# VIKRAM SINGH & ORS v. STATE OF PUNJAB - **Citation:** [2010] 2 S.C.R. 22 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2010-01-25 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 1396-1397 of 2008 - **Bench:** Harjit Singh Bedi, J.M. Panchal - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vikram-singh-ors-v-state-of-punjab-26581 - **Pages:** 46 ## Headnote Penal Code, 1860: c ss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 - Kidnapping for ransom - Poisoning young boy to death - Conviction ulss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 and award of death sentence by courts below - Propriety of - Held: Kidnapping must be dealt with in the harshest possible manner and obligation rests on courts too 0 - On facts, boy was not only kidnapped for ransom but was murdered in the process - Eye witness to the kidnapping by two accused - Witnesses not chance witnesses - Medical evidence that the cause of death was over dose of chloroform and pentazocine - Evidence to the effect that conspiracy hatched between accused - Attempt by lady accused to E destroy the evidence relating to kidnapping - Recovery of various articles including telephone call details, medical equipment and car used as also dead body of deceased - Thus, award of death sentence to two accused upheld - However, death sentence awarded to lady accused, commuted F to life imprisonment as she apparently acted under pressure of her husband. s. 364-A - Provision for death or life imprisonment for offences relating to kidnapping - Purpose of amendment - G Held: Is to act as a deterrent on such offenders due to increasing number of such cases and also in cases where kidnapping does not result in the death of the victim. Evidence Act, 1872: s. 27 - Scope and applicability of - H 22 VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 23 Held: s. 27 reveaLs that a 'person must be accused of any A offence' and that he must be 'in the custody of a police officer' and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest - Accused taken in custody day before the formal arrest, has no adverse effect on recoveries made on disclosure statement, when accused were taken in custody. B Evidence:. Circumstantial evidence vis-s-vis eye witness account - Evaluation of - Standard to be applied - Explained. Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - Award of - Validity and propriety of. C According to the prosecution case, the two appellants-VS and JS, kidnapped AV-a school boy aged 16 years from his school in the car for ransom. During the negotiations, the kidnappers administered heavy o doses of chloroform and fortwin injections to the boy which resulted in his death. The appellants-VS and JS had attempted to run away and the appellant S-wife of JS, was in the process of destroying the evidence, when they were apprehended by the police. The appellant VS was E known to the family of the deceased. The trial court convicted the appellants for offences punishable u/ss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced them to death. The High Court upheld the order of death sentence. Hence the present appeals. F Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. In the instant case, not only was the deceased-young boy kidnapped for ransom which acts would by itself attract the death penalty but he was G murdered in the process. There is the direct and eye witness evidence of PW-BS who had seen VS and JS (whom he knew earlier) kidnapping AV from outside the school. The balance sheet has been drawn up by the High Court and the same is accepted. However, there is H 24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A some reason in favouring S-the lady appellant, wife of JS. Keeping in view the overall picture and the fact that at the time when AV was kidnapped from outside the School, S was not present and that she may have got embroiled in the conspiracy with her husband a13d VS on account B of having come under their pressure, some leniency must be shown to her. Therefore, regarding S, her death sentence ought to be converted into one of life. [Paras 20, 26, 29 and 30] [55-H; 56-A; 67-F-G-H; 64-D] C 2.1. Regarding the submission that it was doubtful as to whether the Alto belonging to NK had actually been used, it is.true that the colour of the car is said to be Miami Gold but it is significant that in the cross-examination of all the witnesses and in particular PW3, PW13 and PW19 w~o had ## Text _Characters 0–39,841 of 92,396. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39841 for what follows._ A 8 [2010] 2 S.C.R. 22 VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1396-1397 of 2008) JANUARY 25, 2010 [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860: c ss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 - Kidnapping for ransom - Poisoning young boy to death - Conviction ulss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 and award of death sentence by courts below - Propriety of - Held: Kidnapping must be dealt with in the harshest possible manner and obligation rests on courts too 0 - On facts, boy was not only kidnapped for ransom but was murdered in the process - Eye witness to the kidnapping by two accused - Witnesses not chance witnesses - Medical evidence that the cause of death was over dose of chloroform and pentazocine - Evidence to the effect that conspiracy hatched between accused - Attempt by lady accused to E destroy the evidence relating to kidnapping - Recovery of various articles including telephone