# VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI & ORS v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY & ORS

- **Citation:** [2019] 13 S.C.R. 634
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-10-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2019
- **Bench:** R. F. Nariman, V. Ramasubramanian
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/virudhunagar-hindu-nadargal-dharma-paribalana-sabai-ors-v-tuticorin-educational-33314
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Constitution of India:
Art.227 - Jurisdiction under - Scope of - Though
availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of High Court - But in civil
proceedings under CPC, when the forum is civil court, availability
of remedy under CPC, will deter the High Court from exercising
its power of superintendence under Art.227 - In the present case,
since specific remedy of appeal was available to the party, High
Court should not have entertained the revision u/Art. 227.
Injunction:
Interim injunction in a civil suit - Restraining interalia the
respondent-Secretary of the respondent-Society from functioning
as Secretary - Challenged in revision petition - High Court allowed
the petition setting aside the injunction order holding that the same
was passed in haste - Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: High Court
had overlooked the fact that the respondent-Secretary having been
injuncted from acting as a Secretary of the respondent-Society,
could not have filed revision petition on behalf of the respondentSociety - High Court was also wrong in holding that the order was
passed in haste - Injunction order was passed after duly hearing
the opposite party - Order XXXIX r.3A of CPC also mandates
disposal of injunction application within 30 days - Therefore,
impugned order set aside - Advocate Commissioner appointed to
convene the 'General Body' as well as 'Executive Committee'
meeting for the election of Office Bearers - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Or. XXXIX r.3A.
 [2019] 13 S.C.R. 634
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Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Primarily the High Court went wrong in
overlooking the fact that there was already an appeal under
Order XLI, Rule 1(r) of CPC, at the instance of the fifth
defendant in the suit (third respondent), as against the very same
order of injunction and, therefore, there was no justification for
invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. [Para
11] [639-H; 640-A]
2. The High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy
of appeal under Section 104(1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule
1(r) of CPC was directly available, the respondents 1 and 2 ought
to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability
of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. But courts should
always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such
alternative remedy is available before Civil Courts in terms of
the provisions of CPC and (ii) cases where such alternative
remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory
rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial
authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the
first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings
before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in
terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a
near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may
challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed
in a suit, on the same grounds on which the respondents 1 and
2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High court. "orders of civil court
stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals
or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Therefore wherever the
proceedings are under CPC and the forum is the Civil Court,
the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High
Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but
as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power
of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High
Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article
227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is
provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. [Paras 12,
13 and 14] [640-B-G; 641-A-B]
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA
SABAI v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY
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## Text

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VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL
DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI & ORS.
v.
TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2019)
OCTOBER 03, 2019
[R. F. NARIMAN AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Constitution of India:
Art.227 - Jurisdiction under - Scope of - Though
availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of High Court - But in civil
proceedings under CPC, when the forum is civil court, availability
of remedy under CPC, will deter the High Court from exercising
its power of superintendence under Art.227 - In the present case,
since specific remedy of appeal was available to the party, High
Court should not have entertained the revision u/Art. 227.
Injunction:
Interim injunction in a civil suit - Restraining interalia the
respondent-Secretary of the respondent-Society from functioning
as Secretary - Challenged in revision petition - High Court allowed
the petition setting aside the injunction order holding that the same
was passed in haste - Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: High Court
had overlooked the fact that the respondent-Secretary having been
injuncted from acting as a Secretary of the respondent-Society,
could not have filed revision petition on behalf of the respondentSociety - High Court was also wrong in holding that the order was
passed in haste - Injunction order was passed after duly hearing
the opposite party - Order XXXIX r.3A of CPC also mandates
disposal of injunction application within 30 days - Therefore,
impugned order set aside - Advocate Commissioner appointed to
convene the 'General Body' as well as 'Executive Committee'
meeting for the election of Office Bearers - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Or. XXXIX r.3A.
