# VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR (F/R) AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [2022] 3 S.C.R. 736
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-05-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2929 of 2022
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, A. S. Bopanna, Bela M. Trivedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/veena-singh-dead-through-lr-v-the-district-registrar-additional-collector-f-r-36031
- **Pages:** 55

## Headnote

Registration Act, 1908:
ss. 35, 72, 73, 74 - Execution and registration of sale deed -
Agreement to sell certain land between the appellant and the second
respondent - Execution of sale deed by the appellant in favour of
second respondent, however, during registration of said sale deed,
the appellant denied its execution - However, no denial on the part
of the appellant in signing the sale deed and having placed her
thumb impressions/fingerprints on the documents - Appellant also
asserted commission of fraud and undue influence by the second
respondent - Refusal of registration of the sale deed by the Sbregistrar in terms of s. 35(3)(a) - However, in appeal u/s. 72, the
District Registrar ordered registration of the sale deed - Said order
upheld by the High Court - On appeal, held: Sub-Registrar having
specifically denied registration in terms of s. 35(3)(a), the order
was not amenable to an appeal u/s. 72, however, the Registrar, in
the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the
powers entrusted u/s. 73 - Mis-labelling of an application u/s. 73
as an appeal u/s. 72 would by itself not vitiate the proceedings
before the Registrar - Execution happens when a person's signature
on the document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents
of the document, which they have understood before signing it -
"Execution" of a document does not stand admitted merely because
a person admits to having signed the document - Thus, admission
of one's signature on a document is not equivalent to admission of
its execution - High Court conflated the mere signing of the sale
deed with its execution - Such an approach is completely erroneous
and cannot be upheld - Thus, the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court and that of the District Registrar set aside.
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 736
736
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737
ss. 35, 72-77 - Power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their
procedures under - Explained.
Words and phrases: Expression 'execution' - Meaning of, in
context of the Registration Act, 1908.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 From the objections filed before the SubRegistrar by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having
signed the sale deed. The essence of her grievance was that her
signatures were taken forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the
intent of the parties in terms of the area which was intended to
be sold; the sale consideration was undervalued; the consequence
of the sale deed was that even the residential house of the
appellant would be sold, contrary to her understanding; and the
sale deed had been procured by fraud. The order of the SubRegistrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was not
ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have been
executed in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus
being denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the SubRegistrar in terms of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.
[Para 32][765-A-C]
1.2 If a person by whom the document is purported to be
executed denies its execution and registration is refused on those
grounds, an appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying
execution would not be maintainable under Section 72 of the
Registration Act. Section 72 clearly stipulates that an appeal will
lie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document
to registration "except where the refusal is made on the ground
of denial of execution". [Para 33][765-C-E]
1.3 In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically
denied registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was
not amenable to an appeal under Section 72. However, the
Registrar, in the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took
recourse to the powers entrusted under Section 73. Section 73
empowers the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to
register a document on denial of its execution by a person
purporting to have executed it. Subsequently, the Registrar
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/AD

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 3 S.C.R.
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR
v.
THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR (F/R)
AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 2929 of 2022)
MAY 10, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, A. S. BOPANNA
AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Registration Act, 1908:
ss. 35, 72, 73, 74 - Execution and registration of sale deed -
Agreement to sell certain land between the appellant and the second
respondent - Execution of sale deed by the appellant in favour of
second respondent, however, during registration of said sale deed,
the appellant denied its execution - However, no denial on the part
of the appellant in signing the sale deed and having placed her
thumb impressions/fingerprints on the documents - Appellant also
asserted commission of fraud and undue influence by the second
respondent - Refusal of registration of the sale deed by the Sbregistrar in terms of s. 35(3)(a) - However, in appeal u/s. 72, the
District Registrar ordered registration of the sale deed - Said order
upheld by the High Court - On appeal, held: Sub-Registrar having
specifically denied registration in terms of s. 35(3)(a), the order
was not amenable to an appeal u/s. 72, however, the Registrar, in
the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the
powers entrusted u/s. 73 - Mis-labelling of an application u/s. 73
as an appeal u/s. 72 would by itself not vitiate the proceedings
before the Registrar - Execution happens when a person's signature
on the document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents
of the document, which they have understood before signing it -
"Execution" of a document does not stand admitted merely because
a person admits to having signed the document - Thus, admission
of one's signature on a document is not equivalent to admission of
its execution - High Court conflated the mere signing of the sale
deed with its execution - Such an approach is completely erroneous
and cannot be upheld - Thus, the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court and that of the District Registrar set aside.
