# VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [2010] 9 S.C.R. 772
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-08-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1316 of 2002
- **Bench:** Dalveer Bhandari, A.K. Patnaik
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/virendra-singh-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-26967
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860: s.302 r.w. s.34 - Murder- Vicarious
liability - Appellant along with his father and brother armed
C with weapons went to the house of the deceased - After verbal
altercation, appellant and his father started beating the son
of the deceased - When deceased intervened, the brother of
the appellant on exhortation of his father, fired at the deceased
which resulted in his death - Conviction of all the three
D accused by courts below by invoking of s.34 - Challenged by
appellant - Held: All the three accused in consonance with a
prearranged plan had gone to the house of the deceased -
They all were armed with weapons so there was prior meeting
of minds - Appellant rightly convicted under ss.302134 by
E courts below by invoking the principle of vicarious liability.
s. 34 and s. 149 - Resemblance with and distinction
between - Discussed.
The prosecution case was that the appellant went to
F the house of the deceased along with his father and his
brother. The father of the appellant asked the deceased
to reap their crop. The deceased informed him that he
was busy and could not reap their crop. On hearing this,
the father of the appellant got very annoyed. The next
G day, all the three again went to the house of the
deceased. The appellant and his father were armed with
lathis and his brother with a firearm. They insisted that
the deceased should reap their crop. On getting a
negative response, the appellant and his father started
H
772
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 773
abusing and beating the son of the deceased. The family
A
members of the deceased tried to intervene and in the
process they also got injured. The deceased tried to save
his son. At that point of time, father of the appellant
exhorted the other son to shoot the deceased, who then
shot at the deceased in the stomach, which resulted in
B
his death. The trial court convicted all the three accused
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The High
Court upheld the order of conviction.
In the instant appeal, the appellant contended that in
C
the facts and circumstances of the case Section 34 IPC
could not be invoked.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A person can be vicariously responsible
D
for the acts of others, if he had a common intention to
commit the offence. The vicarious or constructive liability
under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions
stand fulfilled, i.e., the mental element or the intention to
commit the criminal act conjointly with others; and the
E
actual participation in one form or the other in the
commission of the crime. Section 34 is not a substantive
offence. It is imperative that .Jefore a man can be held
liable for acts done by another, under the provisions of
this section, it must be established that there was
common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan
between the two and the person sought to be so held
liable had participated in some manner. in the act
.constituting the offence. Such a common intention
should be anterior in point of time to the commission of
the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such
G
a crime is committed. In most of the cases it is difficult to
procure direct evidence of such intention and it can be
inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and
other relevant circumstances. The essence of Section 34
IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the H
F
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A persons participating in the criminal action to bring about
a particular result. Section 34 IPC does not create any
distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of
constructive liability. [Paras 17, 43-46] [780-H; 781-A; 7920-H; 793-A-C]
B
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC
1; Mehbub Shah v. King-Emperor AIR 1945 PC 148;
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. The State of Hyderabad
(1955) 1 SCR 1083; Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab
C AIR 1963 SC 174; State of UP. v. lftikhar Khan & Ors. (1973)
1 SCC 512; Ramaswami Ayyangar & Others v. St

## Text

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A
8
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 772
VIRENDRA SINGH
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1316 of 2002)
AUGUST 09, 2010
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 r.w. s.34 - Murder- Vicarious
liability - Appellant along with his father and brother armed
C with weapons went to the house of the deceased - After verbal
altercation, appellant and his father started beating the son
of the deceased - When deceased intervened, the brother of
the appellant on exhortation of his father, fired at the deceased
which resulted in his death - Conviction of all the three
D accused by courts below by invoking of s.34 - Challenged by
appellant - Held: All the three accused in consonance with a
prearranged plan had gone to the house of the deceased -
They all were armed with weapons so there was prior meeting
of minds - Appellant rightly convicted under ss.302134 by
E courts below by invoking the principle of vicarious liability.
s. 34 and s. 149 - Resemblance with and distinction
between - Discussed.
