# VIDYA VATI v. DEVI DAS

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 182
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-11-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 501 of 1976
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, A. C. Gupta, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vidya-vati-v-devi-das-7024
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure-S. 115-0. XLI/l r. I (s)-Scope of-Obliga"
tion to repay a loan and obligation to de/ii•er possession concurrent-Demanding possession before repayment of /0011-Jf permissible
The appellant and the respondent entered into an agreement by which the
appellant advanced money to the respondent and the respondent
in
lieu
of
interest thereon gave a portion of his house for residence to the appellant for
a period of two years.
The other terms were that if after the expiry of the
two-year period, the respondent wished to repay the amount, he should give
one month's notice in writing; that if after the payment of the sum, the appellant would not vacate the house, she would be liable to pay damages and that
if the respondent did not repay the amount on tile expi1y of
tile
two-year
period, he would not be entitled lo recover damages.
The respondent alleged that before the expiry of the two-year period on
September 27, 1969, he addressed a notice to the appellant and teadered re-
. payment of the loan which she refused to accept. The respondent's suit for
recovery of possession of the premises was decreed ex-parte with an order that
he should tender payment to the appellant and that if she refused to accept the
me11ey, it should be deposited in the court. The appellant, on the other hand;
filed a suit for recovery of the loan in which the respondent contended that the
claim was bnrred by limitation. The respondent filed a review application before
the Suh-Judge contending that the order directing deposit of money in
the·
court was cleady an error apparent on the face of the record. Allowing the review
application, tho Sub-Judge. ordered the deletion of the direction for depositing
the money in court.
The appellant filed a revision application in the High Court against the order
on the review application.
The High Court held that since the order allowing
the review application was appealable, the revision application was not competent, but on the alternative view that the revision application lay before the·
High Court, it held (a) that the Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction to impose
a
eondition requiring deposit of the loan money, particularly when the suit for
recovery of the money was pending before the same court and (b) since the·
respondent tendered the money td. the appellant,
but it was
refused, he was
entitled to a decree for possession.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) Order XLIII r. 1 (s) of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides
an apperu against an order allowing a review application.
Since the order
allowing the review application was made by a Sub-Judge, the appeal against .it
lay to the District Court .and not to the High Court and since no appeal lay
agaimit the order of the Sub-Judge to the High Conrt, the revis\on application
could 11ot be rejected as incompetent. [186F)
Under ~. 115 C.P.C. a revision application can lie before the
High Court
from an order made by a 8llbordinate court only if no appeal lies from that
order to the High Court. The words of limitation used in that section, namely,
"in which no appeal lies thereto" clearly mean that no appeal must lie to the
High Court from the order sought to be revised because an appeal is a much
larger remedy than a revision application and if an appeal lies that would afford
VIDYA VATI v. DEVI DASS (Bhagwati, I.)
183
sufficient relief and there wouldb? no reason or justification for invoking the
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revisional jurisdiction. (1860-E]
(2) The High Court and the Sub Judge were in error in allowing the review
application.
The direction requiring the respondent to pay the loan to the
appellant or to depOl'it it in the court was a correct and valid direction and was
rightly introduced in the original ex-parte decree.
The courts below were in
error in ordering its deletion.
[189 El
(3) Merely because one party has tendered the amount due "nd p"'yable
by him and such tender has been wrongly refused by the other party does not
absolve the first party from its obli

## Text

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182
VIDYA VATI
v.
DEVI DAS
November 25, 1976
[P. N. BHAGWATI, A. C. GUPTA AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.J
Code of Civil Procedure-S. 115-0. XLI/l r. I (s)-Scope of-Obliga"
tion to repay a loan and obligation to de/ii•er possession concurrent-Demanding possession before repayment of /0011-Jf permissible
The appellant and the respondent entered into an agreement by which the
appellant advanced money to the respondent and the respondent
in
lieu
of
interest thereon gave a portion of his house for residence to the appellant for
a period of two years.
The other terms were that if after the expiry of the
two-year period, the respondent wished to repay the amount, he should give
one month's notice in writing; that if after the payment of the sum, the appellant would not vacate the house, she would be liable to pay damages and that
if the respondent did not repay the amount on tile expi1y of
tile
two-year
period, he would not be entitled lo recover damages.
