# Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 678
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-06-23
- **Case number:** Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/veerappa-pillai-v-raman-raman-ltd-1-1362
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

fg57
V. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1
Ltd.
"
Tht Re-gionttl
Transport
Au.tlwritJ
Coimbatore
VuJoatarama
Ayy11r].·
February 1 g,
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(i957]
way of appeal against it, and that had not been done.
We are of opinion that the decision in
Veerappa Pillai
v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1
) is of no assistance
to the
appellant.
In the result, we affitm the decision of the High
Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June
23, 1955, is a continuation
of the permit granted
on
December 3, 1952,
and
must fall to the ground when
that stood finally set aside
by the

## Text

_Characters 0–38,530 of 40,151. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=38530 for what follows._

fg57
V. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1
Ltd.
"
Tht Re-gionttl
Transport
Au.tlwritJ
Coimbatore
VuJoatarama
Ayy11r].·
February 1 g,
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(i957]
way of appeal against it, and that had not been done.
We are of opinion that the decision in
Veerappa Pillai
v. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1
) is of no assistance
to the
appellant.
In the result, we affitm the decision of the High
Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June
23, 1955, is a continuation
of the permit granted
on
December 3, 1952,
and
must fall to the ground when
that stood finally set aside
by the
judgment
of the
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March
21, 1956, and on the ground
that it was an implied
condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to
the decision of the
High
Court in that appeal, and that
in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be
effective.
These appeals fail, and are
dismissed
with costs in
Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.
Apf!eals dismissed ..
ASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA
"·
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(BHAGWATI,
]AGANNADHAOAS,
JAFER
IMAM,
GOVINDA
MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
Crirninal trial-Enactment providinK for speedy trial-Specified
offences made tn'able only by Special fudges empotvcred td atvard
heavier sentences-If violates equality' befo1'e the larv-Pendency ofC.'iminal !.Aw Amendment Act, (XLVI of
1952)-Constitution of
India, Art. 14.
The appeilant
and four others
were being tried before the
Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with
116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the
Indian Penal
Code.
During the pendency of the trial
the Criminal
Law
Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament
and came into force on July 28, 1952. The Act provided for ,the
trial of all offences punishable unc!er ss. 161, 165 or 165-A, of the
Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s. 5, of the
Prevention
of
Corruption Act, 1947 exclusively by Special Judges and directed
the transfer of all such trials pending on the date of the coming
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT lU:PORTS
679
into force of the Act to. Special Judges.
The Presidency Magistrate
continued the trial and acquitted the appellant.
Upon appeal by
the State
Government, the High Court held that from the date of
the commencement of the Act the Presidency Magistrate lost all
jurisdiction to continμe the trial and . ordered a retrial
by the
Special. Judge.
It was contended that the
Act was void as it
violated Art. 14 ~f the C:onstitution :\_nd consequently could not
affect the jurisdicuon of the Presidency
Magistrate to continue
the trial.
Held, that the Act did not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The Legislature classified the offences punishable under ss. 161,
165 or 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-s. 2 of s. 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption ·Act, 1947 in one group or category. They
were offences relating to bribery or corruption by public servants
and were appropriately classified in, one group of category.
The
classification was
founded on an intelligible differentia
which
distinguished the offenders thus grouped together from those left
out of the group. This intelligible differentia had rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, the object being
to provide for speedier trials of the said offences.
Bribery and
corruption having been rampant
~nd the need for weeding them
out having
been
urgently felt, it was necessary to enact thr
measure for the purpose of eliminating all possible delay in bringing the offenders to book.
The State of Bombay v. F.
N. Balsara, (1951)
S.C.R. 682,
Budhan Chowdhry and othe1·s _v. The State of Bihar, ( 1955) S.C.R.
1945 an<l ~edar Nath Baioria '" The State of West Bengal, (1954)
S.C.R. 30, applied.
There is no doubt that the case of the appellant · was not
concluded and
was pending before the Presidency Magistrate on
July 28, 1952, the date of the commencement of the
Act.
The
fact that .the Special Judge was not appointed until September 26,
1952, on which date the arguments for the prosecution and the
defence were concluded did not affect the position.
