# VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI

- **Citation:** [2010] 1 S.C.R. 1069
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-01-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2009
- **Bench:** Harjit Singh Bedi, J.M. Panchal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vijay-kumar-arora-v-state-govt-of-nct-of-delhi-26527
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder of wife - Death due
A
B
to more than 90% burn injuries - Circumstantial evidence -
Verbal dying declaration of deceased before five witnesses
C
implicating the accused - Parents and sister of deceased
alleging physical and mental cruelty meted out to deceased
by accused - Extra marital relations of accused also proved
- Defence case that the death was either suicidal or accidental
- Conviction by courts below - Held: Conviction justified -
D
The facts and circumstances of the case prove that the case
was neither suicidal nor accidental, it was homicidal -Physical
and mental cruelty against the deceased is proved - Motive
of the accused for the murder is also proved - Testimony of
the witnesses establish that the deceased made the dying E
declaration - These witnesses are truthful - Medical evidence
also proves that the case was homicidal - The circumstances
from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn are proved
conclusively - Circumstantial evidence.
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence -
Yardsticks for
F
reliance on - Discussed.
The appellant-accused was prosecuted for causing
death of his wife. The prosecution case was that the
injured wife who had sustained burn injuries, was
G
admitted to the hospital by (appellant-accused) at 2.30
a.m. on the fateful night. On the information of the Duty
Constable posted at the said hospital, Daily Diary entry
was made in the police station and one ASI was deputed.
1069
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A He collected MLC of the injured, wherein it was
mentioned that she died due to exploding of stove; that
her clothes were smelling of kerosene. As per the MLC,
the injured was declared unfit to make statement at about
4.30 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. The injured ultimately succumbed
B to the burn injuries.
Thereafter, father of the deceased gave a written
complaint to police, mentioning that his daughter was
burnt to death by her husband and mother-in-law and
C other family members. He stated that the victim had, at
12.15 p.m., declared before him that the appellantaccused and his mother and his other .relatives had set
her on fire. ·
Case was registered against the appellant-accused
D and his mother u/s. 302/34 IPC. Plea of the appellantaccused was that the deceased died as the stove
exploded when the deceased had gone to boil the milk
for their infant daughter. On hearing the cry, he got up
and tried to extinguish the fire to save the deceased. In
E the process, he also received burn injuries on his palms.
Trial court held that the deceased had neither
committed suicide nor received the injuries accidentally,
but was set ablaze. The court convicted the appellantF accused u/s. 302 IPC. However, his mother was acquitted
in absence of sufficient evidence against her.
High Court dismissed the appeal against the trial
court judgment confirming the conviction. Hence the
G present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In dealing with circumstantial evidence,
there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion
H lingering on mind may take place of proof. Suspicion,
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1071
DELHI
however strong, cannot be allowed to take place of proof A
and, therefore, the Court has to be watchful and ensure
that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of legal
proof. However, it is no derogation of evidence to say that
it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in
expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the
B
circumstances can not fail. [Para 9] [1083-G-H; 1084-A],
1.2. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of.
guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully · C
established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be
proved individually. However, in applying this principle,
a distinction must be made between facts called primary
or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be
drawn from them, on the other. [Para 9] [108

## Text

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[2009] 8 S.C.R. 1069
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA
v.
STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
(Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2009)
JANUARY 13, 2010
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder of wife - Death due
A
B
to more than 90% burn injuries - Circumstantial evidence -
Verbal dying declaration of deceased before five witnesses
C
implicating the accused - Parents and sister of deceased
alleging physical and mental cruelty meted out to deceased
by accused - Extra marital relations of accused also proved
- Defence case that the death was either suicidal or accidental
- Conviction by courts below - Held: Conviction justified -
D
The facts and circumstances of the case prove that the case
was neither suicidal nor accidental, it was homicidal -Physical
and mental cruelty against the deceased is proved - Motive
of the accused for the murder is also proved - Testimony of
the witnesses establish that the deceased made the dying E
declaration - These witnesses are truthful - Medical evidence
also proves that the case was homicidal - The circumstances
from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn are proved
conclusively - Circumstantial evidence.
