# VIRENDRA v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 308
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958
- **Bench:** S.R. Das, Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, A. K. Sarkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/virendra-v-the-state-of-punjab-and-another-1457
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Press Control-Notification issued by State Government on daily
newspaper-Prohibition against publication of a particular matterProhibition against entry into the State-Restrictions, if reasonableJf violative of fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression
and right to carry on trade or business-The Punjab Special Powers
(Press) Act, 1956 (No. 38 of 1956), ss. 2, _3-The Constitution of
India, Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(!)(g), 19(2), 19(6).
These two petitions challenged the constitutional validity of
the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 (No 38, of 1956)
passed by the State Legislature in the wake of the serious communal tension that had arisen between the Hindus and the Akali
Sikhs over the question of the partition of the State ·on a linguistic
and communal basis. The petitioners were the editors, printers
and publishers, respectively, of the two daily newspapers, Pratap
and Vir Arjun, printed
and
published
simultaneously
from
Jullundur and New Delhi, whose admitted policy was to support
the "Save Hindi agitation". Two notifications under s. 2(1)(a) of
the impugned Act were issued against the editor,
printer and
publisher of the two papers published from Jullundur by
the
Home Secretary prohibiting him from printing and publishing any .
matter relating to the "Save Hindi agitation" in the two papers for
a period of two months. Two other notifications in identical terms
were issued under s. 3(1) of the impugned Act against the other
petitioner, the editor, printer and publisher of the two papers in
New Delhi prohibiting him from bringing ·into the Punjab the
new_spapers printed" and published in New Delhi from the date of the
publication of the notifications, Unlike s. 2(1) of the impugned Act
which provided a time-limit for the operation of an order made
thereunder as also for a representation to be made by the aggrieved
person, s. 3 of the Act made no such provision. It was contended
on behalf of the petitioners that both the sections were ultra vires
the State Legislature inasmuch as they infringed Arts. 19(1) (a) arid
19(1)(g) of the Constitution and were not saved by Arts. 19 (2) and
19(6) of the Constitution. It was urged that the sections imposed
not merely restrictions but a total prohibition against the exercise
of the said fundamental rights by prohibiting the publication of all
matters relating to the 'Save Hindi agitation' under. 2(1)(a) and
by a complete prohibition of the entry of the two papers into the
whole of the Punjab under s. 3(1) of the Act, that even supposing
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
that the sections merely imposed restrictions ·and not a
total .
prohibition, the restrictions were not reasonable, that the section
gave unfettered and uncontrolled discretion to the State Government and its delegate, that the Act did not provide for any safeguard against an abuse of the power, that the language of the sections being wide enough to cover restrictions both within and outside the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action
they were ultra vires the Constitution and that the notification
under s. 2(1)(a) of the Act as made would prevent even the publication of anything against the "Save Hindi agitation" and should
have been restricted to such matters alone as were likely to prejudicially affect the public order.
·
·
Held, that the restrictions imposed by s. 2(1)(a) of the
impugned Act were reasonable restrictions within the meaning of
Art. 19(2) of the Constitution and the petition directed against
the notifications issued thereunder must fail, but since s. 3 of the
Act did not provide for any time limit for the operation of an
order made thereunder nor for a representation by the aggrieved
party to the State Government, the restrictions imposed by it
were not reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution and the petition directed against the notifications made
thereunder must succeed.
Held further, that there can be no doubt that the right of
freedom of speech and e

## Text

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1957
September 6.
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
VIRENDRA
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER
(and connected petition)
(S.R. DAS, C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA,
.
J. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)
Press Control-Notification issued by State Government on daily
newspaper-Prohibition against publication of a particular matterProhibition against entry into the State-Restrictions, if reasonableJf violative of fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression
and right to carry on trade or business-The Punjab Special Powers
(Press) Act, 1956 (No. 38 of 1956), ss. 2, _3-The Constitution of
India, Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(!)(g), 19(2), 19(6).
