# VIJA YEE SINGH AND ORS v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH _ _c

- **Citation:** [1990] 2 S.C.R. 573
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990-04-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 375-377 of 1987
- **Bench:** S. Ratnavel Pandian, M. Fathima Beevi, B K. Jayachandra Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vija-yee-singh-and-ors-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-c-10726
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

•
Tndian Evidence Act: Section 105-'Burden of proof-What is
r
'fact'-When proved-When 'disproved'-Presumption court is entitled
to draw-What is.
-'t'
c
14 accused were tried for offences under section 148 and 302 read
with Section 149 of I.P.C. for the murder of two pe..SOns named
Mahendra Singh and Virendra Singh and injuries to 3 others named
__.,,,,
Vijay Narain Singh, P.W. 1, Uma Shankar Singh, P.W. 2and Kailash
Singh. Accused No. 6 Chirkut Singh was further tried under Section
307 l.P.C. for attempting to murder P.W. 1 and all the remaining
D
accused under section 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. for causing
' injuries to Uma Shankar and Kailash Singh. The trial court relying on
the evidence of P. Ws 1 and 2 who were the main eye witnesses con·
victed all the 14 accused under section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149
I.P.C. and awarded them life imprisonment. The convicted accused
-A
preferred appeals to the High Court and the State filed appeals for
E
enhancement of their sentence. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court consisting of Justice Katju and Aggarwal heard the appeals.
While Justice Katju allowed the appeals by the accused and dismissed
the State appeals, Justice Aggarwal disagreeing with him, dismissed all
~
the appeals, both by the accused and by the State. Consequently the
>--
matter was referred to a third judge. Justice Seth who confirmed the
F
conviction and sentence awarded to accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 only and
)-
acquitted all the rest of the aecused on the view taken by him that the
specific overt acts were attributable to only tJtese four accused and the
rest should be given the benefit.of doubt.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 375-377 of 1987 by special leave were preG
'
ferred by the convicted accused Nos. 1, 3; 4 and 6 and Criminal Appeals
Nos. 372-374 of 1987 preferred by the State against the acquittal of
I
other accused. Accepting the plea of the accused to the right of self-
-,>..__
defence but holding that they bad defmitely exceeded this right when
they went to the extent of intentionally shooting the deceased to death
and therefore the offence COillillitted was one punishable under section
H
,·-
573
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1990] 2 S.C.R.
A 304 Part I I.P.C. and not under Section 302 read with Seeton 149 I.P.C
Accordingly in partly allowing the Appeals fded by the convicted accused
and dismissing the State appeals, this Court,
HELD: A fact is said to be "proved" when, after considering the
matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its
B existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. l596G-H]
A fact ts said to be 'disproved' when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its
non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances. of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
C
does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is neither
"proved" nor "disproved". l596H; 597AJ
The maxim that the prosecution must prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt is a rule of caution laid down by the Courts of Law in
o respect of assessing the evidence in criminal cases. [60IE]
Section I 05 places "burden of proof" on the accused in the first
part and in the second part there is a presumption which the Court can
draw regarding the absence of the circumstances, which presumption is
always rebuttable. Taking the section as a whole the "burden of proof''
,.\-_
E and the presumption have to be considered together. It is exiomatic
when the evidence is sufficient as to prove the existence of a fact conclusively then no difficulty arises. But where the accused introduces material
to displace the presumption which may affect the prosecutio'l.,!'ase or
create a reasonable doubt about the existence of one or other ingredients of the offence and then it would amount to a case where prosecu-
-"'\

## Text

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VIJA YEE SINGH AND ORS.
A
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
_ _c.---
APRIL 20, 1990
[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, M. FATHIMA BEEVI AND
B
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]
•
Tndian Evidence Act: Section 105-'Burden of proof-What is
r
'fact'-When proved-When 'disproved'-Presumption court is entitled
to draw-What is.
-'t'
c
14 accused were tried for offences under section 148 and 302 read
with Section 149 of I.P.C. for the murder of two pe..SOns named
Mahendra Singh and Virendra Singh and injuries to 3 others named
__.,,,,
Vijay Narain Singh, P.W. 1, Uma Shankar Singh, P.W. 2and Kailash
Singh. Accused No. 6 Chirkut Singh was further tried under Section
307 l.P.C. for attempting to murder P.W. 1 and all the remaining
D
accused under section 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. for causing
' injuries to Uma Shankar and Kailash Singh. The trial court relying on
the evidence of P. Ws 1 and 2 who were the main eye witnesses con·
victed all the 14 accused under section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149
I.P.C. and awarded them life imprisonment. The convicted accused
-A
preferred appeals to the High Court and the State filed appeals for
E
enhancement of their sentence. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court consisting of Justice Katju and Aggarwal heard the appeals.