Even if it be
assumed that the
Act did not effectively commence until the
Special Judge was appointed
by the
notification of September 26,
1952, which came into effect immediately after the midnight of
September 25, 1952, the trial of the appellant could not be said to
have concluded before that,
for a trial is not complete
until
either
the sentence
has been passed or the
accused has
been
ordered to be discharged.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
}URISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 149 of 1954.
Appeal by special
leave from
the judgment and
order dated
October 20, 1953, of the
Bombay
High
Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1953.
1957
As1uali N u.orali
SintaJlorawalla
.v.
Till Stat• of
Bomb41
1957
Ngar4Ji N ar.arali
Sintapotawalla
v.
T/,, Slateof
Bombtg
Bha,(toati J.
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
S. A. Desai and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent.
.
1957. February 19.
The
Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave under
Art. 136 of the
Constitution is directed
against a
judgment of the
High
Court of Judicature at Bombay
setting aside
the acquittal of the
appellant
by the
Court
of
the
Presidency
M'lgistrate,
19,
Court,
Bombay and ordering his re-trid by the
Court of the
Special
Judge, Greater Bombay in accordance with the
provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952
(Act XL VI of 1952).
The appellant was accused No. 3 in the Court of the
learned
Presidency
Magistrate.
Accused
No. 1 was
the Mehta in the employ of a firm
called
Messrs.
M. M. Baxabhoy & Co., accused No. 2 was the manager of the said firm.
The appellant, and accused Nos.
4 and 5 were
Receivers of the
firm
in litigation in
regard to it.
They were
all charged
with offences
under s. 161 read with s. 116 and further
read either
with s. 109 or s. 114 of the
Indian
Penal COde
for
offering to one Jibhai
Chhotalal Barot, a sub-inspector
of police attached to the
Anti-Corruption Branch of
the C. I. D. the sum of Rs. 1,25,000 as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as
a motive
or
reward for his showing favour to the accused
and to
the firm M/s. M. M. Baxabhoy
& Co., in the exercise
of his official
functions.
The offence
was alleged to
have been committed on July 28, 1950, and the accused were charge-sheeted
on
June 16, 1951 ; the
trial
commenced on July 14, 1951 and charges were framed
on
September 27, 1951.
40 witnesses
were examined
and 226 documents were exhibited in the course of the
trial, and the prosecution closed its case on July 15,
1952.
During the course of the trial the Criminal Law
Amendment
Act, 1952 (XL VI
of 1952)
hereinafter
called the impugned Act was enacted by Parliament
-
S. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
on July 28, 1952, being an
Act further to amend the
Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy tri1l of
certain offences, viz., offences punishable
under s. 161,
s. 165 or s. 165A of the
Indian Penal Code or s:Jb-s. 2
of s. 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act
II of 1947) and any conspiracy
to
commit
or any
attempt to commit or any abetment
of
any
of the
offences specified
above.
The
learned
Presidency
Magistrate proceeded with the
trial
and
after
the
examination of the appellant under s. 342 of the Code
of Criminal
Procedure, the appellant filed his written
statement
on
August
14,
1952.
The
addresses
commenced thereafter.
The
prosecution
commenced
its address on
August 26, 1952, ending it on September
5, 1952. The
defence thertafter addressed the learned
Magistrate.
In the meantime on
September 23, 1952,
the
Gorernment of
Bombay by a notification appointed
a Special Judge to try offences
specified
above and
this appointment was notifie,d in the
Official Gazette
on
September 26, 1952.
The defence
concluded its
address on September 26, 1952 and the learned
Presidency Magistrate delivered his judgment on September
29, 1952, whereby he convicted the
Accused
Nos. 1
and 2 of the offences with which they
were charged
and sentenced
them each to nine
months
rigorous
imprisonment
and a fine of
Rs. 1,000 in default 6
months' rigorous
imprisonment.
He
however acquitted the appellant and the accused Nos. 4 and 5 of these
offences.
The accused No. 2 carried an appeal
before
the
High
Court of
Bombay being
Criminal Appeal No.
1304 of 1952.
The
State of
Bombay also thereupon
filed an appea~ against the acquittal of the appellant
and accused Nos. 4 and 5 being Criminal Appeal No.
349 of 1953.
