# VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF DELHI

- **Citation:** [2023] 4 S.C.R. 748
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-04-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No.2276 of 2022
- **Bench:** K. M. Joseph, S. Ravindra Bhat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vikas-chaudhary-v-the-state-of-delhi-37098
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Sentence/Sentencing:
Imposition of a fixed term sentence of 30 years, without
remission - Correctness of - Victim aged 18 years, kidnapped for
ransom and on the same day was killed by strangulation, and the
body was burnt, to eliminate evidence - Pursuant to the commission
of murder, the accused regularly made ransom calls to the family -
Trial court convicted all the accused persons u/ss. 302, 364A, 201,
r/w s. 120B - Appellants-A-1 and A-2 also convicted u/s. 411 with
A-1 additionally u/ss. 420, 468 and 471 and sentenced to life
imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life without any
parole, remission, or furlough before completing 30 years of
imprisonment - Upheld by the High Court - On appeal, held: Power
to impose "special" or "fixed term sentences" is with this Court
and the High Court - Trial courts are foreclosed from imposing
such a modified or specific term sentence, or life imprisonment for
the remainder of the convict's life, as an alternative to death penalty
- On basis of the report of the probation officer, report on nature of
work done while in jail and a psychological and psychiatric
evaluation report strong case made out in support of the appellants'
probability of reform and reintegration into society - Thus, the
sentence awarded to both the appellants is modified to a minimum
term of 20 years actual imprisonment - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 120
B, 201, 302, 364 A, 411 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.
433A.
Special or fixed term sentence - Imposition of, as an
alternative to death penalty in serious crimes - Held: Power to impose
special or fixed term sentence beyond the minimum sentence
specified in s. 433A CrPC reserved solely with High Courts and
Supreme Court as per decision in *Sriharan's case - Code of
Criminal Procedure - s.433A.
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Procedure to be followed - Offences where death penalty
proposed by prosecution - Role of trial court and State - Held:
Trial court under obligation to balance aggravating and mitigating
circumstances - Whereas, State must produce material disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused (collected
beforehand), and all objective materials whether favourable or
unfavourable, as it is in a position to collect this information and
facilitate the court in arriving at a just sentence.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The appropriateness of imposing a punishment
(termed as a special or fixed term sentence) in serious crimes,
which carried, as a sentencing option, the death penalty (apart
from life sentence), was considered by this court in Sriharan's
case. The majority decision, after considering the previous
decisions, held that the ratio in Swamy Shraddananda's case was
correct. It is clear that Sriharan, approved an alternative third
sentencing option in cases where the accused are convicted of
serious and grave crimes which carried with it the option of capital
sentence. Realising that a life sentence per se can lead to early
release of accused upon their undergoing the minimum sentence
prescribed under Section 433A, and highlighting that the
asymmetry in state rules with respect to minimum incarceration
in different kinds of life sentences, this court decided to retain to
itself (and the High Courts) the option of imposing what Sriharan
termed as "special" or "fixed term sentences". [Paras 16,
17][762-A-B; 763-B-C]
*Union of India v. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. (2016)
7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14 SCR 613 - relied on.
1.2. It is clear that the trial courts, are foreclosed from
imposing such a modified or specific term sentence, or life
imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's life, as an
alternative to death penalty. The court, when trying an offence
punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment, has merely these
two options. While the principles evolved in Sriharan's case are
clear, there are nevertheless issues which still remain unexplored
and unresolved. Whenever the state proposes and urges for
imposition of

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 4 S.C.R.
 [2023] 4 S.C.R. 748
748
VIKAS CHAUDHARY
v.
THE STATE OF DELHI
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2276 of 2022)
APRIL 21, 2023
[K. M. JOSEPH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Sentence/Sentencing:
Imposition of a fixed term sentence of 30 years, without
remission - Correctness of - Victim aged 18 years, kidnapped for
ransom and on the same day was killed by strangulation, and the
body was burnt, to eliminate evidence - Pursuant to the commission
of murder, the accused regularly made ransom calls to the family -
Trial court convicted all the accused persons u/ss. 302, 364A, 201,
r/w s. 120B - Appellants-A-1 and A-2 also convicted u/s. 411 with
A-1 additionally u/ss. 420, 468 and 471 and sentenced to life
imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life without any
parole, remission, or furlough before completing 30 years of
imprisonment - Upheld by the High Court - On appeal, held: Power
to impose "special" or "fixed term sentences" is with this Court
and the High Court - Trial courts are foreclosed from imposing
such a modified or specific term sentence, or life imprisonment for
the remainder of the convict's life, as an alternative to death penalty
- On basis of the report of the probation officer, report on nature of
work done while in jail and a psychological and psychiatric
evaluation report strong case made out in support of the appellants'
probability of reform and reintegration into society - Thus, the
sentence awarded to both the appellants is modified to a minimum
term of 20 years actual imprisonment - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 120
B, 201, 302, 364 A, 411 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.