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 736
736
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737
ss. 35, 72-77 - Power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their
procedures under - Explained.
Words and phrases: Expression 'execution' - Meaning of, in
context of the Registration Act, 1908.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 From the objections filed before the SubRegistrar by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having
signed the sale deed. The essence of her grievance was that her
signatures were taken forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the
intent of the parties in terms of the area which was intended to
be sold; the sale consideration was undervalued; the consequence
of the sale deed was that even the residential house of the
appellant would be sold, contrary to her understanding; and the
sale deed had been procured by fraud. The order of the SubRegistrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was not
ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have been
executed in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus
being denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the SubRegistrar in terms of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act.
[Para 32][765-A-C]
1.2 If a person by whom the document is purported to be
executed denies its execution and registration is refused on those
grounds, an appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying
execution would not be maintainable under Section 72 of the
Registration Act. Section 72 clearly stipulates that an appeal will
lie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document
to registration "except where the refusal is made on the ground
of denial of execution". [Para 33][765-C-E]
1.3 In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically
denied registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was
not amenable to an appeal under Section 72. However, the
Registrar, in the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took
recourse to the powers entrusted under Section 73. Section 73
empowers the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to
register a document on denial of its execution by a person
purporting to have executed it. Subsequently, the Registrar
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 3 S.C.R.
appears to have followed the procedure which is emphasized in
Section 74. Upon such an enquiry under Section 74, Section 75
enables the Registrar to order the document to be registered if
it is found that: (i) the document has been executed; and (ii) the
requirements of the law have been complied with. Section 75(4)
also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance
of witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74.
[Para 34][765-E-H]
1.4 Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealing
with an application under Section 73 are wider than the powers
which are entrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. Under
Section 35(1)(a), the registering officer shall register the
document if all the persons executing the document appear in
person before the officer and admit the execution of the document.
Section 35(2) empowers the registering officer to examine anyone
present in the office, for the purpose of satisfying himself that
the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent
themselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section 35,
sub-Section stipulates that once execution is denied by the
person who purports to have executed the document, the
registering officer shall refuse to register it. On the other hand,
under Sections 73 and 74, the Registrar is entrusted with the
duty to enquire whether the document has been executed and
whether all the requirements of the law for the time being have
been complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry, Section
75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the SubRegistrar under Section 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuse
registration when the execution of a document is denied by the
person purported to have executed the document, the Registrar
is entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiry on an
application under Section 73 by following the procedure under
Section 74. [Para 35][766-A-E]
1.5 In the instant case, the appeal before the Registrar was
not maintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, in
response to the memo of appeal filed by the second respondent,
specifically pleaded in her objections that "hearing the appeal
under Section 72 of the Registration Act or to deliver any judgment
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will be against law". At the same time, however, the appellant
also pleaded that she "had full right for argument under Section
75(4) of the Registration Act and under the CPC from the
witnesses and the appellant". The Registrar is empowered to
summon witnesses under Section 75(4) for the purpose of an
enquiry under Sections 73 and 74. It thus, emerges that the
parties proceeded on the basis that the proceedings would be
decided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and the
enquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section
74. The appellant herself understood this to be the position in
her objections filed to the appeal filed by the second respondent,
since she invoked her rights under Section 75(4), which applies
to enquiry proceedings under Section 74. The appeal against the
Sub-Registrar's order was not maintainable under Section 72.