These two petitions challenged the constitutional validity of
the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 (No 38, of 1956)
passed by the State Legislature in the wake of the serious communal tension that had arisen between the Hindus and the Akali
Sikhs over the question of the partition of the State ·on a linguistic
and communal basis. The petitioners were the editors, printers
and publishers, respectively, of the two daily newspapers, Pratap
and Vir Arjun, printed
and
published
simultaneously
from
Jullundur and New Delhi, whose admitted policy was to support
the "Save Hindi agitation". Two notifications under s. 2(1)(a) of
the impugned Act were issued against the editor,
printer and
publisher of the two papers published from Jullundur by
the
Home Secretary prohibiting him from printing and publishing any .
matter relating to the "Save Hindi agitation" in the two papers for
a period of two months. Two other notifications in identical terms
were issued under s. 3(1) of the impugned Act against the other
petitioner, the editor, printer and publisher of the two papers in
New Delhi prohibiting him from bringing ·into the Punjab the
new_spapers printed" and published in New Delhi from the date of the
publication of the notifications, Unlike s. 2(1) of the impugned Act
which provided a time-limit for the operation of an order made
thereunder as also for a representation to be made by the aggrieved
person, s. 3 of the Act made no such provision. It was contended
on behalf of the petitioners that both the sections were ultra vires
the State Legislature inasmuch as they infringed Arts. 19(1) (a) arid
19(1)(g) of the Constitution and were not saved by Arts. 19 (2) and
19(6) of the Constitution. It was urged that the sections imposed
not merely restrictions but a total prohibition against the exercise
of the said fundamental rights by prohibiting the publication of all
matters relating to the 'Save Hindi agitation' under. 2(1)(a) and
by a complete prohibition of the entry of the two papers into the
whole of the Punjab under s. 3(1) of the Act, that even supposing
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
that the sections merely imposed restrictions ·and not a
total .
prohibition, the restrictions were not reasonable, that the section
gave unfettered and uncontrolled discretion to the State Government and its delegate, that the Act did not provide for any safeguard against an abuse of the power, that the language of the sections being wide enough to cover restrictions both within and outside the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action
they were ultra vires the Constitution and that the notification
under s. 2(1)(a) of the Act as made would prevent even the publication of anything against the "Save Hindi agitation" and should
have been restricted to such matters alone as were likely to prejudicially affect the public order.
·
·
Held, that the restrictions imposed by s. 2(1)(a) of the
impugned Act were reasonable restrictions within the meaning of
Art. 19(2) of the Constitution and the petition directed against
the notifications issued thereunder must fail, but since s. 3 of the
Act did not provide for any time limit for the operation of an
order made thereunder nor for a representation by the aggrieved
party to the State Government, the restrictions imposed by it
were not reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution and the petition directed against the notifications made
thereunder must succeed.
Held further, that there can be no doubt that the right of
freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right
to
propagate one's views and the several rights of freedaμi guaranteed
by Art. 19(1) of the Constitution are exercisable throughout India
but whether or not any restrictions put on those rights amount to
a total prohibition of the exercise of such rights must be judged
by reference· to their ambit. So judged, the restrictions imposed
in the instant cases with regard to the publications relating to
only one topic and the circulation of the papers only in a particular territory could not amount to a 'total prohibition of the
exercise of the fundamental rights.
The expression "in the interest of" in Arts. 19(2) and 19(6) of
the Constitution makes the protection they afford very wide and
although free propagation and interchange of views are ordinarily
in social interest, circumstances may arise when social interest in
public order is greater and the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression and on the freedom
of carrying on trade or business becomes imperative. Regard
being had to the surrounding circumstances in which the impugned
Act was passed, its object, the extent and urgency of the evil it
sought to remedy, and the enormous power weilded by the Press,
with modern facilities of quick circulation, and the consequence
that any abuse· of it might lead to, the restrictions imposed by
the impugned Act must be held to be reasonable restrictions under
the Articles.
The State of Madras·v. V. G. Row, (1952) S.C.R. 597, followed,
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab [and
Another
1957
Virendra
v.
l7re Stat• of
Punjab
and
Another
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
It was only in the fitness of things that the State Legislature
should have left the wide preventive powers under the sections to
the discretion of the State Government, charged with the maintenance of law and order, or to its delegate, to be exercised on their
subjective satisfaction. To make the exercise of these powers
justiciable and subject to judicial scrutiny would be to defeat
the purpose of the enactment.
Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 519,
referred to.