call details, medical equipment and car used as also dead body of deceased - Thus, award of death sentence to two accused upheld - However, death sentence awarded to lady accused, commuted F to life imprisonment as she apparently acted under pressure of her husband. s. 364-A - Provision for death or life imprisonment for offences relating to kidnapping - Purpose of amendment - G Held: Is to act as a deterrent on such offenders due to increasing number of such cases and also in cases where kidnapping does not result in the death of the victim. Evidence Act, 1872: s. 27 - Scope and applicability of - H 22 VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 23 Held: s. 27 reveaLs that a 'person must be accused of any A offence' and that he must be 'in the custody of a police officer' and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest - Accused taken in custody day before the formal arrest, has no adverse effect on recoveries made on disclosure statement, when accused were taken in custody. B Evidence:. Circumstantial evidence vis-s-vis eye witness account - Evaluation of - Standard to be applied - Explained. Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - Award of - Validity and propriety of. C According to the prosecution case, the two appellants-VS and JS, kidnapped AV-a school boy aged 16 years from his school in the car for ransom. During the negotiations, the kidnappers administered heavy o doses of chloroform and fortwin injections to the boy which resulted in his death. The appellants-VS and JS had attempted to run away and the appellant S-wife of JS, was in the process of destroying the evidence, when they were apprehended by the police. The appellant VS was E known to the family of the deceased. The trial court convicted the appellants for offences punishable u/ss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced them to death. The High Court upheld the order of death sentence. Hence the present appeals. F Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. In the instant case, not only was the deceased-young boy kidnapped for ransom which acts would by itself attract the death penalty but he was G murdered in the process. There is the direct and eye witness evidence of PW-BS who had seen VS and JS (whom he knew earlier) kidnapping AV from outside the school. The balance sheet has been drawn up by the High Court and the same is accepted. However, there is H 24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A some reason in favouring S-the lady appellant, wife of JS. Keeping in view the overall picture and the fact that at the time when AV was kidnapped from outside the School, S was not present and that she may have got embroiled in the conspiracy with her husband a13d VS on account B of having come under their pressure, some leniency must be shown to her. Therefore, regarding S, her death sentence ought to be converted into one of life. [Paras 20, 26, 29 and 30] [55-H; 56-A; 67-F-G-H; 64-D] C 2.1. Regarding the submission that it was doubtful as to whether the Alto belonging to NK had actually been used, it is.true that the colour of the car is said to be Miami Gold but it is significant that in the cross-examination of all the witnesses and in particular PW3, PW13 and PW19 w~o had deposed that the colour was silver grey not a D single question had been put as to the fact that the car was gold in colour and not grey. The only inference that can flow from the cross-examination is that "Miami Gold" was in fact a trade name and not an indication of the actual colour of the car. PW's NK, BS and SK had E absolutely no animosity against the appellants which could motivate them to give a false statement as to the colour of the vehicle. NK in fact deposed that the car had been taken by VS, his son's friend, at about 7.30 a.m. and had been returned at about 10.30 a.m. or so the same F morning. This circumstance fits in with the prosecution story that VS and JS had been seen by PW-BS with the deceased and a short while later PW-SK had heard the noise of "bachao bachao" and on looking in that direction had seen a silver grey coloured car being driven G away from the School at a very high speed with one !:.uman foot protruding -outside the car window. It is significant that this information had been conveyed on telephone to the police as well. [Para 5] [41-E-H; 42-A-D]. H 2.2. The presence of PW-BS and SK was natural at ,\ VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 25 the places they professed to be in and they cannot, A therefore, be dubbed as chance witnesses. BS gave a cogent explanation as to the circumstances under which he had seen AV being kidnapped and taken away- in the Alto Car. It is also relevant that when BS had seen the Alto Car driven being away, it appeared to be a normal B transaction as the boy appeared to be going willingly with VS and JS-kidnappers. Therefore, it is obvious that his suspicion about anything amiss could not have been raised at any stage prior to his return from Chintpurni. It is also extremely significant that this witness was in a c position to recognize VS as VS was running a computer centre where S was undergoing training. Likewise, he knew JS and S from those days as they too would often visit VS in the computer centre. Criticism of PW-SK is equally misplaced. SK was the owner of a bakery shop 0 at Shimla Pahari and it was while he was outside the shop that he had heard the screams of "Bachao Bachao" and on looking in that direction had seen a car being driven away