# VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [2015] 1 S.C.R. 504
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-01-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 554 of 2012
- **Bench:** Dipak Misra, ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/vinod-kumar-v-state-of-punjab-30386
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13(2) -
Public servant taking illegal gratification - Public servantC octroi inspector accepting bribe - Conviction and sentence
ulss. 7 and 13(2) on basis of the trap laid, examination and
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the courts
below - On appeal held: On facts, presumption can be drawn
that the inspector had received or accepted the said currency
D notes on his own volition -
Testimony of PW6, an
independent witness and PW-7 show that the prosecution was
able to prove demand, acceptance fWd recovery of the
amount - Though PW 7 was cross-examined after 20 months
which resulted in his pre-varication from the examination-inE chief, he was declared hostile and re-examined, reading the
evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot be brushed aside
- Thus, order passed by the courts below upheld.
Criminal trial - Inordinate delay in holding trial in respect
of serious offences relating to corruption - Adjournments
F sought by the counsel for cross-examination - Duty of the
court - Held: Adjournments sought on the drop of a hat by
the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, is
contrary to all principles of holding a trial - It is necessary that
if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination
G should be completed on the same day - If the examination
of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned
to the next day for cross-examination - Cross-examination
should not be deferred for a long time - Special reasons are
H
504
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
505
to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note
A
of - If adjournments are granted in this manner it would
tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such
trials to a farce - Trial judges directed to follow the principles
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer crossexamination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of B
the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an
apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer
chicanery - Administration of criminal justice - Practice and
procedure - Adjournments.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. Mere recovery of the tainted money is not
sufficient to record a conviction unless there is evidence
that bribe had been demanded or money was paid
voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of D
demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to
convict the accused. PW6-clerk supported the recovery
in entirety. He stood firm and remained unshaken in the
cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to
E
dislodge his testimony. Further, from. the testimony of PW
7 it is absolutely clear that he supported in entirety about
the demand, acceptance and recovery of money. PW7
was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was crossexamined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months.
F
The delay in said cross-examination, had given enough
time for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is
to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well
as to the victim. An offence registered under the
Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all
G
seriousness. There is failure to appreciate how the trial
Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time_,,. ·
for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would
have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the trial
Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the said
H
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason
whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination
took place after 20 months. The witness had all the time
in the world to be gained over. He was declared hostile
and re-examined. Reading the evidence in entirety, the
B evidence of PW-7 cannot be brushed aside. However, part
of his testimony does not commend acceptance in the
backdrop of entire evidence in examinati

## Text

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[2015] 1 S.C.R. 504
VINOD KUMAR
V.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 554 of 2012)
JANUARY 21, 2015.
[DIPAK MISRA AND ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13(2) -
Public servant taking illegal gratification - Public servantC octroi inspector accepting bribe - Conviction and sentence
ulss. 7 and 13(2) on basis of the trap laid, examination and
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the courts
below - On appeal held: On facts, presumption can be drawn
that the inspector had received or accepted the said currency
D notes on his own volition -
Testimony of PW6, an
independent witness and PW-7 show that the prosecution was
able to prove demand, acceptance fWd recovery of the
amount - Though PW 7 was cross-examined after 20 months
which resulted in his pre-varication from the examination-inE chief, he was declared hostile and re-examined, reading the
evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot be brushed aside
- Thus, order passed by the courts below upheld.