The prosecution case was that the appellant went to
F the house of the deceased along with his father and his
brother. The father of the appellant asked the deceased
to reap their crop. The deceased informed him that he
was busy and could not reap their crop. On hearing this,
the father of the appellant got very annoyed. The next
G day, all the three again went to the house of the
deceased. The appellant and his father were armed with
lathis and his brother with a firearm. They insisted that
the deceased should reap their crop. On getting a
negative response, the appellant and his father started
H
772
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 773
abusing and beating the son of the deceased. The family
A
members of the deceased tried to intervene and in the
process they also got injured. The deceased tried to save
his son. At that point of time, father of the appellant
exhorted the other son to shoot the deceased, who then
shot at the deceased in the stomach, which resulted in
B
his death. The trial court convicted all the three accused
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The High
Court upheld the order of conviction.
In the instant appeal, the appellant contended that in
C
the facts and circumstances of the case Section 34 IPC
could not be invoked.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A person can be vicariously responsible
D
for the acts of others, if he had a common intention to
commit the offence. The vicarious or constructive liability
under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions
stand fulfilled, i.e., the mental element or the intention to
commit the criminal act conjointly with others; and the
E
actual participation in one form or the other in the
commission of the crime. Section 34 is not a substantive
offence. It is imperative that .Jefore a man can be held
liable for acts done by another, under the provisions of
this section, it must be established that there was
common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan
between the two and the person sought to be so held
liable had participated in some manner. in the act
.constituting the offence. Such a common intention
should be anterior in point of time to the commission of
the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such
G
a crime is committed. In most of the cases it is difficult to
procure direct evidence of such intention and it can be
inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and
other relevant circumstances. The essence of Section 34
IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the H
F
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A persons participating in the criminal action to bring about
a particular result. Section 34 IPC does not create any
distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of
constructive liability. [Paras 17, 43-46] [780-H; 781-A; 7920-H; 793-A-C]
B
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC
1; Mehbub Shah v. King-Emperor AIR 1945 PC 148;
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. The State of Hyderabad
(1955) 1 SCR 1083; Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab
C AIR 1963 SC 174; State of UP. v. lftikhar Khan & Ors. (1973)
1 SCC 512; Ramaswami Ayyangar & Others v. State of Tamil
Nadu (1976) 3 SCC 779; Rambilas Singh & Ors. v. State of
Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 605; Krishnan & Another. v. State of
Kera/a (1996) 10 SCC 508; Surendra Chauhan v. State of
MP. (2000) 4 SCC 110; Suresh & Another v. State of UP.
D (2001) 3 SCC 673; Gopi Nath @ Jha//ar v. State of UP.
(2001) 6 SCC 620 ; Krishnan & Anr. v. State represented by
Inspector of Police (2003) 7 SCC 56; Girija Shankar v. State .
of UP. (2004) 3 SCC 793; Ramesh Singh @ Photti v. State
of A.P. (2004) 11 sec 305 - relied on.
E
F
Queen v. Gora Chand Gope & Ors. (1866) 5 South WR
(Cri) 45 - referred to.
Russel in his celebrated book "Russel on Crime" 12th
Edn. Vol. 1 - referred to.
Amrik Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab 1972 CrLJ 465
(SC) - relied on.
1.2. The other section under which a person can be
G vicariously responsible for the acts of others is Section
149 in the Indian Penal Code. Both Sections 34 and 149
IPC deal with combinations of persons who become
punishable as sharer in an offence. In both these sections,
the persons are vicariously responsible for the acts of
H others. Simultaneously, there is a basic resemblance in
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 775
both these sections and to some extent they also overlap.
A
When several persons, numbering five or more, do an act
or intend to do it, both Sections 34 and 149 IPC may
apply. Section 149 IPC is of wider scope than Section 34
IPC and in a case where Section 149 applies, a
constructive liability arises in respect of those persons
B
also who did not actually commit the offence. [Paras 48,
50-51] [793-G-H; 794-D-F]
1.3. However, there are some distinctive features in
Section 34 and Section 149 IPC: Section 34 does not by
itself create any specific offence, whereas Section 149
C
does so. Some active participation, especially in crime
involving physical violence, is necessary under Section
34, but Section 149 does not require it and the liability
arises by reason of mere membership of the unlawful
assembly with a common object and there may be no
D
active participation at all in preparation and commission
of the crime. SectiOn 34 speaks of common intention, but
Section 149 contemplates common object which is
undoubtedly wider in its scope and amplitude than
intention. Section 34 does not fix a minimum number of E
persons who must share the common intention, whereas
Section 149 requires that the'"e must be at least five
persons who must have the same common object.