at a high speed and a human foot protruding out of the car window and on seeing this unusual activity, SK's neighbour, had informed the Police on telephone. It E is also significant that SK was not in any way connected with RV-complainant, and that they were not even known to each other. [Paras 6 and 7) [42-E, G-H; 43-C-G] Rana Partap & Ors. vs. State of Haryana 1983(3) SCC F 327, referred to. 2.3. The medical evidence is the material circumstance with regard to this incident. It is another link in the chain of circumstances. The dead body had G been recovered on the morning of 15.02.2005 and had been subjected to a post-mortem by a Board of Doctors. The post-mortem did not indicate any of the allegatons, the viscera was taken from the body and sent to the chemical examiner. On the receipt of the chemical H 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R. A examiner's report the Board opined that the cause of death was Chloroform and Pentazocine poisoning. [Paras 8 and 9] [44-G-H; 45-A-B] -2.4. PW4, owner of a shop called Scientific Sales 8 Corporation deposed that he knew the appellants as they were all residing near his house. He further stated that he had sold a bottle of 500 ml Chloroform manufactured by Glaxo and also issued Bill dated 11.02.2005 pertaining to the sale. He also produced the purchase bill indicating C that the Chloroform had earlier been purchased by him for sale in his shop and after a comparison of the batch number on the bottle with the Bills testified that it was the same bottle of Chloroform that had been sold to the appellants. Some insignificant questions had been put to him and no material circumstance could be elicited by the 0' defence. The evidence of PWS, another shop keeper, is equally significant as the 5 Fortwin injections of 1 ml. each had been purchased by the appellants vide Bill dated 11.02.2005 on the basis of a prescription from a veterinary Doctor that had been produced by them. PW5 also E brought the original bill whereby he had purchased the injections. The fact that the prescription for Fortwin injection had been produced on account of a prescription from a veterinary Doctor is fortified by the fact that on the Bill the word "Dog" has been written. Further, not a single F question was put to both the shop keepers as to their association with the complainant party. The factum of the over dose of Chloroform and pentazocine administered to the deceased is clear from the fact that the recoveries show that almost the entire bottle of Chloroform (500 ml.) G and all five Fortwin injections i.e. 5 ml. had been used by the kidnappers and that this lethal combination of Chloroform and an over dose of pentazocine was the cause of death. [Para 9] [45-F-H; 46-A-F] H 2.5. The evidence reveals that the conspiracy had VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 27 been hatched by the three appellants and the first step A towards the execution of the conspiracy was taken on 11.02.2005 at 11.00 a.m. when the Fortwin injections were purchased from PW5, the second step was the purchase of Chloroform at 4.00 p.m. the same afternoon from PW 4 and the third the borrowing of the Alto car from NK on s the morning of 12.02.2005. These three transactions are intimately connected with the kidnapping and subsequently the murder of AV. [Para 10] [46-G-H; 47-A] 2.6. Even the post incident conduct of an accused can be taken into account to determine as to whether the C criminal act which had been committed was pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. In the instant case, there is categorical evidence with regard to the purchase of the Fortwin injections and Chloroform and merely because PW-BS and SK did not refer to the presence of S in the D Alto car at the time of the actual kidnapping would not mean that she was not privy to the conspiracy. Moreover, the evidence also reveals that she was attempting to destroy the evidence relating to the kidnapping when she had been apprehended. Therefore, the second set of E incriminating circumstances is ·the medical evidence and the conspiracy hatched between the three appellants including S leading to the kidnapping and murder. [Para 10] [47-E-H] State of Himachal Pradesh vs. K.L.Pardhan & Ors. 1987 (2) SCC 17; Keshar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi Administration) 1988 (3) SCC 609, referred to. F 2.7. The appellants were under grave suspicion, suspected to be accused in a case of kidnapping and G murder, and VS and JS had attempted to run away and S was in the process of destroying evidence, when they had been apprehended and put in police custody whereafter they had made their disclosure statements. [Para 11] [49-C-D] H .. 28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A 2.8. A bare reading of s. 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would reveal that a 'person must be accused of any offence' and that he must be 'in the custody of a police officer' and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest. Section 46 Cr. P. C. deals with s 'Arrest how made.' The word "arrest " used in s. 