# VISWESHW AR RAO v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1020
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-04-05
- **Bench:** PATANJALI SASTRI c. J, Mehr Chand Mahajan, MuKHERJEA, DAs, Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/visweshw-ar-rao-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-208
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

Madhya
Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act (l of 1951)-Law for abolition of
proprietary estates and
tenures-Compensation
inadequate-/urisdiction of Court to inquire into validity of Act-Right of eminenr
tiomain--Necessity of provision for paynlent of compensation and
public purpose-Spirit of Constitution-Delegation of legislative
potuers-Fraud on the Constitution-Passing of Bills-Certificate
of Speaker that Bill was passed-Conclusiveness-Omission to note
on record that Bill was passed-Effect-Reserving law for astent
of
President~Governor's signature to Bill, whether
necessary--
"Law", "Legislature", "Public purpose" f'eanings of-Compulsory
Requisition of 1nalguzari villages, and property set apart as private
property of ~"ler under covenant of merger-Legalit}'-Constitution
of India,
1950-Constitution
(First Amendment)
Act, 1951Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363.
Held by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
MoKHERJEA,
DAs
and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
JJ.)-The
Madhya. Pradesh
Abolition of
Proprietory
Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands), Act (I of 1951) is valid in its entiret"
In view of the provisions contained in
arts.
31(4), 31-A
an.1
31-B of the Constitution the court has no jurisdiction to enquire
into an objection to the validity of the Act ·on the ground that
it drxs not provide for adequate compensation.
The Act does.
not involve any de:legation of legislative powers and the provisions relating to compensation therein are not a fraud on
the
Constitution.
Held also, that the certificate of the Speaker on the original
Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent,
th~t
the Bill was passed by the House was conclusive proof that the
Bill was passed, and the mere fact that there was nothing on the
record of the proceedings to show that the motion that
the Bill
be passed was voted upon and carri,,d, as required by rule 20( l)
of the Rules of Procedure, could not invalidate the Act.
Per
PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-In any case, the omission to put the
motion formally to the House, even if true, \Vas, in the circun1stances no more thap_ a mere irregularity of procedure as it was
not disputed
that the overwhelming majority of the members
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
present
were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient
voice was actually raised.
Held further, (i) that though art. 31(3) speaks of a "law"
being reserved for
the consideration of
the
President;
the
Constitution does not contemplate that before submitting a Bill
which has been passed by a Legislative Assembly for the assent
of the President, the Governor should give his assent to it;
(ii) that the President can perform both the duties entrusted
to him under art. 200 and art. 31(3) and (4) at one and the same
time; he need not give his assent twice, once to make the Bill a
law under art. 200 and then give his assent oncei more in order to
make the law effective against art. 31 (2); the
word
"Legislature"
used in this connection in art. 31 ( 4) means the House or Houses
of Legislature and does not include the Governor;
(iii) that though malguzari villages are not included in the
expression "estate" as defined in art. 31-A, art. 31-B (which is
not merely illustrative of art. 31-A, but an independent provision)
validated the Act even in respect of rnalguzari villages, and
since art.
31 ( 4)
is not limited to "estates" its provisions also
saved the law in its entirety;
(iv) Article 362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties set apart as private properties of a Ruler by a covenant
of merger.
Per MAHAJAN and DAs
JJ.-In any event, the
jurisdiction
of the Court to decide disputes which arise out of a covenant of
merger was barred by art. 363.
PETITIONS under article 32 of the Constitution of
Indi;i for enforcement of fundamental rights.
(Petitions Nos. 166, 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257,
268,
280
to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487
of 1951).
The
facts which gave rise to these petitions

## Text

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1952
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
VISWESHW AR RAO
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(AND OTHER CASES)
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Madhya
Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act (l of 1951)-Law for abolition of
proprietary estates and
tenures-Compensation
inadequate-/urisdiction of Court to inquire into validity of Act-Right of eminenr
tiomain--Necessity of provision for paynlent of compensation and
public purpose-Spirit of Constitution-Delegation of legislative
potuers-Fraud on the Constitution-Passing of Bills-Certificate
of Speaker that Bill was passed-Conclusiveness-Omission to note
on record that Bill was passed-Effect-Reserving law for astent
of
President~Governor's signature to Bill, whether
necessary--
"Law", "Legislature", "Public purpose" f'eanings of-Compulsory
Requisition of 1nalguzari villages, and property set apart as private
property of ~"ler under covenant of merger-Legalit}'-Constitution
of India,
1950-Constitution
(First Amendment)
Act, 1951Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363.
