# VINOD KUMAR v. ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI

- **Citation:** [2019] 10 S.C.R. 1051
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-08-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No.3793 of 2016
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhushan, K.M. Joseph
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vinod-kumar-v-ashok-kumar-gandhi-33105
- **Pages:** 47

## Headnote

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
s.14(1)(e) - Provision under - Providing for eviction of
residential premises on the ground of bonafide requirement - Held
violative of Art.14 of the Constitution in *Satyawati Sharma case
making the provision applicable also to non-residential premises -
In the present case application u/s.14(1)(e) filed seeking eviction
of non-residential premises - Rent Controller followed summary
procedure - Procedure when challenged, was confirmed by High
Court - In appeal to Supreme Court, tenant sought reference of
*Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration to larger Bench - The
grounds for reference were that *Satyawati Sharma case was
contrary to Constitution Bench Judgment in **Gian Devi Anand
case; that it was per incuriam Three Judge Bench judgment in #Gauri
Shanker case; that without adverting to s.25-B, s.14(1)(e) could
not have been made applicable for non-residential premises and
that it was not open to the Court to read down the provisions of
s.14(1)(e) in *Satyawati Sharma case - Held: Judgment in
*Satyawati Sharma case cannot be said to be per incuriam or
contrary to the judgment of Constitution Bench in **Gian Devi
Anand case or three Judgment Bench judgment in #Gauri Shanker
case - Gauri Shanker case being on different provision and premise,
is distinguishable and cannot be said to be a binding precedent -
In **Gian Devi Anand case it was suggested to legislature to
consider making 'bonafide requirement' a ground for eviction in
respect of commercial premises as well - Rather *Satyawati Sharma
case seeks support from **Gian Devi Anand case - In pursuance
to the suggestion in **Gian Devi Anand case Delhi Rent Act, 1995
was enacted - The judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case was not a
case of reading down of s.14(1)(e), but was a case where a portion
of the provision which was discriminatory and violative of Art.14
[2019] 10 S.C.R. 1051
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was struck down - s.25-B being related to only procedure for
considering application u/s.14(1)(e), has no bearing on the issue
which was considered in *Satyawati Sharma case - Nothing in s.
25-B can be read which runs counter to what is laid down in
*Satyawati Sharma case - Therefore, non-consideration of s.25-B
in *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be a ground to refer the case to
larger Bench - Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgment
in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by a larger Bench.
Legislation:
A legislation is complete, when the Act is passed by the
legislature and receives the assent of the President, even if it is not
enforced.
Judgments/Orders:
Principle of per incuriam - Meaning and applicability of.
Rejecting the plea to refer the judgment in *Satyawati
Sharma case to larger Bench and directing to list the matter for
consideration on merits, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 confines to the premises let for residential
purposes which may be required bonafide by the landlord for
occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his
family dependent on him. Part of Section 14(1)(e) was struck down
in *Satyawati Sharma case holding that Section 14(1)(e) is
violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the
Constitution in so far as it discriminates between the premises
let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same
are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himself
or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts
the landlord's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the
premises let for residential purposes only. [Paras 10, 11] [1063B-D]
1.2 Prior to *Satyawati Sharma case, the provisions of
Section 14(1)(e) were resorted to, by the landlord for seeking
recovery of possession only with regard to residential premises.
After the said judgment landlords of non-residential premises
started filing application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) whi

## Text

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VINOD KUMAR
v.
ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI
(Civil Appeal No.3793 of 2016)
AUGUST 05, 2019
[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
s.14(1)(e) - Provision under - Providing for eviction of
residential premises on the ground of bonafide requirement - Held
violative of Art.14 of the Constitution in *Satyawati Sharma case
making the provision applicable also to non-residential premises -
In the present case application u/s.14(1)(e) filed seeking eviction
of non-residential premises - Rent Controller followed summary
procedure - Procedure when challenged, was confirmed by High
Court - In appeal to Supreme Court, tenant sought reference of
*Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration to larger Bench - The
grounds for reference were that *Satyawati Sharma case was
contrary to Constitution Bench Judgment in **Gian Devi Anand
case; that it was per incuriam Three Judge Bench judgment in #Gauri
Shanker case; that without adverting to s.25-B, s.14(1)(e) could
not have been made applicable for non-residential premises and
that it was not open to the Court to read down the provisions of
s.14(1)(e) in *Satyawati Sharma case - Held: Judgment in
*Satyawati Sharma case cannot be said to be per incuriam or
contrary to the judgment of Constitution Bench in **Gian Devi
Anand case or three Judgment Bench judgment in #Gauri Shanker
case - Gauri Shanker case being on different provision and premise,
is distinguishable and cannot be said to be a binding precedent -
In **Gian Devi Anand case it was suggested to legislature to
consider making 'bonafide requirement' a ground for eviction in
respect of commercial premises as well - Rather *Satyawati Sharma
case seeks support from **Gian Devi Anand case - In pursuance
to the suggestion in **Gian Devi Anand case Delhi Rent Act, 1995
was enacted - The judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case was not a
case of reading down of s.14(1)(e), but was a case where a portion
of the provision which was discriminatory and violative of Art.14
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was struck down - s.25-B being related to only procedure for
considering application u/s.14(1)(e), has no bearing on the issue
which was considered in *Satyawati Sharma case - Nothing in s.
25-B can be read which runs counter to what is laid down in
*Satyawati Sharma case - Therefore, non-consideration of s.25-B
in *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be a ground to refer the case to
larger Bench - Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgment
in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by a larger Bench.
Legislation:
A legislation is complete, when the Act is passed by the
legislature and receives the assent of the President, even if it is not
enforced.
Judgments/Orders:
Principle of per incuriam - Meaning and applicability of.
Rejecting the plea to refer the judgment in *Satyawati
Sharma case to larger Bench and directing to list the matter for
consideration on merits, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 confines to the premises let for residential
purposes which may be required bonafide by the landlord for
occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his
family dependent on him. Part of Section 14(1)(e) was struck down
in *Satyawati Sharma case holding that Section 14(1)(e) is
violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the
Constitution in so far as it discriminates between the premises
let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same
are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himself
or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts
the landlord's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the
premises let for residential purposes only. [Paras 10, 11] [1063B-D]
1.2 Prior to *Satyawati Sharma case, the provisions of
Section 14(1)(e) were resorted to, by the landlord for seeking
recovery of possession only with regard to residential premises.
After the said judgment landlords of non-residential premises
started filing application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) which
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are dealt with by the Rent Controller as per procedure contained
in Chapter III-A of the Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains
'Summary Trial of Certain Applications'. [Paras 11 and 12]
[1063-C; 1064-A-B]
2.1 The principle of per incuriam has been developed by
the English Courts in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In
practice per incuriam is per ignoratium. The above principle has
been developed, accepted, approved and adopted by this Court
while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies
the doctrine of precedent as a matter of law. When a Court
delivers judgment ignoring the binding precedent of a larger
Bench, the judgment so delivered is held to be per incuriam and
has no precedential value. [Paras 22 and 24] [1069-D-E;
1071-C-D]
V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Specially Hospital and
Another (2010) 5 SCC 513 : [2010] 5 SCR 1 -
relied on.
Punjab Land Development and Reclamation
Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Chandigarh and Another (1990) 3 SCC
682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111 - followed.