But such discretion was by no means unfettered
and
uncontrolled. The two sections laid down the principle that the
State Government or its delegate could. exercise such powers only
if they were satisfied· that such exercise was necessary for the
purpose mentioned in the sections and not otherwise. Where there
was any abuse of such powers, therefore, what could be struck
down was the abuse itself but not the statute.
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1954) S.C.R. 803, held inapplicable.
Harishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) I
S.C.R. 380, relied on.
In view of the amended provisions of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution and the language of the two sections limiting the exercise of
the powers to the purposes specifically !Ilentioned therein,
the
principles enunciated by this Court in Ramesh Thapper's case and
applied to Chintaman Rao's case could have no application to the
instant cases.
Ramesh Thapper v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594
and Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1960) S.C.R.
759, held inapplicable.
.
The two provisos to s. 2(1)(a) and cl. (b) of s. 2(1) clearly
show that the restrictions imposed by s. 2 are reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Arts. 19(1)(a) and
19(1)(g) and are, therefore, protected by Arts. 19(2) and 19(6) of
the Constitution.
There could be no basis for the grievance that the notification under s. 2(l)(a) prevented the publication even of matters
against the "Save Hindi agitation''. If there was a change in the
policy of the papers, the time-limit provided for the operation of
the notifications and the right to make a representation provided
ample remedies for the petitioner. To introduce into the notifications the suggested qualification would be to make the exercise of
the powers conferred by the section dependent on an objective
test subject to judicial scrutiny and defeat the ve•y purpose of
the section.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 95
and 96 of 1957.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
N.C. Chatte1jee, Charan Das Puri and Naunit Lal,
for the petitioners (in both the petitions).
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Lachman
Das Kaushal, Deputy Advocate-Genera/for the Sate· of
Punjab and T.M. Sen, for the respondents.
1957. September 6. The following Judgement of
the Court was delivered by
OAS C. J.-In these two petitions under Art. 32 of
the Constitution of India
the petitioners
call in
·question the validity of the Punjab Special Powers
(Press) Act, 1956 (being Act No. 38 of 1956), hereinafter referred to as "the impugned Act", and pray
for an appropriate writ or order directing the respond-
·ents to withdraw the Notifications issued by them on
the two petitioners as the
editors,
printers and
publishers of two newspapers, Pratap and Vir Arjun.
The Daily Pratap was started about 38 years back
in Lahore, the capital of the . united Punjab. It is a
<laily newspaper printed in the Urdu language and
script. Since the partition of the country the Daily
Pratap is being published simultaneously from Jullun-
<lur and from New Delhi. Vir Arjun is a Hindi daily
newspaper also published simultaneously from Jullun-
-Our and from New Delhi. Virendra, the petitioner, in
Petition No. 95 of 1957 is the editqr, printer and
publisher of the two papers published from Jullundur
and K. Narendra is the editor, printer and publisher
of the two rapers published from New Delhi.
The petitioners allege that after the appointment of
the States Reorganisation Commission on December 29,
1953, the Akali party in the Punjab started a campaign for the partition of the State of Punjab on
communal and linguistic basis. According to the
petitioners this
agitation soon degenerated into a
campaign of hatred which threatened the peace of the
State. The petitioners maintain that
the Hindu
inhabitants of the State belonging to all shades of
opinion and also a section of the Sikh community and
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C.J.
1957"
Virendra
v.
The Slate of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C. J.
. 312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
the Congress Party were strongly opposed to that
proposal. It is in the circumstances reasonable to
infer that the Hindus would also indulge in a counter
propaganda
in foe Press and from the platform
against the agitation started by the Akali patry. It
is admitted that the policy of these two papers, the
Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun, has been to oppose the
Akali demand for partition of the State of Punjab.
Obviously a good deal of tension was generated in the
State by reason of the two bitterly opposing parties
trying to propagate their respective ideologies. About
a year back the Congress Party, which is the ruling
party, is said to have surrendered to the communal
pressure of the Akalis and accepted what has since
come to be known as the regional formula. It was
amidst the din and bustle of this ideological war and
to prevent and combat any possible activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony that
the Legislature of the State of Punjab found it
necessary to pass the impunged Act which received
the assent of the President on October 19, 1956, and
came into force on the 25th of the same month.