In the memorandum of appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1953 a point
was taken
that
the leanml
Presidency
Magistrate had 110 jurisdiction
to continue the trial
and acquit
the
appellant
and
accused Nos. 4 and 5 as the same was ousted by the
impugned Act. It was contended that since the date
the said
Act came into force
the
Special Judge alone
1957
Asgarali
Na~ara/i
Sing.1pvrowa//a
\'
The siate of
Bombay
Bhagwati ].
1957
itJ1arali Nr.z.arali
Singaporawillla
v.
The Sttde of
Bomba..1
B~agwali J.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957J
had jurisdiction to
try the
accused
for the offence
under s. 161 read
with s.
116 of the
Indian
Penal
Code, that the duty of the learned
Presidency
Magistrate was to transfer this case
to the
Court of the
Special Judge for Greater
Bombay, spec;aJly appointed
to try such offences by the impug~1"<l Act and that the
order of acquittal of the appe!'ant
and accused Nos.
4 and 5 was therefore erroneous in law bting without
jurisdiction.
Both these Criminal Appeals came up for hearing
before a Bench of the
Bombay High Court consisting
of BavaJckar & Vyas TJ.
These appeals
were heard
only on the preliminary point as to the 1urisdiction of
the learned
Presidency
Magistrate
to try and decide
the case.
In reply to the paint as to jurisdiction which
had been taken by -the State of
Bombay, the appellant
and the accused Nos. 4 and 5 urged that the provisions of the
impugned
Act
were
violative
of the
principle of equal protection of laws contained in Art.
14 of the
Constitution
and therefore the
impugned
Act was ultra vires the
Constitution.
If that was so,
it was contended,
the learned
Presidency
Magistrate
had jurisdiction to continue the trial in spite of the
commencement of the impugned
Act and the order of
acquittal of the appellant and
accused
Nos. 4 and 5
recorded by him was correct.
The learned judges of the
High Court rejected this
contention of the appellant and held that the impugned
Act was intra vires and that
the fearned
Presidency
Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case after the
commencement of the
impugned Act.
The learned
Magistrate's order convicting the accused No. 2 and
acquitting the appellant and the accmed Nos. 4 and 5
complained of by the State of Bombay was accordingly
set aside.
Thi:
High Court ordered a re-trial
of the
appellant and the other accused by the
Court of the
Special
Judge, Greater Bombay, and remanded the case
for disposal according to law.
The appellant applied to the
High Court for a
certificate under
Art. 134 (I) ( c) of the
Constitution
which was however refused.
The appellant
tb.ereafter
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
applied for and obtained from this Court special leave
to appeal against the
judgment and
or<ler passed by
the
J:-!.igh Court. This is how the appeal has come up
for hearing and final disposal before_ us.
It will be convenient at this stage to set out
the
relevant provisions of the impugned Act.
As already
noted the preamble to the
Act stated that it was an
Act further to amend the
Indian Penal Code and the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
and
to provide for
a more speedy trial of certain offences.
Section
5 of
the
Act inserted sub-s. (2-B) in s. 337 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898
and provided that in every
case where the
offence is punishable
under s. 161 or
s. 165 or s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-s. (2)
of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . then notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-s. (2-A), the Magistrate shall,
without making any further enquiry, send the case for
trial to the Court of the Special Judge appointed under
the impugned Act.
This amendment was to remain
in force for a period of two years from the commencement of the
impugned
Act, but
was
subsequently
incorporated in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898,
as s. 337 (2-B) by s. 59 (b) of the
Code of Criminal
Procedure
Amendment Act, 1955 (Act XXVI of 1955).
Section 6 of the
Act provided for the appointment of
Special Judges and empowered the State Governments
by notific:ition in the Official
Gazette to appoint as
many
Special
Judges as may be necessary for such
area or ;_lfeas as may be specified
in the notification to
try the following offences, namely :
(a) an offence punishable
under s. 161, s. 165 or
s. 165-A of the
Indian Penal Code or sub-s. (2) of s. 5
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ; and
(b) any conspir.acy
to commit or any attempt to
commit or any abetment
of the offeaces specified m
cl. (a) above.
Section 6 (2) laid down the qualifications . for the
appointment of a Special
Judge and provided that a
person shall not be qualified
for
appointment as a
Special Judge under this Act unless he was or had been
1957
As1ara/i
Na~ara/i
Singaporau,al/a
v.