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence -
Yardsticks for
F
reliance on - Discussed.
The appellant-accused was prosecuted for causing
death of his wife. The prosecution case was that the
injured wife who had sustained burn injuries, was
G
admitted to the hospital by (appellant-accused) at 2.30
a.m. on the fateful night. On the information of the Duty
Constable posted at the said hospital, Daily Diary entry
was made in the police station and one ASI was deputed.
1069
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A He collected MLC of the injured, wherein it was
mentioned that she died due to exploding of stove; that
her clothes were smelling of kerosene. As per the MLC,
the injured was declared unfit to make statement at about
4.30 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. The injured ultimately succumbed
B to the burn injuries.
Thereafter, father of the deceased gave a written
complaint to police, mentioning that his daughter was
burnt to death by her husband and mother-in-law and
C other family members. He stated that the victim had, at
12.15 p.m., declared before him that the appellantaccused and his mother and his other .relatives had set
her on fire. ·
Case was registered against the appellant-accused
D and his mother u/s. 302/34 IPC. Plea of the appellantaccused was that the deceased died as the stove
exploded when the deceased had gone to boil the milk
for their infant daughter. On hearing the cry, he got up
and tried to extinguish the fire to save the deceased. In
E the process, he also received burn injuries on his palms.
Trial court held that the deceased had neither
committed suicide nor received the injuries accidentally,
but was set ablaze. The court convicted the appellantF accused u/s. 302 IPC. However, his mother was acquitted
in absence of sufficient evidence against her.
High Court dismissed the appeal against the trial
court judgment confirming the conviction. Hence the
G present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In dealing with circumstantial evidence,
there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion
H lingering on mind may take place of proof. Suspicion,
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1071
DELHI
however strong, cannot be allowed to take place of proof A
and, therefore, the Court has to be watchful and ensure
that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of legal
proof. However, it is no derogation of evidence to say that
it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in
expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the
B
circumstances can not fail. [Para 9] [1083-G-H; 1084-A],
1.2. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of.
guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully · C
established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be
proved individually. However, in applying this principle,
a distinction must be made between facts called primary
or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be
drawn from them, on the other. [Para 9] [1084-A-C]
1.3. With regard to proof of primary facts, the court
has to judge the evidence and decide whether that
evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved,
D
the question whether that fact leads to an inference of
guilt of the accused person should be considered. In
E
dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of
benefit of doubt applies. Although, there should not be
any missing links in the case, yet it is not essential that
each of the links must appear on the surface of the
evidence adduced and some of these links may have to
F
be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these
inferences, the court must have regard to the common
course of natural events and to human conduct and their
relations to the facts of the particular case. The Court
thereafter has to consider the effect of proved facts. In
G
deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for
the purpose of conviction, the court has to consider the
total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one
of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
combined effect of all these facts taken together is
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the
conviction would be justified even though it may be that
one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is, or
are not decisive. The facts established should be
cons.istent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
B accused and should exclude every hypothesis, except
the one sought to be proved. [Para 9) [1084-C-G]
1.4. But this does not mean that before the
prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and
C every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever
extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a
chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
D human probability the act must have been done by the
accused; and where the various links in a chain are in
themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence
may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.
[Para 9) [1084-G-H; 1085-A-B]
E
2. On overall view of the circumstances of the case,
the Court is of the opinion that the deceased did not die
a suicidal death. A critical analysis of the paragraphs from
the diary relied on by the accused to suggest suicidal
F death of the deceased, does not indicate any suicidal
tendencies on the part of the deceased. No suggestion
was made by the defence to any of the prosecution
witnesses that the deceased had developed suicidal
tendencies. The paragraphs make it more than clear that
the relations between the deceased on the one hand and
G her husband and members of his family on the other,
were strained one. However, those paragraphs do not
indicate that the deceased was of feeble mind and had
developed tendency to commit suicide. It is also nobody's
case that the deceased was not a caring mother. The
H
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1073
DELHI
testimony of the father of the deceased makes it more A
than clear that the behaviour of the father-in-law of the
deceased towards the newly born child was not good at
all. Under the circumstances, if the deceased had
decided to put an end to her life by committing suicide,
in normal course, she would have left her daughter to the
B
care of her own parents but no attempt, at any point of
time, was made by the deceased to leave the infant child
to the care of her parents. Normally, a woman committing
suicide will leave a suicidal note. But it is nobody's case
that any suicidal note written by the deceased was found c
after she had received burn injuries. Further, if the
deceased had been fed up with her life and had decided
to commit suicide, she would not have failed to inform
the appellant that because of lack of love and affection
on his part, she had set herself ablaze. [Para 12) (10870
G; 1086-G-H; 1087-A-FJ.