While Justice Katju allowed the appeals by the accused and dismissed
the State appeals, Justice Aggarwal disagreeing with him, dismissed all
~
the appeals, both by the accused and by the State. Consequently the
>--
matter was referred to a third judge. Justice Seth who confirmed the
F
conviction and sentence awarded to accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 only and
)-
acquitted all the rest of the aecused on the view taken by him that the
specific overt acts were attributable to only tJtese four accused and the
rest should be given the benefit.of doubt.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 375-377 of 1987 by special leave were preG
'
ferred by the convicted accused Nos. 1, 3; 4 and 6 and Criminal Appeals
Nos. 372-374 of 1987 preferred by the State against the acquittal of
I
other accused. Accepting the plea of the accused to the right of self-
-,>..__
defence but holding that they bad defmitely exceeded this right when
they went to the extent of intentionally shooting the deceased to death
and therefore the offence COillillitted was one punishable under section
H
,·-
573
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1990] 2 S.C.R.
A 304 Part I I.P.C. and not under Section 302 read with Seeton 149 I.P.C
Accordingly in partly allowing the Appeals fded by the convicted accused
and dismissing the State appeals, this Court,
HELD: A fact is said to be "proved" when, after considering the
matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its
B existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. l596G-H]
A fact ts said to be 'disproved' when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its
non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances. of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
C
does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is neither
"proved" nor "disproved". l596H; 597AJ
The maxim that the prosecution must prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt is a rule of caution laid down by the Courts of Law in
o respect of assessing the evidence in criminal cases. [60IE]
Section I 05 places "burden of proof" on the accused in the first
part and in the second part there is a presumption which the Court can
draw regarding the absence of the circumstances, which presumption is
always rebuttable. Taking the section as a whole the "burden of proof''
,.\-_
E and the presumption have to be considered together. It is exiomatic
when the evidence is sufficient as to prove the existence of a fact conclusively then no difficulty arises. But where the accused introduces material
to displace the presumption which may affect the prosecutio'l.,!'ase or
create a reasonable doubt about the existence of one or other ingredients of the offence and then it would amount to a case where prosecu-
-"'\
F
lion failed to prove its own case beyond reasonable doubt. [60IF-G]
G
The initial obligatory presumption regarding circumstances gets
lifted when a plea of exception is raised. More so when there are
circumstances on the record, gathered from the prosecution evidence,
chief and cross examinations, probabilities and circumstances, if any,
introduced by the accused, either by adduqing evidence or otherwise
creating a reasonable doubt about the existence of the ingredients of the
offence. In case of such a reasonable doubt, the Court has to give the
benefit of the same to the accused. [60IH; 602A]
The presumption regarding the absence of existence of circumstH
ances regarding the exception can be rebutted by the accused by intro-
-{.
VUAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P.
575
ducing evidence. If from such a rebuttal, a reasonable doubt arises
A
regarding his guilt, the accused should get the benefit of the same. Such ·
---
a reasonable doubt consequently negatives one or more of the ingredients of the offence charged, for instance, from such a rebuttal evideuce, a reasonable doubt arises about the right of private defence then
it follows that the prosecution has not established the necessary ingredients of intention to commit the offence. In that way the benefit of a
B
reasonable doubt which arises from the legal and factual considerations
'y
even under Section 105 of the Evidence Act should necessarily go to the
accused. [602C-E]
--Y
Section 3 is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind,
first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of fact, in other
words, "believes it to exist" and secondly in which though he may not c
feel absolutly certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a
¥
prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of
Its existence. [602G-H; 603A]
-
The Evidence Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent
D
man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at
the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of
certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be
--1said to be proved. [6030]
E
The general burden of establishing the guilt of accused is always
on the prosecution and it never shills. Even in respect of the cases
covered by Section 105 the prosecution is not absolved of its duty of
~
discharging the burden. The accused may raise a plea of exception
either by pleading the same specifically or by relying on the proba-
>----
bilities and circumstances obtaining in the case. [606F-G]
F
>--
In the instant case, as per the evidence of the material witnesses,
the two deceased were only proceeding alongwith the rasta towards the
pump set for taking bath. Even in the plea set up by accused No. 6 it is
not stated specifically that deceased Nos. l and 2 were armed with any
deadly weapons. Therefore, the assailants had definitely exceeded the
G
...
right of private defence when they went to the extent of intentionally
shooting them to death by inflicting bullet injuries. Therefore, the offI
ence committed by them would be one punishable under Section 304
-:;......