The remedy of the second respondent, where the Sub-Registrar
refused registration on the ground that the appellant denied
execution of the document, was under Section 73. The Registrar
conducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and
74. Both parties participated in the enquiry. [Para 36][766-E-H;
767-A-B]
1.6 The mis-labelling of an application under Section 73 as
an appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate the
proceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially true
when proceedings before the Registrar, in substance, were
proceedings under Section 73 itself and both the parties
acknowledged them to be so, explicitly or by their conduct. This
is clearly what has happened in the present case as well, as is
evident from the appellant's reference to Section 75(4) and her
participation in the enquiry proceedings before the District
Registrar. Therefore, the second respondent's mis-labelling of
their application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiate the
proceedings which led to the District Registrar's order. [Para
38][767-F-G; 768-A-B]
1.7 Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the
expression "admit the execution of the document", while Section
35(3)(a) uses the expression "denies its execution". Similarly,
Section 72(1) has adopted the expression "denial of execution",
while Section 73(1) uses the expression "denies its execution".
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R)
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However, the word "execution" itself is not defined by the
Registration Act. [Para 39][768-C-D]
Bryan A Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson
Reuters, 2009) pgs 649-650; Words and Phrases
(Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020); Justice
K Kannan, Mulla's The Registration Act (LexisNexis,
2012) pg 416 - referred to.
1.8 "Execution" happens when a person's signature on the
document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents of
the document,which they have understood before signing it. This
understanding of the phrase "execution" is also adopted by
textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68 of the
Evidence Act 1872 prescribes the requirement for proving that
a document has been executed. The proviso to s. 68 stipulates
that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove
the execution of a document if it has been registered under the
Act, provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the
person who is purported to have executed it. The "execution" of
a document does not stand admitted merely because a person
admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation
accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank
paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when
an individual is made to sign a document without fully
understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation
would unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution
to challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court,
since registration will have to be allowed once the signature has
been admitted. In giving meaning to the expression "execute"
in the provisions of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt
a purposive construction to protect, facilitate and achieve the
object of registration. [Paras 42, 43, 57, 58][771-A-B, B-C; 772B; 780-C-E]
Suraj Lamps and Industries Private Limited v. State of
Haryana & Another (2009) 7 SCC 363 : [2009] 9 SCR
1048; Bharat Indu and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Hamid
Ali Khan 1920 SCC OnLine PC 37 - referred to.
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S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act,
1908 (Kamal Law House, 2017) pgs 617-618; Sudipto
Sarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of EvidenceIn India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon,
Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016);
N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal &
Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 2021) -
referred to.
1.9 The Registration Act exists so that information about
documents can be put into the public domain, where it can be
accessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud, and
so that individuals can be aware of the status of properties. If the
interpretation conflating signing with execution is adopted, it would
ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars will continuously end
up registering documents whose validity will inevitably be then
disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit or writ
proceedings continue, the document would remain on the public
records as a registered instrument, which has the potential to
cause more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not
be adopted. However, while adopting the current interpretationthat the admission of one's signature on a document is not
equivalent to admission of its execution- it is important to consider
the power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their procedures
under the Registration Act. [Paras 60, 61][781-E-H]
1.10 The decision of the Registrar in ordering document
to be registered, or for that matter in refusing to register a
document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review.
Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their signature
on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar is
bound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a)
of the Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed
under Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of
conducting an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature under Section
74. If the Registrar passes an order refusing registration under
Section 76, the party presenting the document for registration
has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of the
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R)
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Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able to
adjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively. [Para 63,
64][784-G-H; 785-A-C]
1.11 In the instant case, where Sub-Registrar had in the
first instance declined to order the registration of the document
and the order of the Sub-Registrar was questioned in an appeal
under Section 72 filed by the second respondent. The Registrar,
in the course of the appellate proceedings, purported to hold an
enquiry of the nature contemplated under Section 74 of the
Registration Act and concluded that the execution of the sale
deed had been established and it was liable to be registered. The
Registrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrar
had declined to order registration on the ground that the
execution of the document was denied by the appellant under
Section 35(3)(a). While exercising the jurisdiction pursuant to
the invocation of the remedy under Section 72, the Registrar
relied on the statements of the scribe of the sale deed and the
attesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed had been
signed by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixed
her fingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by the
appellant, the signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation of
her fingerprints is not in dispute. The real issue is whether there
was due execution of the sale deed by the appellant. The appellant
in the course of her objections specifically pleaded fraud. The
plea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed though signed
by her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matter
which raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her
contentions, the appellant has also adduced the inspection report
by the Sub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, this court
cannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since the
Registrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on the
issue of fraud and undue influence. [Para 67][788-E-H; 789-A-B,
D-F]
Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P. (2016) 10 SCC 767 :
[2016] 12 SCR 26 - distinguished.
1.12 The Registrar purported to exercise the powers
conferred under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale
deed had been duly signed by the appellant and was therefore
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liable to be registered. However, the objections of the appellant
raised serious issues of a triable nature which could only have
been addressed before and adjudicated upon by a court of
competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during the course
of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that in
respect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the front
portion of the land, a suit for specific performance has been
instituted by the second respondent, resulting in a decree for
specific performance. As regards the subject matter of the sale
deed, the second respondent instituted a suit for possession
before the Civil Judge, where certain proceedings are pending.
In view thereof, the Registrar acted contrary to law by directing
the sale deed to be registered. [Para 68][789-F-H; 790-A-B]
1.13 In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of the
High Court observed that registration does not depend upon the
consent of the executant but on the Registrar's finding that the
executant had actually signed the document. The High Court held
that having found in the course of the enquiry that the sale deed
was duly prepared by a scribe, that the attesting witness had stated
that the sale deed was signed by the appellant and she also placed
her fingerprints in their presence, it was open to the Registrar to
direct registration in spite of a denial of its execution by the
appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High Court has,
with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with its
execution. Such an approach is completely erroneous and cannot
be upheld. The impugned judgment and order of the Single Judge
of the High Court as also the order passed by the District
Registrar is set aside. [Paras 69, 70][790-B-E]
Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad (1998) 7
SCC 602 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444; N.M.
Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka 2007 SCC
OnLine Kar 192; Banasettappa Laljichikkanna v.
District Registrar 1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132;
Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh
and Others 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227; Jogesh
Prasad Singh & Others v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh
and Others 1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31; Ebadut Ali v.
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R)
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Muhammad Fareed AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206:35 Ind. Cas.
56; Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta
Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta; Smt. Uma Devi v.
Narayan Nayak 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94; Bhutkani
Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and
Nagaland 15; Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath
Mukherji and Others 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100;
Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic 1973
SCC OnLine Del 109; Kamlabai v. Shantirai 1980 SCC
OnLine Bom 152; S. Ramamurthy v. Jayalakshmi
Ammal 1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501; Union Bank of
India v. Dhian Pati 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90; In Re
Kuttadan Velayudhan 2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14; Bank
of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries 2008 SCC OnLine
Bom 486; Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar,
Saharanpur and Anr. 2011 SCC OnLine All 2335 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2016] 12 SCR 26
distinguished
Para 11(i)
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444
referred to
Para 44
AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206
referred to
Para 48
AIR 1972 Assam and
referred to
Para 49
Nagaland 15
[2009] 9 SCR 1048
referred to
Para 58
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2929
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No. 24928 of 2012.
Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Rohit Kumar Singh, Simranjeet Singh
Rekhi, Advs. for the Appellant.
V. K. Shukla, Sr. Adv., P. H. Vashishtha, Divyansh Tiwari,
Ms. Parul Shukla, Pradeep Kumar Yadav, Vishal Thakre, Aryan P. Nanda,
Sanjeev Malhotra, Advs. for the Respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.