The provisions of the impugned Act, in so far as
they are material, may now be referred to. Section
2(1) (a) runs as follows :
"2(1) The State Government or any authority so
authorised in this behalf if satisfied that such action
is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating
any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of
communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public
order, may, by order in writing addressed to a printer
publisher or editor,-
(a) prohibit the printing or publication
in any
document or any class of documents of any matter
relating to a particular subject or class of subjects for
a specified period or in a particular issue or issues of a
J
newspaper or periodical;
Provided that no such order shall remain in force
for more than two months from the making thereof;
Provided further that the person against whom
the order has been made may within ten days of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
passing of this order make a representation to the
State Government which may on consideration thereof
modify, confirm or rescind the order;"
.
Section 2(1)(b) authofises the State Government or
. any authority so authorised in this behalf to require
that any matter covering not more than two columns
be published in any particular issue or issues of a
newspaper or periodical on
payment
of adequate
remuneration and to. specify the period (not exceeding
one week) during which and the manner in which such
publication·shall take place. Clause (c) of s. 2(1)
authorises the State Government or the delegated
authority to impose pre-censorship. Sub-section (2) of
s. 2 enables the State Government or the authority
issuing the order in the event of any disobedience of
an order made under s. 2 to order the seizure of all
copies of any publication and of the printing press
or other instrument or apparatus used in the publication. Section 3 (1) runs as follows :
"The State Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action
is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of
communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public
order, may, by notification, prohibit the bringing into
Punjab of any newspaper, periodical, leaflet or other
publication."
Sub-section (2) of s. 3 gives power to the State Government or the authority issuing the order, in the event
of any disobedience of an order made under s. 3, to
order the seizure of all copies
of any newspaper,
periodical, leaflet or other publication concerned.
Section 4 provides punishment for the contravention
of any of the provisions of the Act by imprisonment
of either description which may extend to one year or
with fine up to one thousand rupees or with both.
It appears that on or about May 30, 1957, a movement known as the "save Hindi
agitation" was
started by a Samiti whish goes by the name of Hindi
Raksha Samiti. The Arya Samaj, which claims to be
a cultural and religious society, joined this campaign
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C.I.
1957
Virendra
v.
-The Slate of
Punjab
and
Another
. Das
C. J.
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
for changing what they conceive to be the objectionable features of the regiona\ formula and the Sachar
formula on language. According to the petitioners
the Hindi Raksha Samiti, the sponsor of the "save
Hindi agitation" claims that it has the support of
practically all sections of the Hindus of the State .
The petitioners who are the editors, printers
and
publishers of the two newspapers published simultaneously from Jullundur and New Delhi respectively
consider that the objectionable clauses of those formulae are not only unjust and unfair to the cause of
prnpagating that national
language in the country,
but are also a contrivance to secure
the political
domination of ~he minority
community over the
majority. Admittedly the
petitioners
have been
publishing criticisms and news concerning the agitation which, according to them, are quite fair and
legitimate,
but they allege
that newspapers like
Prabhat and Ajit, which support the Akali party in the
State have been publishing articles and news couched
in a strong and violent language against the "save
Hindi agitation" and the Hindu
community. The
agitation apparently followed the usual course and
pattern of all political agitation of this kind with its
attendant demonstrations, slogans and satyagraha by
the volunteers and Jathi charge by the police. .Eventually on July JO, 1957, the agitation culminated in
the "save Hindi agitation" volunteers' forcible entry
into the Secretariat of the Punjab Government at
Chandigarh. It was in these circumstances that the
four Notifications complained of were issued.
On July 13, 1957, a Notification under s. 2(1 )(a) of
the impugned Act was issued against the petitioner
Virendra, as the editor, printer and publisher of the
Daily Pratap published from Jullundur. It was in the
following terms :
"Whereas J, Ranbir Singh,
Home Secretary,
Punjab Government, authorised by the said Government under section 2(1) of the Punjab Special Powers
(Press) Act, 1956, on examination of the publications
enumerated in the annexure relating to the ''save
Hindi agitation" have satisfied myself that action is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
necessary for combating the calculated and persistent
propaganda carried on in the newspaper the 'Pratap'
published at Jullundur to disturb communal harmony
in the State of Punjab ;
And whereas the said propaganda by making an
appeal to communal
sentiments has created a situation which is likely to affect public order and tranquillity in the State;
And therefore in pursuance of the powers conferred under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of section 2 of
the said Act, I prohibit Shri Virendra, the printer,
publisher and the editor of 'Pratap' from printing and
publishing any article, report, news item, letter or any
other material of any character whatsoever relating to
or connected with "save Hindi agitation" for a period
of two months from this date.