[Paras 51] [794-F-H; 795-A-C]
F
2. In the instant case, the appellant alongwith his
father and brother armed with weapons went to the
house of the deceased to eliminate him. The brother of
the appellant on exhortation of his father, fired at and
killed the deceased . In view of the facts, Section 34 IPC
G
is invoked and on the principle of vicarious or
constructive liability, the appellant is clearly guilty under
Sections 302/34 IPC along with his father and his brother.
The trial court and the High Court correctly applied the
law. [Para 52] [795-0-F]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 9 S.C.R.
A
Case Law Reference:
1972 CrLJ 465 (SC)
relied on
Para 18
(1866) 5 South WR (Cri) 45referred to
Para 23
8
AIR 1925 PC 1
relied on
Para 24
AIR 1945 PC 148
relied on
Para 26
(1955) 1 SCR 1083
relied on
Para 27
AIR 1963 SC 174
relied on
Para 28
c
(1973) 1 sec 512
relied on
Para 29
(1976) 3 sec 119
relied on
Para 30
(1989) 3 sec 605
relied on
Para 31
D
(1996) 10 sec 508
relied on
Para 32
(2000) 4 sec 11 o
relied on
Para 33
(2001) 3 sec 673
relied on
Para 34
E
(2001) 6 sec 620
relied on
Para 37
(2003) 1 sec 56
relied on
Para 38
(2004) 3 sec 793
relied on
Para 39
F
(2004) 11 sec 305
relied on
Para 40
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1316 of 2002.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.5.2002 of the High
G Court of Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 262 of 1986.
D.B. Vohra, T. Hashmi, S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellant.
Siddharth Dave, Vibha Datta Makhija for the Respondent.
H
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 777
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. This appeal has been
preferred by the appellant Virendra Singh against the judgment
dated 17.5.2002 passed by the High Court of Judicature of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 262
of 1986.
2. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of the appeal
are as under:
Hakim Singh and his two sons Virendra Singh and
Kamlesh Singh went to the house of the deceased Bhagirath
and asked him to reap their crop the next day. Bhagirath
informed that he would not be able to reap their crop as he had
to reap the crop grown in his own field. He also informed the
accused persons that apart from reaping his crop he would also
be busy in 'lagan ceremony' of his son Satyanarain and Tilak
ceremony of his grandson, Lakhan which was going to be
performed after two days. In spite of his clear explanation for
not being abte to reap the crop of the accused persons, they
pressurized the deceased Bhagirath to reap the crop standing
on their field. The accused persons got annoyed on deceased's
refusal to reap their crop. Accused Hakim Singh, Kamlesh and
Virendra Singh armed with weapons went to the house of
Bhagirath the next day at 7.00 a.m. to take revenge for declining
to carry out the order of the accused persons. Virendra Singh
and Hakim Singh were armed with lathis and Kamlesh was
armed with a rifle. They asked Bhagirath why he had not gone
to reap their crop. The deceased replied that he had already
informed them that he would not be in a position to reap their
crop for the aforementioned reasons. On getting this response,
accused persons, namely, Hakim Singh and Virendra Singh got
infuriated and started hurling filthy abuses and beating
Baburam, son of the deceased. When Hakim Singh and
Virendra Singh were assaulting Baburam with lathis, then
Lakhan, Rakesh, Satyanarain, son of the deceased, Ramshri,
mother of Baburam and Rajkumari, sister of Baburam rushed
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A to save Baburam. Hakim Singh and Virendra Singh also
assaulted Lakhan with lathis on the head, shoulder and back.
The accused persons also caused injuries to Ramshri and
Satyanarain.