 [2019] 13 S.C.R. 634
634
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Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Primarily the High Court went wrong in
overlooking the fact that there was already an appeal under
Order XLI, Rule 1(r) of CPC, at the instance of the fifth
defendant in the suit (third respondent), as against the very same
order of injunction and, therefore, there was no justification for
invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. [Para
11] [639-H; 640-A]
2. The High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy
of appeal under Section 104(1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule
1(r) of CPC was directly available, the respondents 1 and 2 ought
to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability
of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. But courts should
always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such
alternative remedy is available before Civil Courts in terms of
the provisions of CPC and (ii) cases where such alternative
remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory
rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial
authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the
first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings
before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in
terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a
near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may
challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed
in a suit, on the same grounds on which the respondents 1 and
2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High court. "orders of civil court
stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals
or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Therefore wherever the
proceedings are under CPC and the forum is the Civil Court,
the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High
Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but
as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power
of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High
Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article
227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is
provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. [Paras 12,
13 and 14] [640-B-G; 641-A-B]
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA
SABAI v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY
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3. Another aspect that was overlooked by the High Court
was that the second respondent was already restrained by the
Sub-Court, from functioning as the Secretary of the first
respondent society. It is seen from the records that the civil
revision was filed before the High court by the first respondent
society as well the second respondent. The second respondent
was not only the second petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition
filed before the High Court, but he also sought to represent the
first respondent-Society as its Secretary, before the High court
in the Civil Revision. On the date on which the first respondentSociety filed the Civil Revision before the High court, the second
respondent was not the secretary and could not have acted on
behalf of the society. This aspect was also overlooked by the
High Court. [Paras 15 and 16] [641-C-D; G-H]
4. The observation of the High Court that the trial Court
proceeded in great haste, appears to be uncharitable. Order
XXXIX Rule 3A of CPC itself mandates the disposal of an
application for injunction within 30 days, whenever an injunction
was granted without notice to the opposite party. In the present
case, the trial Court, without granting an ex-parte order of
injunction, chose to allow the opposite parties to file counter
affidavit(s) along with documents and then heard the opposite
parties before allowing the application for injunction. Finding the
line of demarcation between speedy disposal and hurried
dispatch, with mathematical precision, is not possible. In any
case, even if the High Court was convinced that the trial Court
had proceeded hastily, the High Court could have only remanded
the matter back. But the High Court allowed the application for
injunction without recording any finding on merits. In fact the
order of the Trial Court deals with the rival contentions and is
one passed on merits after due consideration of the pleadings
and documents. The High Court did not even deal with the
matter on merits to over turn the decision of the Trial Court.
Therefore, the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside
and the order of the Trial Court is liable to be restored. [Paras
17 and 18] [642-A-E]
5. It is brought to the notice of the Court that after the
High Court allowed the Civil Revision petition by its order dated
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28.08.2018, the second respondent proceeded with the meeting
of the General Body and the Executive Committee on
25.09.2018 and also conducted elections. Notice was ordered
and the interim order of the status quo was passed in the above
special leave petition only on 8.10.2018. Normally, in the above
circumstances, the appeal could have been held having become
infructuous. But in the present case every meeting of the
General Body and every attempt at holding elections to the first
respondent-Society have created a series of litigation before
three different fora namely (i) the Civil Courts (ii) the Registrar
of Societies (iii) the High court (in Writ Petitions arising out of
orders of the Registrar of Societies). Therefore, the only way
to bring to an end all the litigations between the parties before
various fora would be to set aside the impugned order and the
elections held pursuant thereto and to appoint an Advocate
Commissioner to convene the General Body as well as the
Executive Committee for the election of office bearers.
Accordingly, the order of the High court as well as the elections
purportedly held pursuant to the order of the High Court are
set aside. [Paras 19, 20 and 21] [642-F-H; 644-C-E]
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan & Ors. (2000)
7 SCC 695 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 303 ; Radhey
Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423 : [2015] 3
SCR 197 - relied on.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC
675 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290 - stood overruled.
Case Law Reference
[2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 303
relied on
Para 12
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290
stood overruled
Para 13
[2015] 3 SCR 197
relied on
Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 7764
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2018 of the Madurai
Bench of the High Court of Madras in C.R.P. No. 1084 of 2018.
R. Anand Padmanabhan, K. Selvaraj, Aravind C., Shashi
Bhushan Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA
SABAI v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY
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Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv., Ashok Mathur, R. Kannan, T. Antony
A., Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN
1. Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by an order of the High Court passed under Article
227 of the Constitution, vacating an interim order of injunction granted
by the trial Court, the plaintiffs have come up with this appeal.