433A.
Special or fixed term sentence - Imposition of, as an
alternative to death penalty in serious crimes - Held: Power to impose
special or fixed term sentence beyond the minimum sentence
specified in s. 433A CrPC reserved solely with High Courts and
Supreme Court as per decision in *Sriharan's case - Code of
Criminal Procedure - s.433A.
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Procedure to be followed - Offences where death penalty
proposed by prosecution - Role of trial court and State - Held:
Trial court under obligation to balance aggravating and mitigating
circumstances - Whereas, State must produce material disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused (collected
beforehand), and all objective materials whether favourable or
unfavourable, as it is in a position to collect this information and
facilitate the court in arriving at a just sentence.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The appropriateness of imposing a punishment
(termed as a special or fixed term sentence) in serious crimes,
which carried, as a sentencing option, the death penalty (apart
from life sentence), was considered by this court in Sriharan's
case. The majority decision, after considering the previous
decisions, held that the ratio in Swamy Shraddananda's case was
correct. It is clear that Sriharan, approved an alternative third
sentencing option in cases where the accused are convicted of
serious and grave crimes which carried with it the option of capital
sentence. Realising that a life sentence per se can lead to early
release of accused upon their undergoing the minimum sentence
prescribed under Section 433A, and highlighting that the
asymmetry in state rules with respect to minimum incarceration
in different kinds of life sentences, this court decided to retain to
itself (and the High Courts) the option of imposing what Sriharan
termed as "special" or "fixed term sentences". [Paras 16,
17][762-A-B; 763-B-C]
*Union of India v. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. (2016)
7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14 SCR 613 - relied on.
1.2. It is clear that the trial courts, are foreclosed from
imposing such a modified or specific term sentence, or life
imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's life, as an
alternative to death penalty. The court, when trying an offence
punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment, has merely these
two options. While the principles evolved in Sriharan's case are
clear, there are nevertheless issues which still remain unexplored
and unresolved. Whenever the state proposes and urges for
imposition of death sentence, it has to, per force provide material
VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF DELHI
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to facilitate the court to carry out the exercise of balancing the
aggravating factors with the mitigating circumstances - the test
propounded in Bachan Singh and examined in many cases; the
recent trend being that the reformative element acquires equal
attention. The obligation to carry out this balancing interest is
upon the courts imposing the sentence in the first instance, i.e.,
the trial courts; the prosecution (per Bachan Singh) is also under
an obligation to show that the mitigating circumstances are absent
especially that there are no chances of reformation of the accused.
Since this exercise is mandated whenever a heinous capital crime
is committed, at the stage of conviction, the court has no idea
that the prosecution may urge for capital sentence. When that
stage occurs, and the prosecution seeks a capital sentence, the
court has to carry out the exercise of conducting a review of
aggravating circumstances (which are already on the record, being
factors that lead to the conviction of the accused) and balancing
the mitigating circumstances (which are not matters of the record
and have to be adduced by the prosecution and the accused).