2.2 *Satyawati Sharma case judgment cannot be said as
per incuriam. The ratio in **Gian Devi Anand case has neither
been ignored nor any contrary view has been taken by *Satyawati
Sharma case. **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraphs 32 and 34
has noticed the provisions of Section 14(1) specifically Section
14(1)(e) as existed in the Act, 1958. There was no challenge for
the classification in Section 14(1)(e) in the above case, hence
neither **Gian Devi Anand case was required to pronounce on
the classification in Section 14(1)(e) nor was required to consider
striking down of the provisions. In any view of the matter, the
observation in paragraph 39, **Gian Devi Ananad case justified
that there is ground to seek eviction on bona fide need. The
observation in paragraph 39 of **Gian Devi Anand's case suggests
that the Constitution Bench was satisfied that a ground for eviction
of tenant of commercial premises on bona fide requirement of
landlord should also be provided for. The basis for what has been
done in *Satyawati Sharma case was clearly laid down in **Gian
VINOD KUMAR v. ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI
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Devi Anand case for striking down the unconstitutional part in
Section 14(1)(e). Thus, *Satyadevi Sharma case seeks support
of what has been done in **Gian Devi Anand's case. [Para 30]
[1077-C-E]
2.3 #Gauri Shanker case was not a case in which provision
of Section 14(1)(e) came for consideration nor any observation
had been made with regard to ground of eviction available to
landlord with regard to commercial premises. #Gauri Shanker
case had dealt with entirely different provision, certain limitation
which was attached to residential premises itself to heritability.
The case of #Gauri Shanker case being on different provision
and premise, it cannot be said that #Gauri Shanker case was a
binding precedent to be followed by *Satyawati Sharma case.
Therefore, the judgment of *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be
held to be per incuriam. [Para 32] [1079-D-F]
**Gauri Shanker and Others v. Union of India and
Others (1994) 6 SCC 349 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 244
- distinguished.
2.4 The ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case that a Legislation
which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its
enactment may with the lapse of time and due to change of
circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of
the doctrine of equality has been affirmed in ##Super Max
International Pvt. Ltd. case, a three Judge Bench judgment. The
three-Judge Bench in ##Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. case
approved limited ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case.
[Paras 39 and 40] [1083-D-E; 1084-A-B]
3.1 Non-reference of Section 25B in *Satyawati Sharma
case does not render the judgment per incuriam. Nothing in Section
25B can be read which runs counter to what has been laid down in
*Satyawati Sharma case. *Satyawati Sharma case was considering
the challenge to provisions of Section 14(1)(e) in so far as the
ground of bona fide need of landlord is also available for
commercial premises. Section 25B being related to only
procedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e)
has no bearing on the issue which had propped up before this
Court in *Satyawati Sharma case. [Para 35] [1081-D-E]
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3.2 It was contended that in so far as applicability of the
procedure under Section 25B is concerned, the issue needs to
be revisited to save the tenants from hardship. This cannot be a
ground for referring the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case to
larger Bench for reconsideration. *Satyawati Sharma case having
not said about the procedure, there is nothing in the judgment
which needs to be revisited on the above aspect. It is for the
Legislature to take stock of situation and if it so decides, it can
make necessary changes in the procedure for considering the
application under Section 14(1)(e) with regard to eviction of
commercial tenants on the ground of bona fide need of the land
lord. [Para 45] [1090-D-F]
3.3 In sofaras submission of the appellant that under Section
14(1)(e) in respect of commercial tenancy leave to defend is
generally rejected, it is suffice to say that rejection of leave for a
particular case is matter to be examined in each case and no
general observation can be made in this regard. [Para 45]
[1091-F-G]
4. In *Satyawati Sharma case, this Court did not read down
the provision of Section 14(1)(e). This Court held that Section
14(1)(e) is not intra vires the doctrine of equality enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution. After considering all the aspects
of the matter, this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case had held that
Section 14(1)(e) is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied
in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court, thus, struck down
the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e). The judgment of
*Satyawati Sharma case was, thus, not a case of reading down of
Section 14(1)(e) rather it was a case where portion of Section
14(1)(e) was struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. [Paras 52, 53 and 54] [1094-E, F-H;
1095-A, D-E]
5.1 In **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 the
Constitution Bench observed that bona fide need of the landlord
stands very much on the same footing in regard to either class of
premises, residential or commercial. Therefore, it is suggested
that Legislature may consider the advisability of making the bona
fide requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect
of commercial premises as well. After more than a decade of the
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above observation, a comprehensive Legislation, namely, Delhi
Rent Act, 1995 has been enacted to provide for the regulation of
rents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premises
and of rates of hotels and lodging houses in the National Capital
Territory of Delhi. [Para 46] [1090-G-H; 1091-A-B]
Subramanian Swamy and Others v. Raju through
Member, Juvenile Justice Board and Another (2014) 8
SCC 390 : [2014] 9 SCR 283 - distinguished.