The respondent alleged that before the expiry of the two-year period on
September 27, 1969, he addressed a notice to the appellant and teadered re-
. payment of the loan which she refused to accept. The respondent's suit for
recovery of possession of the premises was decreed ex-parte with an order that
he should tender payment to the appellant and that if she refused to accept the
me11ey, it should be deposited in the court. The appellant, on the other hand;
filed a suit for recovery of the loan in which the respondent contended that the
claim was bnrred by limitation. The respondent filed a review application before
the Suh-Judge contending that the order directing deposit of money in
the·
court was cleady an error apparent on the face of the record. Allowing the review
application, tho Sub-Judge. ordered the deletion of the direction for depositing
the money in court.
The appellant filed a revision application in the High Court against the order
on the review application.
The High Court held that since the order allowing
the review application was appealable, the revision application was not competent, but on the alternative view that the revision application lay before the·
High Court, it held (a) that the Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction to impose
a
eondition requiring deposit of the loan money, particularly when the suit for
recovery of the money was pending before the same court and (b) since the·
respondent tendered the money td. the appellant,
but it was
refused, he was
entitled to a decree for possession.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) Order XLIII r. 1 (s) of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides
an apperu against an order allowing a review application.
Since the order
allowing the review application was made by a Sub-Judge, the appeal against .it
lay to the District Court .and not to the High Court and since no appeal lay
agaimit the order of the Sub-Judge to the High Conrt, the revis\on application
could 11ot be rejected as incompetent. [186F)
Under ~. 115 C.P.C. a revision application can lie before the
High Court
from an order made by a 8llbordinate court only if no appeal lies from that
order to the High Court. The words of limitation used in that section, namely,
"in which no appeal lies thereto" clearly mean that no appeal must lie to the
High Court from the order sought to be revised because an appeal is a much
larger remedy than a revision application and if an appeal lies that would afford
VIDYA VATI v. DEVI DASS (Bhagwati, I.)
183
sufficient relief and there wouldb? no reason or justification for invoking the
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revisional jurisdiction. (1860-E]
(2) The High Court and the Sub Judge were in error in allowing the review
application.
The direction requiring the respondent to pay the loan to the
appellant or to depOl'it it in the court was a correct and valid direction and was
rightly introduced in the original ex-parte decree.
The courts below were in
error in ordering its deletion.
[189 El
(3) Merely because one party has tendered the amount due "nd p"'yable
by him and such tender has been wrongly refused by the other party does not
absolve the first party from its obligation to make payment and where
the
obligation to make payment is concurrent with the obligation to hand over
possession, the claim for recovery of' possession must be accompanied by payment or deposit of the amount. [188C]
Dixon v. Clark (1847) 16 LJ CP 237=136 E.R. 919, referred tb.
In the instant case, the respondent could not validly tender the amount to
the appellant in repayment of the loan until September 27, 1969 and the tender
made on August 26, 1969 was clearly invalid. If the respondent did not at
any time validly tender payment to the appellant, she was not liable to hand
over possession of the premises and no claim for damages for wrongful use
could be sustained against her. The respondent was not entitled to possession
unless he paid or deposited the money in court in repayment of the loan. The
respondent could ieek to recover possession of the premises only on condition
of making repayment of .the loan because the two obligations were mutual and
concurrent and were required to be simultaneously performed and one could
not get deli11ked from the reason of •.he refusal on the appellant's part to
accept the tender of money. [188E-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
501
of
1976.
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
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28th April, 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 186
of 1975.
Hardayal Hardy, S. K. Bagga, (Mrs.) S. Bagga, (Miss) Yesh
Bagga and K. K. Mittal for the Appellant.
Bikramjit Nayar, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for ResponF
dent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, .T.-This is an unfortunate litigation where a widow
has been kept out of her monies for over six years by reason of
wrong application of Jaw by the courts.
Much of the travail of the
widow could have been1 avoided if the courts had taken a commonsense view of the law instead of adopting
a rather 'technical and
unimaginative approach.
The facts giving rise to this litigation are
few and may be briefly stated as follows ..