They are:
A
Introduction ......................................................................3*
B
Submissions of Counsel ................................................. 13*
C
Analysis.......................................................................... 18*
 C.1 Statutory Framework of the Registration Act .......... 18*
 C.2 Validity of the recourse by the Second Respondent..27*
 C.3 Meaning of "execution" .......................................... 33*
D
Conclusion ...................................................................... 61*
A Introduction
1. This appeal has arisen from a judgment dated 31 May 2018 of
a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed a petition under Article
226 filed by the appellant, seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for
quashing an order dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar/
Additional Collector (Finance and Revenue), Bareilly1, who is the first
respondent in the present appeal. During the pendency of this appeal,
the appellant has passed away and has been substituted by her legal
heir, by an order of this Court dated 9 December 2021.
2. At the heart of this dispute is a certain piece of land admeasuring
3,793 square yards, situated at 110-B, Civil Lines, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh,
which was owned by one C P Singh. During his life time, he had alienated
approximately 415 square yards of the land to four distinct persons.
After his death, the appellant, who is his spouse, together with her two
daughters, namely Nita Singh and Neelam Singh, and son, Pradeep Singh,
became joint owners of the property. A power of attorney was executed
on 17 April 2010 in favour of the appellant by her daughters and son,
which is stated to have been cancelled on 27 September 2011.
3. The appellant is alleged to have entered into two agreements
with a developer - Gujral Associates, who is the second respondent in
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R)
1 "District Registrar"
*Ed. Note: The pagination is as per the original judgment.
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the present appeal: (i) the first was allegedly a development agreement
in respect of an area admeasuring 1000 square meters in the front portion
of the land. It is important to note that the nature of this agreement is
disputed by the second respondent (who alleges that it was instead an
agreement to sell), but that dispute is not before this Court in the present
appeal; and (ii) the second was an agreement to sell for an area
admeasuring 839.4 square meters in the rear portion of the land for a
sale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores, which was executed on 22 October
2010. On the other hand, the second respondent contends that this
agreement to sell was for an area admeasuring 1839.4 square meters. It
is also important to note that the stamp duty in the amount of Rs 39,61,000
(according to counsel for the second respondent) was paid on the
agreement on the basis of the circle rate of the land, i.e., Rs 6,11,53,000.
4. Between October 2010 and 3 January 2011, the second
respondent allegedly paid the appellant a sum of Rs 93 lakhs in twelve
instalments. A cheque for the remaining sum of Rs 67 lakhs was handed
over to the appellant by the second respondent on 20 June 2011. The
appellant has stated that she did not encash this cheque upon realising
that a fraud had been committed upon her. On the same date, a sale
deed was purported to have been executed by the appellant in favour of
the second respondent based upon the agreement to sell and upon the
payment of the remaining sale consideration. The execution and
registration of this sale deed forms the bedrock of the dispute in the
present appeal.
5. On 5 December 2011, the second respondent filed an application
seeking permission to execute the sale deed. Thereafter, on 15 December
2011, they presented the sale deed for registration before the SubRegistrar-I, Bareilly. In response to a notice from the Sub-Registrar, the
appellant appeared before the Sub-Registrar on 17 February 2012 and
submitted an objection in writing, with a request not to execute the
incomplete and forged sale deed in favour of the second respondent.
The appellant stated that she was 78 years of age, "a chronic patient of
depression, heart ailment and hypertension" under medical treatment
and that her son was an alcoholic who was incapable of taking any
decision on his own. The appellant stated that the second respondent
had been harassing her into forcibly signing the sale deed in respect of
her property. The appellant further stated that the second respondent
furnished her with misleading and false information in order to ger her to
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sign the papers, all the while even forcing her to hide the transaction
from the members of her own family. Specifically in relation to the two
transactions in regards the front and rear portion of the land, the appellant
alleged as follows:
"(A) Details of 100 sq. meter agreement with m/S Gujral
Associates having a market value of not less than Rs.5 Crore
showing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,30,00,000/- on
22.10.2010 forming part of 110-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulating
to have paid a sum of Rs.18,00,000/- to me including a sum of
Rs.90,00,000/- in cash and a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- through cheque
No.111681 dated 03.06.2009 Bank of Baroda, which in fact was
never paid to me and the cheque referred to above stands credited
in someone else account and not in my account. According to me
and the Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as the
intention of the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures.