[Para 18][763-G-H; 764-A-D]
1.3. The imperative to conduct evaluation of mitigating
circumstances at the trial stage, "to avoid slipping into a
retributive response to the brutality of the crime" which this court
noticed was frequently occurring in several cases, was underlined,
and it was categorically held that the court had to elicit information
from the state and the accused. The prosecution also is mandated
to produce before the Sessions Court, material disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused, which is
to preferably be collected beforehand. At the stage when the trial
court is informed that the prosecution intends to press for
imposition of capital sentence, the evaluation should be insisted
upon; the state is under a duty to present all objective materials,
as mentioned in Manoj's case, having regard to the decision in
Bachan Singh's case and importantly, the fact that it is in a position
to actually gather the materials. Its task is to present the factsrelating to the accused, which are favourable and unfavourable,
for the court to impose a just sentence. [Para 20][767-G-H; 768A-B]
1.4. Since the judgment in Sriharan's case reserves the
power to impose special or fixed term sentences (which may be
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longer than the minimum specified in Section 433A CrPC-i.e.,
may extend to considerably long periods, such as 30 years), with
only the high courts and this court, it is imperative that this
exercise is carried out even in cases where the accused might
eventually not be imposed the death sentence. To put it simply -
although the trial courts are not empowered to impose such special
sentences, yet at the stage when they arrive at findings of guilt in
the case of a heinous offence, what would be the nature of the
sentence imposed eventually, is unknown; therefore, the
prosecution would have to inform the court, and present relevant
materials, in case the death sentence is proposed. In that event,
if ultimately death sentence is not imposed, it is open to the state
(or the aggrieved party, under Section 372 CrPC) to appeal against
the trial court judgment on the point of sentence; at that stage
the evaluation before the High Court would be nuanced, and
informed with full materials, about the convict, which otherwise
it would not have the benefit of. Further, if considerable time has
elapsed since the trial stage at which this exercise was
undertaken, the appellate court should direct that a fresh attempt
be made, to take into account the contemporaneous progress, if
any, made by the convict. Wherever the prosecution is of the
opinion that the crime an accused is convicted for, is so grave
that death sentence is warranted, it should carry out the exercise
of placing the materials, in terms of Manoj's case. In case this
results in imposition of death sentence, at the stage of
confirmation, the High Court would have the benefit of
independent evaluation of these materials. On the other hand, if
death sentence is not imposed, then, the High Court may still be
in a position to evaluate, if the sentence is adequate, and wherever
appropriate and just, impose a special or fixed term sentence, in
the course of an appeal by the State or by the complainant/
informant. Given the imperative need for such material to form a
part of the court's consideration, it has to be emphasized that in
case the trial court has failed to carry out such exercise (for
whatever reason), the High Court has to call for such material
while considering an appeal filed by the State or complainant for
enhancement of sentence (whether resulting in imposition of
capital punishment, or a term sentence). [Paras 21, 22][768-CH; 769-A-B]
VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF DELHI
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1.5. There was limited material regarding the mitigating
circumstances of the appellants; existing jail reports and probation
officer reports, were also outdated. So, this court directed the
preparation and submission of three reports, to facilitate fairer
consideration of the question of sentence. These were: a report
of the probation officer, report on nature of work done while in
jail (by the jail administration), and a psychological and psychiatric
evaluation report (by Director of VIMHANS); these are on record,
and form part of this court's consideration, to ascertain the
individualised sentences appropriate in the present case. The
Counsel placed on record, written submissions outlining the
mitigating factors and justification for a modification, on the
question of sentence. [Para 24][769-E-F; 770-A-B]
1.6. The sole motive for this crime seems to have been
greed. Undoubtedly, there was premeditation in the commission
of the crime. These are the aggravating circumstances. [Para
27][771-D-E]
1.7. Both the appellants in the instant case, share some
commonalities: they were of young age at the time of offence,
hail from educated backgrounds, and they continue to enjoy the
love and affection of their families, each of which have a good
standing and strong ties within the communities they live in.
While the material relating to their lives and social conditions
pre-conviction do not offer an explanation as to the cause for
commission of offence, it can certainly be said that the material
available regarding their conduct post-conviction, remains
encouraging. They have applied themselves during the time of
incarceration and used their time to contribute meaningfull-for
which they have each received commendations. Their
psychological and psychiatric evaluations were concluded to be
normal, without cause for concern. A strong case is made out in
support of the appellants' probability of reform (as already
evidenced by their jail conduct), and reintegration into society.
The State, too, has not indicated any material to the contrary,
regarding this aspect. [Para 28][771-E-H]
1.8. In view of the totality of the facts and circumstances, it
would be appropriate to modify the sentence awarded to both
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appellants to a minimum term of 20 years actual imprisonment.
