.hour vary under
Gajendragadkar 1. different circumstances and from State to State, and
the expediency of including a. particular trade or
industry within the schedule depends upon a variety
of facts which a.re not uniform and which can best be
ascertained by the person who is placed in charge of
administration of a particular State. It is with a
view to carry out the particular purpose of the Act
that power is delegated to the appropriate Government by s. 27. That is how the challenge to tho vires
of s. 27 was repelled.
The
present
Act is undoubtedly a benificent
measure. It has enacted provisions for agrarian reform which the Legislature thought was overdue. The
preamble shows that the object of the Act, inter a.lia.,
was to improve the economic and social condition of
peasants and ensure the full and efficient use of land
for agriculture. With ~ha.t object the Act has made
several provisions to 8afegua.rd the interests of the
tenants. Let us consider some of these provisions.
Section 6 which we have already set out prescribes the
maximum rent payable by a. tenant, and provides for
the reduction of the said maximum by reference to
particular areas. Sect.ion 7 lays down that the rent
pa.ya.hie by tenants shall, subject to the maximum
rate fixed under s. 6, be the rent a.greed between the
parties, or in the abs1mce of any agreement or usage,
or where there is a. disput.e as regards the reasonableness of the rent pa.ya.hie according t-0 the agreement or
usage, the rea.eonahle rent. It is thus clear that even
in regard to an agreed rent or a rent fixed by usage, if
a. tenant raises a. dispute a.bout its reasonableness that
dispute bas to be settled in the ma.oner prescribed by
the Act and the a.mount of reasonable rent determined.
Section 8 provides for commutation of crop-share rent
into ca.sh.
Section 9 prohibits a. landlord from receiving from hie tenant a.ny rent in terms of service or
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.349
labour; and it requires him to apply to the Mamlatdar
'960.
for commuting such rent into cash. Section 10 pro-·
vasantlal;
vides for refund ofexcess rent recovered by the landMaganbhai
lord from his tenant. Section 11 prohibits the recovery
sanjanwala
by the landlord of any cess, rate, vero, huk or tax or
v.
service of any description from the tenant other than
The State of
the rent lawfully due from such land. Section 12 pro- Bombay_°:_ Others
vides for enquiries in regard to the fixation of reason- Gajendragadkar J. ·
able rent. On an application made by the tenant or
the landlord in that behalf the Mamlatdar has to
determine the reasonable rent under s. 12(3) having
regard to the factors specified in the said sub-section.
These factors are (a) the rental values of lands used
for similar purposes in the locality, (b) the profits of
agriculture of similar lands in the locality, (c) the
prices of crops and commodities in the locality, (d) the
improvements made in the land by the landlord or the
tenant, (e) the assessment payable in respect of the
land, and (f) such other factors as may be prescribed.
There is no doubt that the last clause which refers to
other factors must be construed as referring to factors
ejusdem generis with those that have been previously
enumerated. Section 13 provides for the suspension
or remission of rent, and the conditions under w bich
the said remission or suspension can be granted. It
would thus be seen that the material provisions of the
Act aim at giving relief to the tenants by fixing the
maximum rent payable by them ahd by providing for
a speedy machinery to consider their complaints about
the unreasonableness of the rent claimed from them by
their respective landlords. It is in the light of this
policy of the Act which is writ large on the face of
these provisions that we have to consider the question
as to whether the delegation made by s, 6(2) suffers
from the infirmity of excessive delegation.