Part I I.P.C. The conviction of accused No. 1, 3, 4 and 6 under Section
302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and the sentence of rigorous imprison-
.-
ment for life awarded thereunder is set aside and instead they are
H
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1990] 2 S.C.R.
convicted under SectiOJI 304 Part I read with Section 34 I.P.C. and each
A of them sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for IO years.
Their other convictions/sentences are confirmed the sentences to run
concurrently. l608C-E]
Mohar Rai & Bharath Rai v. The State of Bihar, (1968] 3 S.C.R.
B 525; Lakshmi Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, ]19761 4 SCC 394; Pratap
v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 S.C. 966; Woo/mington v.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935] Appeal Cases 462;
Emperor v. U. Damapala, AIR 1937 RangGon 83; Parbhoo & Ors. v.
Emperor, AIR 1941 Allahabad 402; K.M. Nanavati v. State of
Maharashtra, (1962] Suppl. 1 SCR 567; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai
Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 S.C. 1563; Rishi Kesh Singh &
C Ors. v. The State, AIR 1970 Allahabad 51; Bhikari v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1966 S.C. I; Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of
Bombay, (1955] 1 SCR 613; Government of Bombay v. Sakur, AIR
1947 Bombay 38; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1974 S.C.
1570; Mohd. Ramzani v. State of Delhi, AIR 1980 S.C. 1341; State v.
D Bhima Devraj, AIR 1956 Sau. 77; Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947]
2 All ER 373; C.S.D. Swami v. The State, AIR 1960 S.C. 7; V.D.
Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 S.C. 1762; Harbhajan
Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 S.C. 97; Amjad Khan v. The State,
(1952] S.C.R. 567 and Puran Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR
1975 S.C. 1674, referred to
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 375-77 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.1984 in the Allahabad High Court in Cr!. A. Nos. 1925, 1808 of 1981 and Government
p
Appeal No. 2599 of 1981.
G
R.K. Garg, Prith Raj, U.R. Lalit, R.L. Kohli, Sbivpujan Singh,
Manoj Prashad, Dalveer Bhandari, T. Sridharan (N.P.) and B.S.
Chauhan for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. On 29.5.1981 at about 8 A.M.
-----·
-
··--"'
a grave rioting took place in the village of Tirro in Varanasi District. In
-"' -
the course of the said rioting two persons Mahendra Singh and
Virendra Singh deceased Nos. 1 and 2 were killed and Vijay Narain
H Singh, P.W. 1, Uma Shankar Singh, P.W. 2 and one Kailash Singh
VIJAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. [REDDY, J.]
577
received injuries. In respect of these offences 14 accused were tried
A
under Sections 148 and 302 read with Sec. 149 I.P.C. Chirkut Singh,
~-
Accused No. 6 was tried for offence punishable under Section 307
I.P.C. for attempting to commit the murder of P.W. 1 and the remaining accused under Section 307 read with Sec. 149 I.P.C. for causing
in juries to U ma Shankar Singh, P. W. 2 and Kail ash Singh. It is alleged
that the rraterial prosecution witnesses, deceased persons and the
B
accused belong to the same village. Since 1972 there have been disputes between these two rival groups. A number of cases were also
T
pending in the courts. On the day of occurrence at 8 A.M. P.W. 1 went
to his pumping set. P.W. 2 Uma Shankar Singh and his relation
-f Kailash Singh were also at the pumping set. Deceased Nos. 1 and 2
were proceeding alongwith the rasta towards the pumping set for takc
ing bath. When they reached near the Khandhar (old building) of
Vijay Pratap Singh Accused No. 5 LaUan Singh exhorted the other
·~ accused who were all lying .in wait to kill them. All the 14. accused
emerged out of the Khandar. Out of them Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6
(accused Nos. are being referred to as arrayed before the trial court)
were armed with guns and the rest were armed with lathis. They
D
advanced towards deceased Nos. 1 and 2. Accused No. 1 fired a shot
which hit deceased No. 1 and he was immediately also shot at by
accused No. 3 Ranjit Singh and he fell down. In the meanwhile
Accused No. 4 Ram Briksh Singh fired at Deceased No. 2 Virendra
Singh who fell down and both deceased died on the spot. The other
~·· . accused carrying lathis advanced towards P. W. 1 who ducked and
E
escaped unhurt. Then the lathis-wielding accused assaulted P.W. 1
Vijay Narain Singh, P.W. 2 Uma Shankar Singh and Kail.ash Singh.