The respondent is the owner of a residential quarter bearing No.
1/20 situate at Old Rajendra Nagar, New Delhi.
He wanted a loan
for the purpose of repaying an earlier
debt
and
he,
therefore,
approached the appellant and as a result of
negotiations
between
them, an agreement dated 27th September, 1967 was entered into
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SUPREME COURT -REPORTS
[l 977) 2 S.L.R.
between the parties.
This agreement recited that a sum of Rs. 7500/-
was lent and advanced by the appcJiant to the respondent and it
provided that in lieu of interest on his amount of Rs. 7500/-, the
respondent would give to the appellant a portion of his residential
quarter (hereinafter referred to as the premises) for temporary residence.
The agreement went on to say, and we are setting out· the
precise terms of the agreement since they are material for the decision .
of the controversy between the parties :
"On the expiry of two years as. stated above the seooud
party shall give one month's notice in writing to the llrst
party for the said rcom. . . If after the expiry o ftwo years
fixed period, the first party wants to pay the amount he
shall give one month's notice in writing fo the second party. ·
When the first party repays the above stated loan to the
second party, then the second party shall vacate the room etc.
under temporary residence and give it to the first party. . If
the first party pays the amount of Rs. 7500/- and the second
party docs not give possession of the room etc. under her
use, then the second party shall be liable to pay Rs. 110/-
per month as damages. If the first party does. nbt pay the
amount of Rs. 7500/- to the second party on the expiry of
the two years period, the first party will not be entitled to
recover damages of Rs. 110/- per month from the second
party and the second party shall be entitled to take legal
proceedings against the first party-and also if the first
party pays the amount of Rs. 7500/- and the second party
does not give possession, the first party shall be entitled to
take· the legal proceedings reg·arding vacation of the room
etc. under the use of the second party."
Pursuant to the agreement, the respondent handed over possession of
the premises to the appellant and the appellant sti1rted occupying the
same against interest on the Joan of Rs. 7500/- advanced by her to
the responde1tt.
The period of the agre~ment expired on 27th
SeJ!tcmb~r, 1969
and according to the terms 'fYf tlte agreement, tht resj.oJtoant could
thereafter repay the loan of R•. 7500/- to the appallaii.t ·and claim
back possession of the premise• from her.
Th* cas• of ·the :responG
dent was that he addre8'ed a 1wtice dated 26th Au:,ust, 19119 to the
appellant and tendered a 'sum of Rs. 7500/-.to .her i• ·r•11.ayment of
the loan, but the appellant refused to accept the sa1n..
The respondent also a~dres~ed another notice dated 4th May, 1'70 te ·•»c appellant but this notice also had no effect on her. The respondent lhereupon filed Suit No. 123 of 1973 in the Court of Sub-Jud!!" Jst Class
. Delhi seekirig to _recover possession of the premises from th~ appellant'.
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The appellant did not appear to contest the suit and· it was decreed
ex parte by a judgment dated 22nd May, 1973. · Tue learned subJudge passed a decree for possession of the premises in favour of the
respondent but added the following rider:
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VIDYA VATI v. DEVI DASS (Bhagwati, J.)
185
"The plaintiff is ordered to tender the amount of Rs.
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7500/- to the defendant within a period of 30 days from
today in cash.
lf the defendant refuses to accept the money,
it should be deposited in the Court with
notice
to the
defendant within the aforesaid period."
Now, it appears that prior to the filing of this suit by the respon-
<lent, the appellant had filed a suit against the respondent for recovery
of the loan of Rs. 7500/- advanced by her to the respondent.
The
respondent had filed his defence to the suit and '"arious grounds were
taken by him, one of which was that the claim was barred by limitation.
This suit was pending on 22nd May, 1973 when the ex parte
.decree was passed against the appellant.
The respondent had obviously no desire-and perhaps not even
capacity-to repay the loan of Rs. 7500/- to the appellant and he,
therefore, preferred an application for review under Order XL VII,
Rule l of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking deletion of the direction given by the learned Sub-Judge requiring him to deposit the sum
of Rs. 7500/-.
