# VIRSA SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1495
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-11-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 90...of 1957
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, Gaiendragadkar, Vivian Bose
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/virsa-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-1436
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Culpable homicide amounting to murderProsecution to prove-Presence and Nature of Injury-Intention
to cause that Particular Injury, which was 118<1 accidental or unintentional and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 300, 3rdly.
The accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased.
This injury caused his death.
In the opinion of the doctor the
injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. It was found by the Sessions Judge that the accused
intended tc cause grievous hurt only.
In his opinion however
the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code applied.
He accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused under s. 302 Indian
Penal Code.
The High Court upheld the conviction. It was
argued that the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code did not
apply as it was not proved that the accused intended to inflict a
1958
March II.
1496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1958
bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature as s. 300 lndim Penal Code third clause states,
Virsa Singh
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any
v.
person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient
Tlie State of Punjab in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" :
Held, that the prosecution must prove the following before it
can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.
(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury
is present.
(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are
purely objective investigations.
( 3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict
that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
( 4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
The third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code consists of two
parts.
Under the firsi part it must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and
under the second part it must be proved that the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The
words "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted" are merely
descriptive.
All this means is, that it is not enough to prove
that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that
the injury found to be present was the injury intended to be
inflicted. Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the
proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do
with the question of intention.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 90...of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 1956 arising out
of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of
the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in
Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956.
·
Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1958. March 11. The Judgment of the
Court
was delivered by
•
..
-I
-
' ,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1497
BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh
has
been
1958
sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh.
Vlrsa Singh
He was grant~d ~p~cial leave to appeal by this Court The 8101;·01 Punjab
but the leave is limited to
"the question that on the finding accepted by the
Bose J.
Punjab High Court what offence is made out as having
been committed by the petitioner."
The appellant was tried with five others
under
ss. 302

## Text

s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1495
explai11 when it is deemed to have taken place outside
1958
any State whatsoever that State ma)'.· be. I am there- M. P. v. Sundarafore unable to see that the Explanation has any facet
ramier & co.
showing what would be a sale inside Andhra.
v.
The conclusion that T reach is that the Sales
Tax
The State oJ
Act with which these cases are concerned does not
Andhra Pradesh
authorise the taxing of a sale under which goods are
Sarkar J.
delivered in Andhra but the property in them passes
in Madras. In this view of the matter I do not think
it necessary to discuss the various other grounds on
which the respondent's right to tax these sales was
also challenged.
·
In the result I would allow these petitions.
BY COURT : In view of the
opinion of the
majority, the petitions are dismissed. The parties are
to bear their own costs.
Petitions dismissed.
VIRSA SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(JAFER IMAM, GAIENDRAGADKAR and VIVIAN
BOSE JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Culpable homicide amounting to murderProsecution to prove-Presence and Nature of Injury-Intention
to cause that Particular Injury, which was 118<1 accidental or unintentional and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 300, 3rdly.
The accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased.
This injury caused his death.
In the opinion of the doctor the
injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. It was found by the Sessions Judge that the accused
intended tc cause grievous hurt only.
In his opinion however
the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code applied.
He accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused under s. 302 Indian
Penal Code.
The High Court upheld the conviction. It was
argued that the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code did not
apply as it was not proved that the accused intended to inflict a
1958
March II.
1496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1958
bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature as s. 300 lndim Penal Code third clause states,
Virsa Singh
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any
v.
person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient
Tlie State of Punjab in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" :
Held, that the prosecution must prove the following before it
can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.
(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury
is present.
(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are
purely objective investigations.
( 3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict
that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
( 4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
The third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code consists of two
parts.
Under the firsi part it must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and
under the second part it must be proved that the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The
words "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted" are merely
descriptive.
All this means is, that it is not enough to prove
that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that
the injury found to be present was the injury intended to be
inflicted. Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the
proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do
with the question of intention.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 90...of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 1956 arising out
of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of
the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in
Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956.
·
Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1958. March 11. The Judgment of the
Court
was delivered by
•
..
-I
-
' ,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1497
BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh
has
been
1958
sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh.
Vlrsa Singh
He was grant~d ~p~cial leave to appeal by this Court The 8101;·01 Punjab
but the leave is limited to
"the question that on the finding accepted by the
Bose J.
Punjab High Court what offence is made out as having
been committed by the petitioner."
The appellant was tried with five others
under
ss. 302/149, 324/149 and 323/149 Indian Penal Code.
He was also charged individually under s. 302.
The others were acquitted of the murder charge by
the first Court but were convicted under ss. · 3i6, 324
and 323 read with s. 149, .Indian Penal Code: On
appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted.
The appellant was convicted by the first
Court
under s. 302 and his conviction and sentence . were
upheld by the High Court.