8
3. The deceased Bhagirath intervened. At that point of
time Hakim Singh exhorted Kamlesh to shoot Bhagirath.
· Kamlesh shot at Bhagirath in the stomach, which resulted in his
death. Kamlesh also fired at Baburam but the bullets missed
him. After commission of the offence the accused persons ran
C away towards the canal. The incident was witnessed by
Ramsahay P. W .11 and Bhoorelal.
4. The trial court, after scrutinizing the entire evidence on
record, convicted Hakim Singh, Kamlesh and Virendra Singh
under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal
D Code (for short, IPC).
5. It was canvassed before the trial court that the
deceased. had died because of the fire arm injury caused by
Kamlesh, therefore, Virendra Singh and Hakim Singh cannot
E be convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code.
6. Baburam P.W. 6 is an injured eye witness. He had given
the graphic description of the entire incident and specifically
mentioned that Kamlesh and Virendra Singh had abused him
F and then Hakim Singh and Virendra Singh had beaten him with
lathis. He further deposed that when his mother came to save
him, then accused Hakim Singh and Virendra Singh had
assaulted his mother also on her hand and head by lathis, which
resulted in the fracture of her hand. The accused also assaulted
G Lakhan on the head by lathi. It was further deposed by Baburam
P.W. 6 that Hakim Singh then asked Kamlesh to shoot
Bhagirath and Kamlesh shot at Bhagirath. The pallets of the
bullet also injured Satyanarain and his sister Rajkumari.
H
7. Satyanarain P.W.7 had also given the detailed
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 779 ·
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
description of the entire incident and specifically stated about
A
-
the role of the appellant Virendra Singh in the entire incident.
8. Rajkumari P.W.10 has categorically stated that Hakim
Singh along with Virendra Singh armed with lathis and Kamlesh
armed with a firearm came to the house of Bhagirath and
started abusing him and thereafter Hakim Singh and Virendra
Singh assaulted Baburam with lathis. When Baburam shouted
B
on getting lathi blows, then his mother Ramshri, Satyanarain and
Lakhan rushed to save him. Both Hakim Singh and Virendra
Singh also assaulted Ramshri, the mother of Baburam on her
C
hand and head, which resulted into a fracture of her hand.
Lakhan was also assaulted.
9. The version of prosecution witnesses is consistent and,1
despite gruelling and long cross-examination, no dent could b¢
made by the defence on the testimony of the prosecution
D
witnesses. The trial court convicted all the three accused under
section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
10. Hakim Singh died during the pendency of the appeal.
In appeal by the remaining two accused Kamlesh and Virendra
E
Singh, the High Court again carefully scrutinized the entire
evidence and came to a clear conclusion that the appellant
Virendra Singh is also guilty under section 302 read with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
11. The High Court observed that all the accused persons
went to the house of the deceased Bhagirath with the intention
to teach him a lesson. Immediately on reaching the spot
Virendra Singh and Hakim Singh started beating Baburam with
lathis and when deceased Bhagirath intervened, he was shot
at by Kamlesh in furtherance of the commission of offence.
12. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot
be concluded that death was caused on account of grave or
sudden provocation. On the contrary, it is fully established that
all the accused had gone to the house of Bhagirath to teach
F
G
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A
him a lesson armed with lathis and a rifle, because the previous
day the deceased declined to follow their orders of reaping their
crops because of his reasons. On Hakim Singh's exhortation,
Kamlesh fired at the deceased Bhagirath causing his death.
According to the prosecution, the appellant Virendra Singh is
B clearly guilty of an offence under sections 302 read with 34 IPC.
Admittedly, all the three accused in consonance with the
prearranged plan had gone to the house of the deceased to
teach him a lesson for disobeying their orders. All three of them
were armed with weapons, so there was a prior meeting of
c minds or pre- concert.
D
13. The High Court, on the basis of the entire evidence on
record, came to a definite conclusion that the appellant
Virendra Singh is guilty under section 302 read with section 34
of the Indian Penal Code.
14. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment of the
High Court preferred this appeal.