[Para 29][771-H; 772-A]
Amit v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 8 SCC 93 : [2003]
Supp. 2 SCR 285; Laxman Naskar v. West Bengal
(2000) 7 SCC 626 : [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 62; Rajendra
Prahladrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 12
SCC 460 : [2018] 14 SCR 585; Swamy Shraddananda
v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11
SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State
of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90;
State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216 : [2010]
3 SCR 716; Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 3 SCC
685 : [2011] 4 SCR 585; Birju v. State of MP (2014) 3
SCC 421 : [2014] 1 SCR 1047; Shankar Kisanrao
Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 :
[2013] 6 SCR 949; Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph
v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 69 : [2014] 3
SCR 34; Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra
(2019) 16 SCC 380; Satish @ Sabbe v. State of UP 2020
SCC OnLine SC 791; Mohd Firoz v. State of MP (2022)
7 SCC 433; Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra
(2021) 11 SCC 1; Gauri Shankar v. State of Punjab
(2021) 3 SCC 380; Bachan Singh v. Union of India
(1980) 2 SCC 684 : [1983] 1 SCR 145; Machhi Singh
v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 : [1983] 3 SCR
413; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra
[1961] 3 SCR 440; Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab
(1979) 3 SCC 745 : [1979] 3 SCR 1059; Subash
Chander v. Krishan Lal (2001) 4 SCC 458 : [2001] 2
SCR 864; Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 6
SCC 296 : [2001] 3 SCR 656; State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470 : [1976] Supp. 1 SCR
552; Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC
353: [2022] 9 SCR 452; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of
Chhattisgarh (2019) 12 SCC 438 : [2018] 14 SCR 355
- referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2003] Supp. 2 SCR 285
referred to
Para 7
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[2000] Supp. 3 SCR 62
referred to
Para 7
[2018] 14 SCR 585
referred to
Para 8
[2008] 11 SCR 93
referred to
Para 8
[2009] 9 SCR 90
referred to
Para 8
[2010] 3 SCR 716
referred to
Para 8
[2011] 4 SCR 585
referred to
Para 8
[2014] 1 SCR 1047
referred to
Para 8
[2013] 6 SCR 949
referred to
Para 8
[2014] 3 SCR 34
referred to
Para 8
(2019) 16 SCC 380
referred to
Para 8
(2022) 7 SCC 433
referred to
Para 8
(2021) 11 SCC 1
referred to
Para 9
(2021) 3 SCC 380
referred to
Para 11
[1983] 1 SCR 145
referred to
Para 13
[1983] 3 SCR 413
referred to
Para 13
[1961] 3 SCR 440
referred to
Para 15
[1979] 3 SCR 1059
referred to
Para 15
[2001] 2 SCR 864
referred to
Para 15
[2001] 3 SCR 656
referred to
Para 15
[1976] Supp. 1 SCR 552
referred to
Para 15
[2022] 9 SCR 452
referred to
Para 19
[2018] 14 SCR 355
referred to
Para 19
[2015] 14 SCR 613
relied on
Para 21
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.2276 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.2018 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.319 of 2018.
With
Criminal Appeal No.2277 of 2022.
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Vivek Sood, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Gopal Jha, Akash
Godhvani, Ms. Tanvi Atree, Anuj Chauhan, Anand, Sanket, Krishan
Kumar, Mohit D. Ram, Ms. Sunita Arora, Monisha Handa, Rajul
Shrivastav, Shivam Dedi, Ms. Gargi Singh, Anubhav Sharma, Advs. for
the Appellant.
Chirag M. Shroff, Shailendra P. Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The limited question on which this Court issued notice1 was to
consider the correctness of the sentence imposed on the accused/
appellants. The appellants' grievance is with the imposition of a fixed
term sentence of 30 years, without remission, by the trial court, which
was affirmed by the impugned judgment2 passed by the Delhi High Court.
2. The facts of the case briefly are that the deceased (aged 18-20
years), had been kidnapped for ransom on 18.01.2003. On the same day
itself, he was killed by strangulation, and the body was burnt, to eliminate
evidence. The deceased's father (complainant) filed a 'missing person
report' with the police on 18.01.2003 itself, after which he received six
ransom calls (on 19.01.2003, 20.01.2003, 01.02.2003, 02.02.2003,
10.03.2003, 11.03.2003) from different people, seeking money in exchange
for information about his son's whereabouts, and his safety. By tracking
of call records, a link was established first with A-1, who disclosed
involvement of A-2 and A-3. A gold chain belonging to the deceased,
and a motorcycle on which the deceased was last seen, were recovered
at the behest of A-1; the deceased's wristwatch, and a black muffler
used to strangle him, were recovered from A-2. A-1's disclosure also
led to recovery of the car used to abduct, and in which the deceased had
been strangulated. Evidence collected against them included voice
samples to compare ransom call recordings, and identification by PW-7,
PW-2, and others as to the deceased last being seen with them. On
09.05.2003, the three accused persons disclosed where the dead body
had been dumped, but the same could not be recovered. Upon
investigation, it was found that another police station, in which jurisdiction
1 Order dated 09.05.2019, in SLP (Crl) D. No. 5964/2019, with Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl) No. 3129/2019.