Th' Stal< of
Bombay •
Blin:wati J.
1957
Aslatali N azarali
Singaporawalla
v.
Th• Stau ef
Bomba)
Bhagwati ].
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an
Assistant
Sessions
J uJge under the
Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898.
Section 7 of the
Act is important and
provided that
notwithstanding
anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or any other law
the offences specified in sub-s. ( l) of s. 6 shall be triable
by special judges only.
Section 7(2) further provided
that when trying any case, a Special
Judge may also
try any offence other than an offence specified in s. 6
with
which the accused may,
under
the
Code
of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 be charged at the same trial.
The procedure and powers of special judges were laid
down in s. 6 of the
Act.
A
Special
Judge
was
empowered to take cognizance of offences without the
accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying
the accused persons,
he was to follow the procedure
prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for
the trial of
warrant cases by
magistrates.
A Special
Judge was also empowered to tender a pardon to any
person suppQsed
to hal'e been directly or indirectly
concerned in, or privy to, an offence on condition of
his making a iull and true
disclosure of
the whole
circumstances within his knowledge
relating
to the
offence and to every other person concerned,
whether
as a principal or abetter,
in the
commission
thereof.
Save as above the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1898 were so far as they
were not
inconsistent
with the
Act made applicable to the proceedings before
a
Special
Judge ; and
for the
purposes of the said
provisions, the
Court of the Special Judge was deemed
to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury or
without
the
aid
of
assessors.
A
Special Judge was
empowered to pass upon any person convicted by him
any sentence authorised by Jaw for the punishment of
the
offences of which such person was
convicted.
Section 9 qf the , Act provided for appeal and revision
and the High Court was to exercise as far as applicable
all the powers conferred
by
Chapters
XXXI
and
XXXII of the Code of Crimihal Procedure, 1898 on the
High Court, as if the Court of the Special Judge were
a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury within
the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
Section
10 is also important
and
provided for
the
transfer of certain cases pending before magistrates.
It
was laid down that all cases triable by a Special Judge
under s. 7, which immediately
beiore
the commencement of the
Act, were pending before
any Magistrate
shall, on such commencement, be forwarded
for trial
to the
Special
Judge
having jurisdiction over such
cases.
It is clear from the provisions of the impugned Act
set out hereinabove that the intention of the legislature
in enacting the same was to amend the
Indian Penal
Code and the Code ~f Crimjnal Procedure, 1898 with a
view to provide for a more speedy trial of
offences
punishable under ss.
161, 165 or 165-A, of the Indian
Penal
Code or sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of the
Prevention
of
Corruption
Act, 1947.
Special
Judges of the status
of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or
an Assistant
Sessions
Judge were to be appointed for
the purpose of trying these offences and these offences
were made triable only
by these Special ·Judges.
Not
only were the special judges invested with the exclusive
jurisdiction to try these offences
but
they
were also
empowered while
trying
any
case
involving these
offences to try any offence other than those
offences
with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 be charged at the same trial. Committal
proceedings were also done away
with and the special
Judges were empowered to t;ike cognizance
of these
offences without the accused being committed to them
for trial and were empowered to try the accused persons
~f the same by following the procedure prescribed by
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of
warrant cases by magistrates.
The courts of the Special
Judges were deemed to
be courts of
Sessions
trying
cases without a• jury or without the
aid
of assessors
and were also empowered to pass upon
the
persons
convicted by them of any offence any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of such offences.
The
powers of appeal and revision vested in the Hig_h Court
were to be exercised as if the courts of Special Judges
were the courts of sessions trying cases without a jury
or without the aid of assessors
within the local limits
1957
Asgara/i N a:r.arali
Sin1aporawal/a
v.
T lu State of
Bombay
Bhagwati J.
1957
.1hgarali Nat.arali
Singaparawalla
v.
Tht State of
Bombay
Bhagwati J.
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
of the jurisdiction of the
High Court.
The procedure
for trial before the
Special
Judges was thus assimilated
to that obtaining in the case of trial of the accused by
the courts of sessions.