5.2 The Legislature itself notices the need for providing a
ground for eviction to landlord on bona fide need with regard to
residential as well as non-residential premises. Thus, what was
said in **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 was duly accepted
by Legislature. It is another matter that Delhi Rent Act, 1995
even though it received assent of the President could not be
enforced. Even though the said Act could not be enforced, the
Legislation is complete when the Act is passed by the Legislature
and receives the assent of the President. The Parliament in
enacting Act, 1995 accepts the suggestion of Constitution Bench
in **Gian Devi Anand case and hence what has been held by
*Satyawati Sharma case was felt both by this Court and
Legislature. Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgment
of this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by a
larger Bench. [Paras 55 and 57] [1095-F; 1096-A; 1097-A-B]
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of
Maharashtra and Another (1998) 2 SCC 1 : [1997] 6
Suppl. SCR 717; Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel
Association of India and Others (2008) 3 SCC 1 :
[2007] 12 SCR 991; Saradamani Kandappan v.
S. Rajalakshmi & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 18 : [2011] 8
SCR 874; Modern Dental College and Research Centre
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others
(2016) 7 SCC 353; Subramanian Swamy and Others v.
Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and
Another (2014) 8 SCC 390 - relied on.
State of Kerala and Others v. Mar Appraem Kuri
Company Limited and Another (2012) 7 SCC 106 :
[2012] 4 SCR 448 - distinguished.
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H.C.Sharma v. LIC of India (1973) ILR 1 Del 90;
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India
and Another (2008) 5 SCC 287 : [2008] 6 SCR 566;
Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and Others (1985)
2 SCC 683 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Harbilas Rai
Bansal v. State of Punjab and Another (1996) 1 SCC
1 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 178 ; Rakesh Vij v. Raminder
Pal Singh Seth and Others (2005) 8 SCC 504 : [2005]
3 Suppl. SCR 777; State of Maharasthra and Anr. v.
Super Max International (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2009) 9
SCC 772 : [2009] 13 SCR 801 - referred to..
Case Law Reference
[2008] 6 SCR 566
referred to
Para 5
(1973) ILR 1 Del 90
referred to
Para 14
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 14
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 244
distinguished
Para 14
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 178
referred to
Para 14
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 777
referred to
Para 14
[2009] 13 SCR 801
referred to
Para 16
[1990] 3 SCR 111
followed
Para 22
[2010] 5 SCR 1
relied on
Para 23
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 717
relied on
Para 43
[2007] 12 SCR 991
relied on
Para 44
[2011] 8 SCR 874
relied on
Para 44
(2016) 7 SCC 353
distinguished
Para 47
(2014) 8 SCC 390
followed
Para 56
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.3793 of
2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.03.2016 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in R.C. Revision No. 534/2015
With
C.A. No. 8972-8973/17, 6063/19, 6064/19, 6066-72/19, 6073/19,
16916/17 and 6075/19
VINOD KUMAR v. ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI
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 Uday Gupta, Ms. Shivani Lal, Hiren Dasan, M.K. Tripathi, Vikas
Bansal, Ram Bhakt Aggarwal, Mohan Pandey, Uday Gupta, Ms. Shivani
Lal, Hiren Dasan, M. K. Tripathi, Vikas Bansal, Ram Bhakt Aggarwal,
G. L. Soni, Chand Qureshi, Amit Mishra, Mrs. Sarla Chandra, Kanwal
Chaudhary, Bimlesh Kumar Singh, Rajinder Mathur, Ashok Kr. Rohatgi,
M. K. Ravi, Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. Vinishma
Kaul, Prem Paul Ahuja, Nikunj Dayal, Pramod Dayal, Ms. Payal Dayal,
Nitin K. Gupta, Parth Upadhyay, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the
Appellant.
N.K. Kaul, Sr. Adv. Jai Sahai Endlaw, Shivansh Soni, Arun K.