P. W. 1 managed to escape and ran away.
~.
The trial court relying on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, who are
~--
the main eye witnesses, convicted all the 14 accused of the offences. for
F
'
which they were charged and the substantial sentence awarded is
Iimprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149
I.P .C. The convicted accused preferred appeals. The State also filed
appeal for .enhancement of the sentence. A Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court consisting of Justice Katju and Justice Agrawal
heard the appeals. Justice Katju allowed the appeals filed by the
G
accused and dismissed the appeal filed by the State but the other
learned Judge disagreed and dismissed all the appeals concurring with
I
the trial court. The matter came up before a third Judge Seth, J. He
~:;>.._~ took the view that only such of those accused to whom specific overt
acts were attributed could be covicted and the other should be given
benefit of doubt. In. that yiew of the matter he confirmed the convicH
1.
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] 2 S.C.R.
tion of Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 and acquitted the rest of the
A accused. Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 applied for special leave which was
granted by this Court and their appeals are numbered as Criminal
Appeal Nos. 375-77/87 and the State has preferred appeals against the
acquittal of the other remaining 10 accused which are numbered as
Criminal Appeal Nos. 372-74/87.
B
--------
It is contended on behalf of the State that the occurrenc;; ha;;
taken place in broad-day light and merely because the witnesses are
·}·
interested their evidence cannot be rejected and that the view taken by
Justice Seth is incorrect and the view taken by the trial court as well as
by Justice Agrawal has to be accepted. On the other hand, the counsel
,-
appearing for the accused submitted that witnesses who were partisans
C and were highly interested have made omnibus allegations and it is
highly dangerous to accept their evidence because there is every likelihood of innocent persons having been falsely implicated. It is also their
"-
further submission that the prosecution has not come forward with the
whole truth; and that the origin of the occurrence has been suppressed
D in as much as injuries to some of the accused persons have not been
explained and consequently it must be held that occurrence did not take
place in the manner alleged by the prosecution and that nnder these
circumstances the truth from falsehood cannot be separated and therefore, none of the accused could be convicted.
E
F
Before we consider these rival contentions some of the facts
which are not indispute may be noted. There was a longstanding rivalary between the two groups. The time and place of occurrence are not
in controversy. That the two deceased persons died of gun-shots
injuries also is not in dispute. P.Ws. 1 and 2 also received injuries
during the course of this occurrence.
The prosecution in support of its case examined P .Ws 1 to 11.
P. W. 7 the Doctor examined P.W. 2 at about 11.40 A.M. on the same
day and·found 10 in juries. All of them were contusions and he opined
that they might have been caused by a blunt object like lathi. On the
same day, he examined P.W. 1 and on his person he found four contuG sions which could have been caused by Lathis. The Doctor also
examined Kailash Singh, who was not examined as a witness. and
found two contusions. P.W. 4 another Doctor who conducted postmortem on deceased No. 2 Virendra Singh found two gun-shots
~~ -
wounds on the cranial cavity. Injury No. 1 is an entry wound and
injury No. 2 is an exist wound. Then he conducted the autopsy on the
H dead body of deceased No. 1. He found two injuries, the first one is on
VIJAYEE SINGH v. ,STATE OF U.P. (REDDY, J.]
579
the left nipple which is an entry wound and injury No. 2 is on the left
palm. On internal examination he found a bullet embedded and the
same was recovered. P. W. 5 is the Investigating Officer. After registration of the crime he undertook the investigation, went to the scene
of occurrence, held the inquest of the two dead-bodies and recorded
the statement of the witnesses. He also found two live cartridges one
of 16 bore and another of 12 bore. P.W. 3 is another eye-witness. He
deposed that Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 were armed with-guns and the
other were armed with lathis. Accused No. 1 fired at the deceased No.
1 and Accused No. 3 also fired at him as a result of which he fell down
and when deceased No. 2 tried to move, Accused No. 4 shot at him
and deceased No. 2 also fell down. When P.Ws 1, 2 and Kailash Singh
rushed towards the place, accused No. 6 fired at P.W. 1 but he
escaped. Then the lathi-wielding persons beat P .Ws 1 and 2 and
Kailash Singh. To the same effect is the evidence of P .Ws 1and2 also.
Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. all the circumst.ances appearing against the
accused were put to them. They in general denied the offence. However, among them, accused Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14 admitted their
presence at the scene of occurrence. Accused No. 6 in particular stated
that P.W. 1 and others armed with guns, spears and lathis tried to' do
fishing in the pond in which accused No. 6 had a share. Accused No. 6
and others went to the pond for fishing. P. W. 1 and other challenged
and they chased accused No. 6 and others and accused No. 13 was shot
at by P.W. 1 and others and he and accused No. 14 were beaten with
la this and in defence he fired two gun shots hitting deceased Nos. 1 and
2. He then went to the police station and lodged a report and deposited
his gun and that P.W. 1 h.as falsely implicated him. As regards this
report which is purported to have been given by accused No. 6, P.W. 5
the Investigating Officer was questioned. He admitted that when he
returned to the Police Station on 30th May, 1980 he came to know that
accused No. 6 has surrendered his gun. He also admitted in the crossexamination that the crime was registered on the basis of the report
given by Chirkut Singh and the same was also investigating but it
appears that no action was taken. Investigating Officer also admitted
that when he saw accused Nos. 13 and 14 he found injuries on them.
The other circumstance strongly relied upon by the defence is that
there were gun shots injuries on accused No. 13. It may be noted that
the same has not been explained by the prosecution. P. W. 7 the
Doctor admitted that he examined Accused No. 14 and found on him a
skindeep 12" x 2" lacerated wound on the left thigh and a wound
certificate was issued. He also admitted that he examined accused No.
13 and he found five tiny abrasions in the area of 4cm x 4cm on outer
surface of right thigh just above knee joint and the injured was referA
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] 2 S.C.R.
red to the radiologist. P. W. 7, however, stated that he has not seen the
A report of the radiologist. The defence examined Dr. S.K. Singh as
D.W. 1. He deposed that he took the X-ray of the right thigh of the
accused No. 13 Mahendra Kahar and the report was marked as an
exhibit. He further deposed that the shadows in the X-ray go to show
that there were 10 radio opaque round shadows and these shadows
B
may very well correspond to the pallets fired by some fire arms and the
same appear to have pierced upto muscles and bone. His examination
further showed that the pallets remained embedded in the thigh.
c
D
E
F
0
H
Before the trial court as well as before the High Court, firstly it
was contended on behalf of the accused that the eye witnesses are
highly interested and therefore, their evidence cannot be accepted and
even otherwise they have not come out with the whole truth and the
injuries found on two of the accused would go to show that the accused
acted in right of self-defence. Relying on the presence of gun-shots
injuries on accused No. 13 it was strongly contended that the prosecution party have also used fire-arms and, therefore, the accused were
entitled to the right of private defence. The trial court accepted the
evidence of all the three witnesses holding that their evidence is consistent and does not su(fer from any serious infirmity. So far as the plea
ofself-defence is concerned, the trial court held that the plea taken by
accused No. 6 was to be rejected mainly on the ground that there was
no material to show that at the pond the fishing operations were going
on. As regards the presence of injuries on the accused persons,
learned Sessions Judge having regard to the nature and size of the
injuries found on accused Nos. 13 and 14 took the view that they are
simple and that it is not proved that these injuries were received during
the occurrence. Regarding the presence of the alleged gun-shots
injuries on accused No. 13 he pointed out that the medical evidence is
inconclusive on the point whether those injuries were caused at the
time ·when this incident took place. In the appeal before the High
Court, Justice Katju took the view that the theory that the injuries on
accused Nos. 13 and 14 were self inflicted cannot be accepted and that
the plea taken by accused No. 6 appears to be probable in view of the
fact that the bullet found in the dead body of deceased No. 2 was fired
by a 16-Bore gun and that as admitted by the Investigating Officer,
P.W. 5, it was accused No. 6 only in that area who had a licence for
16-Bore gun which was deposited by him in the police station after the
occurrence. Coming to the injuries found on accused Nos. 13 and 14
Justice Katju took the view that they received injuries during the
course of the same occurrence and that the three eye-witnesses have
not furnished any explanation regarding those in.juries and that these
-·~
VIJAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P.'[REDDY, J.l
581
witnesses have falsely implicated some of the accused due to enmity
A
and, therefore, their evidence cannot be relied upon and accordingly
~-
ordered total acquittal. As already mentioned Justice Agrawal, on the
other hand, agreed with the trial court completely. Justice Seth, to
whom the case was referred because of the difference of opinion took a
third view and convicted only accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6 to whom
specifically overt acts were attributed. Dealing with the plea of self
B
defence Justice Seth held that lacerated injury on accused No. 14 was a
,
simple one and he could have received that even subsequent to the
-f
'
occurrence. With regard to the gun-shots injuries found on accused
No. 13 Mahendra Kahar, the learned Judge himself examined accused
~
No. 13 who was present in the Court when the appeal was being heard
~
and found that hard substance were palpable underneath the flesh
c
round about the location of his injury. In the circumstances it',does.
appear that fire-arm shots to exist underneath the location of injury
~-
found on the person of accused Mahendra Kahar. But he ultimately
held that in all probability the pallets found in the leg of accused No.