3.1. The circumstances proved by the prosecution
establish beyond pale of doubt that the deceased had
died a homicidal death and not an accidental death as
suggested by the defence. [Para 13] (1091-G]
E
3.2. The panchnama of the place of incident
establishes that the place suggested by the defence
where the deceased was found engulfed in fire is a
narrow passage where several articles were lying. The
F
panchnama does not indicate that any article was burnt
except a towel which was found partially burnt Further,
the story put forth by the appellant that at midnight the
deceased had got up for boiling milk for the infant itself
does not inspire confidence of the Court. Even if it is G
assumed for the sake of argument that the deceased had
got up at 2.00 am for boiling milk for the infant, it does
not sound reasonable to believe that she would attempt
to light a kerosene stove in the dingy and cramped
passage normally used for washing clothes, utensils etc.
H
107 4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A and would not go in the kitchen and use gas connection
for the purpose of heating the milk. [Para 13) [1088-A-D;
F-H]
3.3. As the record does not show that. other articles
8 lying in the narrow passage were ·extensively burnt, it
becomes highly doubtful whether the incident in question
had at all taken place in the passage as suggested by the
appellant. [Para 13) [1089-C-D]
3.4. The presence of kerosene oil on the body of the
C deceased and clothes put on by hQr, rules out the theory
of accidental fire, as suggested by the defence. The
medical evidence on record makes it evident that soot
particles were present in the stomach of the deceased.
This indicates that the injuries could have been sustained
D by the deceased only in a conflagration and that too In a
closed area. [Para 13] [1089-G-H; 1090-A]
3.5. In this case, the record does not indicate that any
attempt was made by the deceased to run towards any
E open space and positively establishes that she was
found at the end of the passage which hardly
admeasures 12? x 3? [Para 13] [1090-B-C]
3.6. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument
that in the instant case, the appellant had made an
F attempt to extinguish fire with his bare hands, it is
reasonable to infer that he would have received-extensive
burn injuries because the whole body of the deceased
was on fire and ultimately it was found that she had
received almost 100% burn injuries. The medical
G evidence on record indicates that the appellant had
sustained first to second degree burns over the dorsum
and wrist of his right hand with blisters at places, some
of which had already burst. The case of the appellant that
the deceased had informed him that she had sustained
H burn injuries because the kerosene oil stove had burst
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1075
DELHI
into a vaporized flame does not inspire the confidence
A
at all. [Para 13) [1090-D-G]
3.7. The established facts of the case abundantly
indicate that kerosene oil stove was planted at the site
in a fake attempt to hide the homicidal death. The
presence of extensive burns with more than 90% burn
8
injuries rules out the theory of accidental fire. [Para 13)
[1091-8-E)
Surinder Kumar v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1987
SC 692, relied on.
C
4.1. The evidence of father of the deceased would
indicate that the deceased was subjected to physical and
mental cruelty for bringing insufficient dowry. The
testimony of the father regarding physical and mental
0
cruelty meted out to his daughter gets corroboration from
the testimony of the mother and the sister of the
deceased. The record further shows that 22 letters were
recovered from the tenanted premises of the appellant.
Those letters were written by a woman. Some of the
letters show that the appellant was simultaneously E
carrying affairs with two/three girls. The evidence relating
to cruelty meted out by the appellant to the deceased for
bringing insufficient dowry and his extra-marital relations
would show that he had a strong motive to do away with
the deceased. Thus, the second circumstance of motive
sought to be relied upon by the prosecution is also firmly
established. [Para 14) [1091-H; 1092-A-D-H]
F
4.2. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution against the appellant is that the deceased
G
had made a verbal dying declaration. The evidence of six
of the witnesses would indicate that the deceased had
stated before them that she was held by her husband,
,and her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil. over her
before she was set on fire. The. father of the deceased,
H
1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 1 S.C.R.