Criminal trial - Inordinate delay in holding trial in respect
of serious offences relating to corruption - Adjournments
F sought by the counsel for cross-examination - Duty of the
court - Held: Adjournments sought on the drop of a hat by
the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, is
contrary to all principles of holding a trial - It is necessary that
if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination
G should be completed on the same day - If the examination
of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned
to the next day for cross-examination - Cross-examination
should not be deferred for a long time - Special reasons are
H
504
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
505
to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note
A
of - If adjournments are granted in this manner it would
tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such
trials to a farce - Trial judges directed to follow the principles
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer crossexamination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of B
the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an
apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer
chicanery - Administration of criminal justice - Practice and
procedure - Adjournments.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. Mere recovery of the tainted money is not
sufficient to record a conviction unless there is evidence
that bribe had been demanded or money was paid
voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of D
demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to
convict the accused. PW6-clerk supported the recovery
in entirety. He stood firm and remained unshaken in the
cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to
E
dislodge his testimony. Further, from. the testimony of PW
7 it is absolutely clear that he supported in entirety about
the demand, acceptance and recovery of money. PW7
was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was crossexamined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months.
F
The delay in said cross-examination, had given enough
time for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is
to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well
as to the victim. An offence registered under the
Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all
G
seriousness. There is failure to appreciate how the trial
Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time_,,. ·
for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would
have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the trial
Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the said
H
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason
whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination
took place after 20 months. The witness had all the time
in the world to be gained over. He was declared hostile
and re-examined. Reading the evidence in entirety, the
B evidence of PW-7 cannot be brushed aside. However, part
of his testimony does not commend acceptance in the
backdrop of entire evidence in examination-in-chief and
the re-examination. Further, the evidence of PW6 and
PW7 have got corroboration from PW8. He in all material
c particulars stated about the recovery and proven the
necessary documents pertaining to the test carried with
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught redhanded with the currency notes smeared with the powder
by PW 8. The appellant in his statement recorded under
0
Section 313 CrPC took the plea that he is innocent and
was falsely implicated due to animosity. No explanation
was given as regards the recovery. Therefore, legitimately
a presumption can be drawn that the accused-appellant
had received or accepted the said currency notes on his
E own volition. The factum of presumption and the
testimony of PW6 and 7 go a long way to show that the
prosecution was able to prove demand, acceptance and
recovery of the amount. Thus, the trial judge and the High
Court appositely concluded that the charges leveled
against the accused have duly been proven by the
F prosecution. It is not a case that there is no other
evidence barring the evidence of the complainant. On the
contrary there are adequate circumstances which
establish the ingredients of the offences in respect of
which he was charged. [Para 39-40] [537-A-D; 538-D-H;
G 539-D-G; 540-8-D]
2. Agony and anguish is expressed in the manner in
which trials jn respect of serious offences relating to
corruption are being conducted by the trial courts.
H Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
507
counsel, even though the witness is present in court,
contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after
the examination-in-chief of a witness is over,
adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the
disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The
law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of
time but the same is not taken note of. There has to be a
fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while
conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the
law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind
A
B
its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on th.e basis of c
the material brought on record. If an accused for his
benefit takes the ttial on the path of total mockery, it
cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty
to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If
adjournments are granted in this manner it would
tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn
such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are
expected in law to follow the command of the procedure
relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel
to grant adjournment for non-accepta~ble reasons. In fact,
it is not all appreciable to call a witness for crossexam ination after such a long span of time. It is
imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the crossexamination should be completed on the same day. If the
examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial
can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination.
It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination
should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema
D
E
F
to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the
court is to see that not only the interest of the accused
G
as per law is protected but also the societal and collective
interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that
despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of
granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. There
is a constant discomfort. Therefore, it is appropriate that
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A the copies of the judgment be sent to the Chief Justices
of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the
trial Judges with a command to follow the principles
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the
cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the
B leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the
trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society
to suffer chicanery. Law cannot allowed to be lonely; a
destitute. [Para 41] [540-G-H; 541-A-G]
Gumaib Singh V. State of Punjab 2013 (3) SCR 563 =
C (2013) 7 SCC 108; Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab 2000
(3) SCR 572 = 2000 (5) SCC 668, State of U.P. V. Shambu
Nath Singh (2001) 5 SCC 667, Raghubir Singh V. State of
Haryana 1974 (2) SCR 799: 1974 (4) SCC 560; Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra 2000 (4) Suppl.