Sinha, Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, Mohit Chaudhary, Ms. Puja Sharma,
Balwinder Singh Suri, Kunal Sachdeva, Anup Kumar Mishra, Rajesh
Goyal, Siddharth Mittal, Parbhat Kumar, V. K. Monga, Parmanand Gaur,
Mrs. Rachna Gupta, Gagan Gupta, Ms. Anushree Kapadia, Ms. Kavita
Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals, except one where leave to defend was granted,
have been filed against the judgment of Delhi High Court dismissing the
Rent Control Revisions filed by the appellants in which the order passed
by the Rent Controller rejecting the application filed by the appellantstenants seeking leave to defend in a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 have been challenged.
3. The appellants are tenants occupying non-residential buildings
for whose eviction petitions have been filed by the landlord on the ground
of bonafide need of landlord. The appellants at the very outset challenge
the maintainability of eviction petitions filed by the landlord under 14(1)(e)
on the ground of bonafide need. The facts are being taken from
C.A.No.3793 of 2016 (Vinod Kumar vs. Ashok Kumar Gandhi) for
considering the issues which have been raised by the learned counsel
for the appellant at the very beginning of the submission.
C.A.No.3793 of 2016(Vinod Kumar vs. Ashok Kumar Gandhi)
4. The appellant is a tenant of a shop bearing No.J-3/188-B, Nehru
Market, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027. The respondent-landlord
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of the premises filed an Eviction Petition on 03.01.2011 to obtain
possession of the shop on the ground that son of the landlord was without
any job and the premises in question are bonafide required by his son to
start business of sale of readymade garments and accessories. It was
further pleaded in the application that the landlord has planned to make
a passage of around six feet wide throughout the length of the property,
from the front side, to have access to the stairs case in the rear side of
the property. The Rent Controller after receipt of the said application
issued notice to the appellant-tenant. On 25.01.2011, the appellant filed
an application seeking leave to defend along with a detailed affidavit in
support thereof. The landlord filed a reply to the application alongwith
counter-affidavit. The Additional Rent Controller vide order dated
05.05.2015 rejected the application seeking leave to defend filed by the
appellant. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated
05.05.2015 revision petition was filed by the appellant under Section
25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenging the order or
Additional Rent Controller. The High Court vide its judgment dated
14.03.2016 dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved
by the judgment of the High Court, this appeal has been filed by the
appellant.
5. In C.A.No.3793 of 2016 various grounds have been raised in
support of the appeal. Other appeals included in this group also raise
several grounds on the merits questioning the refusal to grant leave to
defend by the Rent Controller. However, on the opening of the
submissions, learned counsel for the appellants have confined their
submissions on the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead)
by LRs. Vs. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287.
Questioning the correctness of judgment of Satyawati Sharma various
grounds have been canvassed before us. Learned counsel for the
appellant submits that the said judgment needs to be referred to a larger
Bench to examine its correctness. It is the submission of the appellant
that the Eviction Petitions have been filed under 14(1)(e) for eviction
from non-residential premises on the projected bonafide need of landlord
only on the basis of judgment of Satyawati Sharma, which had, in fact,
re-written the provision of 14(1)(e). It is submitted that as per provision
of 14(1)(e) as contained in Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the landlord
was precluded from filing application for eviction on the ground of bonafide
need regarding non-residential premises. It is submitted that application
VINOD KUMAR v. ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
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under 14(1)(e) was contemplated by the Act only with regard to premises
let for residential purposes.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord has countered the
submission of the appellant and submits that the judgment of this Court
in Satyawati Sharma lays down the correct law and needs no reference
to a larger Bench.
7. Learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissions
only on the question as to whether judgment of this Court in Satyawati
Sharma needs reference to larger Bench or not. We, in these appeals,
thus, proceed to consider limited submission as to whether judgment of
this Court in Satyawati Sharma needs reference to larger bench or not.
The issues on merits of the order passed by the Rent Controller rejecting
leave to defend application are not being examined as of now.