A the mother of the deceased, PW 6 and PW 11 would
indicate that each of them had entreated and implored
different authorities to get the statement of the deceased
recorded. The testimony of father of the deceased would
show that he had requested Assistant Commissioner of
8 Police to record the statement of the deceased but he had
refused to oblige saying that on her MLC, it was
mentioned that she was unfit to make a statement. The
witness has further stated that thereafter he had met
Doctor who was in- charge of Burns Ward and requested
C him to record the statement of the deceased but he had
refused to record the same saying that he had to attend
some operation. The evidence of mother of the deceased
shows that she had beseeched Sub-Inspector to record
the statement of her daughter but he refused to record
the same saying that the doctor had declared the
D deceased unfit to make the statement. The testimony of
PW6 would indicate that he had gone to the extent of
visiting Tees Hazari Courts in the company of one SubInspector and had gone to the hospital with an SOM to
record the statement of the deceased. The testimony of
E PW 11 satisfactorily establishes that when the Assistant
Sub-Inspector sitting inside the Burns Ward had refused
to record the statement of the deceas~d, he had
immediately gone to the shop to bring a tape recorder and
had returned to the hospital with tape recorder but the
F hospital staff and nurses on duty had prevented him from
taking the tape recorder inside the burns ward and,
therefore, he could not record the dying declaration of the
deceased. The statements made on oath by these
witnesses would indicate that the deceased was in a fit
G state of mind to make a statement and was talking and,
therefore, the four witnesses had made frantic efforts and
craved different authorities to record the statement of the
deceased. [Para 15] (1093-A, F-H; 1094-A-H; 1095-A-C;
1096-E-H; 1097-A]
H
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1077
DELHI
Sunder Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1211,
A
referred to.
4.3. It is true that the police statements of PWs 6, 10
and 11 before whom the deceased had made dying
declarations, were recorded after one month from the
8
date of the death of the deceased. However, neither an
explanation was sought from any of the witnesses as to
why their police statements were recorded after a delay
of one month nor the Investigating Officer was
questioned about the delay in recording statements of
those witnesses. Unless the Investigating Officer is asked
C
questions about delay in recording statements and
explanation is sought from the witnesses as to why their
statements were recorded late, the statements by
themselves did not become suspicious or concocted.
The evidence of the above-mentioned witnesses would
D
indicate that though they are neighbours of the father of.
the deceased, they were neither got up nor concocted
witnesses, No enmity is suggested to any of the
witnesses with the appellant. Under the circumstances,
their evidence could not have been rejected on the
E
ground stated by the High Court unless the same was
found suffering from inherent improbability. [Para 15)
[1095-F-H; 1096-A-C]
4.4. It is true that on MLC of the deceased, it was
endorsed that she was unfit to make a statement at about
4.30 am and 11.00 am on April 6, 1983. However, keeping
F
in view the statements on oath made by the abovenamed witnesses which are not seriously challenged in
their searching cross-examination, it would be safe to G
infer and conclude that medical record at about 12.00
Noon or 12.30 pm did not mention at all that the deceased
was not in a fit state of mind to make a statement. [Para
15] [1097 -C-D]
4.5. On the facts and in the circumstances of the
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A case, this Court has no hesitation in relying upon the
truthful testimony of the relatives and neighbours of the
deceased which unerringly establishes that the deceased
had made dying declaration before those witnesses
implicating the appellant. The circumstance, namely,
B deceased had made dying declaration before six
witnesses implicating the appellant is firmly established.