D SCR 475 = 2000 (8) SCC 571; B. Jayaraj V. State of Andhra
Pradesh (2014) 4 SCALE 81; M.R. Purushotham Vs. State
of Kamataka (2014) 11 SCALE 467; Sat Paul V. Delhi
Administration 1976 (2) SCR 11 = 1976 ( 1 ) SCC 727; State
of Bihar V. Basawan Singh (CB) (1959) SCR 195, Major E.G.
E Barsey V. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 195, Bhanupratap
Hariprasad Dave V. State of Gujarat (1969) 1 SCR 22; MO
Shamshuddin V. State of Kera/a 1995 ( 2 ) SCR 900 = 1995
( 3 ) SCC 351; C. M. G Babu V. C. B. I., Cochin 2009 (2 )
SCR 1-021 = 2009 (3 ) SCC 779; and Benarsi Das V. State
F of Haryana 2010 (4 ) SCR 383 = 2010 (4 ) SCC 450; Shiv
Bahadur Singh V. State of Vindhya Pradesh 1954
SCR 1038 =AIR 1954 SC 322 , Bhagwan Singh V. State of
Rajasthan 1976 ( 1 ) SCC 15 , Megha Singh V. State of
Haryana 1996 (11 ) SCC 709, State vs. V. Jayapau/ (2004)
G 5 SCC 223 State of U.P. V. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi 1964
SCR 71 = 1964 AIR 221, S.Jeevanatham V. State (through
Inspector of Police, TN.) 2004 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 607 = 2004
(5) SCC 230; Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana 1976 (2)
SCR 921 = 1976 (1) SCC 389, Khuji@ Surendra Tiwari V.
H State of Madhya Pradesh1991 ( 3) SCR 1 = 1991 ( 3) SCC
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
509
627, Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of Orissa 1977 ( 1 ) SCR
A
439 = 1976 ( 4 ) SCC 233; and Syad Akbar V. State of
Karnataka 1980 ( 1 ) SCR 95 = 1980 ( 1 ) SCC 30, Rammi
@ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (3 ) Suppl.
SCR 1 = 1999 (8 ) SCC 649, Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi
Administration) 1980 (2) SCR 1051 = 1980 (2) SCC 390;Sita
B
Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1975 ( 2 ) SCC 227; M. Narsinga
Rao v. State of A.P 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584 = 2001 ( 1 )
SCC 691; Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4)
SCC 725;
Suresh Budharmal Kalani v.
State of
Maharashtra1998 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 608 = 1998 ( 7 ) SCC c
337;M.R. Purushotham v. State of Karnataka 2014 (11)
SCALE 467; T. Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu
2006 (1 ) SCR 180 = 2006 (1 ) SCC 401, Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000 ( 4 ) Suppl.
SCR 475 = 2000 ( 8 ) SCC 571 , Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v.
D
State of Jharkhand and Anr. 2008 (11 ) SCR 66 = 2008 (11)
SCC 681; State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao
Wankhede 2009 (11 ) SCR 513 = 2009 (15) SCC 200, C.M.
Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin 2009 (2 ) SCR 1021 =
2009 AIR 2022, K. S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka 2013
E
(4 ) SCR 155 = 2013 (3 ) SCC 721 and Satvir Singh v. State
of Delhi (2014) 13 SCC 143 - referred to.
Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd (1911) 1
KB 988 : 1911 WN 53 DPP V. Hester (1972) 3 All ER 1056;
OPP V. Kilbourne (1973) 1 All ER 440- referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
2013 (3) SCR 563
referred to
para 4
2000 (3) SCR 572
referred to
para 5
G
(2001) 5 sec 667
referred to
para 6
1974 (2) SCR 799
referred to
para 13
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475 referred to
para 13
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A
(2014) 4 SCALE 81
referred to
para 14
(2014) 11 SCALE 467
referred to
para 14
1976 (2) SCR 11
referred to
para 15
B
(1959) SCR 195
referred to
para 15
(1962) 2 SCR 195
referred to
para 15,20
(1969) 1 SCR 22
referred to
para 15,21
1995 (2) SCR 900
referred to
para 15,22
c
2009 (2) SCR 1021
referred to
para 16
2010 (4) SCR 383
referred to
para 16
1954 SCR 1038
referred to
para 19
D
1976 (1) sec 15
referred to
para 23
1996 (11) sec 109
referred tcf
para 24,26
(2004) 5 sec 223
referred to
para 25,27
E
1964 SCR 71
referred to
para 25,26
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 607
referred to
para 27,28
1976 (2) SCR 921
referred to
para 29
F
1991 (3) SCR 1
referred to
para 29
1977 (1) SCR 439
referred to
para 29
1980 (1) SCR 95
referred to
para 29
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
para 30
G
1980 (2) SCR 1051
referred to
para 33
1975 (2) sec 221
referred to
para 34
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584 referred to
para 35
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
511
1979 (4) sec 725
referred to
para 35
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 608 referred to
para 35
2014 (11) SCALE 467
referred to
para 38
2006 (1) SCR 180
referred to
para39
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475 referred to
para 39
2008 (11) SCR 66
referred to
para 39
2009 (11) SCR 513
referred to
para 39
2009 AIR 2022
referred to
para 39
2013 (4) SCR 155
referred
para 39
(2014) 13 sec 143
referred to
para 39
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 554 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2011 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA No.
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c
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1280-SB of 2001 (0 & M)
E
Sushil Kumar jain, Puneet Jain, Khushbhu Jain, Abhinay
Gupta, Manu Maheshwari, Pratibha Jain for the Appellant.
V. Madhukar, AAG, Anvita Cowshish, Kuldeep Singh tor
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.
F
D.IPAK MISRA, J. 1. If one is asked a question, what
afflicts the legally requisite criminal trial in its conceptual
G
eventuality in this country the two reasons that may earn the
status of phenomenal signification are, first, procrastination of
trial due to non-availability of witnesses when the trial is in
progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought by the
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[2015] 1 S.C.R.
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counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable reasons for
acceptation of such prayers for adjournments by the trial courts,
despite a statutory command under Section 309 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and series of
pronouncements by this Court. What was a malady at one time,
B with the efflux of time, has metamorphosed into malignancy.
What was a mere disturbance once has become a disorder, a
diseased one, at present.
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that
c exemplifies how due to passivity of the learned trial Judge, a
witness, despite having stood embedded absolutely firmly in
his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way,
obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind, and paved the
path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to say that it
o is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt to strangulate
and crucify the fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arrive at
the truth on the basis of evidence on record. The redeeming
feature is, despite the malevolent and injurious assault, the
cause of justice has survived, for there is, in the ultimate
E eventuate, a conviction which is under assail in this appeal, by
special leave.
3. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the judicial
conscience and gravitates the mind to pose a question, is it
F justified for any conscientious trial Judge to ign_ore the statutory
command, not recognize "the felt necessities of time" and
remain impervious to the cry of the collective asking for justice
or give an indecent and uncalled for burial to the conception of
trial, totally ostracizing the concept that a civilized and orderly
G society thrives on rule of law which includes "fair trial" for the
accused as well as the prosecution.
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a passage
from Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab. 1
H
1.
(2013) 7 sec 10s.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
513
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
" ...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and
express our anguish pertaining to the manner in which the
trial was conducted as it depicts a very disturbing scenario.
As is demonstrable from the record, the trial was
conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal
manner. Adjournments were granted on a mere asking.
The cross-examination of the witnesses was deferred
without recording any special reason and dates were
given after a long gap. The mandate of the law and the
views expressed by this Court from time to time appears
to have been totally kept at bay. The learned trial Judge,
as is perceptible, seems to have ostracised from his
memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity.