There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both
Courts are agreed that the appellant caused . it. It
was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the
doctor who examined Khem Singh, while he was still
alive, said that it was
"a
punctured
wound
2" x r transverse
in
direction on the left side of the abdominal wail in the
lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal
canal.
He also said that
"Three coils of intestines were coming out of the
wound."
The incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13,
1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following
day.
The doctor who conducted the post-mortem described the injury as-
"an oblique incised stitched wound 2f on the
lower part of left side of belly, 1!" abov~ the left
inguinal ligament. The injury was through the hole
thickness of the abdominal wall. Peritonitis was
present and there was digested food in that cavity.
Flakes of pus were sticking round the small intestines
M2SC (Part X)/61-10
1498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958
19ss
and there were six cuts ........... at
various places, and
digested food was flowing out from three cuts."
Ylrsa Singh
The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause
The Stat;~! Punjab death in the ordinary course of nature.
The learned Sessions Judge found that the appelBose J.
!ant was 21 or 22 years old and said-
"When the common object of the assembly
seems to have been to cause grievous hurts only, I do
not suppose Virsa Singh actually had the intention to
cause the death of Khem Singh, but by a rash and
silly act he gave a rather forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death. Peritonitis also supervened
and that hastened the death of Khem Singh. But for
that Khem Singh may perhaps not have died or may
have lived a little longer."
Basing on those facts, he said that the case fell under
s. 300, 3rdly and so he convicted under s. 302, Indian
Penal Code.
The learned High Court Judges considered
that
"the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a
chance meeting." But they accepted the finding that
the appellant inflicted the injury on Khem Singh an<l
accepted the medical testimony that the blow was a
fatal one.
It was argued with much circumlocution that the
facts set out above do not disclose an offence of
murder because the prosecution has not proved that
there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that
was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. Section 300, 3rdly was quoted :
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death . "
It was said that the intention that the section requires
must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted,
but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death."
This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but
is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an
injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
..
-
S.C.R.
SBPREME COURT REPORTS
1499
course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in
19ss
that event, the "thirdly"
would be
unnecessary
because the act would fall under the first part of the
Vlrsa Singh
section, namelyTlieStat;~f Pun}ob
"If the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death."
Bose 1.
Jn our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and
separate. The first is subjective to the offender :
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person."
It must, of course, first be found that
bodily
injury was caused and the nature of the injury
must be established, that is to say,
whether
the
injury is on the leg or the arm or the stomach,
how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs
were cut and so forth. These are purely objective
facts and leave no room for inference or deduction :
to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it
comes to the question of intention, that is subjective
to the offender and it must be proved that he had an
intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to
be present.
Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next
clause-
" and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death."
The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part
of the section, namely, the infliction of bodily injury
with the intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the
circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the
leg, or some lesser blow, and it can be shown that the
blow landed in the region of the heart by accident, then,
though an injury to the heart is shown to be present,
the intention to inflict an injury in that region, or
of that nature, is not proved. In that case, the first
part of the clause does not come into play. But once
it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the
injury that is found to be present, then the earlier part
of the clause we are now examining -
M2SC (Part X)/61-11
1500
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1958]
19ss
"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted"
is merely descriptive. All it means is that it is not
Vlr1a Singh
enough to prove that the injury found to be present
77ie s1.,;~, Punjab is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
_
na,ture; it must in addition be shown that the injury
Bose J.
is of the kind that falls within the earlier clause,
namely, that the ·injury found to be present was the
injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it
was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the
proved facts about the nature of the injury and has
nothing to do with the question of intention.
In considering whether the intention was to inflict
the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry
necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example,
whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or
a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to
cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted.
It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every
last detail as, for instance, whether the
prisoner
intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he
intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the
heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of
anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he does not
know that there is a heart or kidney or bowels, he
cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of
course, ·that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broadbased and simple and based on commonsense :
the
kind of enquiry that "twelve good men and true"
could readily appreciate and understand.
To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the
following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300,
"3rdly";
First, it must establish, quite objectively,
that a
bodily injury is present;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved;
These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to
say,
that it was not accidental or unintentional, or
that some other kind of injury was intended.
(
--•,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1501
Once these three elements are proved to be present,
19ss
the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the
Virsa Singh
type just d~scribed. made up of the th~ee elemen~s set The Stat:~! Punjab
-0ut above is sufficient to . cause death m the ordinary
_
-course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely
Bose J.
objective and inferential and has nothing to do with
the intention of the offender.
Once these four elements are established by the
prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the
prosecution throughout ) the offence is murder under
s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no
intention to cause death. It does not matter that
there )Vas no intention even to cause an injury of a
kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature (not that there is any real distinction
between the two). It does not even matter that there
is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely
to cause death. Once the intention to cause the
bodily injury actually found to be present is proved,
the rest of the enquiry .is purely objective and the
-only
question is whether, as
a matter
of purely
objective inference,. the injury is sufficient in the
-ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one
has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder.