[Para 15) [1097-D-F]
4.6. On reappraisal of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the circumstances from which the
C conclusion about the guilt of the appellant is to be drawn
are fully proved. The circumstances proved are
conclusive in nature. All the facts so established are
consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the
appellant and inconsistent with his innocence. The
D circumstances proved exclude the possibility of guilt of
any person other than the appellant. [Para 16) [1097-F-G] _
4.7. The defence that the deceased had received burn
injuries accidentally, is disbelieved by the trial court and
E the High Court as well as by this Court. This false plea/
defence of the appellant is called into aid only to lend
assurance that the circumstances taken in cumulative,
suggest that it was the appellant who had murdered his
wife. No error is committed either by the trial court or the
F High Court in convicting the appellant under Section 302
IPC for committing murder of his wife. [Paras 16 and 17)
[1097-H; 1098-A-C]
G
H
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1987 SC 692
AIR 1962 SC 1211
Relied on.
Referred to.
Para 13
Para 15
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 125 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 15.5.2008 of the High
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1079
DELHI
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 183 of
A
1992.
Shashi Kumar Dubey, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj, Yash Pal
Chopra Yogesh Tiwari, Sunil Roy for the Appellant.
P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Sadhna Sandhu, Naresh Kaushik,
B
Anil Katiyar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave, C
questions the legality of Judgment dated May 15, 2008
rendered by Division Bench of High Court of Delhi in Criminal
Appeal No.183 of 1992 by which Judgment dated September
29, 1992 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Delhi in Sessions Case No.100 of 1989 convicting the
appellant under Section 302 lPC and sentencing him to R.I. for
D
life and fine of Rs.2000/-in default R.I. for one year, is confirmed.
2. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as
under:
The marriage of deceased Shashi was solemnised with
the appellant on January 30, 1982. After marriage, the
deceased started living with the appellant at his place of
residence situated at Chandigarh.
E
F
3. During the subsistence of the marriage, the deceased
gave birth to a girl child on January 2, 1983 at New Delhi.
Thereafter, the deceased went to Chandigarh to reside with the
appellant. On April 4, 1983, the appellant with his wife and child
came to Delhi from Chandigarh. After visiting the parents of the
appellant, they went to the house of the parents of the deceased
G
and took dinner there. After taking dinner, the appellant and the
deceased with the child returned to the house of parents of the
appellant at about 11.30 pm and retired to bed. At about 2.30
am on April 6, 1983, shrieks of the deceased were heard and
she was found engulfed in the flames. At about 2.45 am on the
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A night intervening between April 5 and April 6, 1983, the
deceased was admitted to Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain
Hospital, New Delhi (LNJPN Hospital, for short) with burn
injuries. The Duty Constable posted at the said hospital sent a
telephonic message at about 3.00 am that Shashi, aged about
B 26 years, with burn injuries sustained in her house was admitted
by her husband, i.e., the appellant. This message was recorded
at DD No.6A. On receipt of the message, ASI Hans Raj along
with Constable Umrao Singh went to the hospital. He collected
· MLC of injured Shashi wherein it was mentioned that the injured
c was got admitted at 2.45 am by her husband and Dr. S.K.
Bindal. It was also mentioned therein that the accident occurred
due to the exploding of the stove. It was further mentioned in
the said certificate that her clothes were smelling of kerosene
oil and she had received extensive burns all over the body and
D face.
4. As per the endorsement recorded on the MLC, the
injured was declared unfit to make statement at about 4.30 am
and 11 am on April 6, 1983. Under the circumstances, ASI
Hans Raj recorded the statement of the appellant in the hospital
E wherein the appellant claimed that at about 2.15 am, his wife
Smt. Shashi had got up for boiling the milk for their three
months' old child and he had got up from the bed on hearing
her shouts "Raje Raje". In his statement, the appellant
mentioned that he immediately rushed and found his wife
F Shashi in flames in the kitchen and that her clothes had caught
fire while Shashi was boiling the milk on the stove. It was also
mentioned by the appellant in his statement that he had received
burn injuries on palm when he had made attempt to extinguish
the fire to save his wife. The record shows that said injured
G Shashi succumbed to her burn injuries in the hospital at about
3.15 pm on April 6, 1983. On the same day, Mr. Ram Nath
Mehra, the father of the deceased submitted a written complaint
before the Police mentioning that his daughter was burnt to
death by Beena Arora who was her mother in law as well as
H by V.K. Arora who was her husband and by other family
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1081
DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
members on the night intervening between April 5 and April 6,
A
1983, It was mentioned by Mr. Mehra in his complaint that
injured Shashi had regained her senses in the hospital at about
12.15 pm on April 6, 1983 and had declared weepingly in his
presence and in the presence of his other relatives that she had
been set on fire by her mother-in-law, the appellant and his other
B
family members. On the basis of the complaint, offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were
registered and investigation commenced. On completion of
investigation, the appellant and his mother Mrs. Beena Arora
were chargesheeted for commission of offence punishable c
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. As the offence
punishable under Section 302 is exclusively triable by the Court
of Sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court, Delhi
for trial.