In this regard, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in Ta/ab Haji Hussain v.· Madhukar
Purshottam Mondkai' wherein it has been stated that an
accused person by his conduct cannot put a fair trial into
jeopardy, for it is the primary and paramount duty of the
criminal courts to ensure that the risk to fair trial is removed
and trials are allowed to proceed smoothly without any
interruption or obstruction."
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from
Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab3 , was reproduced.
"It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal
case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and
gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get
adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is
won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he
is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even
bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the
matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes
party to miscarriage of justice."
2.
AIR 1958 SC 376.
3.
(2000) 5 sec 668.
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[2015] 1 S.C.R.
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in
State of UP. V. Shambu Nath Singh4 , wherein thts Court
deprecating the practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case
in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined
fully, opined thus:
"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present
in court he must be examined on that day. The court must
know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only
at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own
avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income.
The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness
may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the
financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial
courts that witnesses who are called through summons or
other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till
evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case
is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must
be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and
it can be reformed by everyone provided the presiding
officer concerned has a commitment towards duty."
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall
presently proceed to adumbrate the necessitous facts. We have
already stated that despite the impasse, there is a conviction
by the trial Judge and an affirmation thereof by the High Court.
F
Elucidating the factual score, be it noted, the instant appeal is
directed against the judgment and order dated 13.10.2011
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in Criminal Appeal No. 1280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the
learned Single Judge has given the stamp of approval to the
G judgment and order dated 24.10.2001 passed by the learned
Special Judge, Patiala whereby he had convicted the appellant
under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity, 'the Act') and sentenced him to undergo
H
4.
(2001) 5 sec 667.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
515
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a
A
fine of Rs.2,000/- with a default clause.
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that Baj
Singh, PW-5, used to bring earth in tractor trolley within the
municipal area of Rajpura. The appellant, at the relevant time,
was posted as Octroi lnspector·and he demanded Rs.20/- per
trolley for permitting him to enter into the municipal area.
Eventually, a deal was struck that the accused-appellant would
B
be paid Rs.500/- per month for the smooth operation. As the
prosecution story further unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met
C
Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about
the demand of the accused for permitting the entry of the tractor
trolley inside the municipal area and thereafter, as he was not
desirous of obliging the accused, he narrated the entire story
to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn, with the intention to lay the
trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma, PWD
7 about the procedure of the trap. As alleged, Baj Singh gave
five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP Vigilance who noted the
numbers of the notes and completed other formalities like
applying phenolphthalein powder on the currency notes.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the place of the accused and a
trap was laid. Eventually, currency notes amounting to Rs.500/
E
- were recovered from the trouser of the appellant and were
taken into possession. The statements of the witnesses were
recorded and after completing the investigation chargesheet
was placed for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(2) of the Act.
9. To bring home the charges against the accusedappellant, the prosecution examined eight witnesses. PW-1 to
PW-4 are formal witnesses. PW-5, the complainant resiled from
his previous statement and was cross-examined by the
prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a clerk in the office of
Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the police party as an
independent witness. He supported the case of the prosecution
in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7, in his examination-in-chief,
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[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A supported the prosecution case in all aspects, but in crossexamination, resiled from his examination-in-chief. The witness,
PW-7, was declared hostile on a prayer being made by the
Public Prosecutor and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal,
PW-8, DSP of Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party
B on 25.1.1995, in his deposition, deposed in detail about the
conducting of the raid and recovery of the amount.
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313
CrPC, denied the allegations and took the plea of false
implication due to party faction and animosity. It was his further
C stand that he was brought from his office and was taken to the
office of thic Tehsildar and thereafter to the Vigilance office.
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence
brought on record, came to hold that though the complainant
D had not supported the case of the prosecution yet prosecution
had been able to prove the demand and acceptance of the
bribe and the recovery of the tainted money from the accused
and, therefore, the presumption as envisaged under Section 20
of the Act would get attracted and accordingly convicted the
E accused and sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore.