Held by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
MoKHERJEA,
DAs
and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
JJ.)-The
Madhya. Pradesh
Abolition of
Proprietory
Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands), Act (I of 1951) is valid in its entiret"
In view of the provisions contained in
arts.
31(4), 31-A
an.1
31-B of the Constitution the court has no jurisdiction to enquire
into an objection to the validity of the Act ·on the ground that
it drxs not provide for adequate compensation.
The Act does.
not involve any de:legation of legislative powers and the provisions relating to compensation therein are not a fraud on
the
Constitution.
Held also, that the certificate of the Speaker on the original
Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent,
th~t
the Bill was passed by the House was conclusive proof that the
Bill was passed, and the mere fact that there was nothing on the
record of the proceedings to show that the motion that
the Bill
be passed was voted upon and carri,,d, as required by rule 20( l)
of the Rules of Procedure, could not invalidate the Act.
Per
PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-In any case, the omission to put the
motion formally to the House, even if true, \Vas, in the circun1stances no more thap_ a mere irregularity of procedure as it was
not disputed
that the overwhelming majority of the members
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
present
were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient
voice was actually raised.
Held further, (i) that though art. 31(3) speaks of a "law"
being reserved for
the consideration of
the
President;
the
Constitution does not contemplate that before submitting a Bill
which has been passed by a Legislative Assembly for the assent
of the President, the Governor should give his assent to it;
(ii) that the President can perform both the duties entrusted
to him under art. 200 and art. 31(3) and (4) at one and the same
time; he need not give his assent twice, once to make the Bill a
law under art. 200 and then give his assent oncei more in order to
make the law effective against art. 31 (2); the
word
"Legislature"
used in this connection in art. 31 ( 4) means the House or Houses
of Legislature and does not include the Governor;
(iii) that though malguzari villages are not included in the
expression "estate" as defined in art. 31-A, art. 31-B (which is
not merely illustrative of art. 31-A, but an independent provision)
validated the Act even in respect of rnalguzari villages, and
since art.
31 ( 4)
is not limited to "estates" its provisions also
saved the law in its entirety;
(iv) Article 362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties set apart as private properties of a Ruler by a covenant
of merger.
Per MAHAJAN and DAs
JJ.-In any event, the
jurisdiction
of the Court to decide disputes which arise out of a covenant of
merger was barred by art. 363.
PETITIONS under article 32 of the Constitution of
Indi;i for enforcement of fundamental rights.
(Petitions Nos. 166, 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257,
268,
280
to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487
of 1951).
The
facts which gave rise to these petitions and the arguments of counsel are stated in the judgment.
B. Somayya (V. N. Swami, with him)
for
the
petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951.
N. S.
Bindra
(P. S. Safeer, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 317 of 1951.
V.
N.
Swami for
the petit10ners in Petitions
Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, . 280 to 285 of 1951, 257
and 287 to 289 of 1951.
K.
B.
Asthana
for
the
petitioners
111
Petition
No. 26 of 1951.
S. N. Mukherjee
for
the
petitioner
in
Petition
No. 318 of 1951.
1952
Viswcshwar R11Q
v.
The State of
Madhj'a
Pradesh.
1952
Viscueshtvar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
M. N. Jog for the petitioner in Petition No. 487
of 1951.
T.
L.
Shivde
(Advocate-General
of
Madhya
Pradesh), with T. P. Naik for the respondent.
1951. May 2, 5, The judgment of the CHIEF JusTICE
printed at pp. 893-916 supra. covers these cases also.
MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA,
DAs
and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ. delivered separate judgments.
MAHAJAN J.
Petition No. 166 of 1951.
This is a petition under article
32 of the Constitution of India by Shri Visweshwar Rao, zamindar and
proprietor of Ahiri
zamindari,
an estate as
defined in section
2(3)
of the Central Provinces Land
Revi;nue Act, II of
1917, and situated
in tehsil
Sironcha, district Chanda (Madhya Pradesh), for
the
enforcement of his fundamental right to property under
article 31(1) of the Constitution by the issue of an
appropriate writ or a direction to the respondent State
restraining it from disturbing his possession of the
estate, and eighty malguzari villages situate in the
Garchiroli tehsil of the san1e district.
The petitioner and his ancestors have been owning
and enjoying these properties in full proprietary right
for several generations past.
On the 5th April, 1950,
the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted an
Act called the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
·,Rights Act. The Act received the assent of the President
of India on the 22nd January, 1951, and was published
in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on
the
26th January,
1951, as Act I of 1951.