5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, to whom the
D ·
case Was made over for trial, framed charge 'against the
appellant and his mother under Section 302 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code. The same was read over and
explained to them. The appellant and his mother did not plead
guilty to the same and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the
E
prosecution examined several witnesses and produced
documents in support of its case against the appellant and his
mother. On completion of recording of evidence of prosecution
witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge explained to the
appellant and his mother the circumstances appearing against
F
them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and recorded
their further statements as required by Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As far as the mother of the
appellant is concerned, she claimed that she was falsely
involved ·in the case and was innocent. The appellant in his
G
further statement claimed that when he was asleep, he was
awakened by the shrieks of his wife and, therefore, had come
out in the verandah and had seen his wife in flames. According
to him, he tried to extinguish the fire with his hands and water
and in that process received burn injuries on his hands. What
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(2010) 1. S.C.R.
A was claimed by the appellant was that he called a doctor and
rang up his father-in-law but he was not remembering the exact
time at which the information about the deceased having
sustained bum injuries was conveyed to his father-in-law. It was
stated by him that he told the family of his father-in-law to come
B to the hospital and that his injured wife herself had told him that
she had caught fire while she was boiling milk on the stove. It
was also mentioned by him in his further statement that he was
informed by his wife that the stove had inflamed (bhabhak
gaya). He claimed in his statement that he would file a written
c statement if so advised.
6. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the learned Judge of Trial Court held that ASI Mr.
Hans Raj to whom DD report was marked at about 3 am on
the night intervening April 5 and April 6, 1983 conducted
D himself in the most dishonest and partisan manner in making
enquiry and in conducting investigation after registration of the
first information report. The learned Judge further noticed that
the conduct of Mr. V.P. Gupta, who was the then SHO of P.S.
Moti Nagar and presently ACP was not above board.
E According to the learned Judge, the then SHO Mr. V.P. Gupta
had passed on his entire burden on the shoulders of ASI Hans
Raj without doing absolutely anything in the name of fair
investigation. After noticing that the deceased had sustained
accidental burns leading to her death on the night intervening
F April 5 and April 6, 1983 at her matrimonial home located at
F-503, Karam Pura, Delhi, the learned Judge held that the case
against the appellant and his mother was based on
circumstantial evidence. The learned Judge considered the
circumstances established by the prosecution and held that the
G deceased had neither committed suicide nor received burn
injuries accidentally but was set ablaze by the appellant.
According to the learned Judge, the circumstances brought on
record were inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant arid
established that, in all human probability, the act of murder of
H the deceased was committed by the appellant. The learned
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1083
DELHI {J.M. PANCHAL, J.)
Judge noticed that no satisfactory evidence could be adduced
A
by the prosecution to establish the guilt of original accused No.2
who was mother of the appellant. In view of the said
conclusions, the learned Judge, by judgment dated September
29, 1992, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and
sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of
B
Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) in default rigorous
imprisonment for one year and acquitted his mother.
7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal
No.183 of 1992 before Delhi High Court. The Division Bench
C
of the High Court has dismissed the appeal, giving rise to the
instant. appeal. ·
8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered
the docu·ments forming part of the appeal.
D
9. It is not in dispute that the case against the appellant
rests on circumstantial evidence. It would be advantageous to
restate the well settled law relating to appreciation of
circumstantial evidence. The evidence tendered in a court of
E
law is either 'direct' or 'circumstantial'. Evidence is said to be
'direct' if it consists of an eye-witness account of the facts in
issue in a criminal case. On the other hand, circumstantial
evidence is evidence of relevant facts from which, one can, by
· process of intuitive reasoning, infer about the existence of facts
in issue or factum probandum. Es.sential ingredients to prove
the guilt of an accused by circumstantial evidence are :
The law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled.
F
In dealing with circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger
that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind may take place
G
of proof. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be allowed to take
place of proof and, therefore, the Court has to be watchful and
ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of
legal proof. However, it is no derogation of evidence to say that
it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in expressing
H
1084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 1 S.C.R.
A picturisation of actual incident, but the circumstances can not
fail. Therefore, many a times it is aptly said that "men may tell
lies, but circumstances do not". In cases where evidence is of
a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance,
B be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must
be proved individually. However, in applying this principle, a
distinction must be made between facts called primary or basic
on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them,
on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has
c to judge the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves
a particular fact and if that fact is proved, the question whether
that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the accused person
should be considered. In dealing with this aspect of the
problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. Although,
0 there should not be any missing links in the case, yet it is not
essential that each of the links must appear on the surface of
the evidence adduced and some of these links may have to
be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these inferences,
the court must have regard to the common course of natural
events and to human conduct and their relations to the facts of
E the particular case. The Court thereafter has to consider the
effect of proved facts. In deciding the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, Court has
to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts,
each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
F combined effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive
in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be
justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts
by itself or themselves is, or are not decisive. The facts
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
G guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis,
except the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean
that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every
hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant
H and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF1085
DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
A
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused; and where the various links in a chain
are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false
defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the
B
Court.
10. Having noticed the principles governing the case
based on the circumstantial evidence, this Court proposes to
consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
c
11. The first circumstance sought to be relied upon by the
prosecution is that the deceased died a homicidal death. A
human death may be a natural one or homicidal one or
accidental or suicidal one. It is not the case of anyone that the
deceased Shashi had died a natural death. Therefore, the
D
question which falls for determination of this Court is whether
she died a homicidal death or a suicidal death or an accidental
death. The medical evidence on record shows that after the
deceased had succumbed to her burn injuries, post mortem
examination was conducted by Dr. G.K. Sharma on April 7,
E
1983 at 12 noon. On external examination, the doctor found that
there were superficial bums all over the body except patches
over scalp, lower front of abdomen, perineum, left buttock and
inner part of right buttock. According to the doctor, the
approximate area of burn was about 90%. When the post
F
mortem was being perfoqTied, the doctor could not smell
kerosene oil. On internal examination, it was found by the doctor
that all the organs were congested. According to the doctor,
the death of the deceased was due to shock and toxemia due
to burns by fire. What is important to notice is that the defence
G
had not cross-examined Dr. G.K. Sharma at all.
12. Having regard to the nature of injuries noticed by Dr.
G.K. Sharma, who had performed autopsy on the dead body
of the deceased, the Court will have to examine the question
whether those injuries were received by the deceased while · H
1086
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 1 S.C.R.