The respondent contended that since the appellant
has already filed a suit against him for recovery of the amount of
Rs: 7500/- and he was resisting the suit inter alia on the ground of
limitation, it was not competent to the learned Sub-Judge to gi'"e such
a direction for deposit of the amount of Rs. 7500/- and the giving of
such direction was clearly an error of law apparent on the face of
the record.
The respondent also claimed review on the ground of
.discovery of new and important matter in the shape of Suit No. 123
.of 1973 filed by the appellant against him.
The learned Sub-Judge,
by a judgment dated 3rd August, 1973 allowed the review application
and held that the direction for depositing the amount of Rs. 7500/-
in court should be deleted from the ex-parte de;cree passed against the
appellant.
The result was that the respondent became entitled to
Tecover possession of the premises from the appellant without paying
lo the appellant or depositing in court the amount of Rs. 7500/- in
n~payment of the lmm.
Now, unfortunately this order allowing the review application was
made by the learned Sub-Judge without issuing notice to the appellant.
That was obviously bad and, therefore, on the application of the
.appellant, the learned Sub-Judge had to set aside the order and
rehear the review application.
The- same order was, however, once
again made by the learned Sub-Judge after hearing the appellant and ~
the dire.ction requiring the respondent to deposit the sum of Rs.
7500/- m court was deleted on the ground that such direction 11ullified
the effect <if the ex-parte decre1e 'for possession and forced the respondent to admit the claim of the appellant for repayment.of <he sum
,of Rs. '7500/-, wltid1, according to the respondent, was tim1 barred.
The appellant being aggrieved by the order allowing the review
appJication, preferred a revision application to the High
Court of
Delhi under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Mr. Justice
Avadh Behari, who heard the revision application, took the view
that the order allowing the review application was appealable
and
1ie~ce the revision application was not competent, but on the alter-
,native view that the revision application Jay before the High Court,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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he proceeded to consider whether the review had been rightly granted
and held that the respondent having brought a
simple
suit
for
possession, the learned Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction to impose a
condition requiring him to deposit the sum of Rs. 7500/-, particularly
when the appellant's suit for recovery of the same was pending in that
very court and that under the terms of the agreement, all that he was.
required to do was to tender the sum of Rs. 7500/- and since that
was done by him and the appellant had refused to accept the same,
he was entitled to a decree for
possession.
The learned Judge·
accordingly dismissed the revision application.
That led to the filing
of the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.
When the hearing of the appeal commenced, a contention of a .
preliminary nature was advanced on behalf of the respondent and it
was that since the order of the learned Sub-Judge impugned in
revision before the High Court was an order allowing the review
application, it was appealable under XLIII, rule L cl. ( s) of the
Code of Civil Prdcedure and hence no revision was competent to
the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the High Court was right in rejecting the revision application.
Now, there can be no doubt that under section 115 of the Ccxle of'
Civil Procedure a revision application can lie before the High Court
from an order made by a subordinate court only if ho appeal lies
from that order to the High Court.
The words of limitation used·
in section 115 are "in which no appeal lies thereto" and these words
clearly mean that no appeal must lie to the High Court from thd order
sought to be revised, because .an ap~eal is a much larger remedy
than a revision application :and if an appeal lies, that would afford
sufficient relief and there would be no reason or justification for
invoking the revisional jurisdi'ction.
The question, therefore, here is.
whether an appe:d against the order made by the learned Sub-Judge
allowing the review application lay to the High Court. If it did, the·
reviision application would
be
clearly incompetent.
Now
Order
XLIII, Rule 1, cl. (s) undoubtedly provides an appeal against an
order allowing a review application, but the or.der
allowing
tl1e
review application in the present case was made by the learned SubJudge, and hence an appeal against it lay to the District Court and
not to the High Court, and, obviously, since no appeal Jay against
the order of the learned Sub-Judge to the High Court, the revisio,n·
application could not be rejected as incompetent.
The preliminary
contention must, in the circumstan·ces, be decided against the respondent.
That takes us to the merits of th'e appeal and the question which
arises for consideration on merits is whether the direction requiring
the responde11t to deposit the sum of Rs. 7500/- in court as a condition of recovery of poss.ession of the premises from the appellant
was erroneous in law so as to justfy its deletion on review.