By a notification in a gazette
extraordinary issued on the
27th January, 1951,
the
Madhya Pradesh Government fixed 31st March,
1951,
as the date of vesting of the estates under section 3 of
the Act.
The petitioner thus was to lose his estate
and lands on the 31st March, 1951. On the 9th March,
1951, i.e., before the vesting date,
he
presented the
present application to this court for the issue of appropriate writs against . the Government prohibiting it from
taking possession of his properties.
It was
alleged
l
•
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
that the Madhya Pradesh Act, I of 1951, was unconstitutional and void and infringed the fundamental rights
of the petitioner in a variety of ways.
For a proper appreciation of the ground on which
the validity of the Act is being challenged, it is necess:u-y to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and
to state the facts which Jed to this enactment.
Madhya Pradesh is a composite State, comprising
the Central Provinces, Berar and the merged territories.
By an agreement of merger made between the rules
of States and the Dominion of India dated the
15th
December, 1947, certain territories which at one time
were under the Indian States Agency and were held by
these rulers were integrated with the Dominion. The
integration actually took place on the 1st January,
1948. On the 1st August, 1949, the States were merged
in the Madhya Pradesh.
There were in all 106 estates
in Madhya Pradesh as defined in section 2(3) of Act I
of 1951 aI1d held by zamindars.
Most ot the lands are
owned by
malguzars
of
mahals in the status
of
"Malkan cabza".
The land system prevailing in Madhya Pradesh is
malguzari (except in certain areas where the ryotwari
system iis in vogue), the malguzar being an intermediary between the State and
the tiller.
Land
is
also
held on a variety
of subordinate
tenures by
absolute occupancy tenants,
occupancy
tenants,
ryots,
thikedars, mafidars, ilaqadars, etc.
Land revenue in Madhya Pradesh was last assessed
under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of
1917.
The estate
holders pay land revenue on the
lands comprised in the estates at a concession rate.
The payment is technically
called
"tekoli".
In 1939
there was an ad hoc increase in the amount of tekoli
by the Central Provinces Revision of Land Revenue
Estates Act, I of 1939.
O;i the 3rd September, 1946, the
Central Provinces
and Herar Legislative Assembly
passed
a
resolution
for the
elimination
of intermediaries between the
State and the peasant.
Soon after the passing of this
1952
Visweshwar RaO'
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian f.
1952
Viswes hwar Rao
.v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
resolution several laws were enacted, it is said, with a
view to achieve this result, the impugned Act being
the_ last of that series. In 1947, the Central Provinces
Land Revenue Estates Act, :X:XV of 1947,
was
enacted.
The revenue assessment, viz., tekoli,
on
the
estates was, we are told, enhanced in some places from
thirty to fifty per cent. of the full jama and in others
from forty to sixty per cent.
In the same year was
enacted the Central Provinces Land Revenue Revision
Mahals Act, XXVI of 1947. The land assessment on
malguzari villages ' was, it is alleged, raised to 75 per
cent. from 45 to 50 per cent. of malguzari assets. This
was done without . recourse to a settlement.
In 1948
·came the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of
Exemptions Act, XXXVII
of
1948
making
persons
exempted from payment of land revenue liable for it.
This legislation, it is urged, resulted in
the
reduction
of the net income of the proprietor5 to a large extent.
On the 11th October, 1949, the impugned
Act
was
introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly.
It was
referred to a Select Committee on the 15th October,
1949; the Select Committee reported on the 9th March,
1950, the report was published on the 17th March,
1950, and was taken into consideration on
the 29th
March, 1950, by the Assembly. On
the
30th March,
1950, the opposition moved for the circulation of the
Bill. The circulation motion was negatived on the 3rd
April, 1950, and the Bill
was
discussed
clause
by
clause and the clauses were passed between the 3rd oE
April and .the 5tl1 of April.
On the 5th April, 1950,
the member in charge of the Bill moved as follows:-
"Speaker Sir, I now move that the Central Provinces
& Bera!
Abolition of
Proprietary Rights
(Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949)
as considered by the House be passed into law."
TI1e Hon'ble the Speaker said : "Motipn moved,
that· the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates,
Mahals,
Alienated
Lands)
Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949) as considered by the House
be passed into law."
l
•
t·
J
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
. A number of speeches were made at the third reading stage.
The opposition was in a hopeless minority.
The trend of the speeches was of a laudatory character,
each member hailing the Bill as a piece of great reform
in the Madhya Pradesh land system.