(B) Details of 1839.48 Sq. meter agreement with M/s Gujral
Associates having a market value of not less than Rs.7 Crore
showing a meagre sale consideration of Rs.1,60,00,000/- on
22.10.2010 forming part of 11-B Civil Lines, Bareilly, stipulating
to have paid a sum of Rs.83,00,000/- including a sum of
Rs.8,00,000/- shown to have been paid in cash, which in fact has
never been paid to me (Mrs. Veena Singh). According to me and
the Law the agreement becomes NULL and VOID as the intention
of the party is to do a fraud by illegal measures."
The appellant further stated:
"That the time within which sale deed was allegedly agreed to be
executed was period of eight months which too has expired on
22.06.2011 and to avoid legal consequences they obtained
signature on INCOMPLETE SALE DEED dt. 20.06.2011 from
me under misleading and false information when they were
pressurizing me to quickly sign the papers before the registry office
closes and didn't give a chance to read the papers before signing,
my granddaughter entered the room and enquired about the doing.
She asked if the papers had been read by one to which I replied
NO. So she asked a photo copy of the documents so that our
Lawyer could go through them. It was at that moment that this
fact came to light that whatever was undergoing was wrong and
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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misleading, M/ s Gujral Associates people and his lawyer Mr. Anil
Ku. Agarwal was shocked when my granddaughter asked for a
photo copy as she was scared to see me surrounded by 5 people
in my Room and then when we realized that they manipulated the
land area and they were taking my manipulated the land area and
they were taking my HOUSE also illegally, so I am against this
SALE deed as they have done a fraud."
The appellant further claimed that:
(i)
The boundaries which were set out in the deed for 1839.48
square meters were erroneous and did not clearly reflect
what was to be sold. Further, the second respondent had
manipulated the actual land area by also including within it
the appellant's house, where she was residing for over five
decades, though it was not her intention to alienate it;
(ii)
The sale deed itself was incomplete, but the second
respondent forcibly made her sign it on the pretext of a rush
to file the sale deed within time for registration; and
(iii)
The second respondent himself was aware that there was
no partition between the co-sharers of the land, yet went
ahead with the sale deed.
Hence, based on her above contentions, the appellant requested
the Sub-Registrar to take action for the forgery which had been committed
by the second respondent and prevent the second respondent from getting
the incomplete sale deed registered for an area admeasuring 1839.48
square meters.
6. By an order dated 17 February 2012, the Sub-Registrar declined
to register the sale deed after recording the following statement of the
appellant:
"I was alone, my signature was forcibly taken on this sale deed, I
do not remain well, and I take Alprex also, I am diabetic also, I
r4emain under Hypertension also. Many persons who were 4-5
in number by reaching there, got my signature forcibly. Other
paper was read to me, and signature was taken on other paper. I
live alone. They trouble me from day to today. The land not so in
quantity which they have written. As per them, they try to occupy
that house also which is mine. I do not want to execute this sale
deed. I be let live comfortably."
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Relying upon her statement, the Sub-Registrar held as follows:
"On the basis of the aforesaid statement as Smt. Beena is not
ready to register the aforesaid sale deed which she tells to be
executed fraudulently and cheatingly. Therefore, the registration
of the sale deed is denied under Section 35(3)A of the Indian
Registration Act and under Rule 249 of the Registration Manual,
Part -2."
7. The Sub-Registrar having refused to order the registration of
the sale deed, the second respondent instituted an appeal2 under Section
72 of the Registration Act 19083 on 2 March 2012. The appellant objected
to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 72, besides supporting
the order of the Sub-Registrar on the ground that the sale deed in dispute
had not been executed by her.