2 Order dated 31.10.2018 passed by the Delhi High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 319/2018.
VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF DELHI
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the nala fell, had recovered a half-burned dead body on 19.01.2003
itself (i.e., one day after abduction). This was identified by the father, to
be that of the deceased. 41 prosecution witnesses were examined over
the course of 11 years, and 8 defence witnesses.
3. The trial court3 convicted the three accused persons for the
commission of offence under Sections 302, 364A, 201, read with Section
120B IPC. A-1 and A-2 (present appellants) were also convicted under
Section 411, with A-1 additionally being convicted for offences punishable
under Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC. They were sentenced to life
imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life, and an additional
condition was imposed on A-1 and A-2 - that they would not be entitled
to any parole, remission, or furlough, before completing 30 years of
imprisonment. They were also sentenced to each pay
2,10,000 as
fine, and
4,00,000 as compensation to the victim's family.
4. The High Court, by its common impugned judgment, on an
appreciation of the facts at hand, acquitted A-3 Joginder @ Mintu of all
charges; and acquitted the present appellants only for offence under
Section 411, but affirmed their conviction for other offences, as well as
the corresponding sentence imposed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the
impugned judgment, A-1 and A-2 have approached this court, challenging
both the conviction and sentence; this court issued notice on the limited
question of sentence.
Appellants' contentions
5. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel, appearing for
the appellants, placed strong emphasis on this court's decision in Union
of India v. Sriharan @ Murugan &Ors.4, which categorically held
that it was outside the jurisdiction of the trial court, to provide a specific
term punishment or till the end of ordinary life, as an alternative to the
death penalty. It was urged that this aspect, however, was overlooked
by the High Court - which was reason enough to set aside the erroneous
decision.
6. It was urged that the High Court had, in its impugned judgment,
while dismissing the appeal on conviction, also rejected the arguments
made on sentencing, without proper consideration. Reliance was placed
on Section 386(b)(ii) and (iii) of the CrPC to argue that adjudication and
3 Sessions Case No. 130/2014 - Orders dated 13.11.2017 (conviction) and 23.12.2017
(sentence)
4 [2015] 14 SCR 613: (2016) 7 SCC 1 (hereafter 'Sriharan')
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examination of the order on sentence was still necessary, even when
order of conviction has been upheld or modified under Section 386(b)(i);
the appellate court had to specifically hear the accused on the quantum
and nature of sentence imposed. While doing so, it is imperative to call
for the report by the Officer under the Probation of Offenders Act, and/
or psychological assessment report, to adjudicate the same.
7. Ms. Arora submitted that weight had to be given to mitigating
circumstances, to guide sentencing discretion; relevant factors being -
age at which the offence was committed, likelihood of convict reforming
in jail, etc. Reliance was placed on this court's decisions in Amit v. State
of Maharashtra5 and Laxman Naskar v. West Bengal6. Counsel
submitted that there was strong evidence supporting good and normal
social behaviour, reformation, and possibility of reintegration into society,
as per the probation officer's report, jail conduct report, and psychologist's
report - all of which were prepared in compliance of this court's orders.
That the appellants had no criminal antecedents was also a factor in
their favour. It was pointed out that the appellant Vikas Chaudhary, was
below 18 years of age at the time of kidnapping and murder but had
attained majority during the alleged ransom calls. Therefore, the benefit
of juvenile was denied to him, and the conviction was based solely on
circumstantial evidence.
8. Counsel also relied on judgments of this court, which elaborated
on sentencing policy in the case of imposing death penalty. In Rajendra
Prahladrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra7, a three-judge bench of
this court emphasised the importance of determining whether the accused,
notwithstanding their crime, can be reformed, rehabilitated, and
reintegrated, and that the activity of obtaining this information is essential,
and must be undertaken. It was argued that the mitigating circumstances,
and report of the probation officer were neither considered by the trial
court, nor High Court. Counsel stressed on the importance of the theory
of reformation through punishment and submitted that the special
category of sentence for serious crimes where death sentence is
substituted with life imprisonment for a fixed number of years (as evolved
in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka8, and upheld in
5 [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 285: (2003) 8 SCC 93 [para 10]
6 [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 62: (2000) 7 SCC 626 [para 6]
7 [2018] 14 SCR 585: (2019) 12 SCC 460 [para 47] (hereafter 'Rajendra Prahladrao
Wasnik')
8 [2008] 11 SCR 93: (2008) 13 SCC 767 [para 94-95] (hereafter 'Swamy Shraddananda')
VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF DELHI
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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Sriharan), still requires consideration of these factors. Reliance was
also placed on Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra9, State of Haryana v. Jagdish10, Ramesh v. State of
Rajasthan11, Birju v. State of MP12, Shankar Kisanrao Khade v.
State of Maharashtra13, Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph v. State
of Maharashtra14, Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra15,
Satish @ Sabbe v. State of UP16, and Mohd Firoz v. State of MP17.
State's contentions
9. Mr. Chirag M. Shroff, learned counsel for the State, contended
that the conviction based on concurrent findings, and sentence imposed
was commensurate in the present case, which was a cold-blooded murder.
It was submitted that the act of abduction committed in a clandestine
manner and the thought process that guided the series of events, was
executed with preplanning and premeditation. This was evidenced by
the fact that the deceased was murdered on 19.01.2003, and the family
was made to believe that their son was alive, and in view of which they
regularly demanded ransom from the family. Reliance was placed on
Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra18 for the submission that if a
mere threat for the purpose of ransom or otherwise becomes reality,
and the victim is done to death, then if the sessions court had passed a
specified sentence which is upheld by the High Court, intervention by
this court was unwarranted.
10. It was pointed out that the gruesome nature of the murder of
a minor victim (nearly 18 years), despite the appellants being educated
and belonging to well-to-do families, reflected that they were well aware
and had full knowledge of their actions - of kidnapping, murder, and
finally, disposing of the body by burning and dumping the remains in a
9 [2009] 9 SCR 90: (2009) 6 SCC 498 [para 127-128] (hereafter 'Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar')
10 [2010] 3 SCR 716: (2010) 4 SCC 216 [para 41, 44-46]
11 [2011] 4 SCR 585: (2011) 3 SCC 685 [para 66, 69, 76]
12 [2014] 1 SCR 1047: (2014) 3 SCC 421 [para 20]
13 [2013] 6 SCR 949: (2013) 5 SCC 546
14 [2014] 3 SCR 34: (2014) 4 SCC 69 [para 33] (hereafter 'Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy
Joseph')
15 (2019) 16 SCC 380 [para 20]
16 2020 SCC OnLine SC 791 [para 13]
17 (2022) 7 SCC 433 [para 60]
18 (2021) 11 SCC 1 [para 94, 98, 101, 102]
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pond. These circumstances, it was argued, justified that this was a coldblooded murder, which fell within the gravest of grave category of cases.
11. Counsel conceded that this court in Sriharan (supra) held
that only the High Court or Supreme Court had the power to pass a
sentence in excess of life imprisonment, but lesser than capital punishment;
however, it was pointed out that this court had also denied in that
judgment, the proposition that the court awarding punishment should
merely impose the punishment of death or life imprisonment, as prescribed
in the CrPC. Therefore, merely because the sessions court had exercised
such power, did not vitiate the sentence altogether. Instead, it was
contended that the fact that the High Court had affirmed the sentence,
meant the spirit of the law laid down in Sriharan (supra) had been given
effect to. Reliance was placed on Gauri Shankar v. State of Punjab19
wherein in view of the grotesque nature of the crime, this court had
upheld the session's court order on sentencing, which had been passed
in excess of the scope of its powers.
12. Mr. Shroff also submitted that the VIMHANS report submitted
pursuant to this court's directions, was a neutral report which could not
be relied on as demonstrating 'mitigating circumstances' as it cannot
speak to the mental state of the appellants, at the time of commission of
the offences. It does not necessarily support any prospect of rehabilitation
or reformation.