 3. We have heard Mr. R. Anand Padmanabhan, learned counsel
for the appellants and Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
4. The appellants herein filed a suit O. S. No. 145 of 2018 on
the file of Principal District Munsif, at Thoothukudi praying (i) for a
declaration that the notice issued by the sixth defendant (second
respondent in this appeal) convening the General Body Meeting of the
first respondent-Society at 5 P.M. and the Executive Committee
meeting at 5:30 P.M. on the same day namely 05.05.2018 was illegal;
(ii) for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant Nos.
5 & 6 from convening the meetings of the General Body and the
Executive Committee of the first respondent-society; (iii) for a
declaration that the appointment of the fifth defendant (third respondent
in this appeal) as patron for life of the first defendant-Society was
unlawful; (iv) for a permanent injunction restraining the sixth defendant
(second respondent in the appeal) from acting as the Secretary of the
first defendant-Society and (v) for the appointment of a Commissioner
to receive the list of members and to conduct free and fair election of
office bearers of the first defendant-Society.
5. Along with the suit, the appellants/plaintiffs moved an
Interlocutory Application i.e. I. A. No. 386 of 2018 seeking an interim
order of injunction restraining the respondents from convening the
meetings of the general Body and the Executive Committee on 5.5.2018.
It appears that the appellants/plaintiffs also moved one more
Interlocutory Application i.e. Interlocutory Application No.387 of 2018
seeking an injunction restraining the defendant nos. 5 & 6 from acting
respectively as Patron and the Secretary.
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6. It appears that the suit was filed on 23.04.2018 and the
application for interim injunction was moved on 24.04.2018. The
Contesting defendants filed a counter affidavit on the very next day
namely 25.04.2018 along with 19 documents.
7. Therefore, after hearing both sides, the trial Court passed an
order on 26.04.2018 allowing Interlocutory Application No.386 of 2018
and injuncting the defendants from proceeding with the Meeting of the
General Body and the Executive Committee as scheduled on 5.5.2018.
It is relevant to note that the trial Court not only took note of the
pleadings on both sides but also took note of 12 documents filed by the
plaintiffs and 19 documents filed along with the counter affidavits of
the defendants.
8. As against the order of the trial court granting injunction, the
fifth defendant in the suit (the third respondent in this appeal) who was
claiming to be the Patron for life, filed a Regular Appeal in C.M.A No.1
of 2018 on the file of the Sub-Court at Thothukudi under Order XLIII
Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the respondent nos.1 &
2 herein who were the defendant Nos.1 & 6 respectively, instead of
filing a Regular Appeal, filed a Civil Revision in C.R.P.(MD) (PD)
No.1084 of 2018 on the file of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High
Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
9. Despite objections to the maintainability of the revision on the
ground of availability of an appellate remedy under the Code, the High
Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the order of
injunction granted by the trial Court. It is against the said order that
the plaintiffs have come up with the above appeal.
10. The objection to the maintainability of the revision was sought
to be overcome by the High Court on the basis of a few decisions which
revolved around the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to keep
the subordinate courts within the bounds of law. Then the High Court
found fault with the trial Court for taking up the application for injunction
filed on 24.04.2018, for hearing on 25.04.2018 and passing an order on
26.4.2018. This, in the opinion of the High Court, was a case of justice
being hurried and consequently getting buried. Therefore, the High Court
allowed the revision and set aside the order of injunction.
11. Primarily the High Court, in our view, went wrong in
overlooking the fact that there was already an appeal in C.M.A. No. 1
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI
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of 2018 filed before the Sub-Court at Tuticorin under Order XLI, Rule
1 (r) of the Code, at the instance of the fifth defendant in the suit (third
respondent herein), as against the very same order of injunction and,
therefore, there was no justification for invoking the supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227.
12. Secondly, the High Court ought to have seen that when a
remedy of appeal under section 104 (1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule
1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was directly available, the
respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken recourse to the same. It is
true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a
bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In
A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan & Ors.1, this Court held
that "though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the
Constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well recognized
principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court
should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies before he
resorts to a Constitutional remedy".
13. But courts should always bear in mind a distinction between
(i) cases where such alternative remedy is available before Civil Courts
in terms of the provisions of Code of Civil procedure and (ii) cases
where such alternative remedy is available under special enactments
and/or statutory rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasijudicial authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the
first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before
civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the
provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar.
Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision
under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds
on which the respondents 1 and 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High
court. This is why, a 3 member Bench of this court, while overruling
the decision in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai2, pointed out in
Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath3 that "orders of civil court stand
on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or
courts other than judicial/civil courts.
1 (2000) 7 SCC 695
2 (2003) 6 SCC 675
3 (2015) 5 SCC 423
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14. Therefore wherever the proceedings are under the code of
Civil Procedure and the forum is the Civil Court, the availability of a
remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a
measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and
prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the
Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the
revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy
of appeal is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself.
15. Another aspect that was overlooked by the High Court was
that the second respondent herein namely Shri A. Rajendran was
already restrained by the Sub-Court, from functioning as the Secretary
of the first respondent society. It is seen from the records that the civil
revision was filed before the High court by the first respondent society
as well the second respondent herein. The second respondent herein
was not only the second petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition filed
before the High Court, but he also sought to represent the first
respondent-Society as its Secretary, before the High court in the Civil
Revision.
16. But in a connected Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.7 of 2018
filed by the appellants herein (plaintiffs in the suit), the Sub-Court,
Thoothukudi passed an order dated 22.04.2018 restraining the second
respondent herein for acting as the Secretary of the first respondentSociety. This appeal arose out of the dismissal by the trial court, of an
interlocutory application I.A.No. 387 of 2018 filed by the appellants
herein for restraining the second respondent herein from acting as the
Secretary and another person from acting as the Patron. The trial Court
dismissed I.A.No.387 of 2018, but the plaintiffs filed an appeal in Civil
Misc. Appeal No.7 of 2018. The same was allowed by an order dated
22.04.2018 by the Sub-court, Thoothukudi unseating the second
respondent as the Secretary. Though the second respondent has claimed
in his rejoinder, that the order passed in C. M. A. No. 7 of 2018 was
challenged in a revision in CRP (MD) No. 1295 of 2019 and an order
of status quo was obtained, from the Madurai Bench of the Madras
High Court, the same happened after more than a year. Therefore, on
the date on which the first respondent-Society filed the Civil Revision
CRP (MD) No. 1084 of 2018 before the high court, the second
respondent herein was not the secretary and could not have acted on
behalf of the society. This aspect was also overlooked by the High
Court.
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI
v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN]
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17. The observation of the High Court that the trial Court
proceeded in great haste, appears to be uncharitable. It is true that the
application for injunction was moved on 24.4.2018 but the respondent
nos. 1 & 2 were very vigilant, if not overzealous and, hence, they not
only filed a counter affidavit to the application for injunction on
25.04.2018, but also filed 19 documents. They also advanced
arguments, only after considering which the trial Court passed an order
on 26.4.2018.
18. Order XXXIX Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure itself
mandates the disposal of an application for injunction within 30 days,
whenever an injunction was granted without notice to the opposite party.
In this case, the trial Court, without granting an ex-parte order of
injunction, chose to allow the opposite parties to file counter affidavit(s)
along with documents and then heard the opposite parties before
allowing the application for injunction. Finding the line of demarcation
between speedy disposal and hurried dispatch, with mathematical
precision, is not possible. In any case, even if the High Court was
convinced that the trial Court had proceeded hastily, the High Court
could have only remanded the matter back. But the High Court allowed
the application for injunction without recording any finding on merits.
In fact the order of the Trial Court deals with the rival contentions and
is one passed on merits after due consideration of the pleadings and
documents. The High Court unfortunately did not even deal with the
matter on merits to over turn the decision of the Trial Court. Therefore,
the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of
the Trial Court is liable to be restored.
19. But it is brought to our notice that after the High Court
allowed the Civil Revision petition by its order dated 28.08.2018, the
second respondent herein proceeded with the meeting of the General
Body and the Executive Committee on 25.09.2018 and also conducted
elections. Notice was ordered and the interim order of the status quo
was passed in the above special leave petition only on 8.10.2018. Hence,
it was sought to be contended that the above appeal has virtually become
infructuous.