13 Mahendra Kahar must have been there long before the incident, as ·
in the view of the learned Judge it was doubtful that those pallets could
D
have entered the body through the external injuries which are described as tiny abrasions. Seth, J. accordingly rejected the plea of selfdefence.
-.,;.
Before we advert to the above contentions it becomes necessary
to consider whether the accused No. 13 Mahendra Kahar and accused
E
No. 14 Sant Singh received the injuries during the course of occurrence. P.W. 7 the Doctor examined accused No. 13 Mahendra Kahar
on 30.5.1980 at about 6 A.M. and he found the following injuries.
-
1. Five tiny abrasions in the area of 4cm x 4cm on outer surface
--
of right thigh just above knee joint.
/
F
~
2. The injured complained of pain in the right thumb and left
'
forearm.
In respect of injuty No. l..the Doctor advised X-ray with a view
to ascertain whether or not there were pallets; and pending the same G
he reserved his opinion. P.W. 7 also opined that injuries appeared to
-~~
have been caused within 24 hours preceding the medical examination
which correspond to the time of occurrence, namely, 8 A.M. on
29.5.1980. P.W. 7, however, stated that the X-ray report was not
Shown to him. The evidence of P. W. 7 makes it clear that accused No.
1:.'I Mahendra Kahar r.<;_ceived these injuries dllri?g the course of the H
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1990] 2 S.C.R.
A occurrence. D.W. 1 is the Doctor who took the X-ray. He deposed
that on 5.6.80 he took the X-ray of the right thigh of the undertrial
prisoner Mahendra Kahar accused No. 13 and the same is marked as
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Ex-Kha-12. On the basis of the X-ray plate he opined that he noticed
10 radio opaque round shadows in the injured and they correspond to
the pallets fired by some fire-arm. Justice Seth considered the eviB
dence of these two Doctors. He also examined the accused in the
Court and he found that hard substance were palpable underneath the
flesh. As already mentioned he was of the view that these appeared to ·--y.
be pallets but according to him they must have been there long before
the incident. The learned Judge took this view because he was doubtful that those pallets could have entered the body through the external
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c in juries which are described as tiny abrasions. Having given our care-
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ful consideration we are unable to agree with the view taken by Seth,
J. P.W. 7 the Doctor's evidence makes it clear that the external
injuries were caused during this occurrence only and underneath the
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same these pallets were found by the radiologist D.W. 1. The injuries
, are not self-inflicted. Therefore, there is no basis whatsoever to pre·
D sume that the pallets under the flesh must have been there already
even before this occurrence took place. As a matter of fact accused
No. 13 Mahendra Kahar was referred to the Doctor P.W. 7 since there
was an injury. P.W. 7 having examined him found that there were 10
'radio opaque round shadows underneath the injury and it was only for
that reason he referred the injured to the radiologist and D.W. 1 the v
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radiologist after taking the X-ray concluded that underneath the injury
pallets discharged from a fire-arm were embedded in the flesh. Therefore, the only view that is possible is that accused No. 13 Mahendra
Kahar received gun-shot injuries during the course of this occurrence
only. P.W. 7 also examined accused No. 14 Sant Singh on the same
day. He found a skin-deep 12' x2' lacerated wound vertically inflicted
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F on the front and outer surface of left thigh from which blood was
oozing and the injured complained of pain. The Doctor pointed out
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that the injury was simple and could have been cau_sed by blunt
weapon like a lathi. The injury was also stitched. It is suggested by the
prosecution that this could have been a self-intlicted one but again
there is no basis for such presumption. The Investigating Officer said
G that on finding the injury on him he was sent for medical examination.
As a matter of fact accused No. 6 in his statement under Section 313
stated that accused Nos. 13 and 14 received injuries and he also' went
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to the police station and lodged a report to that effect. It, therfore, .,_,L -
emerges that accused No. 13 received gun-shot injuries and accused
No. 14 received lacerated injury during the course of the same occurH rence and these in1uries must have been caused by some member
VUAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. [REDDY, J.]
583
belonging to the prosecution party.
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Now the question is whether the prosecution has explained these
in juries and if there is no such explanation what would be its effect?