No motion of a
dilatory nature was tabled and as a matter of
fact
there was no opposition whatsoever to the passing of
the Bill.
Some members expressed the opinion that
the provisions of the Act did not go far enough, others
thought that the provi,sions as tci compensation should
have been more liberal, but there was none who was
for rejecting the Bill as it stood. The report of the
proceedings of the 5th April,
1950, does not cor1tain
the note that the motion tlhat the Bill be passed into
law was carried.
The omission of this note in the proceedings of the
legislature has furnished a basis for the argument that
the Bill was never passed into law.
The proceedings
were printed Olil the 21st June, 1950, md were signed
by the Speaker on the 1st October, 1950. The original
Bill that was submitted to the President for his assent
was printed on the 29th April, 1950, and it bears on
it the
certificate
of the
Speaker
dated
the
10th
May, 1950, stating that the Bill was duly passed by
the legislature on the 5th April, 1950.
This certificate
Was signed by the Speaker a considerable time ahead
of his signing the proceedings.
The Act, as
already
stated, received the assent of the President
on the
22nd January, 1951, and was published in the Madhya
Pradesh Gazette on the 26th January, 1951, as Madh}'a
Pradesh Act I of 1951.
Against the constitutionality of this Act a number
of petitiops were made in the High Court of Nagpur
but they were all dismissed by that court on the 9th
April, 1951, while this petition along with some others
was pending in this Court.
The preamble of the Act is in these terms :-
"An Act to provide for the acquisition of the
rights of proprietors in estates,
mahals,
alienated
villages and alienated lands in Madhya
Pradesh
and
1952
· V istueshwitr Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Prailesh.
M11hajan f.
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan].
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952t
to
make
provi,sion
for
therewith."
other
matters
connected
The legislation clearly falls within entry 36 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule of
the
Constitution.
The
Madhya Pradesh Legislature had therefore
undoubted
competence to enact it. The Act is divided into eleven
chapters and three schedules.
Chapter II
deals with
the vesting of proprietary rights i.n the State and
states the consequences of the vesting. Section 3 is in
these ter.ms :-
"Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and'
from a date to be specified by a notification by the
State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights
in an estate,
mahal,
alienated
village
or alienated
land, as the case may be, in the area specified· in ri\.Cnotification vesting in a proprietor of such . estate,
mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person
having interest in such proprietary right through the
proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor
or
•Ud1'
other person to and vest in the State for the purpose;
of the State free of all encumbrances .......... ".
Section 4 provides that after the publication of the
notification under section 3, all rights, title and interest
vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest
in such proprietary right through
the proprietur in
such area including land (cultivable or barren}, grass
land, scrub jungle, forest, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks,
ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways,
village
sites,.
hats, bazars and melas; and in all subsoil, including
rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being
worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State
for purposes of the State free of all encumbrantes ;·
but that the proprietor shall continue to retain
the
possession of his homestead, home-farm land, and in
the Central Provinces,
also of
land
brought
under
cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49'
but before the date of vesting.
The
proprietor
is
entitled to recover any sums which became
due
to
him before the date of vesting by virtue of his proprietary rights.
All open enclosures used
for
agricultural or domestic purposes, all buildings, places
•
•
•
-.
•
/
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1027
of worship, wells situated in and trees standing
on
lands included in such enclosures or house sites etc.
continue to remain in possession of the proprietor and
are to be settled with him
by the State Government
on such terms and conditions as it may
determine.
Similarly,
certain
private
wells,
trees,
tanks
and
groves continue to remain in possession of the proprietor or other person
who
may
be interested in
them.
Chapteir III deals with the as!essment of compensation.
It is provided in section 8 that the State
Government shall pay compensation to the proprietor
in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I.
Besides the amount so
determined,
Government
has
to pay compensation for any amount spent on
the
construction of
a
tank or well used for agricultural
purposes, where such tank: or well vests in the State
Government. In addition to all these
amounts,
the
State Government has to pay compensation for lands
within the area of a municirpality or cantonment in
accordance with the rules contained in
Schedule II.
The compensation for divestment of proprietary rights
becomes
due from
the date
of vesting and it is
enacted that it shall carry interest at the rate of tw(}
and a half per cent. per annum from the
date of
' vesting to the date of payment.