A committing suicide. It may be mentioned that in the further
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the case of the appellant is that the deceased
had died accidentally while boiling milk for the infant and it was
never claimed by him in his further statement that the deceased
B had committed suicide. However, it was argued by the learned
counsel for the appellant that personal diary maintained by the
deceased indicates that she was a highly sensitive woman who
expected wholehearted love and affection from the appellant
but having been thoroughly disappointed, out of sheer disgust,
c frustration and depression, she might have chosen to end her
life. The relevant passage from the diary of the deceased relied
upon by the defence has been quoted in paragraph 24 of the
impugned judgment. A critical analysis of those paragraphs from
the diary does not indicate any suicidal tendencies on the part
0 of the deceased. No suggestion was made by the defence to
any of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased had
developed suicidal tendencies. It is well to remember that the
deceased was well educated and a teacher by profession. She
had a three months old child. The paragraphs from the diary
E quoted in the impugned judgment make it more than clear that
the relations between the deceased on the one hand and her
husband and members of his family on the other, were strained
one. However, those paragraphs do not indicate that the
deceased was of feeble mind and had developed !endency to
commit suicide. It is relevant to notice that it is nobody's case
F that the deceased was not a caring mother. The lingering doubt
about the uncertain future of the infant aged three months would
surely deter the deceased from committing the suicide. As
noticed earlier, the deceased in the company of the appellant
and her child had come to the house of the parents of the
G appellant from the house of her parents after taking dinner. It
could not even be remotely suggested on behalf of the appellant
either to the father or to the mother or to the sister of the
deceased that when the deceased, in the company of the
appellant, had come for dinner, she was found to be
H disheartened or gloomy or nervous or depressed. The
VIJAY KUMAR ARORA v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF 1087
DELHI [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
passages quoted in the impugned judgment from the diary
A
maintained by the deceased indicate a firm resolve on the part
of the deceased to lead a life for herself away from her husband
and her in-laws. The testimony of the father of the deceased
makes it more than clear that the behaviour of the father-in-law
of the deceased towards the newly born child was not good at
B
all. Under the circumstances, if the deceased had decided to
put an end to her life by committing suicide, in normal course,
she would have ieft her daughter to the care of her own parents
but no attempt, at any point of time, was made by the deceased_
to leave the infant child to the care of her parents. The evidence c
of the father of the deceased on the contrary makes it very clear
that the appellant wanted to leave the infant daughter with the
parents of the deceased but the deceased had not agreed to
the said suggestion. Further, what is normally found in a case
of suicide by a recently married woman who has given birth to
0
a child shortly before the suicide is that she would bolt herself
in a room or a kitchen or a bathroom to see that no one makes
any attempt to save her and would commit suicide along with
the child. However, the facts of the present case do not indicate
that the deceased had locked herself inside a room or kitchen
or bathroom nor the record shows that any attempt was made
E
by her to commit suicide with her infant. As noticed earlier, the
deceased was highly educated lady and was blessed with
motherhood. Normally, a woman committing suicide will leave
a suicidal note. But it is nobody's case that any suicidal note
written by the deceased was found after she had received burn
injuries. Further, if the deceased had been fed up with her life
and had decided to commit suicide, she would not have failed
to inform the appellant that because of lack of love and affection
on his part she had set herself ablaze.
On overall view of the circumstances brought on the record
of the case, this Court is of the firm opinion that the deceased
did not die a suicidal death.
F
G
13. The next question which falls for consideration of the
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010) 1 S.C.R.
A Court is whether the deceased died an accidental death. As
observed in the earlier part of this judgment, the case of the
appellant is that while boiling milk for the infant, the clothes of
the deceased caught fire accidentally because of the flames
emanating from the stove as a result of which she died. The
B panchnama of the place of incident establishes that the place
suggested by the defence where the deceased was found
engulfed in fire is a narrow passage where several articles were
lying. If the deceased had died because of the flames
emanating from the stove, the other articles lying nearby would
c have been found to be burnt. However, admittedly the
panchnama of place of incident does not indicate that any
article was burnt except a towel which was found partially burnt.
Further, the story put forth by the appellant that at midnight the
deceased had got up for boiling milk for the infant itself does
0 not inspire confidence of the Court. The deceased who was a
teacher by profession and well educated must be
breastfeeding her three months old infant and it would not be
reasonable to infer that the infant was being fed buffalo or any
other milk. It may also be mentioned that the deceased in the
company of the appellant had left her parental home between
E 11 pm to 11.15 pm on April 5, 1983 and must not have gone
to sleep before 11.30 pm. From this fact, it would be reasonable
to hold that before going to the sleep, the young infant child
must have been fed and the child would not have required
another feed within two hours. Thus, the story that deceased
F got up at 2.00 am in the night to boil the milk for the infant does
not inspire confidence of the Court. The panchnama of the place
of incident also makes it clear that there was a kitchen in which
there was a gas cylinder. Therefore, even if it is assumed for
the sake of argument that the deceased had got up at 2.00 am
G for boiling milk for the infant, it does not sound reasonable to
believe that she would attempt to light a kerosene stove in the
dingy and cramped passage normally used for washing clothes,
utensils etc.