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas s. 27 of the Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the instant case, the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal arrest on 15.02.2005 whereas the recoveries had c been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused in an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14.02.2005. Moreover in the light of the judgment in Deoman Upadhyaya's case and the observation that the words in s. 27 'accused of 0 any offence' are descriptive of the person making the statement, the submission that this section would be operable only after formal arrest u/s. 46(1 ), cannot be accepted. [Paras 11 and 12] (49-F; 52-B-E] State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960 E SC 1125, followed. Narayan Swami vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47, referred to. F 2.9. It is indeed true that most of the recoveries have been witnessed by PW-30 and JK-sub inspector and that PW-30 finally admitted that RV was his nephew and the deceased was his grandson. There is nothing unusual in PW 30's statement. It hardly needs emphasizing that independent witnesses are not forthcoming these days G and the prosecution has per force to rely on witnesses who are relatives or associates of the complainant. This in a way also ensures that the witnesses would not leave out the true culprits. It is found from the statement of PW 30 that as a consequence of the disclosure statement H VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 29 made by the three appellants, the Alto car had been A recovered from PW-NK, the black Chevrolet car from the area of KT and on the search of the car, various other items such as the photographs and purse of the deceased, had been taken into possession under seizure Memo. It is also significant that on 16.02.2005 a silver ring B belonging to the deceased had been recovered at the instance of VS and five empty ampules of Fortwin injections, a syringe, a plastic bag with hyperdemic needles and a roll of medical tape at the instance of JS from behind the kothi of DK and were taken to c possession. [Para 15] [53-C-G] 2.10. It is also significant that JS also disclosed that he· had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village D and that it had been removed from OK's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three D appellants further revealed that the dead body had been dispo~ed of in the fields of village D and the dead body was recovered and taken into possession by Memo signed by PW-30 as also JK-Sub-lnspector. It cannot be said that the evidence of PW-30 and JK should not be E believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of th1~ prosecution, as no other material adverse circumstance has been brought to the notice. [Para 16] [53-G-H; 54-A-B] F 2.11. RV had been called on the telephone repeatedly on his landline No. 226059 from Mobile No.98147 83418. Admittedly, the landline telephone is fixed in the shop of RV and it has come in evidence that the said card had been purchased on 14.02.2005 by appellant-JS. PW-14 G stated that JS had come to him in hurry and demanded a connection which had been supplied to him after he had undertaken he would supply the identification papers later on. PW-15 also revealed that he had sold his post paid connection no. 98729-99441 and 98729-99442 on H 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A 14.08.2002 to VS and this fact was confirmed by PW-17, Executive, Human Resources, Bharti Cellular Ltd. [Para 17) [54-C-D; 54-E-F] 2.12. It was submitted that there was something 8 amiss in the evidence of PW14 who deposed that the Mobile connection had been sold to JS on 14.02.2005, but it appeared from the call statement that the first, second and third calls from this Mobile had been made on 19.01.2005 and thereafter several calls had been made on 14.02.2005. Undoubtedly, there is some discrepancy C in the records vis-a-vis the ocular statements but the fact remains that this mobile was being used by JS to call VS on his Mobile No.98729-99441 and that they had been talking to each other much before the present occurrence and that even on the day of crime, they had talked to each D other at 7.30 on their Mobiles. Likewise, it has come on record that the several phone calls had been received by RV on the landline 226059 and were duly recorded by a tape recorder and the incoming number identified by an ID caller machine. It is significant that the conversations E recorded on the tape recorder were compared by an expert with the sample voice of JS and they were found to match with each other. [Para 17) [55-A-D] 2.13. The prosecution has been able to show that the F finger prints lifted by the police officers from the Alto and Chevrolet car belonged to VS and JS Singh respectively. It is significant that the Chloroform bottle recovered from OK's residence was also examined and the thumb impression of JS was detected thereon. [Para 18) [55-EG F] 2.14. Dr. OS, a very reputed Eye Surgeon, appeared as DW1. He deposed that S had been operated by him on 13.05.2002 and that she had come several times to his clinic for a re-check and that she had visited the hospital H on the 11.02.2005 and had been attended by one JW. VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 31 When cross-examil')ed, however, the Doctor admitted that A though the OPD in the hospital was computerized there was no entry in the name of S as on 11.02.2005. Moreover, even assuming that S had indeed gone with her husband to Amritsar on the 11.02.2005, as claimed, it was possible for them to go there and return in time to B purchase the Fortwin injections and the Chloroform etc. on 11.02.2005. DW-1 's evidence, therefore, does not in any way prove the alibi of JS and S. [Para 19] [55-G-H; 56-A-B] 2.15. In a case of circumstantial evidence some C uncertainty is bound to occur in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and