Analysis and Reasoning
13. In Bachan Singh v. Union of India20, this court upheld the
imposition of capital sentence, subject to the caveat that it should be
invoked in the rarest of rare cases. The court, in its later judgments
sought to evolve a principled approach towards capital sentencing. In
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab21 this court, building upon the
observations in Bachan Singh, observed that a balance sheet of
"aggravating and mitigating circumstances" needs to be drawn where
"mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and
a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the
mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised". The court
also laid down a broad two-pronged approach:
19 (2021) 3 SCC 380
20 [1983] 1 SCR 145: (1980) 2 SCC 684
21 [1983] 3 SCR 413: (1983) 3 SCC 470
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"(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which
renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls
for a death sentence?
(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no
alternative but to impose death sentence even after according
maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which
speak in favour of the offender?"
14. During the last two decades or so, however, the capital
sentencing decisions adopted no symmetrical approach; this led to the
court to lament, on more than one occasion, that the exercise of considering
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (which Bachan Singh had
highlighted) had become more of a formality. In Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar (supra), this court enunciated a two-step process
to decide whether a convict deserved the death sentence: first, that the
case belonged to the "rarest of rare" category, and second, that the
option of life imprisonment would simply not suffice. The aggravating
and mitigating circumstances - according to the first step, were to be
identified and considered equally. The court, in the second step, was to
consider whether the alternative of life imprisonment was unquestionably
foreclosed as the sentencing aim of reformation was unattainable, for
which the State was obliged to provide material. In Shankar Kisanrao
Khade (supra) the court fashioned 'the crime'; 'the criminal' and 'the
R&R test' (rarest of rare test) which emphasized the need to look
intensively into all factors. This court also highlighted that in many
previous decisions, sentencing was resorted to without considering
mitigating circumstances, and without any material on the possibility
of reformation of the convict.
The decision in Sriharan
15. In Swamy Shraddananda (supra) this court had to decide
the appropriate sentence to be imposed in a case, where two judges had
differed on the issue of imposition of capital sentence. The court
considered its previous Constitution Bench ruling in Gopal Vinayak
Godse v. State of Maharashtra22, observations in other judgments (such
as Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab23, Subash Chander v. Krishan
Lal24; Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan25; State of Madhya
22 [1961] 3 SCR 440
23 [1979] 3 SCR 1059: (1979) 3 SCC 745
24 [2001] 2 SCR 864: (2001) 4 SCC 458
25 [2001] 3 SCR 656: (2001) 6 SCC 296
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Pradesh v. Ratan Singh26 and other cases). The court had, in Swamy
Shraddananda (supra), observed as follows [SCR, p. 143-144]:
"65. [...] The legal position as enunciated in Kishori Lal v.
King Emperor, (1945) 58 LW 251 , Gopal Vinayak Godse v.
State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union
of India, (1981) 1 SCR 1196; State of M.P. v. Ratan Singh,
(1976) 3 SCC 470 and Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan,
(2001) 6 SCC 296 and the unsound way in which remission is
actually allowed in cases of life imprisonment make out a
very strong case to make a special category for the very few
cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the
punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category
beyond the application of remission.
66. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle.
The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be
excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly
disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to
this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial
court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find,
as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the
rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant
in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having
regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel
that a sentence of life imprisonment subject to remission
normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly
disproportionate and inadequate. What then should the Court
do? If the Court's option is limited only to two punishments,
one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes,
of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court may
feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death
penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more
just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the
options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully
belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years'
imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the
Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily
26 [1976] Supp. 1 SCR 552: (1976) 3 SCC 470
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because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years'
imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all."
16. The appropriateness of imposing a punishment (termed as a
special or fixed term sentence) in serious crimes, which carried, as a
sentencing option, the death penalty (apart from life sentence), was
considered by this court in Sriharan. The majority decision, after
considering the previous decisions, held that the ratio in Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) was correct. Commenting on the decision in
Swamy Shraddananda, the court held in Sriharan that [SCR, p. 701;
and 710-711]:
"87. [...] What all it seeks to declare by stating so was that
within the prescribed limit of the punishment of life
imprisonment, having regard to the nature of offence
committed by imposing the life imprisonment for a specified
period would be proportionate to the crime as well as the
interest of the victim, whose interest is also to be taken care
of by the Court, when considering the nature of punishment
to be imposed.
********************* ***************
104. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the
Penal Code for any modified punishment within the
punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified
offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the
event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not
by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the
power to impose a modified punishment providing for any
specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's
life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by
the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other
inferior court.
105. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down
in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008)
13 SCC 767] that a special category of sentence; instead of
death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category
beyond application of remission is well founded and we
answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore,
not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in
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Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 that the
deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government
by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any
remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the
law and we specifically overrule the same."
17. It is thus clear that Sriharan (supra), approved an alternative
third sentencing option in cases where the accused are convicted of
serious and grave crimes which carried with it the option of capital
sentence. Realising that a life sentence per se can lead to early release
of accused upon their undergoing the minimum sentence prescribed under
Section 433A, and highlighting that the asymmetry in state rules with
respect to minimum incarceration in different kinds of life sentences,
this court decided to retain to itself (and the High Courts) the option of
imposing what Sriharan termed as "special" or "fixed term sentences".
This was seen as serving the following purposes:
(a)
As a feasible alternative in capital cases where the Court
was of the opinion that death sentence is inappropriate, and:
(b)
That the Court was of the opinion that there were elements
in the crime and or the conduct of the criminal which
warranted imposition of a mandatory sentence beyond a
minimum of 14 years prescribed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
(c)
Where the court felt, independently, that the serious nature
of the crime and the manner of its commission warranted a
special sentence, whereby the state's discretion in releasing
the offender, should be curtailed so that the convict is not
let out before undergoing a specified number of years, of
incarceration.
18. It is hence clear that the trial courts, are foreclosed from
imposing such a modified or specific term sentence, or life imprisonment
for the remainder of the convict's life, as an alternative to death penalty.
The court, when trying an offence punishable by death penalty or life
imprisonment, has merely these two options. While the principles evolved
in Sriharan (supra) are clear, there are nevertheless issues which still
remain unexplored and unresolved. Whenever the state proposes and
urges for imposition of death sentence, it has to, per force provide material
to facilitate the court to carry out the exercise of balancing the aggravating
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factors with the mitigating circumstances - the test propounded in
Bachan Singh and examined in many cases; the recent trend being that
the reformative element acquires equal attention. The obligation to carry
out this balancing interest is upon the courts imposing the sentence in the
first instance, i.e., the trial courts; the prosecution (per Bachan Singh)
is also under an obligation to show that the mitigating circumstances are
absent27 especially that there are no chances of reformation of the
accused. Since this exercise is mandated whenever a heinous capital
crime is committed, at the stage of conviction, the court has no idea that
the prosecution may urge for capital sentence. When that stage occurs,
and the prosecution seeks a capital sentence, the court has to carry out
the exercise of conducting a review of aggravating circumstances (which
are already on the record, being factors that lead to the conviction of
the accused) and balancing the mitigating circumstances (which are
not matters of the record and have to be adduced by the prosecution
and the accused).
19. This court, in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh28,
considered the judgments reported as Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik
(supra), Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh29, Anil @
Anthony Arikaswamy Joseph (supra) and several other decisions, the
Law Commission's reports, and held that [SCR, p. 573-576]:
27 The observations in Bachan Singh, listing mitigating factors are that
"(1) That the offence was committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not be
sentenced to
death.
(3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence
as would constitute a continuing threat to society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The
State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions 3 and 4
above.
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused believed that he
was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of another person,
(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally defective and that the
said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."
28 [2022] 9 SCR 452: (2023) 2 SCC 353
29 [2018] 14 SCR 355: (2019) 12 SCC 438
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"212. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society must
strive towards - there are many references to it peppered in
this court's jurisprudence across the decades - but what is
lacking is a concrete framework that can measure and
evaluate it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored by the failure to
implement prison reforms of a meaningful kind, which has
left the process of incarceration and prisons in general, to be
a space of limited potential for systemic reformation. The goal
of reformative punishment requires systems that actively
enable reformation and rehabilitation, as a result of nuanced
policy making. As a small step to correct these skewed results
and facilitate better evaluation of whether there is a possibility
for the accused to be reformed (beyond vague references to
conduct, family background, etc.), this court deems it
necessary to frame practical guidelines for the courts to adopt
and implement, till the legislature and executive, formulate a
coherent framework through legislation. These guidelines may
also offer guidance or ideas, that such a legislative framework
could benefit from, to systematically collect and evaluate
information on mitigating circumstances.
Practical guidelines to collect mitigating circumstances
213.