Section
9
provides
as follows :-
"The compensation payable under section 8 may,
in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, be
paid in one or more of the following modes, namely :-
( i) in cash in full or in annual instalments not
exceeding thirty ;
(ii) in bonds either negotiable or not negotiable
carrying interest at the rate specified in sub-section ( 4)
of section 8 and of guaranteed face valJue maturing
within
a
specified
period. not
exceeding
thirty
years."
The other sections in this chapter deal with interim
payment and appointment
of
compensation
officers
and lay down the procedure for the determinatiqn of
compensation.
Schedule
I provides
that the amount
11-10 S.C. India/71
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan f.
1952
Vi'swes hwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
of compensation in the Central Provinces and in Berar
shall be ten times the net income determined in accordance with the rules mentioned in the schedule.
In
merged territories the compensation
is
payable
on a
sliding scale varying from two times to ten times the
net income.
Schedule II lays down
the measure of
compensation on a scale varying from five to
fifteen
times the assessment on the land as specified in the
schedule. Section 2 of Schedule I provides
for
the
calculation of the gross income by adding the amount
of income received by a proprietor from the aggregate
of the rents from the tenants as recorded in the jamabandi for the previous agricultural
year ;
the
siwai
income, that is, income from various sources such as
jalkar, bankar, phalkar,
h<]ts,
bazars, melas,
grazing
and village forest calculated at two times the income
recorded in the current settlement of 1923 ; and the
consent money
on
transfer
of
tenancy
lands-the
average of transactions recorded in the village papers
for ten years preceding the agricultural year in which
the date of vesting falls.
The schedule also provides
,the method of determination of the gross income of a
mahal as well as of an alienated village or alienated
land separately.
It also provides for the determination
of this income in the case of mines and forests. The
method suggested for assessing the net income is that
out of the gross income the following items have to be
deducted, i.e., the assessed land revenue, sums payable
during the previous agricultural year on account
of
cesses and local rates> the average of income-tax
paid
in respect of income received from big forests
<:luring
the period of thirty agricultural years
preceding
the
agricultural year in which the relevant date falls and
cost of management varying from 8 to 15 per cent. of
the gross annual income
on incomes varying from
Rs. 2,000 to
Rs. 15,000.
It
is
further
provided
that notwithstanding
anything contained
in sub-rule
(2) the net income shall in no case be reduced to less
than five per cent. of the gross income. - Chapter IV
deals with certain incidental matters
in
respect
of
the determination of ·the debts of proprietors. Its
'
t
(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1029
provisions are analogous to the provisions 0£ Debt Conciliation or Relief of Indebtedness Act.
It is provided
in Chapter V how the actual amount of compensation
is to be determined and paid.
Chapter VI deals with
that part of Madhya Pradesh
which is
defined
as
Central Provinces in the Act. It is provided herein
that a proprietor who has been divested of his estate
will have malik-makbuza rights in
his
homefarm
lands.
Absolute occupancy
tenants
and
occupancy
tenants can also acquire malik-makbuza rights.
Provision is made for reservation of grazing lands and for
the collection of land revenue.
Similar provisions are
made in Chapter VII in respect of management and
tenures of land in the merged territories.
Chapter VIII
deals with management and tenures of lands in Berar.
Separate provision has been made for the
determination of compensation payable to lessees of mines and
minerals. Under the provisions of section 218 of the
Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and section 44
of the Berar Land Revenue Code there is a presumption that all mines and minerals belong to the State
and the proprietary rights in them could be granted
by the State to any
person.
Wherever a right of
minerals has
been so assigned,
provision
has
been
made regarding its acquisition and the consequences
as resulting from such acquisition.
The Act provides
for the giving of rehabilitation grant to expropriated
proprietors
within
a
certain range provided for in
Schedule III. The last chapter in the Act deals with
miscellaneous matters including the power of making
rules.
" .)
The main purpose of the Act is to bring the actual
tillers of the soil in direct contaot wfrh the State by
the elimination of intermediary holders.
In short, the
~ Act aims at converting malguzari into ryotwari land
system.
It also aims at giving to the gram panchayats
the map;igement of common lands freed from the grip
,.
of proprietors and contemplates the establishment of
,_ -<: self-government for the villages. The provisions of the
\
Ace in respect of payment of compensation, though
they do not in any way provide for an equivalent
'
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan ].
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1030
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
in money of the property taken and in that sense
may not be adequate, cannot be called illusory.
This
Act 'is a definilte improvement on the Bihar Act ;
it leaves the arrears
of
rents
due in the hands
of the
proprietors and
do~ not operate artificially
to reduce the net income by any
device.