that this flaw is occasioned by the fact that what they have witnessed is often an innocent transaction and it is only after the event that it transpires that what they had seen was a crime or a D prelude to the commission of a crime. A witness, therefore, does not assimilate or imbibe the scene as carefully as he, would, say in a case where he was an eye witness to a murder. PW-BS saw nothing untoward in AV and his kidnappers moving together, and being E unconcerned went off to Chintpurni whereas PW-SK who had seen the car being driven away at a fast speed and someone calling for help, on which he had immediately informed the police. While it is undoubtedly for the prosecution to prove its case beyond doubt but the F standard to be applied for evaluating the evidence in a case of circumstantial evidence vis-a-vis an eye witness account would vary and a slightly different yardstick for assessment has to be applied. It is for this reason that courts have repeatedly emphasized that the chain of G circumstances against an accused in a case of circumstantial evidence must be directed only towards his guilt and admit of no other hypothesis, whereas in the case of the evidence of an eye witness a chain of circumstances is not required and one good eye witness H 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A is sufficient to record a conviction. [Para 20] [56-C-H] 8 3.1. There are the moralists who say that as God has given life, he alone has the right to take it away and this privilege cannot be usurped by any human being. There are others who believe that the death sentence cannot be _taken as a retributive or deterrent factor as the statistics show that the possibility of a death sentence has never acted as a deterrent to serious crime. The theory which is widely accepted in India, however, is that as the death penalty is on the Statute Book it has to be C awarded provided the circumstances justify it. The broad principle has been laid in Bachan Singh's case as the "rarest of the rare cases". In determining the culpability of an accused and the final decision as to the nature of sentence, a balance sheet of the aggravating and D mitigating circumstances vis-a-vis the accused had to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances had to be given full weight so that all factors were considered before the "option is exercised''. The broad principle that emerges from all the judgments is that in E evaluating the category of the rarest of the rare, the facts of that particular case must be given pre-dominant consideration. [Paras 24 and 25] [58-D-F; 60-G-H; 61-AB] F 3.2. Section 364-A had been introduced in the Penal Code by virtue of Amendment Act 42 of 1993. A plain reading of the Objects and Reasons which led to the amendment shows the concern of Parliament in dealing with kidnapping for ransom a crime which called for a G deterrent punishment, even in a case where the kidnapping had not resulted in the death of the victim. The statistics further reveal that kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative and thriving industry all over the country which must be dealt with, in the harshest H possible manner and an obligation rests on Courts as VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 33 well. Courts to lend a helping hand in that direction. It is A relevantthat even before the aforesaid amendments, this Court in Henry's case observed that death sentence could be awarded even in a case of kidnapping and murder based on circumstantial evidence. [Para 26] [63-F-G; 64B-D-E] B Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470; Henry Westmuller Roberts vs. State of Assam (1985) 3 SCC 291, relied on c Dhondiba Gundu Pomaje & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra 1976 (1) SCC 162; Sushi/ Kumar vs. State of Punjab Criminal Appeal No.670 of 2009 decided by Supreme Court on September 1, 2009; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 D SCC 498; Mohan & Ors. vs. State of T.N. (1998) 5 SCC 336, referred to. 3.3. In this tragic scenario and in the drawing up of the balance sheet, the plight of the hapless victim, and E the abject terror that he must have undergone while in the grip of his kidnappers, is often ignored. AV was only 16 years of age, and had been picked up by VS who was known to him but had soon realized the predicament that he faced and had shouted for help. His terror can further F be visualized when he would have heard the threatening calls to his father and seen the preparations to do away with him, which included the taping of his mouth and the administration of an overdose of dangerous drugs. The horror, distress and the devastation felt in the family on the loss of an only son, can also be imagined. [Para 27] G [65-F-H; 66-A-B] Case Law Reference: 1983(3) sec 327 Referred to. Para 7 H A B c D E F G 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. 