8. By an order dated 31 March 2012, the District Registrar, while
entertaining the appeal, proceeded to follow the procedure prescribed
by Section 74 of the Registration Act to determine whether the sale
deed had been executed by the appellant. The District Registrar
subsequently held that the appellant had admitted her signature on the
document and that the second respondent was entitled to get the sale
deed registered. In arriving at the conclusion, the District Registrar relied
on the statements made on solemn affirmation by the scribe of the sale
deed and by the witnesses to the sale deed, to the effect that the document
had been executed by the appellant in their presence without any pressure.
The District Registrar also noted that prior to the sale deed, an agreement
to sell had been registered on 22 October 2010 in terms of which the
appellant received an amount of Rs 93 lakhs by cash and cheque, as
token money towards the sale consideration of Rs 1.6 crores. The receipt
of the consideration by cheque in pursuance of the agreement to sell
was stated to not be in dispute. Further, the District Registrar noted that
during the period of about one year and two months, between the
registration of the agreement to sell and the presentation of the sale
deed on 15 December 2011, the appellant had not lodged any complaint
alleging fraud. The District Registrar also observed that the signatures
and thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant on the agreement to
sell and sale deed had been examined by a handwriting expert, and were
found to be identical. Based on these findings, the District Registrar set
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
2 Appeal No 01 of 2012
3 "Registration Act"
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aside the Sub-Registrar's decision and ordered the registration of the
sale deed presented on 15 December 2011. Consequently, the sale deed
was registered on 16 April 2012.
9. Crucially, the appellant has adverted to certain developments
which took place after the order of the District Registrar. According to
the appellant, the Assistant Inspector General, Registration, Bareilly
ordered a spot inspection by the Sub-Registrar of the land covered by
the sale deed. In his report dated 30 April 2012, the Sub-Registrar
concluded that the actual area covered by the deed was 1341.73 square
meters, out of which 740.73 square meters was the area of the appellant's
house. Further, the Sub-Registrar noted that while the northern and
western boundaries were present as according to the sale deed, the
southern and eastern boundaries at the spot did not match with the
boundaries mentioned in the sale deed. Later, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Sub-Registrar, a further spot verification was
also carried out by the Naib Tahsildar. In a report dated 26 May 2012,
the Naib Tahsildar stated that the boundaries mentioned in the sale deed
were completely incorrect. Further, it was stated that the actual area on
the spot was 849.12 square meters, as opposed to the area of 1839.48
square meters shown in the sale deed. The report noted that if the area
of 1839.48 square meters was taken as the area of the sale deed, it
would partly cover the residential house of the appellant, garden area
situated in front of the house and three properties which had been
previously sold by the deceased husband of the appellant. Therefore,
the Naib Tahsildar concluded that the registered sale deed was completely
incorrect.
10. At this stage, it would also be material to note that a first
information report4 was filed by the appellant on 4 May 2012 at PS
Kotwali, Sub-District Sadar, Bareilly against the proprietors of the second
respondent for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. Subsequently, a final report was
filed in the FIR by the Investigating Officer. A protest petition filed by
the appellant against the final report has since been dismissed by the
Magistrate by an order dated 20 September 20135, against which the
appellant's revision remains pending.
4 FIR No 192 of 2012; Case Crime No 1118 of 2012
5 Misc Case No 225 of 2013
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11. Along with these developments, the appellant challenged the
order dated 31 March 2012 of the District Registrar before the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In adjudicating the appellant's writ petition by the impugned
judgment dated 31 May 2018, a Single Judge of the High Court framed
the following questions for consideration:
"38. The question to be considered by this Court in facts and
circumstances of this case and in the light of arguments made by
the counsel for the parties can be summarized thus: Whether the
Writ Petition was maintainable in the form and manner it had
been filed? What is the scope of power exercised by the Deputy
Registrar under section 35(3)(a) of the Act? Whether the denial
of execution of Sale Deed by the petitioner was correctly
interpreted by the Deputy Registrar to exercise power under
Section 35(3)(a) and refuse registration? Whether the District
Registrar could have considered, the appeal filed by Respondent
No. 2 as a representation and exercise power as an original
Authority and not as an Appellate Authority? Whether Sale Deed
which was Registered on 16.04.2012 before this Court passed its
interim order can be set aside by this Court by holding that it was
wrongly registered?"