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determination of this question turns on the true interpretation of the
agreement between the parties. If we turn to the agreement it is
clear that .the loan of Rs. 7500/- was advanced by the appellant to
the respondent for a period of two years and in lieu of interest on·
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VIDYA VAT! v. DEVI DASS (Bhagwati, J.)
187
the amount of the loan, the respondent handed over the possession
of the premises to the appellant and the appellant was entitled to
occupy the same free of rent.
We have already set out foe, relevant
portions of the agreement and it appears clearly from those pro'.'isions
that the respondent was not entitled to repay the amount of the
loan and demand recovery of possession of the premises from the
appellant before the expiry of the period of two years.
It was only
on the expiration of the period of two years that the respondent was
entitled to repay the amount of the loan and if he wanted to do so,
he was required to give one month's notice
in
writing
to
the
appellant and on such repayment, the appellant was bound to hand
over vacant possession of the premises to him.
If, despite the repayment of the amount of the loan by the respondent, the appellant
failed to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent, she was liable to pay damages at the rate; of Rs. 110 /- per
month.
But if for any reason the respondent failed to repay the
amount of the loan on the expiry of the period of two years, he
could not claim to recover any damages from the appellant.
Clearly
the obligation of the appellant to hand over vacant possession of
the premises to the respondent was concurrent with the ·obligation
of the respondent to repay the amount of loan to the appellant and
the respondent could not claim possession of the premisei; from the
appellant without making repayment of the amount of the loan: Ii
the re~pondent tendered a sum of Rs. 7500/- to the appellant in
repayment of the amount of the loan and yet the appellant refused
to accept the ~ame, the appellant might incur liability to pay to the
respondent damages for wrongful use and occupation of tlie premises,
but the respondent could not say that he was exonerated from the
obligation to repay the amount of the loan and was entitled to recovier
poss'ession of the premises without making repayment of the amount
of the loan.
The respondent could seek to recover possession of
the premises from the appellant only 'on condition of making repayment of the loan, because the two obligations were mutual and concurrent and were required to be simultaneously performed and one
could not get delinked from the other by reason of any refusal on
the part of the appellant to accept the tender of Rs. 7500/- from
the respondent.
We may in this connection refer to the following
pas3age from the judgmemt in Dixon v. Clark(') when it said :
.
"In action of debt and assumpsit, the principle of the
plea of tender, in our apprehension is, that the defendant
has been always ready (toujoure prist) to perform entirely
. the contract on which the action is founded; and that he did
perform it, a& far as he was able, by tendering the requisite
money; the plaintiff himself precluded a complete performance,<;, by refusing to receive it.
And, as in ordinary
casei;, the debt is not discharged by such tender and refusal,
the plea must not only go on to allege that the defendant
is still ready (in core prist) but must be accompanied by
a profort in curiem of the money tendered. If the defendant can maintain this plea, although he will not thereby
(!) (1847) 16 LJ. C.P. 237=136 E.R. 919.
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[1977] 2 S.C.R.
bar the debt (for that would be inconsistent with uncore
prist and profort in curiem) yet he will answer the action.
in the sense that he will recover judgment for his costs of
defence against the plaintiff in which respect the ple:1 of
~ender is essentially different from that of payment of money
mto court.
And, as the plea is thus to
constitute
an
answer to the action, it must, we conceive, be dificient in
noni of the requisite qualities of a good plea in bar.
This decision has been quoted with approval in
Leaks
on
Contracts. 8th Ed. at page 663 and it establishes
beyond
disputation
that merely because the plaintiff or the defendant has tendered the
amount due and payable by him and such tender has been wrongly
refused by the other party, it does not absolve the first named party
from its obligation to make payment of the amount and v,,-here the
obligation to make payment of the amount is concurrent with
the
obligation to hand over possession, the claim for 1recovery of possession must be accompanied by payment or deposit of the amount.
The respondent was, therefore, clearly bound to 1pay or deposit the
amount of Joan as a condition of recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant.
We may point out that in fact, in the present case, there was
no valid tender of the sum of Rs. 7500/- by the respondent to the
appellant.
The case of the respondent was that he tendered the sum
of Rs. 7500/- in cash to the appellant on 26th August, 1969 but
the appellant refused to accept the sum.