It also
provides that in no case the net income should be
reduced below five per cent. of the gross income. The
result is that in every case some amount of money .
becomes payable by the State by way of compensation
co the proprietor and in no case does the compensation
work into a negative sum or to a mere zero or a minus
figure. In other respects the provisions of the Act
in· regard to compensation follow the pattern which is
common to all zamindari, legislation, which is to inflate
the amount of
expenditure
and
deflate
the
actual
income.
The siwai income from jalkar, bankar, etc.
and from village forests is calculated at two times the
siwai income recorded in the . settlement made in 1923.
This Act was passed in 1951. The siwai income recorded in the year 1923 is appreciably less than the actual
income of the proprietors from these sources in 1951.
Similarly the income from consent money has
to be
calculated by taking the average income for
ten years
preceding the date . of vesting and not the actual income
as in the case of. rent realized during the previous agricultural year.
The expenditure has been infiared by
taking in respect of the big forests the average income
tax paid during the period of thirty agricultural years.
No agricultural income-tax existed during most of this
period.
I~ only came into
exi~tence recently.
The
cost of management has been calculated at a flat rate
of eight to fifteen per cent. There can therefore be no
doubt that the principles laid down for determination
of compensation cannot be called equitable and they
do not provide for payment of just compensation to
the expropriated proprietor.
The petitioner's case is that under the formula stated
•.
J
•
in the Act, a compensation of 25 lakhs which would be
~
due to him on the basis of the value of the property
taken, has been reduced to a sum of Rs. 65,000 and is
'·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1031
payable in thirty unspecified instalments and therefore
it is purely nominal and illusory.
This figure of
Rs. 65,000 is arrived at by the following proce_ss : -
(a) Gross income from rents ... Rs. 55,000
(b) Siwai income ... Rs. 80,050 Actually (according to the affidavit the petitioner
was
re~lizing
4,65,000
from
this source) .
Total
1,35,000
Deductions permissible under the Act
are
the
following :-
(a) Revenue
... 45,000
(b) Income-tax on 30 years' average 66,600
(c) Cost of management
... 21,000
Total
. . . 1,32,600
Net income
2,400
Ten times net income would be Rs. 24,000; but
as the net income cannot be reduced below five per
cent. of the gross income which comes to
Rs. 6,500,
compensation payable is Rs. 65,000, while the yearly
income of the petitioner was in the neighbourhood of
Rs. 5,65,000 and the mar{Qet value of his property is
25 lakhs.
The first and the main objection to the validity of
the Act taken by the learned counsel is that the Bill
was never passed into law.
As already indicated, this
objection is founded on the omission from the proceedings of
the
Madhya Pradesh
Legislative
Assembly
dated the 5th April, 1950, of a statement to the eff~ct
that the Bill was put to the House by the Speaker and
was passed by it. Reference was made to rules 20, 22,
34 and 115 of the rules regulating 'the procedure of the
legislature framed under the Government of India Act,
1935, in the year 1936, which provides as follows :-
"20( 1). A matter requiring the decision of
the
Assembly shall be decided by means of a ques.tlion put
by the Speak;er on a motion made by a member.
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
'J:1ahajan /.
1952
Visweshwar Rao
• v.
The State of
Madhya
.Pradesh.
Mahajan ].
1032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
22. After a motion has been made, the Speaker
shall read the motion for the consideration
of
the
Assembly .
34 (1). Votes may be taken by
sion and shall be taken by division if
desires.
The Speaker shall determine
taking votes by division.
voices or diviany member so
the method of
•(2). The result of a division shall be announced
by the Speaker and shall not be challenged.
115 (1). The Secretary shall cause
to be prepared a f!u.11 report of the proceedings of the Assembly
at each of its meetings
and
publish it as soon as
practicable.
(2) One impression of this printed report shall be
submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation
and
signature and
when
signed
shall
constitute
the
authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly."
It was urged that the authentic report of the proceedings of the Assembly was conclusive on the point,
that the Bill was not put to the Assembly by means
of a question and was not voted upon, and hence it
could not be said to have been passed by the legislature.
It was said that even if there was no open
opposition to the passing of the Bill, it was possible
that if ix was put to the Assembly, it might have rejected it.
As already pointed out,
the
proceedings
were signed by the Speak~r on the 1st October, 1950,
while the certificate that the Bill was passed was recorded by him on the original Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent on the 10th May,
1950. The certificate of the Speaker is conclusive on
the point that the Bill was passed by the legislature
(Vide Cra\es' Statute Law, 4th Edn., p. 36). It ~eems
to me that by an oversight it was not recorded in the
proceedings that the motion was put to and passed by
the House and the Speaker while
signing
the proceedings six months after the event failed to notice
the error. There can be no doubt that the sense of the
House on the 5th April, 1950, was for passing the Bill
and there was no one present who was for rejecting it
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1033
The motion before the House was that the Bill
be
passed.