8. Before we notice the respective submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties in detail, we may first notice the provisions of
Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as enacted. The Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 had been enacted to provide for the regulation of
rents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premises and of
rates of hotels and lodging houses in the National Capital Territory of
Delhi. The premises have been defined in Section 2(i) which is to the
following effect:
 "2(i) "premises" means any building or part of a building which
is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for
commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes-
 (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to
such building or part of the building;
 (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building
or part of the building; but does not include a room in a hotel or
lodging house;"
9. Chapter III of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 deals with control
of eviction of tenants. Section 14(1) which has arisen for consideration
in these cases is as follows:
 "Section 14. Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other
law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession
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of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour
of the landlord against a tenant:
 Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to
him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of
possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds
only, namely:-
 (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole
of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two
months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of
rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided
in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882).
 (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952,
sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the
whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in
writing of the landlord;
 (c) that the tenant has used the premises for a purpose other
than that for which they were let-
 (i) if the premises have been let on or after the 9th day of
June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord;
or
 (ii) if the premises have been let before the said date without
obtaining his consent;
 (d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and
neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing
therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of
the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof;
 (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required
bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself
or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the
owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises
are held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
 Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, "premises let
for residential purposes" include any premises which having been
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let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord,
used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;
 (f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human
habitation and are required bona fide by the landlord for carrying
out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being
vacated;
 (g) that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for
the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any
substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the
premises being vacated;
 (h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of,
or been allotted, a residence:
 (i) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence
by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord,
and that the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment;
 (j) that the tenant has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be caused
substantial damage to the premises;
 (k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used
or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition
imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi
Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while
giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate;
 (l) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out
any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi
Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in
pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme
and that such building work cannot be carried out without the
premises being vacated."
10. A perusal of the various grounds available to a landlord to
recover possession of any premises indicates that although several
grounds are available both for residential and non-residential premises
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but few grounds are available only for premises let for residential
purposes. The provision of Section 14(1)(e) which needs consideration
confine to the premises let for residential purposes which may be required
bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for
any member of his family dependent on him. The explanation explains
that premises let for residential purposes which having been let for use
as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally
for commercial or other purposes are also included in residential premises.
11. The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) were resorted by the landlord
for seeking recovery of possession only with regard to residential premises
till part of Section 14(1)(e) has been struck down in Satyawati Sharma
case. This Court held that Section 14(1)(e) of Act, 1958 is violative of
the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution in so
far as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and nonresidential purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlord
for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on
him and restricts the landlord's right to seek eviction of the tenant from
the premises let for residential purposes only. This Court clarified that it
is not totally striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act in its entirety
but it has struck down only the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e).
In Satyawati Sharma(AIR 2008 SC 3148) this Court held that striking
down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) the remaining part
of the Section 14(1)(e) shall be read in the manner as extracted in
paragraph 39 of the judgment which is as follows:
"39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be
misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the
1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor
the learned Counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional
in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking
down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the
remaining part thereof may read as under:
"that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for
himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if
he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit
the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has
no other reasonably suitable accommodation."
..............."
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12. It is on the strength of the judgment of this Court in Satyawati
Sharma that after the said judgment landlords of non-residential premises
have also filed application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) which are
dealt with by the Rent Controller as per procedure contained in Chapter
III-A of the Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains 'Summary Trial of Certain
Applications'. The Rent Controller treating the said procedure applicable
on applications filed by the landlords under Section 14(1)(e) has issued
summons to the tenants in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule and
have passed order either rejecting the leave to defend or granting leave
to defend which orders, were challenged in the High Court giving rise to
these appeals.
13. After noticing the brief background of one of the issues which
has been pressed at the very outset, we now proceed to notice the
submissions of learned counsel for the parties in detail as canvassed
before us.