Having thus provided for the trial by Special Judges
of these offences which would be triable by them after
the commencement
of
the imimgned
Act, the Act
further provided for a transfer of cases falling
within
that category
but pending
before the magistrates.
It
may be noted that the other provisions of the
Act were
prospective in operation and could not affect pending
cases as such.
Provision had tl.i.erefore to
be made for
divesting the
magistrates
who
hacl
already
taken
cognizance of these cases, of jurisdiction to try the same
any further and for the transfer of such pending cases
to the special judges
who were appointed under the
Act.
The cases which were pending before the courts
of sessions did not require to he so transferred because
they would be tried by the procedure
obtaining in the
courts of sessions and nothing
further
required to be
done.
The cases which
were
pending
before
the
Magistrates however required to be transferred
to the
Special
Judges
because
otherwise
the
Magistrates
would continue to try
the same
and
would have to
commit them to the courts of sessions, they them.selves
being unable to mete
out the
enhanced
punishment
which could be meted out to the accused on conviction.
The Committal proceedings were sought to be eliminated
by the
impugned
Act and the
Special
Judges
were
empowered to try these cases as if they were courts of
sessions trying cases without a jury or without the aid
of assessors.
It was
therefore
provi<krl
that
cases
falling under this category which were pending before
the magistrates should on the commencement
of the
impugned Act be forwarded
for
trial to the special
judges
having
.iurisJiction
over
such
cases.
This
provision was
made -when these cases triable
by the
Special
Judges under s. 7 of the
Act were pending
before the magistrates
and the magistrates trying the
same were ipso facto divested of the jurisdiction to try
the same any further,
the
Special
Judges
appointed
under the
Act having been invested
with exclusive
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
jurisdiction to try the same after the
commencement
of the Act.
If this was the position under the impugned Act it
followed without anything more that
the instant case
which was
pending before
the
learned
Presidency
Magistrate on July 28, 1952, which was the date of the
commencement of the
Act,
could
not proceed
any
further before him. By
the operation
of s. 7 of the
impugned
Act, the learned Presidency
Magistrates was
divested of jurisdiction to try it and whatever proceedings were continued before
him after July. 28, 1952,
were without jurisdiction and void.
The
examination
of the appellant under s. 342 of the
Code of
Criminal
Procedure and
the
further proceedings
by way of
filing of the written
statement
and
the ' arguments
addressed by the
prosecution as well as the
defence
were all without jurisdiction and so were the orders of
conviction of the a~cused Nos. 1 and 2 and the acquittal
of the appellant and the accused Nos. 4 and 5.
It was however contended by the
learned counsel
for the appellant before us that the
provisions of the
impugned
Act were violative of the fundamental right
enshrined in
Art. 14 of th~
Constitution
and
were
therefore ultra vires.
The respondents
on the other
hand urged that there was no classification at all and
even if there was
one,
it was based
on intelligible
differentia and had a rational
relation to the
object
sought to be achieved.
The provisions of the impugned
Act in substance
amended the
Indian
Penal
Code and the
Code of
Criminal
Procedure, 1898 pro tanto making the specified offences triable by special judges
and all persons
who committed these offences
became punishable
by
higher sentences and were subjected to procedure
for
trial of warrant cases, the courts of the special judges
being deemed to be courts of sessions trying cases without a jury or
without
the aid of assessors.
It can
therefore be legitimately llrged that there was no classification at all, the provisions thus enacted being equally
applicable to all citizens alike
without any discrimination whatever.
1957
Asgarali N a~arali
Singaporawalla
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwali J.
1957
Asgarali Na~arali
Singaporawalla
v.
Tiu Stale of
Bombay
Ehagwoli J.
688
SUPREME COURT REPQRTS
[1957]
The matter was however argued before the
High
Court and also before us on the basis that the offenders
who committed these specified offences formed a group
or category by themselves and were classified as distinct
from the offenders who committed
the
other offences
under the
Indian Penal
Code. Vv e do
not want to
express
any
opm10n
as to
whether
there is any
classification discernible within the
provisions
of the
impugned Act, but will proceed to deal with this aspect
of the question on the assumption that there was such
a classification intended to be made by the
Legislature
while en.acting the impugned Act.
The principles underlying Art. 14 of the Constitution
have been
completely
thrashed
out
in the
several
decisions of this Court ere this.
The earliest pronouncement of this Court on the meaning and scope of Art. 14
was made in the case of
Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhury v.
The Union of India(').
The principles enunciated
111
that case were summarized by Faz! Ali J. as follows m
The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara('):
"(1) The presumption is always in favour of the
constitutionality
of
an enactment,
since it must
be
assumed that the legislature understinds and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people, that its law
are. directed to problems made manifest by experience
and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.
(2) The presumption may
be rebutted
in certain
cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there
is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to
any individual or class and not applicable to any other
individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.
(3) The principle of equality does not mean that
every law must
have
universal
application
for all
persons who are not by
nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of
different classes
of
persons
often
require
separate
treatment.
(4) The principle
doe.< not take away from the
State the power of classifying persons for legitimate
purposes.
(1) [1g50] S.C.R. p. 869.
(2) [t951] S.C.R. 680, at p. 7o8.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
(5) Every classification 1s m some degree likely to
produce
some inequality,
and
mere production
of
inequalit}C is not enough.
(6) If a law deals equally with members of a welldefined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to
the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground
that it has no application to other persons.
(7) While reasonable
classification
is permissible,
such classification must be based upon some real and
substantial distinction bearing
a
reasonable
and
just
relation to the object sought to be
attained, and the
classification cannot be
made arbitrarily
and without
any substantial basis."
The latest pronouncement on this topic is to be found
in the judgment of this
Court in the case of Budhan
Chaudhry and Others v. The State of Bihar(1) where it
was observed as follows :
"The provisions of Art. 14 of the
Constitution
have come
up for discussion before this
Court in a
number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v.
The Union of India (supra), The State of Bombay v. F. N.
Balsara (supra), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
SarkarC'),
Kathi Raning
Rawat v.
The
State
of
Saurashtra( 3), Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State
of Bombay ( ~), Syed Qasirn Razvi v. The State of H yderabad ( 5) and Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad(6 ).
It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy
discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the
article in question.
It is now well-established that
while article 14 forbids
class
legislation, it does
not
forbid reasonable
classification
.for the
purposes of
legislation.
In order,
however, to pass the test of
permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things that are grouped together
from
others left
out of the group and (ii) that clifferentia
must have. a
rational relation to the ohject sought
to
be achieved
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at p· 10+8.
(2) [,1952] S.C.R. 284.
(3) [1952) S.C.R. 435.
7-79 S. C, India/59
Ci) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
(Sl [1953] S.C.R. 589.
(6) [1953] S.C.R. 661.
1957
Asgarali N a~arali
Singaporawal/o
v.
The State of
Bomba7
Bhagwati].
1957
.AJ1arati Na:arali
Singaporawalla
v.
Th~ Stat1 of
&mba:J
BhazawaJi ].
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
by the statute in question.
The classification
may be
founded on a different base, namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like.
What
is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the
basis of classification and the object of the
Act under
consideration.
It
is
also well-established
by
the
decisions of this
Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also
by
a law of procedure".
We have to scrutinize the provisions of the impugned
Act in the light of the principles enunciated above.
The first
question
which we have to address to
ourselves is whether there is in the impugned
Act a
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. •
It we look to the provisions of the impugned
Act
closely it would appear that the
legislature
classified
the offences punishable under ss. 161, 165 or 165-A of
the Indian Penal Code or sub-s. 2 of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in one group or category.
They were offences relating to bribery or corruption by
public servants and
were thus appropriately classified
in one
group or category.
The
classification
was
founded on
an intelligible differentia
which
distinguished the offenders thus grouped together from those
left out of the
group.
The persons
who
committed
these offences of bribery or corruption
would form a
class by themselves quite distinct from those offen11ers
who could
be dealt with by the
normal
provisions
contained in the
Indian Penal
Code or the
Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 and if the offenders falling
within this group or category
were thus singled out
for special treatme,n.t, there would be no question
of
any discriminatory treatment being meted out to them
as compared
with other offenders who did not fall
within the same group or category and who continued
to be treated under the normal procedure.
The next
question to
consider
is
whether this
differentia had a rational relation to the object sought
to be ac;hieved
by the impugned Act. The preamble of
the
Act showed that it was enacted for providing a
more speedy trial of certain offences.