We are not prepared to agree with the learned counsel for the defence
that in each and every case where prosecution fails to explain the
injuries found on some of the accused, the prosecution case should
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automatically be rejected, without any fur~her probe. He placed considerable reliance on some of the judgments of this Court. In Mohar
~ Rai & Bharath Rai v. The State of Bihar, [1968] 3 SCR 525, it is
observed:
.,.--
"Therefore the version of the appellants that they sustained
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injuries at the time of the occurrence is highly probabilised.
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Under these circumstances the prosecution had a duty to
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explain those injuries. The evidence of Dr. Bishnu Prasad
Sinha (P.W. 18) clearly shows that those injuries could not
have been self-inflicted and further, according to him it was
most unlikely that they would have been caused at the
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instance of the appellants themselves. Under these circumstances we are unable to agree with the High Court
that the prosecution had no duty to offer any explanation as
regards those injuries. In our judgment, the failure of the
prosecution to offer any explanation in that regard shows
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that evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the
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incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true. Further
those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants."
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In another important case Lakshmi Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar,
[ 1976] 4 SCC 394, after referring to the ratio laid down in Mohar Rai's
,....... case, this Court observed:
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"Where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the
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accused, two results follow:
( !) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is
untrue; and that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by
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the appellants.
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It was further observed that:
-. .:.... ..
"In a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries
sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurH
,
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584
<UPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] 2 S.C.R.
rence or in the course of altercation is a very important
circumstance from which the court can draw the following
inferences:
( 1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the
origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true
version;
(2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the
'--<
injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most
tmaterial point and, therefore, their evidence is unreliable.
(3) that in case there is a defence version which explains
the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much
greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a
version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one."
Relying on these two cases the learned counsel for the defence contended that in the instant case the prosecution has failed to explain the
in juries on the two accused and the genesis and the origin of the
occurrence have been suppressed and a true version has not been
presented before the Court and consequently the truth from falsehood
E cannot be separated and consequently the entire prosecution case
must be rejected. We are unable to agree. In Mohar Rai's case it is
made clear that failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation
regarding the injuries found on the accused may show that the
evidence related to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly
true. Likewise in Lakshmi Singh's case also it is observed that any
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non-explanation of the injuries on the accused by the prosecution may
affect the prosecution case. But such a non-explanation may assume
greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in
probability with that of the prosecution. But where the evidence is
clear, cogent and creditworthy and where the Court can distinguish the
G truth from falsehood the mere fact that the injuries are not explained
by the prosecution cannot by itself be a sole basis to reject such evidence, and consequently the whole case. Much depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the trial court as
well as the two learned Judges of the High Court accepted the prosecution case as put forward by P. Ws 1 to 3 in their evidence. The preH sence of these three witnesses could not be doubted at all. P.Ws 1 and
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I
VUAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. (REDDY, J.]
585
2 are the injured witnesses and P.W. 1 gave a report giving all the
details. However, he attributed specific overt acts to accused Nos. 1, 3,
4 and 6 and made an omnibus allegation against the remaining
accused. It is for this reason that Justice Seth found it to be safe to
tonvict only accused Nos. 1, 3,.4 and 6 who are the appellants before
us. P.Ws 1, 2 and 3 are the eye witnesses. We have carefully considered their evidence and nothing material is elicited in the crossexamination which renders their evidence wholly untrustworthy. No
doubt they have not explained the injuries found on accused Nos. 13
and 14. From this alone it cannot be said that the prosecution has
suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has not
presfnted a true version. Though they are interested, we find that
their evidence is clear, cogent and convincing. The only reasonable
inference that can be drawn is that the two accused persons received
the injuries during the course of the occurrence which were inflicted
on them by some members of the prosecution party.
As discussed above we are satisfied in this case that nonexplanation of injuries on these two accused persons does not affect
the prosecution case as a whole but in a case of this nature what all that
the defence can contend on the basis of non-explanation of injuries
found on these two accused is that the accused could have had a right
of private defence or at any rate a reasonable doubt arises in this
regard.
The learned counsel for the defence, however, submits that iffor
any reason the prosecution case in its entirety is not rejected because .
of the non-explanation of the injuries found on these two accused, yet
the right of private defence of the accused cannot be denied and that
on that score also these four convicted accused are entitled to an
acquittal. It is also their submission that a careful examination of the
provisions of Sections 96, 99 and 102 I.P.C. would show that on a
reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt or death the accused had a
right even to the extent of causing the death of the assailants and they
cannot be expected to modulate thi.s right in such a situation and that
in the instant case these four appellants were justified even to the
extent of causing death of the two deceased by inflicting gun-shot
wounds. In this context it is also submitted that the plea taken by
accused No. 6, Chirkut Singh that he shot at the two deceased persons
in;;elf-defence'cannot be brushed aside.