Sd./Home Secretary to Government of
Punjab.
No : 8472-C(H) 57/14679"
The annexure referred to in the Notifications sets out
the headings of fifteen several articles published in
this paper between May 30, 1957, to July 8, 1957.
Another Notification in identical terms with an
annexure setting forth the heading of sixteen articles
published during the same period in Vir Arjun was
issued
0on the same day against Virendra as the eaitor,
printer and publisher of Vir Arjun published from
Jullundur.
On July 14, 1957,two Notifications in identical terms
were issued under s. 3 of the impugned Act aganist
K. Narendra as the editor, printer and publisher of
Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun published from New
Delhi. It will suffice to set out the Notification in
respect of Daily Pratap which ran as follows :
"Punjab
Government
Gazette
Extraordinary
Published by Authority
Chandigarh,
Sunday, July 14, 1957.
Home Department
Notification
The 14th July, 1957.
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das CJ.
1957
Vlr;ndra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Dase. J.
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
. No. 8453-C(H)-57/14580 :--Whereas I,
Ranbir
Smgh, Home Secretary
to Government,
Punjab,
authorised by the said Government under section 3 of
the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, have
satisfied myself that it is necessary to combat and
prevent the propaganda
relating
to "save
Hindi
agitation" carried on in the Pratap with the object of
disturbing communal harmony in the State of Punjab
and thereby affecting public order;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by section 3(1) of the said Act, I do hereby prohibit
the bringing into Punjab of the newspaper printed
and published at Delhi, from the date of publication
of this notification."
The petitioners contend that both ss. 2 and 3 of the
impugned Act are ultra vires the State Legislature,
because they infringe the fundamental rights of the
petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 19(l)(a) and 19(l)(g) of
the Constitution and are not saved by the protecting
provisions embodied in Art. 19(2) or Art. 19(6). In the
first place it is contended that these sections impose
not merely restrictions on but total prohibition against
the exercise of the said fundamental rights, for in the
case of the Notifications under s. 2 there is a total
prohibition against the publication of all matters
relating to or in connection
with the "save. Hindi
agitation" and in the case of the Notifications made
under s. 3 there is a complete prohibition against the
entry and the circulation of the papers published from
New Delhi in the whole of Punjab. There is and can
be no dispute that the right to freedom of speech and
expression carries with it the right to propagate and
circulate one's views and opinions subject to reasonable restrictions. The point to be kept in view is that
the several rights of freedom
guaranteed to the
citizens by Art. 19(1) are exercisable by them throughout and in all parts of the territory of India. The
Notifications under s. 2(1)(a) prohibiting the printing
and publishing of any article, report, news item, letter
or any other material of any character whatsoever
relating to or connected with "save Hindi agitation"
or those under s. 3(1) imposing a ban against the entry
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-317
and the circulation of the said papers published from
New Delhi in the State of Punjab do not obviously
take away the entire right, for the petitioners are yet
at liberty to print and publish all other matters and
are free to circulate the papers in all other parts of
the territory of India. The restrictions, so far as they
extend, are certainty complete
but whether
they
amount to a total prohibition of the exercise of the
fundamental rights must be judged by reference to
the ambit of the rights and, so judged, there can be
no question that the entire rights under Arts. 19(1)(a)
and 19(1)(g) have not been completely taken away,
but restrictions have been imposed upon the exercise
of those rights with reference to the publication of
only articles etc. relating to a particular topic and
with reference to the circulation of the papers only in
a particular territory and, therefore, it is not right to
-say that these sections have imposed a total prohibition upon the exercise of those fundamental rights.
Learned counsel then urges that assuming these
sections impose only restrictions they are, nevertheless,
void as being repugnant to the Constitution, because
the restrictions are not reasonable. As regards the
right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
by Art. 19(1)(a) it is qualified by Art. 19(2) which
protects a law in so far as it imposes reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by Art.