The Speaker
could
not
possibly
have
appended a certificate on a Bill that it was pass.ed by
the House if it had not been so passed. There are no
grounds whatever for doubting the._ correctness of
his
certificate.
In my opinion, the contention raised that
the Bill was not passed into law fails and must be
rejected.
Next it is contended that articles 31-A and 31-B
have no application to this Bill as it never became
law by following the Procedure prescribed in the Constitution and that those articles have only application
to a Bill that had become an Act. The Legislature of
Madhya Pradesh consists of the
Governor and
the
Legislative Assembly. It was said that even if the Bill
was passed by the Legislative Assembly, it
was not
assented to by the Governor but was straightaway sent
to the President and that without the assent
of
the
Gqvernor: the Bill could not become law despite the
fact that it was assented to by the President and it
was pointed out that sub-clause (3) of article 31 of the
Constitution speaks of "law" being reserved
for
the
consideration of the President and not merely a "Bill" .
This argument, in my opinion, has not much force
having regard to the terms and scope of article 200.
The Governor under that article could assent to a Bill
or could reserve it for the consideration of the President
at his option.
The Governor being
empowered
to
reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President
and this having been done, it was for the President
either to assent to the Bill or to withhold his assent.
The President having given his assent, the Bill must be
held to have been passed into law.
It does not seem
to have been intended that the Governor should
give
his assent to the Bill and make it a full:.S.edged law
and then reserve it for the President's consideration
so that it may have effect.
Mr. Somayya pressed the point that the
President
could not perform both his functions under article 200
and article 31(4) concerning this Bill at one and the
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan].
1034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
same time, that first the procedure laid down in
article 200 for the passing of the Bill into law should
been followed, t.e., the Governor should have
either
assented to the Bill or should have reserved it for the
consideration of the President and if it was so reserved,
the President should then have given his
assent
and
the Bill
would
then
become
law,
that after
the
Bill had become law, the Governor should again have
reserved this Bill for the consideration of the President
as required by the provisions of article 31 (3) in order
to make it
effective law
against the
provisions of
article 31(2) and that if the President then gave his
assent, the law so assented to could not be called in
question in a court of law.
It was said that only in
case where this double procedure is followed
that
it
could be said that the President
l;i~d satisfied himself
that the law did not contravene
the
prov1S1ons
of
article 31 (2).
In my opinion, the argument is fallacious.
It would be a meaningless formality for the
President to give his assent to the same Bill
twice
over.
I cannot see why the President cannot perform
both the duties entrusted to him by articles 200 and
31(3) and (4) at one and the same time. He is not
· disabled
under the
Constitution from applying his
mind to such a Bill once and for all and to see whether
it has to be passed into law and whether it fulfils the
requirements of article 31(2).
The President's assent
therefore to
the Bill
attracts
the
application
of
articles 31-A
and
31-B
to it
and deprives persons
affected by it of the rights guaranteed in Part III of
the Constitution.
The provisions of article 31 ( 4) support the view of
the learned Attorney-General that what has to be sent
to the President is the Bill as passed by the legislature
and not the Bill after it has been assented to by the
Governor. T_l-1e article reads thus :-
"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this
Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it
has been passed
by such Legislature,
been
reserved
for the consideration of the President and has received
his assent, then, · notwithstanding
anything
m
this
'
'
/
..
!
l
I
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1035
Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called
in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) ."
In this context the word "Legislature" means the
House or Houses of Legislature and does not include the
Governor within its ambit. This word has not the same
meaning in all the articles.
In some articles it means
the Qoivernor as well as the Houses of Legislature,
while in a number of other articles it only means the
House or Houses of Legislature. Article 31(4) means
that
i.f
any
Bill
contravening
the
provisions
of
clause (2) of article 31 is passed by the House
or
Houses of Legislature but is reserved
for
the consideration of the President and
receives
his
assent,
then it s}iall become law,
not open to any objection
on the ground o{ such contravention.
Next it was contended that the obligation to pay
·compensation was
implicit
i;n the legislaltive power
contained in entry 36 of Ust LI and that the Act was
unconstitutional as it had provided for acquisition of
zamindaris without payment· of compensation, the provisions relating to it being illusory.