15. We have again scrutinized the entire evidence on
E record to satisfy ourselves whether the appellant Virendra Singh
has been wrongly convicted under section 302 read with section
34 IPC?
16. According to the appellant, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, section 34 IPC could not have been
F
invoked. In order to deal with this argument, it has become
imperative to deal with section 34 IPC. It reads as under:
G
H
"34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance
of common intention.- When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention of
all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone."
17. Ordinarily, a person is responsible for his own act. A
person can also be vicariously responsible for the acts of others
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 781
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
if he had the common intention to commit the offence.
A
18. The words "common intention" implies a pre-arranged
plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It must be proved
that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. Common intention comes into force prior to the
8
commission of the act in point of time, which need not be a long
gap. Under this section a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct
previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common
intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on
the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to
C
the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Though
common intention may develop on the spot, it must, however,
be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime
showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert. The common
intention may develop in course of the fight but there must be
clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference. This
D
has been clearly laid down by this Court in the case of Amrik
Singh "& Ors. v. State of Punjab 1972 CrLJ 465 (SC).
19. The essence of the liability is to be found in the
existence of a common intention animating the accused leading
to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
20. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to prove even the intention
of an individual and, therefore, it is all the more difficult to show
the common intention of a group of persons. Therefore, in order
to find whether a person is guilty of common intention, it is
absolutely necessary to carefully and critically examine the entire
evidence on record. The common intention can be spelt out only
from the evidence on record.
E
F
21. Section 34 is not a substantive offence. It is imperative
G
that before a man can be held liable for acts done by another,
under the provisions of this section, it must be established that
there was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged
plan between the two and the person sought to be so held liable
had participated in some manner in the act constituting the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 9 S.C.R.
A offence. Unless common intention and participation are both
present, this section cannot apply.
22. Section 34 IPC is part of the original Code of 1860
as drafted by Thomas Babington Macaulay, later known as
B Lord Macaulay. The original Section as it stood was as follows:
"When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of
such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as
if the act was done by him alone."
c
23. However, on account of certain observations made by
Sir Barnes Peacock C.J. in Queen v. Gora Chand Gope & Ors.
(1866) 5 South WR (Cri) 45, it was necessary to bring about a
change in the wordings of the section. Accordingly, in the year
1870 an amendment was brought which introduced the
0 following words after ..... When a criminal act is done by several
persons ..... " ..... in furtherance of the common intention .... " After
this .change, the section has not been changed or amended
ever.
24. The case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor
E AIR 1925 PC 1 is a locus classicus and has been followed by
number of High Courts and this court in a large number of
cases. In this case, the Judicial Committee dealt with the scope
of section 34 dealing with the acts done in furtherance of the
common intention, making all equally liable for the results of all
F the acts of others. It was observed:
G
H
" ...... the words of Section 34 are not to be eviscerated by
reading them in this exceedingly limited sense. By Section
33 a criminal act in Section 34 includes a series of acts
and, further, 'act' includes omissions to act, for example,
an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being
done before one's very eyes. By Section 37, when any
offence is committed by means of several acts whoever
intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence
by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 783
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
any other person, commits that offence. Even if the
A
appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to
be remembered that in crimes as in other things 'they also
serve who only stand and wait'. By Section 38, when
several persons are engaged or concerned in the
commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different
B
offences by means of that act. Read together, these
sections are reasonably plain. Section 34 deals with the
doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several
persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common
intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, c
as if he had done them himself, for 'that act' and 'the act'
in the latter part of the section must include the whole action
covered by 'a criminal act' in the first part, because they
refer to it. Section 37 provides that, when several acts are
done so as to result together in the commission of an
D
offence, the doing of any one of them, with an intention to
co-operate in the ~ffence (which may not be the same as
an intention common to all), makes the actor liable to be
punished for the commission of the offence. Section 38
provides for different punishments for different offences as
E
an alternative to one punishment for one offence, whether
the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of
a criminal act are set in motion by the one intention or by
the other."