14. Shri Uday Gupta, learned counsel who led the submission on
behalf of the appellant has very ably and persuasively put forward his
submissions. Shri Gupta submits that validity of the provision of Section
14(1)(e) was challenged in Delhi High Court more than once which
challenge was repelled by the High Court. Shri Gupta submits that Delhi
High court in H.C.Sharma vs. LIC of India,(1973) ILR 1 Del 90, in
which restriction placed on the rights of landlord to evict the tenant from
non-residential premises as discriminatory and violative of Section 19
and 14(1)(f) was considered and rejected. In Satyawati Sharma
appellant had filed an application for eviction of the tenant which
application was rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that
application is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(e) for non-residential
purposes. Apart from a revision challenging the said order in the High
court a writ petition was also filed by Satyawati Sharma challenging
the constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e) which challenge was repelled
by Delhi High Court in Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India and others,
2002 (65) SRJ 615 (Full Bench), which judgment was subject matter of
the Civil Appeals before this Court giving rise to the judgment of this
Court in Satyawati Sharma (supra). Shri Gupta relying on the judgment
of Constitution Bench judgment in Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar
and others, (1985) 2 SCC 683, submits that Gian Devi Anand itself
has noticed the distinction in provision of Section 14(1)(e) which was
confined to residential premises and not available in case of commercial
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premises. It is submitted that Gian Devi Anand suggested that
Legislature may consider the advisability of making the bona fide
requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial
premises as well. The legislature having not yet enforced the Delhi Rent
Act, 1995 it was not open for this Court in Satyawati Sharma (supra)
to read down the provision of Section 14(1)(e). Shri Gupta submits that
the judgment of Satyawati Sharma is contrary to the Constitution Bench
judgment in Gian Devi Anand. A Bench of two Hon'ble Judges could
not have adopted the course which was not adopted by the Constitution
Bench itself in Gian Devi Anand. Shri Gupta further submits that
Satyawati Sharma failed to take notice of three-Judge Bench judgment
of this Court in Gauri Shanker and others vs. Union of India and
others, (1994) 6 SCC 349. It is submitted that view taken in paragraph
41 of Satyawati Sharma is per incuriam in view of the judgment already
rendered in Gauri Shanker case. Alternatively, Shri Gupta submits that
even judgment of Satyawati Sharma is not held to be per incuriam, the
said judgment necessarily needs to be revisited, in view of the fact that
the Satyawati Sharma did not consider several relevant provisions of
Act, 1958 including Section 25B and Section 19. It is submitted that
summary procedure which was brought in the statute by inserting Chapter
III-A by Act 18 of 1976 with effect from 01.12.1975 specially Section
25B which was special procedure for the disposal of applications for
eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement under Section 14(1)(e)
was meant only for residential premises. Without adverting to Section
25B, this Court in Satyawati Sharma could not have held that Section
14(1)(e) should also be available for non-residential premises. The very
premise in Satyawati Sharma that Rent Control legislation did not make
any distinction in residential and non-residential purposes was erroneous,
which led Satyawati Sharma to fall in error. The two-Judge Bench of
this Court in Satyawati Sharma has re-written Section 14(1)(e) which
could not have been done by the Court and matter ought to have been
left for legislature as was said by the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi
Anand case. The Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand itself has
observed that there has been distinction between residential and
commercial premises in Delhi. Satyawati Sharma has relied on judgment
of this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab and another,
(1996) 1 SCC 1, and Rakesh Vij vs. Raminder Pal Singh Seth and
others, (2005) 8 SCC 504, which were the judgments on East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and could not have been applied with
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regard to interpretation of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act the remedy for landlord for seeking
eviction on the bonafide requirement both for residential and nonresidential premises was very much available from the very beginning
and it was, for the first time, sought to be taken away by 1956 Amendment
which amendment was struck down by this Court. Those cases were
not relevant for Delhi Rent Control Act. The tenants occupying nonresidential premises are dependent on their livelihood. Applying summary
procedure as prescribed under Section 25B brings hardship in denying
them protection of law since they are not able to defend their cases on
merits. Referring to statement of Minister, Shri H.K.L. Bhagat on debate
in the House on 1976 Amendment, it is submitted that statement was
made that Section 25B was not to apply to non-residential premises
since under Section 14(1)(e) eviction can be sought only with regard to
residential premises. It is submitted that due to Explanation to Section
14(1)(e) having held to be redundant the benefit given under Section 19
is also denied to the tenant. Section 19(2) has been rendered otiose. The
principle of reading down was not attracted in the present case. It is
submitted that reading down cannot be used when the legislative intent
is clear.