An argument
was however addressed before
us based
on certain
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
observations of Mahajan J. (as he then
was) at page
314, and
Mukherjea J. (as he then was) at p. 328 in
Anwar Ali Sarkar's Case( 1 )
quoted at page 43 by
Patanjali Sastri C.J. in the case of Kedar Nath Baioria
v. The State of West Bengal ( 2 )
that the speedier trial
of offences could not afford a reasonable basis for such
classification.
Standing by
themselves
these
passages
might lend support to the contention urged
before us
by the learned counsel for the appellant.
It must be
noted, howevei;, that
this ratio was not held
to be
conclusive by this Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria's Case( 1 )
where this Court held :
" ( 1) That when a law like the present one is
impugned on the ground that it contravenes art. 14 of
the Constitution the real issue to be decided is whether,
having regard to the underlying purpose and policy of
tl1e
Act as disclosed by its title, preamble
and provisions, the classification of the offences for the trial of
which the Special Court is set up and a special procedure
is bid down can be said
to be unreasonable or arbitrary
and therefore violative of the equal protection clause ;
(2) having regard to the fact
that the
types of
offences specified in the
Schedule to the
Act were very
common and widely prevalent during
the
post
war
period and has to be checked effectively and speedily
tried, the legislation in que;tion
must be regarded as
having been based on a perfo:tly intelligent
principle
vf classification, having a clear and reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achic1·ed, and it did not in
any way contravene art. 14 of tbe Constitution."
In the instant case,
bribery :ind corruptio1t having
been rJmpant and th<'
need for weeding
them out
having ·been
urgently fdt, it was necessary
to enact
measures
for
tbe pu rpo'e of elimimting all possible
deby in bringing the offenders to book.
It was with
that tnd i11
\ iew that
provisions were enacted
in the
impugned Act for speedier trial of the said offences by
the appointment of special judges
who were invested
1\·ith exclusive jurisdiction to try the same and were
also empowered to take cognizance thereof without the
(1) [1952] S.C.R, 284,
(2) (195i] S.C,R. 30.
flg
1957
Astarali N azarali
Singaporawal!a
v,
TM State of
Bombay
BhagwatiJ.
1957
Asgarali NtJJ:atali
Sinzaporawalla
v.
TllL Slate of
Boml>tJ.1
8hapali J.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957)
accused being committed to them for trial, and follow
the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases
by magistrates.
The proceedings
before the
Special
Judges were thus assimilated to those before the courts
of sessions for trying cases without a jury or without
the aid of assessors and the powers of
appeal
and
revision invested in the
High Court were also similarly
circumscribed.
All these provisions
had the necessary
effect of bringing about a speedier trial of these offences
and it cannot be denied that this intelligible differentia _
had rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the
impugned Act.
Both these
conditions
were
thus fulfilled and it could
not be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act were in any manner violative
of art. 14 of the .COnstitution.
It wa! next contended
that even if the impugned
Act was intra vires, the le~rned Presidency
Magistrate
trying the case of the appellant was not divested
of
jurisdiction to try the same after
the
commencement
of the impugned Act and the acquittal of the appellant
recorded by him could not be set aside.
Reliance was
placed upon s. 10 of the impugned
Act in support of
this contention.
It was urged that even though the
case related to the offence mentioned ins. 6(1) of the Act
and was thus triable exclusively by the
Special
Judge,
no
Special Judge was appointed by the State Government by notification
in the
Official
Gazette
until
September 26, 1952, that the arguments were concluded
and the trial c3me to an end also on
September 26,
1952 and the
only
thing which remained to be done
thereafter was the pronouncement
of the judgment by
the learned
Presidency
Magistrate and that therefore
even . though the case may be deemed to have
been
pending
before the learned
Magistrate
there was no
occasion
for forwarding the same
for trial
to the
Special Judge appointed by the State Government on
September 26, 1952.
We do not accept this contention.
It cannot be
denied that on July 28, 1952, the date of the commencement of the impugned
Act the case of the appellant
was pending before the learned
Presidency
Magistrate.
On that day .the prosecution had closed its case and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
the appellant had not yet
been called
upon to enter
upon his defence.