25. It was further observed that section 34 when it speaks
F
of a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the
common intention of all, has regard not to the offence as a
whole, but to the criminal act, that is to say, the totality of the
series of acts which result in the offence. In the case of a person
assaulted by many accused, the criminal act is the offence
G
which finally results, though the achievement of that criminal act
may be the result of the action of several persons.
26. In another celebrated case Mehbub Shah v. KingEmperor AIR 1945 PC 148, the court held that "Section 34 lays
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.
The section does not say "the common intentions of all," nor
does it say "an intention common to all." Under the section, the
essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a
common intention animating the accused leading to the doing
B of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the
aid of section 34 successfully, it must be shown that the criminal
act complained against was done by one of the accused
persons in the furtherance of the common intention of all; if this
is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any
c one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done
by him alone. This being the principle, it is clear to their
Lordships that common intention within the meaning of the
section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused
of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the
0
criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged
plan."
27. ·In Pandurang, Tukia and Bhil/ia v. The State of'
Hyderabad (1955) 1 SCR 1083, this Court laid down that it is
well settled that common intention in section 34 of the Indian
E Penal Code presupposes prior concert, because before a man
can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the
act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention
of them all.
F
28. In Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR 1963
SC 174, this Court observed that it is now well settled that the
common intention required by Section 34 is different from the
same intention or similar intention. The persons having similar
intention which is not the result of pre- concerted plan cannot
G be held guilty for the "criminal act" with the aid of Section 34.
29. In State of UP. v. lftikhar Khan & Ors. (1973) 1 SCC
512 it was observed that to attract Section 34 IPC it is not
necessary that any overt act should have been done by the coaccused. In this case four accused persons were convicted on
H a fact situation that two of them were armed with pistols and
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 785
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
the other two were armed with lathis and all the four together
A
walked in a body towards the deceaserj and after firing the
pistols at the deceased all the four together left the scene. The
finding of .fact in that case was also the same. When a plea
was made on behalf of those two persons who were armed with
!athis that they did not do any overt act, this Court made the
B
above observation. From the facts of that case it can be said
that there was no act on behalf of the two lathi holders although
the deceased was killed by a pistol shot. The criminal act in
that case was done by all the persons in furtherance of the
common intention to kill the deceased.
c
30. In Ramaswami Ayyangar & Others v. State of Tamil
Nadu (1976) 3 SCC 779, this Court declared that Section 34
is to be read along with preceding Section 33 which makes it
clear that the "act" mentioned in Section 34 includes a series
of acts as a single act. The acts committed by different
D
confederates in the criminal action may be different but all must
in one way or the other participate and engage in the criminal
enterprise. Even a person not doing any particular act but only
standing guard to prevent any prospective aid to the victims
may be guilty of common intention. However, it is essential that
E
in case of an offence involving physical violence it is essential
for the application of Section 34 that such accused must be
physically present at the actual commission of crime for the
purposes of facilitating accomplishment of "criminal act" as
mentioned in that section. In this case, it was contended that
F
A2 could not be held vicariously liable with the aid of Section
34 for the act of other accused on the grounds: firstly he did
not physically participate in the fatal beating administered by
co-accused to the deceased and thus the "criminal act" of
murder was not done by all the accused within the
G
contemplation of Section 34; and secondly the prosecution had
not shown that the act of A2 in beating PW1 was committed in
furtherance of the common intention of all the three pursuant to
a pre-arranged plan. Repelling such an argument this Court held
that such a contention was fallacious which could not be
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A accepted. The presence of those who in one way or the other
facilitate the execution of the common design itself tantamounts
to actual participation in the "criminal act". The essence of
Section 34 is simultaneously consensus of the minds of persons
participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular
B result. Conviction of A2 under Section 302/34 of the Code in
that case was upheld.
31. In Rambilas Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1989) 3
SCC 605, this Court held as under:
C
"It is true that in order to convict persons vicariously under
section 34 or section149 IPC, it is not necessary to prove
that each and everyone of them had indulged in overt acts.
Even so, there must be material to show that the overt act
or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done
0
in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused
or in prosecution of the common object of the members
of the unlawful assembly."