15. Satyawati Sharma even does not refer to Sections 14A to
14D which were also inserted by Act 18 of 1976. There is reasonable
doubt of correctness of Satyawati Sharma, hence, it needs to be referred
to a larger Bench for final opinion. Legislature never intended to apply
Section 25B to commercial tenancy. Since, the procedure of Section
25B was harsh which was made looking to bonafide need for residential
premises, Section 25B should not be ipso facto applied to commercial
tenancy. In other case, the tenant has right to file written statement
which is now denied by applying procedure under Section 25B. Section
25B having not referred to it is to be seen as to whether Section 25B
shall apply. In any view of the matter judgment of Satyawati Sharma
should be applied to the tenancy coming into the existence after the
judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma case.
16. Shri Neeraj Krishan Kaul, senior counsel, led arguments on
behalf of the landlord. Shri Kaul submits that this Court in Satyawati
Sharma found Section 14(1)(e) to be ultra vires to Article 14 of the
Constitution. However, instead of striking down the provisions altogether,
this Court removed the offending part of the legislation by obliterating
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the classification between residential and non-residential premises and
holding that Section 14(1)(e) would apply equally to residential and nonresidential premises. Satyawati Sharma took notice of Constitutional
Bench judgment in Gian Devi Anand(supra)which had suggested the
Legislature to remove the discrimination between residential and nonresidential premises in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with regard to
seeking eviction by landlord on the ground of bona fide need. When the
Legislation had not acted in removing aforesaid classification, this Court
applying the doctrine of temporal reasonableness held that a Legislation
which may have been reasonable and rational at the time of enactment
may over passage of time become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative
of Article 14. This Court in Satyawati Sharma took judicial notice of the
fact that the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 which was a subsequent Legislation,
but yet to be notified by the Central Government, did not distinguish
between the residential and non-residential premises in sofaras landlord's
right to seek eviction on bona fide need is concerned. The observations
made in Gian Devi Anand were in the background of a discussion in
relation to heritability of tenancies vis-à-vis Section 2(l)of Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. The judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma has
also been affirmed by a three-Judge Bench in State of Maharasthra
and Anr. Vs. Super Max International (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 9
SCC 772.
17. This Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal(supra) and Rakesh Vij
(supra)had held no distinction can be made with regard to residential
tenancy and non-residential tenancy in sofaras eviction is concerned at
the instance of the landlord on the ground of bona fide need. The judgment
of Satyawati Sharma cannot be held to be any kind of judicial Legislation.
What has been done in Satyawati Sharma is to only strike down the
unconstitutional portion of Section 14(1)(e). The part of Section 14(1)(e)
which is severable has been retained. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma
cannot be held to be per incuriam either Gian Devi Anand case or
Gauri Shanker case. The observations in Gauri Shanker were in the
background of Section 2(l)(iii) of Act, 1958 wherein heritability of tenancy
is provided.
18. There can be no distinction in sofaras bona fide need of the
landlord is concerned regarding residential and commercial premises.
The observations of three-Judge Bench in Super Max International
are not obiter but are the judicial dicta which has re-confirmed the
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principles in Satyawati Sharma case. Replying the submission of the
appellant in sofaras Section 25B of the Act is concerned, Shri Kaul
submits that procedure for eviction cannot be different in sofaras
residential and commercial tenancies are concerned. Adopting different
procedures for eviction in the above two cases itself be treated as
discriminatory. There are various safeguards under Act, 1958 which
amply protect the tenant. There is nothing in the Satyawati Sharma
judgment which can be said to be per incuriam. The appellant is asking
this Court to violate certainty of law and comity of the Courts. There is
no ground today to refer the judgment of Satyawati Sharma case for
consideration of a larger Bench.