Broadly stated s. 6(2) seeks to provide for the fixation of a lower rate of maximum rent area-wise. We·
have already seen that individual tenants are given
the right to apply for the fixation of reasonable rent
by s. 12, and specific factors have been specified which
the Mamlatdar must consider in fixing a reasonable
rent. The Legislature realised that a large number of
350
SGPllE:llE COURT TIEPORTS
[1961)
tenants in the Stato were poor, ignorant and in many
vawol/al
cases helpless, and it was thought that many of them
.\/aga .. i,1,,,;
may not be able .to make individual applications for
Sa111amrnla
the fixation of a reasonable rent undN s. 12. That i8
_)
"·
why it was thought necessary to confer upon the Pron
1," 51" 1' of
vincial Go,·ermnent the power to fix a lower rate of
01,,uay \;.. Othtr$ h
,
(
,
,
_
t c maxunurn rent payable >y tl·nants m respect of
Gajtndragadhou ./-particular areas. In a sense what could be done by
the l\tarnlatdar in individual cases can be a.chievecl bv
the Provincial Go\·ernment in respect of a large
number of cases covered in a particular area. If that
be so, the )pgisla.tive policy haYing been clearly
expressed in the relevant provisions and tl11• factors for
determining reasonable rent also having been spPcified
in s. 12(3), it is difficult to accept the argument that
the Provincial Go\·ernmcnt has hmm given uncanalised or unfettered powers by s. 6(2) t{> do what it.
likes without any guidance.
The relernnt factors
having been specified bys. 12(3) when the Provin~ial
Government considers the question of fixing a lower
rate of the maximum rent payahle in any parti.
cular area it is expected to adopt:' basis which i8
suitable to that particular area..
The relevant conclitions of agriculture would not be t.111iform in diffort>nt
areaR and the prohkm of fixing a rNiucP<l maximum
rent payable in the rPspectin· areas would ha,·e to b"
tackle<l in the light of the special features and conditions of that area; t.bat is why a ccrtaiu amount of
latitude had to be left to the Government in fixing thP
lower rate of the mi,ximum rent iu the resp<•cti,·e
areas, and that is intended to be a.chicYed by gi\'iug it
liberty to adopt a basi8 which it thinks i~ Huit.able for
the area in quc•stion.
The word "suitable" in the
context must mean 'suitable to the area' having
regard to the other proYisions of the Act 8Uch as
s. 6(1) and s. 12.
It is true that the power to fix a.
reasonable rent conferred on the :llarulatdar under
s. 12 is subject to the power of the Provincial Government und!'r s. 6(2).
Even so we think it would lie
difficult to hold that the factors prescribed for t.hc
guidance of the l\1amlatdar would have no relevance
at all when the Provincial Government acts under
I
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
s. 6(2). In our opinion, therefore, having regard to the
'960
legislative policy laid down by the Act in its preamble
Vasantlal
and in the other relevant sections to which we have
Maganbhai
referred, and having regard to the guidance which has
Sanjanwala
been provided for fixing a reasonable rent under
v.
s. 12(3), it would not be possible to hold that the power
The State of
d
h
P
. . l G
b
6(2) Bombay & Others
delegate
to t e
rovrnma
overnment
y s.
_
suffers from the infirmity of excessive delegation. Gajendragadhar J.
The fact that no minimum has been. prescribed would
not materially affect this position.
Mr. Limaye has then contended that even if s. 6(2)
is valid the impugned notification is invalid because it
offends against Art. 31 of the Constitution. He concedes that the Act itself is saved under Art. 31B since
it is one of the Acts enumerated in the Ninth Schedule ; but his argument is that the notificatio11 has
in substance amended the provisions of s. 6(1) and
thus it amounts to a fresh legislation to which Art.
31B cannot apply. There is no substance in this
argument. Ifs. 6(2) is valid then the exercise of the
power validly conferred on the Provincial Government
cannot be treated as fresh legislation which offends
against Art. 31. If the Act is saved by Art. 31B s. 6(2)
is also saved, and the power must be held to be validly conferred on the Provincial Government, and a
notification issued by virtue of the said powers cannot
be challenged on the ground that it violates Art. 31.
The next argument is that the notification is invalid because the power to issue a notification conferred
by s. 6(2) was exhausted as soon as the Government
issued the first notification on June 23, 1949. This
argument proceeds on the assun:iption that the power
conferred on the Government by s. 6(2) can be exercised only once, and it seeks to derive· support from
the fact that the words " from time to time " which
were used in the corresponding section of the earlier
tenancy legislation in the State have not been used in
s. 6(2).
Reliance is also placed on the fact that the
said words have been used in s. 8(1) of the Act. The
omission of the said words from s. 6(2) as contrasted
with their inclusion in s. 8(1), says Mr. Limaye, indicates that the power delegated under s. 6(2) was
332
SCPREJIE COURT REPORTS
[Hl61]
1960
intended to be ua1~d only onco.
This argument is
fallacious. \\'hy tho Lrgisla.ture did 11ot use the words
Varnutln!
"from time to time" in s. 6(2) when it used them in
,\Jaga,1bJ,a1
d
d
Sauja.,,wla
s. 8(1) it is difficult to un ersta.n ; but in construing
v.
s. 6(2) it is obviously necessary to apply the provisions
n,, State of
of s. 14 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (I of
Bombay & Oil"'' 1904).
Section 14 μro\·idcs that where by any Berni-
-
bay Act made after tho commencement of this Act
Ga)t"d'"g"dha' ].
•
j"
d
G
th
]
any power 1s con crre on avy
overnrnent
en t rn.t
power may be r:.<erci~ed from time to time as occasion
requires.
Quite clearly ifs. 6(2) is read in the.light of
s. 14 of the Bombay Genera.I Clauses Act it must
follow that the p01\·er to issue a. notification can be
exercised from time to time a.s occasion requires.
It is true that s. 14 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 (X of 1897), provides that where any power is
conferred by any Central Act or Regulation then, unless a different intention appears, that power may bo
exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Since
there is a specific provision of tho Bombay Genl'ra.1
Clauses Act relevant on the point it is unnecessary to
take recourse to s. 14 of tho Central Genera.I Clauses
Act; but even if W•l were to assume that the power in
question can be exercis~d from time to time unless a.
difforent intention appears we would feel no difficulty
in holding that no such different intention can be
attributed to the Legislature when it enacted s. 6t2).
It is obvious that having prescribed for a maximum
by s. 6(1) the Legi3lature ha.s deliberately provided for
a modification of the said maximum rent and that
itself shows that the fixation of any maximum rent
was not treated a~ immutable. If it was necessary to
issue one notification under s. 6(2) it would follow by
force of tho same logic that circumstances may require the iHsue of a fort her notification. The tixa.tion
of agricultural rent depends upon so many uncertain
factors which may vary from time to time and from
place to place that it would he idlo to contend that
the Legislature wanted to fix the maximum only
once, or, as 1\Ir. Lima.ye concedes, twice.
Therefore
the argument that the power to issue a noti!icat.ion
has been exhausted cannot be sustained.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
The last argument which Mr. Limaye faintly
196o
attempted to place before us was that the expression
1, asantlal
"any particular area" would not be applicable to the
Maganbhai
areas in which the appellants' lands are situated
sanjanwala
because, according to him, the expression should be
v.
construed in the light of the same e)(pression used in
The State of
s. 298(2)(a) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Bombay &- Others
This ar~ument is far fetched and fatuous and need not Gajendragadkar 1.
be considered.
In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with
costs.
SuBBA RAO J.-1 have had the advantage of peruSubba Rao J.
sing the judgment prepared by Gajendragadkar, J. I
regret my inability to agree with my learned brother
on the question of the vires of s. 6(2) of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (LXVII of
1948) (hereinafter called the Act).
The facts have been fully stated in the judgment of
my learned brother and" I need not restate them here.
It would be enough if I expressed my opinion on the
said question.
Leitrried counsel for the appellants attacks the con.
stituCional validity of s. 6(2) on the ground that the
said sub-section exceeds the limits of permissible delegated legislation. Before considering the validity of
s. 6(2), it would be convenient to notice briefly the
relevant aspects of the law of the doctrine of delegated
legislation.
The scope of the doctrine of delegation of legislation has been so authoritatively laid down by this
Court in more than one decision that it would be
pedantic to attempt to resurvey , the field over again.
I would, therefore, be content to collate the relevant
passages from the decisions of this Court to ascertain
the principle underlying the doctrine.
The leading decision. on this subject is In re The
Delhi Laws Act, 1912 ('). There the Central Legislature had empowered the executive authority under its
legislative control to apply at its discretion the laws to
an area which was also under the legislative sway of
the Centre. The validity of the .laws was questioned
(1) [1951] S.C.B. 747.
--·
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
on the ground that the legislature had no power to
delegate legislative powers to executive authorities.
Vasantlal
Maganbhai
As many as seven Judges dealt with the question and
Sanjanwala
wrote seven separate judgments considering elabov.
rately the different aspects of the question raised. I
The State of
am relieved of the duty to ascertain the core of the
Bombay & Others decision as that has been done by Bose, J., with
clarity in Racinarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna
Snbba Rao }.
J
Administration Committee, Patna (1). Bose, J., after
pointing out the seven variations of the authority
given to the executive in the Delhi Laws Act Case ('),
summarized the majority view on the relevant aspect
of the question now raised at p. 301 thus:
"In our opinion, the majority view was that an
executive authority can be authorised to modify either
existing or future laws but not in any essential
feature. Exactly what constitutes an essential feature
cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there
was some divergence of view about this in the former
case, but this much is clear from the opinions set out
above: it cannot include a change of policy."
Rajnarain Singh's Case (1) dealt with s. 3(1) of the
Patna Administration Act, 1915, (Bihar and Orissa
Act 1 of 1915) as amended by Patna Administration
(Amendment) Act, 1928 (Bihar and Orissa Act IV of
1928) and with a notification issued by the Governor
of Bihar picking out s. 194 out of the Bihar and Orissa
Municipal Act of 1922, modifying it and extending it
in its modified form to the Patna Administration and
Patna Village areas. Bose, J., after pointing out the
difference between Rajnarain Singh' s Case (1) and the
Delhi Laws Act Case (') observed at p. 303 thus :
"But even as the modification of the whole cannot be permitted to effect any essential change in the
Act or an alteration in its policy, so also a modification of a part cannot be permitted to do that
either."
This Court·again in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (') considered the scope of the Delhi
Laws Act Case ('). Mahajan, C. J., stated at p. 388
thus:
(1) [1955] 1 $.C.R. 290.
(2) [1951] S.C.R. 747.
(3) [1955] l S.C.R. 380.
,..-
~-·
,;,
.,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
" It was settled by the majority judgment in the
196o
Delhi Laws Act Case (') that essential powers of legisvasantlal
lation cannot be delegated.
In other words, the
Maganbhai
legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down
sanf•nwala
legislative policy in respect of a measure and its forv.
mulation as a rule of conduct. The Legislature must
The State of
declare the policy of the law and the legal principles~ombay & .Others
which are to control any given cases and must pro- .5 b~--;· 1
vide a standard to guide the officials or the body in c
"
a
00
•
power to execute the law. The essential legislative
function consists in the determination or choice of the
legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy
into a binding rule of conduct."
In The Edward Mills Co., Ltd., Beawar v. The State of
Ajmer (2), Mukherjea, J., as he then was, speaking for
the Court stated the principle thus at p. 749:
" A Legislature cannot certainly strip itself of its
essential functions and vest the same on an extraneous authority. The primary duty of law making
has to be discharged by the Legislature itself but
delegation may be resorted to as a subsidiary or an
ancillary measure."
The latest decision on. the point is that in Hamdard
Dawakhana v. Union of India('). One of the questions raised in that case was whether s. 3(d) of Drugs
and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements)
Act, 1954, exceeded the permissible limits of delegated
legislation.
The principle has been restated by
Kapur, J., at p. 566 thus:
"This .means that the legislature having laid
down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the
administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation
by supplying details within the limits prescribed by
the statute and in the case of conditional legislation
the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature
conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747·
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 735·
(3) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 67_1.
Vasantlal
356
SUPRE'.\fE COURT REPORTS
[1961]
authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also tho determination of the area.
to which it is to extend."
Maganbhai
· San;anwala
Applying the principle to the facts of that case, the
v.
learned Judge observed at p. 568 thus:
ne Staie 01
"In our view the words impugned a.re vague.
Bombay & Others Parliament has established no criteria., no standards
Subba Rao ;. aud has not prescribed any principle on which a.
particular disease or condition is to be specified in the
Schedule. It is not st1~ted what facts or circumstances
a.re to be ta.ken into consideration to include a particular condition or disease. The power of specifying
diseases and conditions as given in s. 3(d) must therefore be held to be going beyond permissible boundaries of valid delegation.
It is not necessary to multiply decisions; nor is it
necessary to point out the subtle distinction between
delegated legislation and conditional legislation. The
law on the subject may be briefly stated thus: Tho
Constitution confers a power and imposes a. duty on
the lt>gislaturo to make laws.
The essential legislative
function is the determination of the legislative policy
and its formulation as a. rnlo of conduct. Obviously
it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another.
But in view of tho multifarious activities of a. welfare
State, it cannot presumably work out a.II the details to
suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It
must necessarily delegate tho working out of details to
the executive or any other agency.
But there is a
danger inherent in.such a process of dele,ga.tion.
An
overburdened legislature or one controlled by a
powerful executive may unduly overstep the limits of
delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all; it
may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it
may not set down any standard for the guidance of
the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on
the executive to change or modify the policy laid
down by it without reserving for itself any control
over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of
legislative power in favour of another agency either in
whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a. fair, generous
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
and liberal construction of an impugned statute
i96o
whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the
Vasantlal
said liberal construction should not be carried by the
Maganbhai
Courts to the extent of always trying to discover a
Sanjanwala
dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an
v.
arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities. It
The State 0!
is the duty of this Court to strike down without any Bombay & Others
hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the exeSubba Rao J.
cutive by the legislature.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, I shall
look at the provisions of the Act to ascertain whether
s. 6(2) is in conformity with the law laid down by this
Court .. I shall for the present ignore s. 6(2) and briefly
and broadly notice the scheme of the Act.
The preamble shows that the object of the Act was mainly to
improve the economic and social conditions of peasants and to ensure the full and efficient use of land for
agriculture. It also indicates that the Act was not
intended to be a confiscatory one, but was enacted to
regulate the relationship between land-lord and tenant,
particularly in respect of rent payable by the tenant
to the land-lord. In s. 6(1) the legislature in clear
terms fixes the maximum rent payable by a tenant,
having regard to the nature of the land: in the case
of irrigated land it fixes one-fourth and in the case of
other land one-third of the crop of ~uch land or its
value as determined in the prescribed manner as the
maximum rent. The rest of the Act is to be worked
out subject to the maximum rent fixed under s. 6(1).
Section 7 enables ·the land-lord and tenant to agree
upon the rate of rent. Section 8 gives power to the
Provincial Government to issue notifications providing
for the commutation of the rent in kind into cash
rent. It also, if no rate of commutation has been so
fixed by the State Government, enables the Mamlatdar
to fix the amount of commutation in the manner
prescribed. Sub-section (3) of s .. 6 prohibits a landlord from recovering any rent by way of crop-share or
in excess of the commuted cash rent. Section 9 compels the land-lord to apply to the Mamlatdar, if the
land-lord is receiving rent from any tenant in terms
of service or labour, for commuting such rent into
358
SUPREME COURT : • ..:POllTS
[1961]
196o
cash.