32. In Krishnan & Another. v. State of Kera/a (1996) 10
E SCC 508, this Court even assuming that one of the appellants
had not caused the injury to the deceased, upheld his conviction
under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code holding:
"15. Question is whether it is obligatory on the part of the
prosecution to establish commission of overt act to press
F
into service section 34 of the Penal Code. It is no doubt
true that court likes to know about overt act to decide
whether the concerned person had shared the common
intention in question. Question is whether overt act has
always to be established? I am of the view that
G
establishment of a overt act is not a requirement of law to
allow section 34 to operate inasmuch this section gets
attracted when "a criminal act is done by several persons
in furtherance of common intention of all". What has to be,
therefore, established by the prosecution is that all the
H
concerned persons had shared the common intention.
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 787
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
Court's mind regarding the sharing of common intention
A
gets satisfied when overt act is established qua each of
the accused. But then, there may be a case where the
proved facts would themselves speak of sharing of
common intention: res ipsa loquitur."
33. In Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P. (2000) 4 SCC
B
110, this Court held that apart from the fact that there should
be two or more accused, two factors must be established - (i)
common intention; and (ii) participation of the accused in the
commission of the offence. If a common intention is proved but
no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34
C
will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability.
Referring to its earlier judgment this Court held:
"11. Under Section 34 a person must be physically
present at the actual commission of the crime for the
D
purpose of facilitating or promoting the offence, the
commission of which is the aim of the joint criminal venture.
Such presence of those who in one way or the other
facilitate the execution of the common design is itself
tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act. The
E
essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the
minds of persons participating in the criminal action "to
bring about a particular result. Such consensus can be
developed at the spot and thereby intended by all. of them.
(Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of T.N. (1976) 3 SCC
F
779) The existence of a common intention can be inferred
from the attending circumstances of the case and the
conduct of the parties. No direct evidence of common
intention is necessary. For the purpose of common
intention even the participation in the commission of the
G
offence need not be proved in all cases. The common
intention can develop even during the course of an
occurrence. (Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of
Maharashtra (1999) 8 SCC 428). To apply Section 34 IPC
apart from the fact that there should be two or more
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A
accused, two factors must be established" (i) common
intention, and (ii) participation of the accused in the
commission of an offence. If a common intention is proved
but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused,
Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves
B
vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the
crime is proved and a common intention is absent, Section
34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it is not possible to
have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case."
c
34. In Suresh & Another v. State of U.P. (2001) 3 SCC
673, Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code recognizes the
principle of vicarious liability in the criminal jurisprudence. It
makes a person liable for action of an offence not committed
by him but by another person with whom he shared the common
D intention. It is a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The section gives statutory recognition to
the commonsense principle that if more than two 'persons
intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of
them had done it individually. The common intention preE supposes prior concert. Such a pre-concert or pre-planning may
develop on the spot or during the course of commission of the
offence but the crucial test is that such plan must precede the
act constituting an offence. The existence of a common
:ntention is a question of fact in each case to be proved mainly
F as a matter of inference from the circumstances of the case.
35. In that case, it was also observed that the dominant
feature for attracting section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is the
element of partic!pation in absence resulting in the ultimate
G "criminal act". The section does not envisage the separate act
by all the accused persons for becoming responsible for
ultimate criminal act. If such an interpretation is accepted, the
purpose of section 34 shall be rendered infructuous.
36. It was further observed that what is required under law
H is that the accused persons sharing the common intention must
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 789
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
be physically present at the scene of occurrence and be shown
A
not to have dissuaded themselves from the intended criminal
act for which they share the common intention. Culpability under
section 34 cannot be excluded by mere distance from the
scene of occurrence. The presumption of constructive intention,
however, has to be arrived at only when the court can, with
B
judicial servitude, hold that the accused must have
preconceived the result that ensued in furtherance of the
common intention.