This contention
fails for the reasons given in my
judgment in the
Bihar case.
Moreover, the compensation provided for
in the impugned Act cannot be dubbed as
illusory.
All that can be said is that it · is grossly inadequate
and it is not the equivalent of the value of the property acquired, but this issue is no justiciable in view
of the provisions of article 31(4). This Bill was pending at the commencement of the Constitution, it was
reserved for the consideration of the President and the
President gave his as,sent to it.
The conditions for
the application of article 31 ( 4)
thus stand fulfilled.
Besides the obstacle of
article
31 ( 4), two further
hurdles, viz., of articles 31-A and 31-B introduced by
the amendments to the Constitution, stand in the way
-0f the petitioner and bar an enquiry into the question
·of the quantum of compensation.
The contention that there is
no
public
purpose
.behind the impugned Act has also to be repelled on the
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /,
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
1036
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
same reasoning as given by me in the Bihar case. The
purpose behind the Act is to establish airect contact
between tillers of the soil and the Government and to
eliminate the intermediaries, as
in the
view of
the
Government this is for the welfare of the society as a
whole.
It is also the purpose of the Act to confer
malik maqbuza
~tatus on
occupancy
tenants
and
improve their present position and to vest management
of village
affairs
and
cultivation
in
a
democratic
village body. It ·is too late in the day to contend that
reform in this direction is not for general public benefit.
The next argument of Mr. Somayya that the Act is
a fraud on the Constitution in that in legislating under
entry 42 of List III, it has legislated for non-payment
of compensation has also to be repelled, for the reasons
given
in the Bihar case.
Under the provisions of
this
Act
compensation can in no case
work
out
into a mere nothing.
On the other hand, in every
case some amount of compensation is payable and in
the
majority
of cases
it
is also not
inadequate.
Mr. Somayya contended that payment of
Rs. 65,000
as compensation to
his
client
for
property
worth
twenty-five lakhs of rupees was purely illusory.
The
assessment of value by rhe petitioner cannot be taken
at its full value.
It cannot at any rate be held that
legislation which provides for the payment of a sum
of Rs. 65,00U provides
for
no
compensation.
The
amount of instalments, if payment is to be in instalments, is bound to be fixed by the rules made under
the statute and in case the rules are so made that they
amount to an abuse of the exercise of that power,
they can always be challenged on that ground.
The argument that the Act is bad inasmuch as it
·delegates essential legislative power to the executive
is negatived for the reasons given in the Bihar case.
A point was raised that the constitutional amendments in articles 31-A and 31-B could not affect the
petitioner's guaranteed rights contained in Part III of
the Constitution in so far as the
eighty
malguzari
villages were concerned, because those mah1ls did not
•
.\
rl
h
(
•
•
, '
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1037
fall within the ambit of the word "estate" as defined
in article 31-A.
In sub-clause (2) (a) the definition is
in these terms :-
"The expression 'estate' shall, m relation
to
any
local area, have the same meamng as that expression
or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating
to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant."
Section 2(3) of Act II of 1917, C. P. Land Revenue
Act, defines the expression "estate" thus :-
"an estate as declared by the State Government."
The learned Advocate-General conceded that these
villages are not within the ambit of this definition but
he contended that they are within the scope of the
definition of the expression given
m
article 31-A, as
mahals in Central Provinces are local equivalents of the
expression "estate'', though not
so
declared by
the
Act.
There is nothing on the record to support this
contention.
The contention that those eighty
mahals
are not "an estate" and are thus excluded
from
the
reach of article 31-A does not, however, very much
advance
the
petitiioner's
case,
because
the
hurdles
created in his way by articles 31-B and 31( 4) stand in
spite of the circumstance that article
31-A has no
application. It was contended that article
3l~B was
merely illustrative of the rule stated m article 31-A
and if article 31-A had no application, that
article
also should be left out of consideration.
Reference was
made to the decision of the Privy Council in KingEmperor v. Sibnath Banerjee(1 ) on the construction of
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Defence of
India Act.
The material portion of section 2 considered in that case runs thus :-
" (I). The Central Government may, by notification
in the official gazette, make such rules as appear to it
to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence
of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of
public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life
of the
community.
(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.
1952
Visweshwar Rar>
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
(2). Without prejudice to
the
generality
of
the
powers conferred by sub-section (1), the. rules may provide for, or may empower any
authority
to make
orders providing for, all or any of the following matters,
namely, ............ ".
Their Lordships made the following
observati0ns
aboμt.