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that
when the testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma,
PW-7, the shadow witness, was absolutely incredible, the same
could not have been pervertedly filtered by the learned trial
F Judge to convict the accused-appe11ant for the crime in
question. It was also urged that mere recovery of the currency
notes would not constitute the offence under Section 7 of the
Act. It was also propounded that the offence under Section
13(2) of the Act would not get attracted unless the demand and
G acceptance were proven. Non-involvement of any independent
witness in the raid was also seriously criticised. The High Court
posed the question whether the prosecution had been able to
prove the factum of demand of bribe, its acceptance and the
recovery of the money from the possession of the accused. With
H regard to demand of bribe, the High Court placed reliance on
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
517
[DIPAK ~ISRA, J.]
the testimony of the independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6,
A
and the examination-in-chief of Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and
came to hold that the demand. of bribe had been proven. It
appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents,
especially, the Chemical Examiner's report of the hand wash
liquid and came to hold there had been acceptance of bribe.
B
Relating to the recovery of the tainted money, the High Court
took note of the fact that the ocular testimony had been duly
corroborated by the documentary evidence and hence, the
recovery had been proved.
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon
C
Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana 5 and Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra6 and eventually
came to hold that the prosecution had proven its case to the
hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and order of sentence
passed by the trial Court, but reduced the sentence of 2 years'
D
rigorous imprisonment to one year.
14. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned
trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted by
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant that when the
informant had not supported the case of the prosecution, it was
E
not justifiable on the part of the learned trial Judge to record a
conviction against the accused. It is his submission that on the
basis of the testimony of PW-6 to PW-8, the conviction could
not have been recorded, for Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a witness
either to the demand or acceptance of the bribe by the appellant
F
and further the version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard
being had to the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged
that the evidence of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is
an interested witness. To bolster the aforesaid submissions,
learned senior counsel has drawn inspiration from B. Jayaraj
G
V. State of Andhra Pradesh7 and M. R. Purushotham Vs. State
of Karnataka8 .
5.
(1974) 4 sec 560.
6
(2000) 8 sec 571.
7.
(2014) 4 SCALE 81.
8.
(2014) 11 SCALE 467.
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15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that as
PW-7 has not supported the prosecution story and stated to
have been tutored to give statement, his whole testimony should
have been thrown out of consideration and no reliance should
have been placed on it. It is contended by him that the High
B Court has failed to appreciate the importance of crossexamination of PW-7 and hence, the judgment affirming the
conviction is absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission,
reliance has been placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi Administration9.
It is the further stand of Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel that
c the evidence of the trap witnesses, PW-6 and PW-8 should
have been wholly ignored as they are partisan witnesses and
their statements could not have been given any credence to
inasmuch as there has been no corroboration. In this context,
he has commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V.
0
Basawan Singh (CB)1°, Major E G. Barsey V. State of
Bombay11, Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave V State of Gujarat12
and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala. 13
16. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the
basis of evidence of recovery, a conviction is not sustainable
E and in the obtaining factual matrix, the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act would not be attracted. To substantiate
the said proposition, strength has been drawn from C.M. Girish
Babu V. C.8.1., Cochin 14 and Benarsi Oas V. State of
Haryana15".
F
G
H
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in the
instant case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder Pal
9.
(1976) 1 sec 727.
10. (1959) SCR 195.
11. (1962) 2 SCR 195.
12. (1969) 1 SCR 22.
13. (1995) 3 sec 351.
14. (2009) 3 sec 779.
15. (201 oi 4 sec 450.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
519
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Kaushal, PW-8, who has investigated into the case and,
A
therefore, the concept of fair investigation, has been totally
marred as a consequence of which, the trial is vitiated. Learned
senior counsel would contend that a person who is a part of
the trap party is an interested witness and he would be
enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in every manner
B
and in such a situation, it is per se an. unfair and biased
investigation that frustrates the essential principle inhered under
Article 21 of the Constitution and eventually the trial.
18. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the State of Punjab, per contra, would contend that the view
C
expressed by the learned trial Judge and the High Court cannot
be found fault with, for a conviction under the Act can be based
on the evidence of trap witnesses, if they are trustworthy and
the ingredients of the offence are satisfied and in the case at
hand, the High Court on x-ray of the evidence has so recorded.
D
It is urged by him that neither the learned trial Judge nor the
High Court has fallen into error by applying the principle of
presumption as engrafted under Section 20 of the Act. It is
canvassed by Mr. Madhukar that the evidence of the hostile
witness can be placed reliance upon by the prosecution and
E
in the obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one of
the shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for
establishing the case of the prosecution. He has with great
pains, taken us through the evidence to substantiate the stand
that the conviction recorded against the appellant is totally
F
defensible.
19. Keeping in abeyan9e what we intend to say on the facet
of anguish expressed by us in the beginning, we shall proceed
to deal with the proponement of Mr. Jain that when the
investigation conducted by Mr. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, is
vitiated on the foundation that he has lodged the FIR, the trial
is also vitiated. Though the said submission has been raised
and taken note of by us as the last plank, yet we think it seemly
to deal with it first as it goes to the root of the matter. On a
G
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[2015] 1 S.C.R.
A perusal of the material on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a
part of the raiding party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had
also sent the complaint through a Constable to the concerned
police station for lodging of FIR. This being the factual score,
we are required to take note of certain authorities in this regard.
B In Basawan Singh (supra), the Constitution. Bench, after
referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of
Vindhya Pradesh 16 , opined that the said decision does not lay
down an invariable rule that the evidence of the witness of the
raiding party must be discarded in the absence of any
c independent corroboration. The larger Bench proceeded to
state thus:
D
E
F
" ...... The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are
accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the
actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as
the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not
accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who
are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence
must be tested in the same way as other interested
evidence is tested by the application of diverse
consideration which must vary from case to case, and in
a proper case, the Court may even look for independent
corroboratio·n· before ·donvicting the accused person. If a
Magistrate puts himself in the position of a partisan or
interested witness, he cannot claim any higher status and
must be treated as any other interested witness."
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the
evidence of a trap witness, the court opined that though a trap
witness is not an approver, he is certainly an interested witness
G in the sense that he is interested to see that the trap laid by
him succeeds. The Court further laid down that he can at least
be equated with a partisan witness and it would not be
admissible to rely upon his evidence without corroboration, but
his evidence is not a tainted one.
H
16. AIR 1954 SC 322.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
521
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
21. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the Court
A
observed that the police witnesses can be said to be partisan
witnesses as they are interested in the success of the trap laid
by them, but it cannot be said that they are accomplices.
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that their evidence
must be tested in the same way as any other interested witness
B
is tested and in an appropriate case, the Court may look for
independent corroboration before convicting the accused
person. The three-Judge Bench reiterated the principle thus:
" .... It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this
C
Court that while in the case of evidence of an accomplice,
no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is
corroborated in material particulars but as regards the
evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to
convict an accused person solely on the basis of that
evidence, If it is satisfied that that evidence is reliable. But
D
it may in appropriate case look for corroboration".
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after referring
to the decisions in OPP V. Hester17 and OPP V. Kilbourne 18,
made a distinction between accomplice and an interested
witness. The Court, referred to the authority in Basawan Singh
(supra) at length and eventually adverted to the concept of
corroborating evidence. In that context it has been ruled thus:
" ....... Now coming to the nature of corroborating evidence
that is required, it is well-settled that the corroborating
evidence can be even by way of circumstantial evidence.
No general rule can be laid down with respect to quantum
E
F
of evidence corroborating the testimony of a trap witness
which again would depend upon its own facts and
circumstances like the nature of the crime, the character
G
of trap witness etc. and other general requirements
17. (1972) 3 All ER 1056.