1987 (2) sec 11 Relied on. Para 10 1988 (3) sec 609 Relied on. Para 10 AIR 1960 SC 1125 Followed Para 11 AIR 1939 PC 47 Referred to Para 11 1976 (1) sec 162 Referred to Para 22 1980 (2) sec 684 Relied on. Para 24 2009 (6) sec 498 Referred to Para 22 1998 (5) sec 336 Referred to Para 23 1983 (3) sec 410 Relied on Para 24 1985 (3) sec 291 Relied on. Para 26 CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1396-1397 of 2008. From the Judgment & Order dated 30.5.2008 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 105-DB/07and Murder Reference No. 01/07. Amarendra Sharan, Jaspal Singh, Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra, A.K. Singh, Amit Anand Tiwari, Sanchit Guru, Shubham Bhalla, Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia, Kuldip Singh for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. These appeals arise out of the following facts: 1. On 14th February 2005 the deceased Abhi Verma @ Harry, a boy aged 16 years and a student of DAV School, Hoshiarpur, son of Goldsmith Ravi Verma (PW 27) was kidnapped at about 8.45 a.m. from outside the school. An H anonymous call was received in Police Station City, Hoshiarpur VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 35 [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] at 8.45 a.m. by-Sub-Inspector Nirmal Singh (PW 39), the SHO, A and on its basis an FIR was recorded under Section 364 of the IPC referring to the kidnapping of a child from a place near "Shimla Pahari". Sub-Inspector Jiwan Kumar (PW 43) of CIA Staff, Hoshiarpur also received information about the kidnapping on which the police machinery was further activated. B A short while later, that is at about the noon time, Ravi Verma (PW) received a call on his landline telephone No.226059 installed in his shop telling him that his son had been kidnapped and in case he wanted him to return alive, he should pay a ransom of Rs.50 Lac and that he would be contacted later. Ravi C Verma's request to the caller to permit him to speak with his son was denied. Ravi Verma, greatly alarmed, went post hasJe to the school and was told that his son had not come to class that day. This information confirmed his fear that his son had indeed been kidnapped for ransom. Sub-Inspector Jiwan Kumar 0 (PW) in the meanwhile reached Shimla Pahari Chowk and met Ravi Verma at about 12.30 p.m. and recorded his statement (Ex.PWWW) and on its basis the offence under Section 364 IPC was converted into one under Section 364A of the IPC. The Sub-Inspector also directed Ravi Verma to arrange an ID caller with a tape recorder and to connect it with the telephone E in his shop and to await another call from the kidnapper. These directions were carried out by Ravi Verma and the subsequent conversations were duly recorded. At about 4.00 p.m. Ravi Verma received a call on his Mobile No. 9814783418 and the kidnapper enquired as to whether arrangements for the payment F of the ransom had been made. Ravi Verma told him that he was in the process of collecting the money on which the kidnapper once again threatened that in case the money was not paid, the boy would be killed. At 7.00 p.m. Ravi Verma received yet another call from the kidnapper on his landline number G aforementioned, asking him to activate his Mobile but Ravi Verma told him that he was not carrying his Mobile at that moment. The kidnapper also told Ravi Verma that the police, including the SSP, Hoshiarpur had visited his house and that if this was repeated, the boy would be done to death. Ravi Verma, H 36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R. A however, told the kidnapper to reveal the place where the ransom could be delivered and was told that this information would be given later on phone. Ravi Verma again received a call on his land line from the kidnapper asking him to switch on his Mobile and on which the kidnapper called him on the Mobile 8 and told him that there was great panic all over the town after the kidnapping and that this would have serious consequences on his son. Ravi Verma, however, assured the kidnapper that he had no concern with the activity and that he was only interested in securing his son. No call was thereafter received C from the kidnapper._ The cassette on which the conversations had been recorded on the landline was handed over by Ravi Verma to S.I. Jiwan Kumar and on a replay of the tape, the conversation was clearly audible and was heard by the police. During the course of the investigation, it transpired that D . appellant Vikram Singh @ Vicky had visited Naresh Sharma (PW-3) who was the father of Mukul Sharma, at about 7 or 7.30 a.m. on the 14th February, 2005·and had requested for the loan of his car as he wanted to go to Jahankhelan. Naresh Sharma accordingly loaned his Alto Car PB-07-M-5023 to Vicky. Vicky parked his motorcycle inside Naresh Sharma's house and E drove off in the car but returned it at about 10 or 10.15 a.m. the same day. Naresh Sharma's statement was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. on 21st February 2005 as his car was suspected to be used in the commission of an offence. The police also recorded the F statement of Baljeet Kumar Saini (PW13) at about 11.15 p.m. on 14th February 2005 to the effect that an Alto car of grey colour had been parked at 8.30 a.m. in his locality while he was near the main gate of his house awaiting the arrival of a rickshaw to carry children to their school and that he had G noticed that the appellant Vikram Singh was sitting on the driver's seat and that in the meantime Abhi Verma had arrived with the appellant Jasvir Singh and the two had got into the rear seat whereafter Vikram Singh had driven towards the DAV school. During the investigation, it further came to light that a H few minutes later, that is at about 8.40 a.m., Satish Kumar (PW . VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 37 [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 19) who owned a shop called New Deluxe Bakers and A Confectioners situated at Shimla Pahari Chowk had heard a cry of anguish (Bachao Bachao) while standing outside the shop and on loot