# VED PRAKASH AND ORS v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, LUCKNOW AND ANR - **Citation:** [2003] 2 S.C.R. 1000 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2003-03-12 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 999 of2001 - **Bench:** Doraiswamy Raju, Shivaraj V. Patil - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ved-prakash-and-ors-v-ministry-of-industry-lucknow-and-anr-19058 - **Pages:** 28 ## Headnote Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 48(1)-Land acquisition-Land covered by Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act-Land claimed to C be abadi land-Exemption from acquisition sought-On litigation direction by Supreme Ccmrt to State authority to consider the nature of land for considering its exemption from acquisition-Representation to State authorityLand found not liable to be exempted from acquisition as the same was not abadi land~Writ petition dismissed by High Court-On appeal, held: Land not liable to be exempted-Representation rightly rejected by the State D Authority-Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976-United Provinces Village Abadi Act, 1948-UP. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226-Judicial Review of administrative or executive action-Scope of-Held: while examining such action infirmity in the decision making process and not the decision itself is E to be seen. F Certain lands were acquired under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued. Appellant filed writ petitions in High Court challenging the acquisition on the ground that the lands acquired were having abadi and in view of existing State policy such lands could not be acquired. The petition was dismissed. In Special Leave Petitions against the same, the Court in Om Prakash case held that the State authorities were not justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Acquisition Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section SA of the Act. The Court refused to.exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article G 136 of the Constitution in the facts and circumstances cif the case and instead of relegating the appellants to the remedy under Section 5-A of the Acquisition Act, relegated them to the remedy by way of suitable representation before appropriate authority u/s 48 of the Acquisition Act to decide as to whether appellants' lands were to be treated immune from acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having abadi thereon H 1000 YEO PRAKASH v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY 1001 acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having abadi thereon A and hence covered by policy decision of the State not to acquire such land. Pursuant to the directions of the Court, appellants made representations before the State ·Government. The authority heard the appellants, and on inspecting the spot found that most of the land owners were not original residents of the village but from different parts or the . B country; that no abadi was found on the land and the constructions on the lands were in scattered position and were done after the notifications u/ss. 4 and 6 of Acquisition Act were issued. The authority concluded that it was· not feasible to release the lands of the appellants from acquisition u/s 48(1) of the Acquisition Act. Hence, the appellants approached High C Court by filing Writ Petitions challenging the order of the authorities. High .Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that administrative authority could not be expected to discuss each and every evidence; that the authority had recorded a finding on each and every aspect required to be considered as per the directions given by Supreme Court; that consideration of all the representations of the appellants by the authority D and passing of common order did not suffer from any difficulty or infirmity because the entire material and evidence placed before it had been considered before passing the impugned order. In appeal to this Court appellants contended that in view of the order of Supreme Court in Om Prakash case acquisition proceedings was otherwise bad but the directions were given only in order not to disturb the scheme for the purpose for which large area was acquired; and that the order by the Competent Authority was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being arbitrary and discriminatory in view of the policy of E the Government of U.P. F Respondent authority contended that in the order passed by the ## Text _Characters 0–39,953 of 68,967. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39953 for what follows._ A B VED PRAKASH AND ORS. V. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, LUCKNOW AND ANR. MARCH 12, 2003 [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 48(1)-Land acquisition-Land covered by Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act-Land claimed to C be abadi land-Exemption from acquisition sought-On litigation direction by Supreme Ccmrt to State authority to consider the nature of land for considering its exemption from acquisition-Representation to State authorityLand found not liable to be exempted from acquisition as the same was not abadi land~Writ petition dismissed by High Court-On appeal, held: Land not liable to be exempted-Representation rightly rejected by the State D Authority-Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976-United Provinces Village Abadi Act, 1948-UP. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226-Judicial Review of administrative or executive action-Scope of-Held: while examining such action infirmity in the decision making process and not the decision itself is E to be seen. F Certain lands were acquired under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued. Appellant filed writ petitions in High Court challenging the acquisition on the ground that the lands acquired were having abadi and in view of existing State policy such lands could not be acquired. The petition was dismissed. In Special Leave Petitions against the same, the Court in Om Prakash case held that the State authorities were not justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Acquisition Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section SA of the Act. The Court refused to.exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article G 136 of the Constitution in the facts and circumstances cif the case and instead of relegating the appellants to the remedy under Section 5-A of the Acquisition Act, relegated them to the remedy by way of suitable representation before appropriate authority u/s 48 of the Acquisition Act to decide as to whether appellants' lands were to be treated immune from acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having abadi thereon H 1000 YEO PRAKASH v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY 1001 acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having abadi thereon A and hence covered by policy decision of the State not to acquire such land. Pursuant to the directions of the Court, appellants made representations before the State ·Government. The authority heard the appellants, and on inspecting the spot found that most of the land owners were not original residents of the village but from different parts or the . B country; that no abadi was found on the land and the constructions on the lands were in scattered position and were done after the notifications u/ss. 4 and 6 of Acquisition Act were issued. The authority concluded that it was· not feasible to release the lands of the appellants from acquisition u/s 48(1) of the Acquisition Act. Hence, the appellants approached High C Court by filing Writ Petitions challenging the order of the authorities. High .Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that administrative authority could not be expected to discuss each and every evidence; that the authority had recorded a finding on each and every aspect required to be considered as per the directions given by Supreme Court; that consideration of all the representations of the appellants by the authority D and passing of common order did not suffer from any difficulty or infirmity because the entire material and evidence placed before it had been considered before passing the impugned order. In appeal to this Court appellants contended that in view of the order of Supreme Court in Om Prakash case acquisition proceedings was otherwise bad but the directions were given only in order not to disturb the scheme for the purpose for which large area was acquired; and that the order by the Competent Authority was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being arbitrary and discriminatory in view of the policy of E the Government of U.P. F Respondent authority contended that in the order passed by the competent authority directions given by Supreme Court were correctly followed and the competent authority after a finding of fact and after considering the feasibility of releasing the lands from acquisition under Section 48(1) rejected the representations; and that the High Court was G right and justified in not interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the competent authority. Dismissing the appeals and contempt petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. Taking an overall view of the matter having regard to H 1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R. A the facts of the case, in the light of law applicable to them and keeping in . view the parameters of direction passed in judgment in Om Prakash case, the authori~y rightly rejected the representations made by the appellants and the High Court rightly affirmed the same. 11027-DI 1.2. It is no doubt true that the Court in Om Prakash case concluded B against the State that the State authorities were not justified in invoking Section 17( 4) of Land Acquisition Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, but ultimately effective and operative order is to be seen in the direction given in that judgment. The ultimate direction was to consider. the representations of the appellants for releasing the lands C from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Acquisition Act on being satisfied.of the aspects mentioned in the directions in that judgment. 11023-E, F) 1.3. It was open to the State aut_horities to consider regarding the feasibility of releasing such la.nds from acquisition under Section 48(1) of D the Act after taking into consideration the observations made and dit.ections given iri Om Prakash case. The Competent Authority of the State gave hearing io the appellants, considered the evidence and material placed on record and examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties in . compliance with the directions given and observations made in Om Prakash E case. The State authority came to the conclu_sion that having regard to various aspects including development scheme, it was found not feasible torelease the lan~s of the appellants under Section 48(1) of the Acquisition Act. High Court did not find any good ·ground to disagree with the findings of fact recorded by the State authority and also found that the State authorities duly considered the directions given and observations made F by this Court. 11024-C:F) I .4. There is .no material to show that the constructions and structures said to be existing in the Abadi area were existing prior to the Notification issued under Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 declaring the area comprising the villages mentioned in the Schedule G called "New Okhla Industrial Development Area". No village map or other documents show the same in the large area of Abadi claimed by the appellants. In view of Sections 28, 32, 33, 52 and 54 of U.P. Land Revenue· Act, 1901.it i~ clear that field books, maps, record of rights and annual register had to be maintained. Similarly, it is not shown that such H structures pr constructions were put up with the permission as required - VED PRAKASH v. MINIS.TRY OF INDUSTRY 1003 under the provisions of the 1976 Act and the .Regulations. The State A authority having elaborately considered the evidence available on record found that the claims of the appellants as to Abadi is spread over in a large area apart from being whether that was an Abadi or not and whether it was existing prior to the issue of Notificatior. in 1976. Having regard to all aspects, the authority found that it was not feasible to release the lands B of the appellants from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Acquisition Act. As is evident even from the survey report that boongas, bitooras, thatched huts, thatched sheds etc. occupied a small area but were spread over to a long distance. Appellants' claim for large area covering few acres of land as abadi, is untenable. All the more so, when it could not be legitimately claimed or asserted that they were regularly living in those C structure of very kachcha type. The nature of the construction, their age from its appearance, etc., give an impression that they were hurriedly planted at later dates only to circumvent the land acquisition proceedings. 11025-D-F; 1026-A-DJ Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of UP. and.Ors., 11998] 6 SCC 1, D referred to. 2. In examining the validity of an administrative or executive order the test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision making process and not tlie decision itself. When choices are open to the authority it is for that authority to decide upon the choice an.d not for. the Court to substitute its view. On finding that the authority passed the impugned order on proper consideration of the evidence placed before it and after hearing the parties in the light of the directions given and observations made by this Court in the case of Om Prakash, High Court did not consider E it appropriate to interfere with the impugned order. There is no good or ·p valid reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the order passed by the authority. (1026-H; 1027-A-C] Commissioner of !nc911ie Tax, Bombay and Ors. v. Mahindra and . Mahindra Limited and Ors., 1198314SCC392, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 999 of2001. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.2.2000 of the Allahabad High Court C.M.W.P. No. 8235 of 2000. WITH G H 1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R. A C.A. Nos. 1000, JOO 1, 1002, 1003, 1004/2001, C.P.(C) No. 303/2000 in C.A. No. 99912001, C.P. (C) No. 30412000 in C.A. No. 1000/2001, C.P. (C) No. 30512000 in C.A. No. 1001/2001, C.P. (C) No. 30612000 in C.A. No. 1002/2001, C.P. (C) No. 307/2000 in C.A. No. 1003/2001, C.P. (C) No. 274/ 99 in SLP (C) No. 6036/99 and C.P. (C) No. 281199 in SLP (C) No. 6036/99. B Shanti Bhushan, Rakesh Dwivdi, Salman Khurshid, H.V.P. Sharma for c Shiv Sagar Tiwari, Gopal Balwant Sathe, A.N. Bardiya, R.C. Verma, lrshad Ahmed, Dr. l.P. Singh, A_bhishek Choudhary ·and Ms. Virola Sinha for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL J. About 496 acres of land including that of the appellants were _acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act'). Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued for the purpose of planned development of district Ghaziabad (now D district Gautam Budh Nagar) through NO/DA on 5.1.1991 and 7.1.1992 respectively. The appellants challenged those notifications by filing writ petitions in the High Court which were dismissed .. They filed appeals by Special Leave to thi~ Court challenging the order oftli,e High C?urt dismissing the writ petitions. This Court in Om Prakash and Aizr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1998] 6 SCC 1 disposed of those appeals giving certain directions. E Although several contentions were raised before this Court challenging the acquisition ·proceedings, finally this Court has made observations and gave certain directions in paras 31 and 32, which read as under:- F G H "31. Now remains the moot question as to what proper orders can be passed in the present proceedings in the light of our findings on the aforesaid points. We have already noted that the real an_d the only contention of the appellants for effectively challenging the acquisition proceedings is that because· their. lands· are having abadi, they are covered by the existing State policy for not acquiring such lands under the Act. Whether these lands are having abadi or not. is a vexed question of fact which we have kept open for consideration of appropriate authorities instead of relegating the appellants to the remedy under Section 5-A of the Act. We deem it fit to relegate the . appellants to the remedy by way of suitable representation before the appropriate State authorities under Section 48 of the Act. It reads as under:- ·-{ )- YEO PRAKASH v MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J.] !005 "48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation A to be awarded when not completed ( l) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such B acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all cosis reasonably incurred by. him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.· C (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall· apply, so far as may be, to the deterrnination of the compensation payable under this Section." · As laid down by sub-section (I) of Section 48, the Government is at D . liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Leaned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents submitted ihat possession of these lands has already been taken. Our attention was invited to a possession receipt annexed to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent 4, Secretary, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. It is stated E in the counter that NOIDA has been put in possession of the acquired lands from 30-3-1992 and the lands under acquisition now form a part of Sectors 43 and 44 of NOIDA. The Secretary of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Shri Rama Shankar has also earlier filed counter-affidavit to that effect. In para 6 thereof, it is averred as F under:- "6. I further say and submit that the Hon 'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 31.2.1992 passed an interim order to the effect that there would be status quo and/or that the petitioner would not be dispossessed from the land in dispute unless he has G already been dispossessed. I say and submit that a day prior to the date on which the interim order was passed, the petitioner had already lost possession and the 4th respondent was put in actual physical possession of the land which is the subject-matter of this petition." H 1006 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R. Our attention was also invited to Possession Certificate at p. 202 which mentions that for the lands detailed in the certificate, possession should be given to the Tehsildar/ Administrative Officer, NOIDA on 30-3-1992. The number of lands are listed totaling to 492.91 acres wherein the appellants' khasra numbers are also mentioned. It is difficult to appreciate as to how the Possession Certificate for all these number of lands would necessarily include actual taking over of all the number of lands on which there were constructions on ,the ·spot at the relevant time. It is also pertinent to note that the Possession · Certificate is dated 30-3-1992 and the High Court of Allahabad granted status quo order on the next day, i.e., 31.3.1992. It, therefore, appears C to us _that so far as the appellants' lands are concerned, only an effort was made to take paper possession on 30.3.1992 and actual possession does not seem to have been taken. No possession receipt signed by any of the appellants could be produced to substantiate that contention. Not only that, as noted earlier, the evidence on record showed that D E F G H even pending the writ petition, the site inspection report of l l .J.1996 showed that some of the lands in question were actually occupied by residents and the lands were constructed upon and a factory was being run. Consequently, it is not possible to agree with the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the possession o.f the ac.quired lands belonging to the appellants was actually taken on the spot on 30.3.1992. It is not in dispute that status quo order granted by the High Court continued all throughout till the dismissal of the writ petition. It was then contended that before this Court could grant any interim relief, possession appeared to have been taken of these lands at least on 18.11.1995. Our attention was invited to the authority letter written by one Shri Chandra Pal Singh, Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, NO!DA, Ghaziabad that possession should be given on 18.11.1995. It is obviously after the decision of the High Court dated 24.8.1995. However, it must be noted that this Court by order dated 29.9.1995 had already granted ad interim stay limited to the extent that any existing construction should not be demolished without leave of the Court and that order has continued . all throughout till the hearing of the present appeals. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate as to how despite the order .of this Court, possession of the present appellants' lands could have been taken on 18.11.1995. However, Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel for NOIDA, submitted that this Court order was only not to demolish the ' 1 VED PRAKASH v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY [SP.lVARAJ V. PATIL, J.] ] 007 construction and has nothing to do with taking oossession. It is difficult A to appreciate this submission. If the constructions on the disputed lands under acquisition were not to be disturbed, how could it be contended that still the possession of the constructions was with NOIDA and that they would not demolish the construction having taken their possession? Even that apart, the authority letter dated B 18.11.1995 itself shows the details of lands possession of which was giveri to NO IDA and the land of Survey No. 488 is not one of them. For all these reasons, therefore, it must be held that possession of the lands under acquisition belonging to the present appellants has remained with the appellants till date. Once that conclusion is reached, Section 48 sub-section (I) can be legitimately invokedby the appellants C for consideration of the State authorities. It is, of course, true that the said provision gives liberty to the State to withdraw from acquisition of any land but if the appellants are in a position to convince the State authorities that their lands were having abadi on the date on which Section 4 notification was issued on 5.I.I99/and it was that abadi which had continued without any additional construction thereon D ' till the date of Section 6 notification and thereafter and such abadi was squarely covered by the State policy of not acquiring lands having abadi, then it will be open to the State authorities to pass appropriate orders for withdrawing such lands from acquisition and give appropriate relief to the applicants co.ncerned. We, therefore, grant E liberty to the appellants, if so advised to file written representations before appropriate authorities of the State of Uttar Pradesh invoking the State Government's po.wers under Section 48 sub-section (I) of the Act. It is made clear that we express no opinion on the question whether the appellants' lands had such abadi on the date of Section 4 notification which would attract the State policy of not acquiring F such lands and whether such policy had continued thereafter at the stage of Section 6 notification of 7./.1992 and whether such policy is still current and ·operative at the time when the appellants ' representations come up for consideration of appropriate authorities of the State Government. It will be for the· State authorities to take G their informed decision in this connection. We may not be understood to have stated anything on this aspect nor are we suggesting that the State must release these lands from acquisition if the State authorities are not satisfied about the merits of the representations. The State authorities will have to be satisfied on the following aspects in this connection:- H 1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003 J 2 S.C.R. A (i) Whether there was any abadi on the acquired lands at the time of B c D E Section 4( I) notification; (ii) Whether such abadi was a legally pennissible abadi; (iii) Whether such abadi has continued to exist till the date of representation; (iv) Whether such abadi was covered by any. government policy in force at the time of issuance of Section 4( I) notification and/or Section 6 notification for not acquiring lands having such abadi; (v) Whether such government policy has continued to be in force till the date of representation. 32. In short, the entire matter is left at large for the consideration of the State authorities in the appellants' representations. We also make it clear that if the appellants file their written representations to the aforesaid effect on or before 31.8.1998, then the appropriate authorities of the State Government shall consider their representations regarding the feasibility of releasing such lands from acqidsition under Section 48(/) of the Act on the ground that there were "abadis" on these lands at the relevant time and are governed by any existing State policy for releasing such lands from acquisition on that score as indicated hereinabove and for that purpose they may give a hearing to the appellants, either personally or through their counsel, and permit them to lead whatever evidence they want to lead in this connection. The State authorities shall consider these written representations within a period of two months from the date such representations are received, i.e., latest by 31.10.1998 and will take p appropriate decisions on these representations and will inform t/1e representationists concerned in writing about the decision of the St me Government in this connection. " [emphasis supplied] Pursuant to the said directions, the appellants made representations G before the State Government. The Authority, after considering their representations, rejected the same by order dated 3.12.1999. Hence, the appellants approached the High Court for the second time by filing the writ petitions challenging the order of authorities dated 3.12.1999. The Division Bench of the High Court, after considering the contentions raised, dismissed H the writ petitions on 25.2.2000. Hence, the appellants have approached this - YEO PRAKASH v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY fSHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J.] J 009 Court by filing these appeals questioning the validity and correctness of the A order dated 25.2.2000 made by the High Court in the writ petitions upholding the order dated 3.12.1999 passed by the Authority. It is appropriate to recapitulate the substance of the directions given and the observations made as can be gathered from paragraphs 31 and 32 extracted above. This Court noticed that the real and only contention of the B appellants for effectively challenging the acquisition proceedings was that their lands having abadi could not be acqu>ired as per the existing policy for not acquiring such lands; whether those lands are having abadi or not is a vexed question of facts, which is left open for consideration of appropriate authorities; instead of relegating the appellants to the remedy under Section C 5-A of the Act it was deemed fit to relegate the appellants to the remedy by way of suitable representation before the appropriate State authorities under Section 48 of the Act. There was some dispute as to taking of possession of the lands by the authorities in the context that under Section 48(1) the Government is at libe1ty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. On examination of rival contentions on D this point this Court held that the possession of the lands under acquisition belonging to the appellants had remained with them. Hence Section 48(1) of the Act could be legitimately invoked by the appellants for consideration of the State authorities; it is true that the said provision gives liberty to the State to withdraw from acquisition of any iand but if the appellants are in a position E to convince the State authorities that their lands were having abadi on the date on which Section 4 notification was issued on 5.1.1991 and it was that abadi which had continued without any additional construction thereon till the date of second notification and that such abadi was squarely covered by the State policy of not acquiring lands having abadi, then it will be open to the State authorities to pass appropriate orders for withdrawing such lands F from acquisition and give appropriate relief to the applicants concerned; liberty was given to the appellants to file representations before the appropriate authorities under Section 48(1) of the Act; it is made clear that this Court did express no opinion on the question whether the appellants' lands had such abadi on the date of Section 4 notification, which was attracted the State G policy of not acquiring such lands and whether such policy had continued thereafter at the stage of Section 6 notification on 7 .1.1992 and whether such policy was still current and operative at the time when appellants' representations came up for consideration. It would be for the State authorities to take their informed decision in that connection. This Court also made it clear that it may not be understood that anything stated on this aspect nor H JOJO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R. A any suggestion was made that the State must release these lands from acquisition if the State authorities are not satisfied about.the merits of the representations. The State authorities will have to be satisfied in that regard on five aspects stated in paragraph 31 above. In paragraph 32 it is further stated that the entire matter is left at large for the consideration of the State B authorities on the appellants' representations. It is made clear that the State Government shall consider the representations as to feasibility of releasing such lands from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act on the ground that there were abadis on these lands at the relevant time and are governed by any existing State policy for releasing such lands from acquisition on that score. In para 11 of the judgment, the following points were raised for determination:- c D E "!. Whether the State authorities were justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Act for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 2. In any case, whether the appellants' lands have to be treated as Lnmune from acquisition proceedings on the ground that they were having abadi thereon and were, therefore, governed by the policy decision of the State of U.P. not to acquire such lands. Whether this Court should refuse to exercise its discretiClnary jurisdiction under Article ! 36 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. What final orders." The first point was answered in the negative, in favour of the appellants and against the contesting respondents. Point No. 2 was kept open for consideration of the proper State authorities, as indicated while considering F points 3 and 4. Point No. 3 was answered in the affirmative against the appellants and in favour of the respondents refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India for interf,!ring in the proceedings with the impugned notifications. Dealing with point No. 4 directions were given and observations were made as stated in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment. G Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 999-1001/2001 and 1004/2001 and Contempt Petition Nos. 274/1991 and 281 /1991, specifically drew 'our attention to the discussion and conclusion of point no. 1. To emphasize that acquisition proceedings H were otherwise bad, but only in order not to disturb the scheme for the VED PRAKASH v. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY [SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL, J.) 1011 .,_._. purpose of which large area was acquired, the directions as contained in para A 31 were given. He further urged that the High Court committed an error in upholding the order dated 3.12. I 999, issued by the Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Government of Uttar Pradesh, who did not follow the specific directions of this Court; the High Court committed an error in passing the common judgment in number of writ petitions without discussing the individual B cases on merits as the Secretary, Ministry of Industries had also committed the similar mistake in not deciding the cases individually on their own merits in spite of specific directions given by this Court in Om Prakash case (supra), and the order dated 6.9.1999 in Contempt Petition filed by l.M. Dawar and connected special leave petitions. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained in view of the fact that when there was a specific Government policy as is c -revident from the letter dated 8.8.1997 that at the time of acquisition of any area the village abadi be left out from acquisition and if acquisition is very urgent, in that case equal development area of the acquired land shall be given to .the owners of the land, whose land was sought to be acquired. He ad