19(1)(a) "in the interests of. ................... , .
public order .......... ". Likewise the right to carry
on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed by
Art. 19(1)(g) is cut down by Art. 19(6) which protects
a law imposing "in the interests of the general public."
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
<:onferred by Art. 19(l)(g). As has been explained by
this Court in Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P.(1)
the words "in the interests of" are words of great
amplitude and are much wider than the words "for
the maintenance of". The expression "in the interest
of" makes the ambit of the protection very wide, for
a law may not have been designed to directly maintain the public order or to
directly
protect
the
general nublic against any particular evil and yet it
(1) Petition No. 252 of 1956, decided on April 5, 1957·
1957
Virendra
v.
The Stale of
Punjab
and
Another
Da!I C. J.
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C. J.
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
may, have been enacted "in the interests of" the
public order or the general public as the case may be.
It is against this background, therefore, that we are
to see whether the restrictions imposed by ss. 2 and 3
can be said to be reasonable restrictions within the
meaning of Arts. 19(2) and 19(6).
The tests of reasonableness has been laid down by
this Court, in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row(') in
the following words :
"It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,
should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and no abstract standard or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.
The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,.
the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,
the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter intothe judicial verdict."
This dictum has been adopted and applied by this.
Court in several subsequent cases. The surrounding
circumstances in which the impugned law came to be
enacted, the underlying purose of the enactment and
the extent and the urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied have already been adverted to. It cannot
be overlooked that the Press is a mighty institution
wielding enormous powers which are expected to be
exercised for the protection and the good of the people
but which may conceivably be abused and exercised
for anti-social purposes by exciting the passions and
prejudices of a section of the people against another
section and thereby disturbing the public order and
tranquillity or in support of a policy which may be of
a subversive character. The powerful influence of the
newspapers, for good or evil, on the minds of the
readers, the wide sweep of their reach, the mod(!rn
facilities for their swift circulation to territories, distant
and near, must all enter into the judicial verdict and
the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed upon
(1)[1952] S.C.R. 597,607.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
the Press has to be tested against this background. It
is certainly a serious encroachment on the valuable
and cherished right to freedom of speech and expression if a newspaper is prevented from publishing its
own views or the views of its correspondents relating
to or concerning what may be the burning topic of the
day. Our social interest ordinarily demands the free
propagation and interchange of views but circumstances may arise when the social interest in public
order may require a reasonable subordination of the
social interest in free speech and expression to the
needs of our social interest in public order. Our
Constitution recognises this necessity and has attempted
to strike a balance between the two social interests.
It permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions on
the freedom of speech and expression in the interest of
public order and on the freedom of carrying on trade
or business in the interest of the general public. Therefore, the crucial question must always be : Are the
restrictions imposed on the exercise of the rights under
Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(l)(g) reasonable in view of all
the surrounding circumstances? In other words are
the restrictions reasonably necessary in the interest of
public order under Art. 19(2) or in the interest of the
general public under Art. 19(6)?
It is conceded that a serious tension had arisen
between the Hindus and the Akalis over the question of
the partition of the State on linguistic and communal
basis. The people were divided into two warring
groups, one supporting the agitation and the other
opposing it. The agitation and the counter agitation
were being carried on in the Press and from the platforms. Quite conceivably this agitation might at any
time assume a nasty communal turn and flare up into
a communal frenzy and factious fight disturbing the
public order of the State which is on the border of a
foreign State and where consequently the public order
and tranquillity were and are essential in the interest
of the safety of the State. It was for preserving the
safety of the State and for maintaining the public order
that the Legislature enacted this impugned Statute.
Legislature had to ask itself the question; who will be
1957
Virendra
v.
The State q/
Punjab
and
Another
Das C. J.
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C. J,
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
the appropriate authority to determine at any given
point of time as to whether the prevailing circumstances require some restriction to be placed on the
right to freedom of speech and expression and the right
to carry on any occupation, trade or business and to
what extent ? The answer was obvious, namely, that
as the State Government was charged
with
the
preservation of law and order in the State, as it alone
was in possession of all material facts it would be the
best
authority to investigate the circumstances and
assess the urgency of the situation that might arise and
to make up its mind whether any and, if so, what
anticipatory action must be taken for the prevention
of the threatened or anticipated breach of the peace.
The court is wholly unsuited to gauge the seriousness
of the situation, for it cannot be in
possession of
materials which are available
only to the executive
Government. Therefore, the determination of the time
when and the extent to which restrictions should be
imposed on the Press must of necessity be left to the
judgment and discretion of the State Government and
that is exactly what the Legislature did by passing
the statute. It gave wide powers to the State Government, or the authority to whom it might delegate the
same, to be exercised only if it were satisfied as to the
things mentioned in the two sections. The conferment
of such wide powers to be exercised on the subjective
satisfaction of the Government or its delegate as to
the necessity for its exercise for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity
prejudicial to
the
maintenance of communal harmony affecting or likely
to affect public order cannot, in view of the surrounding circumstances and tension brought about or aided
by the agitation in the Press, be regarded as anything
but the imposition of permissible reasonable restrictions on the two fundamental rights. Quick decision
and swift and effective action must be of the essence
of those powers and the exercise of it must, therefore,
be left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government
charged with the duty of maintaining law and order.
To make the exercise of these powers justiciable and
subject to t11e judicial scrutiny will defeat the very
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
purpose of the enactment. Even
in his dissenting
judgment in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi (1)
Mukherjea, J., conceded that in cases of this description certain authorities could be invested with power
to make initial orders on their own satisfaction and
not on materials which satisfy certain objective tests.
It is said that the sections give unfettered and
uncontrolled discretion to the State Government or to
the officer authorised by it in the exercise of the drastic
powers given by the sections. We are referred to the
observations of Mukherjea, J ., in
Dwarka Prasad
Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2).
That
·case does not seem to us to have any application to
the facts of this case. ln the first place, the discretion
is given in the first instance to the State Government
·itself and not to a very subordinate officer like the
licensing officer as was done in Dwarka Prasad's case
(supra). It is true that the State Government may
delegate the power to any officer or person but the fact
that the power of delegation is to be exercised by the
State Government itself is some safeguard against the
abuse of this power of delegation. That apart, it will
be remembered that Uttar Pradesh Coal Control
Order, 1953, with reference to which the observations
were made, prescribed no
principles and gave no
guidance in the matter of the exercise of the power.
There was nothing in that order to indicate the purpose for which and the circumstances under which the
licensing authority
could grant or refuse to grant,
renew or refuse to renew, or suspend, revoke, cancel or
modify any license under that order and, therefore, the
power could be exercised by any person to whom the
State Coal Controller might have chosen to delegate
the same. No rules had been framed and no directions
had been given on the relevant matters to regulate or
to guide the exercise of the discretion of the licensing
officer. That cannot, on our judgment, be said about
s. 2 or s. 3 of the impugned Act, for the exercise of the
power under either of these two sections is conditioned
by the State Government or the authority authorised
by the said Government being satisfied
that such
(1} (1950] S.C.R. 510.
(2} [1954] S.C.R. 303, 813.
M2SC61-2
195i.
Vir·c11dra
v.
Tlze State of
P1111jab
and
Another
Das C. J.
1957
Virendru
v.
The Slate of
Puniah
and
Another
Das C. J.
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
action was necessary for the purpose of preventing or
combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance
of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect
the public order. As explained by this Court in
Harishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ('),
the dictum of Mukherjea, J., can have no application to
a Jaw which sets out its underlying policy so that the
order to be made under the law is to be governed by
that policy and the discretion given to the authority
is to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate that
policy, and the conferment of such a discretion so
regulated cannot be called invalid. The two sections
before us lay down the principle that the State Government or the
delegated authority can
exercise the
power only if it is satisfied that its exercise is necessary
for the purposes mentioned in the sections. lt cannot
be exercised for any other purposes. In this view of
the matter neither of these sections can be questioned
on the ground that they give unfettered and uncontrolled discretion to the State Government or one
executive officer in the exercise of discretionary powers
given by the section.
It is next
said that an executive
officer
may
untruthfully say, as a matter of form, that he has been
satisfied and there is nothing in the section which may·
prevent him from abusing the power so conferred by
these sections. But, as pointed out in Khare's case
(supra),
the exercise of a discretionary
preventive
power to be exercised in anticipation for preventing a
breach of public order must necessarily be left to the
State Government or its officers to whom the State
Government may delegate the authority. No assumption ought to be made that the State Government or
the authority will abuse its power. To make the exercise of the power justiciable will defeat the very
purpose for which the power is given.