If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the
consequences; and they can only escape if it can be
shown, or reasonably deduced that the 'injury
was
accidental or otherwise unintentional.
We were referred to a decision of Lord Goddard in
R. v. Steane (') where the learned Chief Justice says
that where a particular intent must be laid and
charged, that particular intent must be proved. Of
course it must, and of course it must be proved by the
prosecution. The only question here is, what is the
extent and nature of the intent that s. 300 3rdly
requires, and how is it to be proved ?
The learned counsel for the appellant next relied on
a passage where the learned Chief Justice says that :
(1) [1947] 1 All K R, 813, 816.
1958
Virsa Singh
Vo
Tiie Stale of
Punjab
Bose J.
1502
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
(1958)
"if, on the totality of the evidence, there is
room for more than one view as to the intent of the
prisoner, the jury shoul~ be directed that it is for the.
prosecution to prove the intent to the jury's satisfaction, and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they
either think that the intent did not exist or they
are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner is
entitled to be acquitted."
We agree that that is also the law in India. But so is
this. We qoute a few sentences earlier from the same
learned judgment :
"No doubt, if the prosecution prove an act the
natural consequences of which would be a certain
result and no evidence or explanation is given, then a
jury may, on a proper -direction, find that the prisoner
is guilty of doing the act with the intent alleged."
That is exactly the position here. No evidence or
explanation. is given about why the appellant thrust
a spear,into the abdomen of the deceased with such
force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of
the intestines came out of tl;le wound and that digested
food oozed out from cuts in three places. In the
absence of evidence, or reasonable explanation, that
the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach
with ·a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far
into the body, or to indicate that his act was a
regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it
would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend
to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intent is
established (and no other conclusion is reasonably
possible in this case and in any case it is a question
of fact), the rest is a matter for objective determination from the medical and other evidence about the
nature and seriousness of the injury.
The learned counsel for the appellant referred us to
Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan (')where Beaman J.
says that-
"Where death is caused by a single blow, it is
always much more difficult to be absolutely certain
what degree of bodily injury the offender intended."
With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked
{<) (1917) LL.R. 41 Born. 23, 29.
•
-->
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1503
up the intent required with the seriousness of the
injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the
section requires. The two matters are quite separate
and distinct, though the evidence about them may
sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the
prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial
one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that
is proved to be present. If he can show that he did
not, or if the totality of the
circumstances justify
such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the
section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing
beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant
inflicted it,
the only possible inference is that
he
intended to inflict it. Whether he knew
of
its
seriousness,
or intended serious
consequences, is
neither here nor there. The question, .so far
as the
intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to
kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of
seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict
the
injury in question; and once the existence of the
injury is proved the intention to cause it will be
presumed unless the ~idence or the circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion. But
whether the
intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of
law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and
if serious,
how serious, is a totally separate and
distinct question and has nothing to do with the
question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the
injury in question.
It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be
linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For
example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the
circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner
only intended a superficial scratch and that by
accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or
spear that was used, then of course the offence is not
murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not
intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as
serious as it turned out to be but because he did not
intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His
intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally
different injury. The difference is not one of law but
1958
Virsa Singh
v.
Tile State of
Punjab
Bose J.
1958
Virsa Singh
v.
The Stale of
Punjab
Bose J.
1958
March 19.
1504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
one' of .fact; and whether the conclusion should be one
way or .the ~the~ is a matter of pr~of, where necessary,
by ca,lling Ih aid all reasonable mferences of fact in
the absence of direct testimony. It is not one for
guess-work and fanciful conjecture.
The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
BALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM
v.
B.C.
PATIL AND OTHERS
(JAFER IMAM, SUBBA RAo and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)
Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act (/J1of1936), s. 2(vi), JJ.
The Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded bonus equal to 4!
months' wages to the operatives of the Tata Mills Ltd. and directed that those operatives who were no longer in the service of the
Mills should be paid the bonus in one lump sum by a fixed date
and in such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager
of the Mills. The operatives who made a claim before the date
fixed were duly paid but payment was r.efused to operatives who
applied after that date. The operatives who had been refused
payment made applications to the Authority under the Payment
of Wages Act. The Mills contended that the Authority had no
jurisdiction to entertain the application, but the contention was
rejected. The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High
Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and an appeal
against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench:
Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not
wages within the meaning of s. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages
Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain
the application made to it under s. 15 of the Act. Though such
·bonus was remuneration it was not remuneration payable on the
fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, express or
implied, as required by s. 2 (vi).
F. W. Heilgers cl Co. v. N. C. ChalSJ·avarthi, [1949] F.C.R
356, followed.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 35 & 36 of 1954.
•
.... '