Now, we will assume for
the purpose of argument that this case of the respondent is factually
correct and that he did tender the sum of Rs. 7 500 /- in cash to the
appellant on 26th August, 1969, but this was obviously not a valid
tender, because under the terms of the agreement
the
respondent
could repay the amount of the loan to the appellant only on the
expiry of the period of two years and the date of the agreement
being 27th September, 1967, the period of two years expired on 26th
September, 1969.
The respondent could not validly tender the sum
of Rs. 7500/- to the appellant in repayment of the amount of the
loan until 27th September, 1969 and the tender made by him on
26th August, 1969 was clearly invalid.
It may be noted that it was
not the case of the respondent that he made any fresh •e~1der to the
appellant on or after 27th September, 1969 and h111ce tlte conclusion must inevitably follow that the respondent did not at any time
make a valid tender to the appellant of the sum of Rs. 7500/-.
Now, if the respondent did not at any ltime validly tender 11ayment
of the suin of Rs. 7500/- to the appellant, the app•lla.t obviously
did not become liable to hand over possession of the premises to the
respondent and a fortiori no claim for damages for wrnngful use and
occupation of the premises could be sustained by the r~;;pondoot
against the appellant. It was pointed out to us on behalf of the
respondent that he had already filled suits against the appellant for
damages or compensation for wrongful use and occupation of the
premises and one of the suits, namely Suit No. 800 of 1975 had been
decreed by the Sub-Judge, 1st Class and Civil Appeal No. 9 ()f 1975
preferred by the appellant :against it had been dismissed
by
the
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VIDYA VATI v. DEVI DASS (Bhagwati, J.)
Additional District Judge, Delhi on the basis that the respondent
had made a n1lid tender of the sum of Rs. 7500/- to the appellant
and since the appellant had refused to accept the same, she was in
wrongful use and occupation of the premises from the date of the
tender and wai;, therefore, liable to pay compensation to the respondent from th:lt date.
This is true, but it cannot preclude us from
laying down what we think to be the correct legal position on a
proper interpretation of the agreement between the parties.
Moreover, this decision is under appeal before the High Court.
But, apart
from that, we do not think this decision is correct, because, on the
view we have taken, the respondent was not entitled to tender the
sum of Rs. 7500/- to the <;ppellant before 27th September. 1969
and even if a tender was made by him on 26th August, 1969 as
al:eged by him, the appellant was entitled to refuse to accept the
same and she did not become liable to hand over vacant poss~ssion
of the premises to the respondent or to pay compensation to the
rellpondent in respect of her occupation of the premises.
lt is only
if the respondent made a valid tender of the sum of Rs. 7500/- to
the appellant 01i, or aftet.· 27th September, 1969 that the appellant
would be liable to hand over vacant possession of the premises to
the respondent and since that did not happen in the present ca·se, there
was no obligation on the appellant to deliver possession of the premises
to the respondent. The respondent was not entitled to claim possession
of the premises from the appellant unless he paid or deposited the
sum of Rs. 7500/- in court in repayment of the amount of the loan.
The High Court as well as the learned Sub-Judge were, therefore, .in
error in allowing the review application and ordering that the direction
requiring the respondent to pay to the appellant or to deposit in court
a sum of Rs. 7500/- in repayment of the amount of the loan should
be deleted.
It was a correct and valid direction and it was rightly introduced in the original ex-parte decree passed by the learned SubJudge.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order allowing the
review application passed by the learned Sub-Judge as also the order
of the High Court rejecting the revision application.
The original
ex-parte decree for possession together with the direction requir'ng the
respondent to pay or deposit the sum of Rs. 7500/- in court will stand,
but since possession of the premises ha·s already been taken over by
the respondent in pursuance of the ex-parte decree for possession, we
direct that the respondent do pay to the appellant the sum of Rs. 7500/-
together with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from
the date when pos·session of the premises was taken by the respondent
up to the elate of payment. The responden~ will par t~ the appellant
costs of the appeal as also costs of the review apphcat1011 before the
Sub-Judge and therevision application before the High Court.
P.B.R.
Appeal allowed.
A
c
D
E
F
G