18. (1973) 1 All ER 440.
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oecessarv to sustain the conviction in that case. The court
should weigh the evidence and then see whether
corroboration is necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it
cannot be laid down that the evidence of every complainant
in a bribery case should be corroborated in all material
B
particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether
eorroboration is necessary and if so to what extent and
wh-at should be its nature depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. In a case of bribe, the person
who pays the bribe and those who act as intermediaries
c
are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to
give evidence about the bribe and it is not possible to get
absolutely independent evidence about the payment of
bribe."
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap witness
D is an interested witness and his testimony, to be accepted and
relied upon requires corroboration and the corroboration would
depend upon the facts and circumstances, nature of the crime
and the character of the trap witness.
E
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an
interested witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he had
sent the FIR and conducted the investigation, but the question
posed is whether the investigation by him is vitiated. In this
context we may, with profit, refer to the decision in Bhagwan
F Singh V. State of Rajasthan19 , where one Ram Singh, who was
a Head Constable, was the person to whom the offer of bribe
was alleged to have been made by the appellant therein and
he was the informant who had lodged the First Information
Report for taking action against the appellant. He himself had
G undertaken the investigation. In that factual backdrop the Court
ruled thus:
"Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with
concurrent findings of fact reached by the trial court and
H
19. (1976) 1 sec 1s.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
523
. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the High Court on an appreciation of the evidence. But this
is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we find
that several important circumstances have not been taken
into account by the trial court and the High Court and that
has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice calling for
interference from this Court. We may first refer to a rather
disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such an unusual
feature that it is quite surprising that it should have
escaped the notice of the trial court and the High Court.
Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the
offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by the
appellant and he was the informant or complainant who
lodged the first information report for taking action against
the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these
circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could
undertake investigation of the case. How could the
complainant himself be the investigator? In fact, Head
Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below the rank of
Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to
investigate the case but we do not attach any importance
to that fact, as that may not affect the validity of the
conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing out is not
an infirmity arising from investigation by an officer not
authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from
investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the
person to whom the bribe was alleged to have been
offered and who lodged the first information report as
informant or complainant. This is an infirmity which is
bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana20 , the Court
noticed the discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and PW-3
and absence of independent corroboration. Be it noted, the
Court was dealing with an offence under Section 6(1) of the
20. (1996) 11 sec 709.
A
B
c
D
E
F
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Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. In that
context the Court observed that the testimony of the said
witnesses did not inspire confidence about the reliability of the
prosecution's case. Proceeding further, the Court held:
B
c
D
" .... We have also noted another disturbing feature in this
case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the
accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol
and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was
on his complaint a formal first information report was
lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant
should not have proceeded with the investigation of the
case. But it appears to us that he was not only the
complainant in the case but he carried on with the
investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161
CrPC. Such practice, to say the least, should not be
resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to
suspect fair and impartial investigation".
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the pronouncement
in State vs. V. Jayapauf21 wherein the Court posed the question
E whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal
proceedings on the ground that the police officer, who had
lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected commission
of certain cognizable offence by the respondent should not have
investigated the case. The case against the accused was that
F
he was indulging in corrupt practices by extracting money from
the drivers and owners of the motor-vehicles while conducting
check of the vehicles and making use of certain bogus notice
forms in the process. The charge-sheet was filed under
Sections 420 and 201 l.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with
G Section 13(1 ){d) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision
in the State of UP. V. Bhagwant Kishore JoshP2 , wherein it
has been ruled thus:
21. (2004) 5 sec 223.
22. AIR 1964 SC 221.
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
525
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
"Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of A
recording the information received orally or in writing by
an officer in charge of a police station in respect of the
commission of a cognisable offence. Section 156 thereof
authorises such an officer to investigate any cognisable
offence prescribed therein. Though ordinarily investigation
B
is undertaken on information received by a police officer,
the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for
investigation.