# VENKATESH NARAHAR KATTI v. HAJJ SAHEB KHADIR SAHEB MULLA AND ANOTHER - **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 215 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1965-10-13 - **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J. R. Mudholkar, R. S. Bachawat - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/venkatesh-narahar-katti-v-hajj-saheb-khadir-saheb-mulla-and-another-3529 - **Pages:** 6 ## Headnote c D E F G H Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (51 of 1948), s. 29(2) Application wider-Starting point of limitation. On 8th December 1%6, the appellant served on the respondent three months' notice in writing under s. 14(l)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, terminating the tenancy on tho ground of default in payment of rent. On 24th June 1957 the appellant filed an application under s. 29(2) for possession. The Tahsildar allowed the application and the order was confirmed on appeal. But in revision, the ReYenue Tribunal set aside the order on the ground, that the application was barred by. limitation, because, it was filed more than two years after 20th May 1955, which was the date of default. A petition by the appellant under Art. 227, was rejected by the High Court. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, on the question whether the application was filed within the two years' period of limitation prescribed by s. 29(2). HELD : Limitation for the application began to run from the date of tho termination of the tenancy and not from the antecedent date of default in payment of rent and so, the application, filed within two yectrs of the termination of the :tenancy was not barred by limitation. [220 G] "The legislature could not have intended that_ limitation would commence to run before the right to apply under s. 29(2) accrues. The right to apply accrues to the landlord when the tenancy is terminated by notice under s. 14(l)(b). But in spite of the termination of the tenancy the landlord has no right to obtain possession without mt order under s. 29(2). On the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain possession, though in reality not accrued to the landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued to him. Consequently, tho date of termination of the tenancy is also the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed to have accrued to the landlord. Since the limitation for the application under s. 29(2) commences to run from the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed to have accrued to the landlord. it would follow that limitation begins to run from the date when the tenancy is terminated by the notice under s. 14(1)(b). [218 A-B, D, F-GJ The history of the legislation also- shows that both before and after the Amendment Act, 1951-which provided the two years' period of limitation-the date of the termination of the renancy is the starting point of limitation. [218 HJ Ralnachandra Anant v. Janardan, 64 Born. L.R. 637 (F.B.) approved. Chimanbai Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath, I.L.R. [1958] Born. 917 (F.B.) overruled. CIVIL APPELLATJ! JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1963. 216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 2 S.C.R. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated A January 19, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Petition No. 654 of 1960. S. G. Patwardhan and K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellant. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1. ## Text ) 1 • A VENKATESH NARAHAR KATTI v. HAJJ SAHEB KHADIR SAHEB MULLA AND ANOTHER October 13, 1965 B [K. SUBBA RAO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.] c D E F G H Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (51 of 1948), s. 29(2) Application wider-Starting point of limitation. On 8th December 1%6, the appellant served on the respondent three months' notice in writing under s. 14(l)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, terminating the tenancy on tho ground of default in payment of rent. On 24th June 1957 the appellant filed an application under s. 29(2) for possession. The Tahsildar allowed the application and the order was confirmed on appeal. But in revision, the ReYenue Tribunal set aside the order on the ground, that the application was barred by. limitation, because, it was filed more than two years after 20th May 1955, which was the date of default. A petition by the appellant under Art. 227, was rejected by the High Court. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, on the question whether the application was filed within the two years' period of limitation prescribed by s. 29(2). HELD : Limitation for the application began to run from the date of tho termination of the tenancy and not from the antecedent date of default in payment of rent and so, the application, filed within two yectrs of the termination of the :tenancy was not barred by limitation. [220 G] "The legislature could not have intended that_ limitation would commence to run before the right to apply under s. 29(2) accrues. The right to apply accrues to the landlord when the tenancy is terminated by notice under s. 14(l)(b). But in spite of the termination of the tenancy the landlord has no right to obtain possession without mt order under s. 29(2). On the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain possession, though in reality not accrued to the landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued to him. Consequently, tho date of termination of the tenancy is also the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed to have accrued to the landlord. Since the limitation for the application under s. 29(2) commences to run from the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed to have accrued to the landlord. it would follow that limitation begins to run from the date when the tenancy is terminated by the notice under s. 14(1)(b). [218 A-B, D, F-GJ The history of the legislation also- shows that both before and after the Amendment Act, 1951-which provided the two years' period of limitation-the date of the termination of the renancy is the starting point of limitation. [218 HJ Ralnachandra Anant v. Janardan, 64 Born. L.R. 637 (F.B.) approved. Chimanbai Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath, I.L.R. [1958] Born. 917 (F.B.) overruled. CIVIL APPELLATJ! JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1963. 