Further, even
if the officer may coilceivably abuse the power, what
will be struck down is not the statute but the abuse of.
power.
Reference has been made to the principles enunciated by this Court in Ramesh Tlwppar v. The State of
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 380,:;flli<Jfli.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
323
Madras (1), and applied in ChiJ1[aman Rao v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh {2), namely, that if the language
employed in the impugned law is wide enough to
cover restriction both within and outside the limits of
constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting
the guaranteed fundamental rights and so Jong as the
possibility of the statute being applied for purposes
not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot ruled out,
the sections must be struck down as ultra vires the
Constitution. We do not think those principles have
any application in the instant case. It will be remembered that Art. 19(2), as it was then worded, gave protection to a Jaw relating to any matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State.
Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public
Order was made "for the purpose of securing public
safety and the maintenance of public order." It was
pointed out that whatever end the impugned Act might
have been intended to subserve and whatever aim its
framers might have had in view, its application and
scope could not, in the absence of limiting words in the
statute itself, be restricted to the aggravated form of
activities which were calculated to endanger the
security of the State. Nor was there any guarantee
that those officers who exercised the power under the
Act would, in using them, discriminate between those
who acted prejudicially to the security of the State and
those who did not. This consideration cannot apply
to the case now under consideration. Article 19(2) has
been amended so as to extend its protection to a law
imposing reasonable restrictions in the interests of
public order and the language used in the two sections
of the impugned Act quite clearly and explicitly limits
the exercise of the powers conferred by them to the
purposes specifically mentioned in the sections and to
no other purpose.
Apart from the limitations and conditions for the
exercise of the powers contained in the body of the two
sections as hereinbefore mentioned, there are two
provisos to s. 2(l)(a) which are important. Under the
first proviso the orders made under s. 2 (l)(a) can only
(1) (1950] S.C.R. 594·
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 759.
. 1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Another
Das C. J.
1957
Virendra
v.
The State of
Punjab
and
Ano/Mr
Das C. J.
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
remain in force for t~o months from the making
thereof. Further, there is another proviso permitting the
aggrieved person to make a representation to the State
Government which may, on consideration
thereof,
modify, confirm or rescind the order. A power the exercise of which is conditioned by the positive requirement
of the existence of the satisfaction of the authority as to
the necessity for making the order for the specific purposes mentioned in the section and the effect of the
exercise of which is to remain in operation for a limited
period only and is liable to be modified or rescinded
upon a representation being made
cannot,
in our
opinion, in view of the attending circumstances,
be
characterised as unreasonable and outside the protection given by Art. 19(2) or Art. 19(6).
Under cl. (b)
of sub-s. (1) of s. 2 also there are several conditions,
namely, that the matter required to be published must
not be more than two column, that adequate remuneration must be paid for such publication and that such
requirement cannot prevail for more than one week.
A consideration of these safeguards must, in our
opinion, have an important bearing in determining the
reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by s. 2. The
prevailing circumstances which Jed to the passing of
the statute, the urgency and extent of the evil
of
communal antagonism and hatred which must be
combated and prevented, the facility with which the evil
might be aggravated by partisan news and views
published in daily newspapers having large circulation
and the conditions imposed by the section itself on
the exercise of the power conferred by it must all be
taken into consideration in judging the reasonableness
or otherwise of the law and, so judged, s. 2 must be
held to have imposed reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by Arts. 19(l)(a) and
19(1)(g) in the interest of public order and of the
general public and is protected by Arts. 19(2)
and
19(6).
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
Virendra also maintains that assuming thats. 2(1 )(a) is
valid, the Notifications actually issued thereunder are
much too wide in language and cannot be supported.
S.C.R. SUPREME
COURT REPORTS 325
t'
The operative part of the Notification prevents the petitioner from publishing any article, news item, letter. or
any other matter of any character whatsoever relatmg
to or connected with the "save Hindi agitation".
It is said that the petitioner cannot even publish a
report or a letter from a correspondent against the
"save Hindi agitation." It cannot publish a report
of the statement made on the floor of the House by
the Prime Minister deprecating t}le "save Hindi agitation".