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We should at this juncture point out that the plea taken by
accused No. 6, Chirkut Singh does not commend itself. The same
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586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] 2 S.C.R.
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appears to be an after-thought. The observation report and other
circumstances in the case would show that there were no fishing operations in the pond. Therefore, the plea of accused No. 6, Chirkut Singh
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that fishing operations were going on in the pond and that he and some
of the other accused went there and that was the genesis and the origin
of the occurrence, has no basis whatsoever. On the other hand, the
B evidence of the eye-witnesses regarding the time, place and manner of
occurrence in general, as put forward by the prosecution, cannot be
doubted at all.
IWe shall now consider the submission whether the accused.)lad
the right of self-defence. Learned counsel for the State contendedlhat
~
c if the accused want to claim the benefit of the general or special excep- -
tion of the right of private defence then they should plead and discharge the burden by establishing that they are entitled to the benefit
of exception as provided under Section 105 of the Evidence Act. In 'r
other words, the submission is that the burden of proof of the existence of such a right is on the accused and that in the instant case the
D accused have not discharged the burden and that mere presence of
'
simple in juries on the accused cannot necessarily lead to an inference
that they had a right of self-defence. We have already held that having
;-
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, mere non-explanation of these injuries by the prosecution cannot render the whole case
)
unacceptable. We have also held that those injuries on one of the
~
E accused No. 13, Mahendra Kahar were inflicted by a fire-arm during
the same occurrence. Under these circumstances, the important question that we have to consider is whether the accused should be denied
the benefit of an exception on the ground that the accused have not
discharged the necessary burden of establishing their right to the
benefit of the exception beyond all reasonable doubt just like the
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F prosecution is bound under Section 102 of the Evidence Act, or if upon
a consideration of the evidence as a whole and the surrounding facts
~
and circumstances of the case, a reasonable doubt is created in the
mind of the court about the existence of such a right whether the
accused, in such a situation, is entitled to the benefit of the said exception, i.e. the right of private defence. If so, whether they have
G exceeded the same?
The nature and extent of the burden that the accused has to
discharge under Section 105 of the Evidence Act has been one of
,;_questions of great general importance and for considerable time the
opinions of the Courts were not uniform. As a matter of fact, in Partap
H v. State of U. P., AIR 1976 SC 966, this Court _noted "that the question
VUAYEE SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. [REDDY, J.)
587
of law that arises here seems to have troubled several High Courts."
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The phrase "burden of proof' is not defined in the Act. In
respect ·of criminal cases, it is an accepted principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the burden is always on the prosecution and never
shifts. This flows from the cardinal principle that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty by the prosecution and the
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accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Section
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105 of the Evidence Act is in the following terms:
"When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of
...,,-
proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case
within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal c
Code, or within any special exception or proviso contained
in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining
·y-·
the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the
absence of such circumstances."
The Section to some extent places the onus of proving any exception in
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a penal statute on the accused. The burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the exceptions mentioned
therein is upon him. The Section further lays down that the Court
shall presume non-existence of circumstances bringing the case within
--1""
an exception." The words "the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances" occuring in the Section are very significant. It is wellE
settled that "this burden" which rests on the accused does.not absolve
the prosecution from discharging its initial burden of establishing the
case beyond all reasonable doubts. It is also well-settled that the
~
accused need not set up a specific plea of his offel)Ce and adduce
)---
evidence. That being so the question is: what is the nature of burden
that lies on the accused under Section 105 if benefit of the general
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exception of private defence is claimed and how it can be discharged?
In Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, [ 1935) Appeal
Cases 462, Viscount Sankey, L.C. observed:
"When evidence of death and malice has been given (this is
a question for the jury), the prisoner is entitled to show by
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evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced
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by the Crown that the act on his part which caused death
-1was either unintentional or provoked. If the jury are either
satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all, the
evidence are left in reasonable doubt whether, evenif his
explanation be not accepted, the act was unintentional or
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588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1990] 2 S.C.R.
provoked, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted."
It is further observed:
"Just as there is evidence on behalf of the prosecution so
there may be evidence on behalf of the prisoner which may
cause a doubt as to his guilt. In either case, he is entitled to
the benefit of the doubt.