216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 2 S.C.R. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated A January 19, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Petition No. 654 of 1960. S. G. Patwardhan and K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellant. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. The appellant is the landlord and responde:it No. 1 is the tenant of S. Nos. 180 and 182 of village Dhanyal, taluk Bijapur. Respondent No. 1 defaulted in payment of rent for the years 1951-52, 1953-54 and 1954-55. On December 8, 1956, the appellant served on respondent No. 1 three months' notice in C writing under s. 14(1)(b) of the Bamby Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act No. 57 of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act, terminating the tenancy on the ground of default in payment of rent. On June 24, 1957, the appellant filed an application under s. 29(2) read with s. 14(1) of the Tenancy D Act for possession of the land. The Tahsildar, Bijapur allowed the application, and directed possession of the land to be delivered to the appellant. This order was affirmed on appeal by the Assistant Commissioner, Bijapur. On revision, the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the first two tribunals and dis' missed the :uiplication. A petition by the appellant under Art. 227 of the Constitution was summarily rejected by the Mysore High K Court. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave. The Tribunals below concurrently found that respondent No. 1 defaulted in payment of the rent for the years 1951-52, 1953-54 and 1954-55, the last default took place on May 20, 1955 and the tenancy was properly terminated by the appellant. The first two F Tribunals also held that the application was filed within the time allowed by Jaw. The Revenue Appellate Tribunal, however, held that the application being filed more than two years after May 20, 1955 is barred by limitation. The sole question before us is whether the application was filed within the two years' period of limitation prescribed by s. 29(2) of the Tenancy Act. The appellant G contends that the application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation because (1) the right of the appellant to obtain possession of the land is deemed to have accrued to him on the termination of the tenancy by the notice given on December 8, 1956, (2) in any event, in computing the two years' period of limitation, the H period of the three months' notice should be excluded in view of s. 15(2) read withs. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. We are of the opinion that the first contention of the appellant ( • • v. N, KATTI v. KHADIR SAHEB (Bachawat, !.) 211· A should be accepted. In view of this conclusion, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the second contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. B c D Sections 14(1) and 29(2) of the Tenancy Act, as they stood at the relevant time, are as follows : "14. (1) Notwithstanding any Jaw, agreement or usage, or the decree or order of a court, the tenancy of any land shall not be terminated- (a1 unless the tenant- (i) has failed to pay the rent for any revenue years before the 31st day of March thereof; (ii) has done any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land; (iii) has sub-divided, sub-Jet or assigned the land in: contravention of section 27; (iv) has failed to cultivate it personally; or (v) has used such land for a purpose other than agriculture or allied pursuits; and (b) unless the landlord has given three months' notice· . E in writing informing the tenant of his decision to terminate the tenancy and the ground for such termination, and within that period the tenant has failed to remedy the · breach for which the tenancy is liable to be terminated." F G 29(2) No landlord shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar. For obtaining such order he shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land or dwelling house, as the case may be, is deemed to have accrued to him." At first sight, it may appear that the Act gives no indication of · the time when the right to obtain possession of the land or dwelling · house is deemed to have accrued to the landlord as contemplated · by s. 29(2). But ou a close scrutiny of the Act we are satisfied · that this right must be deemed to have accrued to him on the date . H of the termination of the tenancy. It is to be noticed that limitation for the application under s. 29(2) commences to run from the date when the right to obtain. 218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 2 S.C.R. possession of the land or dwelling house is deemed to have accrued A to the landlord. Now, the legislature could not havo intended that limitation would commence to run before the right to apply accrues. It is reasonable to think that the right to apply also accrues to the landlord on_ the date when limitation for the application begins to run. But the right to apply under s. 29(2) read withs. 14(1) accrues to the landlord when the tenancy is terminated by the notice under B s. 14(1)(b). In Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype v. Aba Maruti Mali('), this Court observed : "The statute having provided for the termination of the tenancy would by necessary implication create a right in the landlord to recover possession. The statute recogc nises this right by providing by s. 29(2) for its enforcement by an application to the Mamlatdar." It would follow that limitation for the application under s. 29(2) read with s. 14(1) begins to run from the date when the tenancy is terminated. by the notice under s. 14(1)(b). Consequently, the n date of the termination of the tenancy is also the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed to have accrued to the landlord. But it is argued that on the date of the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain possession of the land actually accrues to the landlord, and, therefore, the legislature could not have inten- .