The examination of the appellant
under s. 342 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure took
place after th!i.t date.
The appellant filed his written
.statement on
August 14, 1952 and the addresses by
the prosecution as well as the defence continued
right
up to
September 26, 1952.
The word "pending"
is
thus
defined
in
Stroud's
Judicial
Dictionary,
3rd
Edition, Vol. III, p. 2141 :
· PENDING :-(1) A legal proceeding is "pending"
as soon as
commenced and until it is concluded, i.e.,
so long as the
Court having original cognizance of it
can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be
dealt with, therein.
Similar are the
observations
of
Jessel, M. R. fo re
Clagttt's Estate, Fordham v. Clagett ( 1):
"What is
the meaning of the word "pending" ?
In my opinion. it includes every insolvency in which
any proceeding can by any possibility be taken.
That
I think
j5
the meaning of the word "pending" ..... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
cause
is
said
to
be
pc:nding in a
Court of justice when
any proceeding
can be taken in it.
That is the test."
There is no doubt therefore that the case of the
appellant was not concluded and was pending before
the learned
Presidency
Magistrate at the date of the
commencement of the impugned Act.
We were however told that as many as 40 witnesses
had been examined and 226 documents exhibited
in
the course of the trial before the learned
Presidency
Magistrate and it could not have been intended by the
Legislature when enacting s. 10 of the
impugned
Act
that a case where everything had been finished except
the addresses and the pronouncement of the judgment
should be forwarded for trial before the Special
Judge
appointed
under
the
Act.
The
fallacy
underlying
this argument
is that
on
July 28, 1952,
when the
impugned
Ac_t came into operation the trial even in
the restricted sense of the term had not been concluded.
The prosecution had closed its case but the appellant
(1) (1882) 20 Ch. D. 637 at p. 653.
Asgarali N aurali
Sin1aportiwall•
v.
Tltt Stat1 of
Bombay
t957
Asgarali N ai:arali
Singapora:waalla
v.
The State of
Bom~ay
BhafWali ].
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
had yet to enter upon his defence and lead evidence,
if any, in reply to the case set up by, the
prosecution.
The same was the
position
even on
September 26,
1952, when by a notification in the
Official Gazette the
Special
Judge was appointed having jurisdiction
over
such cases.
The notification came into operation from
the commencement of
September 26, 1952,
which was
immediately
after the
mid-night
of
September 25,
1952 and the defence address had n6t
concluded by
this time but was continued when the learned
Presi-·
dency
Magistrate's
Court assembled at 11 a. m. on
September 26, 1952 and was concluded thereafter.
The
word "trial" is
also
defined in
Stroud's
Judicial
Dictionaty, 3rd Edition, Vol. IV, at page 3092 :
TRIAL: (1) A "trial" is
the
conclusion, by a
competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings
whether civil or criminal. (2)
The "trial"
(Criminal
Justice
Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6. C. 58)
s. 23 (1) is not complete until sentence has been passed
or the
offender
has
been
ordered to be discharged
(R. v. Grant (1951) 1 K. B .. 500).
The trial of the appellant therefore
could not be
said to
have been concluded on July 28,
1952 and
even on the
September 26, 1952, assuming for the sake
of argument that the effective
commencement of the
impugned
Act could not be said to have come about
until the
Special Judge was appointed
by
the
State
Government bv
notification in
the
Official
Gazette.
This contentio~ of the appellant
therefore is in any
event devoid
of substance.
We are aware
that
in
cases like the present one, the provisions containecl in
s. 10 of the impugned Act would work to the prejudice
of the appellant in that
he
would be subjected to a
re-trial before the Special Judge having jurisdiction over
the case involving a re-hearing of the whole case- with
40 witnesses to be examined and 226 documents to be
exhibited.
The time which would have to be spent,
the anxiety which the appellant would have to undergo, the expenses which he would have to make in the
matter of his defence by competent
counsel and the
possibility which he would have to face of the Special
Judge trying the same coming to a conclusion different
'
I
•
' '
S.C.lt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
from the
one
which was reached
by
the learned
Presidency
Magistrate
are
all
considerations
which
would have made us consider his case very sympathetically and try to find out ways and means whereby he
would be saved these troubles
and tribulations.
The
words of s.