37. In Gopi Nath @Jhallar v. State of U.P. (2001) 6 SCC
C
620 it was observed as under:
"8 ...... As for the challenge made to the conviction
under Section 302 read with Section 23 IPC, it is
necessary to advert to the salient principles to be kept into
consideration and often reiterated by this Court, in the
D
matter of invoking the aid of Section 34 IPC, before
dealing with the factual aspect of the claim made on behalf
of the appellant. Section 34 IPC has been held to lay down
the rule of joint responsibility for criminal acts performed
by plurality or persons who jointed together in doing the
E
criminal act, provided that such commission is in
furtherance of the common intention of all of them. Even
the doing of separate, simi1oi" or diverse acts by several
persons, so long as they are done in furtherance of a
common intention, render each of such persons liable for
the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for
the whole of the criminal action - be it that it was not overt
or was only covert act or merely an omission constituting
an illegal omission. The Section, therefore, has been held
to be attracted even where the acts committed by the
different confederates are different when it is established
F
G·
in one way or the other that all of them participated and
engaged themselves in furtherance of the common
intention which might be of a pre-concerted or prearranged plan or one manifested or developed at the spur
H
of the moment in the course of the commission of the
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A
offence. The common intention or the intention of the
individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention
could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference
from the acts or attending circumstances of the case and
conduct of the parties. The ultimate decision, at any rate,
B
would invariably depend upon the inferences deducible
from the circumstances of each case."
38. In Krishnan & Anr. v. State represented by Inspector
of Police (2003) 7 sec 56, it was observed that section 34 is
dependent on the circumstances of each case. No hard and
C fast rule can be made out regarding applicability or nonapplicability of section 34.
39. In Girija Shankar v. State of UP. (2004) 3 SCC 793,
it was observed that section 34 has been enacted to elucidate
D the principle of joint liability of a criminal act.
E
F
G
H
"Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a
rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
The distinctive feature of the section is the element of
participation in action. The liability of one person for an
offence committed by another in the course of criminal act
perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34
if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common
intention of the persons who join in committing the crime.
Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and,
therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the
circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case
and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to
establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged
with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur
of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true concept of the section
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 791
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly,
A
the position in law is just the same is if each of them has
done it individually by himself. The existence of a common
intention amongst the participants in a crime is the
essential element for application of this section. It is not
necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
B
commission of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be different in character,
but must have been actuated by one and the same
common intention in order t6 attract the provision."
40. In Ramesh Singh@ Photti v. State of A.P. (2004) 11
sec 305, it has been observed as under:
c
"12 ........ As a general principle in a case of criminal
liability it is the primary responsibility of the person who
actually commits the offence and only that person who has
D
committed the crime can be held guilty. By introducing
Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down the
. principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The
essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a
common intention connecting the accused leading to the
E
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Thus,
if the act is the result of a c,.1mmon intention then every
person who did the criminal act with that common intention
would be responsible for the offence committed
irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration.
F
II
41. Referring to the facts of this case, the short question
which arises for adjudication in this appeal is whether the
appellant Virendra Singh can be convicted under section 302
with the aid of section 34 IPC. Under the Indian Penal Code,
G
the persons who are connected with the preparation of a crime
are divided into two categories: (1) those who actually commit
the crime, i.e. principals in the first degree; and (b) those who
aid in the actual commission, i.e. principals in the second
degree. Law does not make any distinction with regard to the
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792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 9 S.C.R.
A punishment of such persons, all being liable to be punished
alike.
42. Under the Indian Penal Code, a person is responsible
for his own act. A person can also be vicariously responsible
8 for the acts of others if he had a common intention to commit
the acts or if the offence is committed by any member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, then also he can be vicariously responsible. Under
the Indian Penal Code, two sections, namely, sections 34 and
149, deal with the circumstances when a person is vicariously
! C responsible for the acts of others.
43. The vicarious or constructive liability under section 34
IPC can arise only when two conditions stand fulfilled, i.e., the
mental element or the intention to commit the criminal act
D conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual
participation in one form or the other in the commission of the
crime.
44. The common intention postulates the existence of a
E pre-arranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds. It is
the intention to commit the crime and the accused can be
convicted only if such an intention has been shared by all the
accused. Such a common intention should be anterior in point
of time to the commission of the crime, but may also develop
on the spot when such a crime is committed.