The Single Judge then observed:
(i)
In terms of this Court's judgment in Satya Pal Anand v.
State of M.P.6, the Sub-Registrar under Sections 34 and
35 of the Registration Act has no quasi-judicial power to
conduct an enquiry regarding the validity of the title or
legality of the transaction in a sale deed, but only has to
ascertain whether the provisions of the Registration Act
have been complied with. Questions regarding the validity
of the title or legality of the transaction can only be decided
by a competent civil court; and
(ii)
The Sub-Registrar, in the present case, had denied the
registration of the sale deed under Section 35(3)(a) of the
Registration Act since the appellant had, while admitting
that she had placed her thumb impressions/fingerprints and
signatures on the sale deed, objected to the registration on
VEENA SINGH (DEAD) THR. LR v. THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR/ADDL.
COLLECTOR (F/R) [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
6 (2016) 10 SCC 767 ("Satya Pal Anand")
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the ground that her signatures had been taken in a fraudulent
manner by representing to her that she was selling only 839
square meters of land whereas the area shown in the sale
deed was 1839 square meters. However, it was held that
the Sub-Registrar under Section 35 did not have the power
to conduct an inquiry regarding the execution of the sale
deed, and could have only recorded the denial of execution
by the appellant. On the other hand, it was noted that a
wider power is entrusted to the Registrar under Section
74(a) of the Registration Act to determine whether the
document has been executed. On these premises, the Single
Judge held:
"55...The registration does not depend upon the consent
of the executant, but on the Registrar finding that the
executant had actually signed the document concerned,
but now was requesting that it may not be registered for
reasons other than its execution. The registrar is required
under Section 74 to conduct an inquiry. If the Registrar
finds that the document was duly prepared by the Scribe/
Deed Writer and the attesting witnesses to such
document also deposed that the document was signed
and the thumb and finger print impressions were made
thereon by the vendor in their presence, and on inquiry
from the vendor it comes out that indeed such facts were
correct, the Registrar can direct registration of a
document in spite of denial of execution before him by
the person aggrieved if such registration of such a
document is compulsory under the Act."
12. The Single Judge also observed that the writ petition had been
instituted after the registration of the FIR by the appellant, prior to which
the order of the District Registrar dated 31 March 2012 had already
been complied with by the registration of the sale deed on 16 April 2012.
The Single Judge noted that initially, the appellant had pleaded before
the High Court that her signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints
had not been placed on the sale deed, but had been forged by the second
respondent. However, the Single Judge noted that this was an
improvement from the appellant's story as detailed in the FIR dated 4
May 2012, where it was stated that the appellant willingly put her
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signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints on the sale deed and only
later did her granddaughter realise the incorrect figure of the area in the
sale deed. In any case, the High Court observed that whether the
signatures and thumb impressions/fingerprints of the appellant had been
forged by the second respondent raised a disputed question of fact which
could only be resolved on the basis of evidence before a competent civil
court. Holding that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction
could not render a finding either way, the writ petition was dismissed by
the Single Judge while leaving it open to the appellant to move the civil
court for a declaration that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud and
was a nullity.
B Submissions of Counsel
13. We have heard Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr V K Shukla, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent.
14. Mr Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel submitted that:
(i) An appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act lies to the
Registrar against an order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to
admit a document to registration except where the refusal is
made on the ground of denial of execution. In the present
case, the execution of the sale deed had been denied by the
appellant and the Sub-Registrar refused registration on that
ground under Section 35(3)(a).