20. In normal circumstances, we would have agreed. But this is
a case where every meeting of the General Body and every attempt
at holding elections to the first respondent-Society seem to have created
a series of litigation before three different fora namely (i) the Civil
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Courts) (ii) the Registrar of Societies (iii) the High court (in Writ
Petitions arising out of orders of the Registrar of Societies). This can
be seen from the following table:
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI
v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN]
S.No
Events which triggered
the litigation
Nature of the
litigation
Forum
where filed
Status
1.
Notice convening the
General Body and
Executive Committee on
21.03.2015.
Suit in O.S.
No.79 of 2015
Sub-Court,
Tuticorin.
Despite undertaking
to the Court, the
meetings were held
and office bearers
elected
2.
By proceeding dated
27.03.2015, second
respondent was appointed
as Secretary of the College
Committee of the College
run by the first respondentSociety. This was by
virtue of the elections held
on 21.03.2015.
Writ Petition
(MD) No.3869 of
2016
Madurai
Bench of the
Madras High
Court.
Pending
3.
Form Nos.6 and 7 in terms
of the Tamil Nadu Society
Registration Act and the
Rules framed thereunder
were filed by the newly
elected office bearers with
the Registrar of Societies,
for recording the names of
the new set of officer
bearers. But the Registrar
rejected these forms on
24.04.2015.
A writ petition in
WP (MD)
No.19710 of
2015 filed,
challenging the
rejection.
Madurai
Bench of the
Madras High
Court.
Pending
4.
Elections held on
21.03.2015
A suit O.S No.21
of 2016 was filed
by the present
appellant No.1
for a declaration
that the election
allegedly held on
21.03.2015 was
null and void and
for a permanent
injunction
District
Munsiff
Court at
Tuticorin.
Suit pending

5.
The newly elected office
bearers sought to amend
the bye laws. The
amendment was rejected
by the District Registrar.
A writ petition in
WP (MD)
No.13144 of
2016 filed
challenging the
order of the
District Registrar.
Madurai
Bench of the
Madras High
Court.
Pending
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21. Therefore, we are of the view that the only way to bring to
an end all the litigations between the parties before various fora is to
set aside the impugned order and the elections held pursuant thereto
and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to convene the General Body
as well as the Executive Committee for the election of office bearers.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the order of the high court as well
as the elections purportedly held pursuant to the order of the High Court
are set aside. Smt. S. SORNALATHA, Advocate, No.1, 1st Street,
Chidambara Nagar, Thoothukkudi-628 008, is appointed as
Commissioner with a mandate to do the following:
(i) Within two weeks of receipt of a copy of this order, the
Advocate Commissioner shall address letters to the
sponsoring bodies/Societies of the first respondent society,
for nominating members to the General Body and the
Executive Committee of the first respondent-Society, as per
the bye-laws.
(ii) Within one week of receipt of the letter from the Advocate
Commissioner, the sponsoring bodies shall send a list of
members nominated by them to the General Body/Executive
Committee of the first respondent society
(iii) Within four weeks of receipt of the nominations, the
Advocate Commissioner shall convene a meeting of the
General Body and the meeting of the Executive Committee
and hold elections in accordance with the bye -laws.
6.
A fresh notice dated
10.06.2017 issued
convening the meetings of
the General Body and the
Executive Committee on
8.07.2017.
A suit O.S.
No.195 of 2017
seeking a
declaration that
the notices were
null and void and
for a permanent
injunction filed
by the appellant
No.1
District
Munsiff
Court,
Tuticorin
Suit pending
7.
By a paper publication
dated 12.04.2018, the
Second respondent
convened the meetings of
the General Body and the
Executive Committee on
5.05.2018
A suit O.S.
No.145 of 2018
(out of which the
present appeal
arises) was filed
for the reliefs
stated (supra)
District
Munshif,
Tuticorin
pending
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
645
(iv) After holding elections, the Advocate Commissioner shall
ensure that form Nos. 6 and 7 are registered with the
Registrar of Societies so that the registration of such forms
do not become the subject matter of any litigation at the
instance of the rival groups.
(v) The Advocate Commissioner shall be paid, by the first
respondent society, a remuneration of Rs. 1,00,000/- apart
from the reimbursement of the expenses incurred by her.
(vi) Till the elections are held and results declared, the Advocate
commissioner shall discharge the duties of the Secretary of
the first Respondent-Society.
Kalpana K. Tripathy
Appeal allowed
VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI
v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN]