# W AMAN SHRINIW AS KINI v. RATILAL BHAGWANDAS & CO

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 217
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 674 of 1957
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/w-aman-shriniw-as-kini-v-ratilal-bhagwandas-co-1626
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Landlord and Tenant-Ejectment-Agreement of lease allowing sub-letting-Sub-letting prohibited by statute-Landlord's suit
for ejectment-Right of ejectment under statute-Equal participant
in illegality-Plea of Waiver-Agreement to waive an illegalityBombay Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, r947 (Bom.
57 of r947), ss. r3(r)(e), r5-Jndian Contract Act, r872 (9 of r872),
s. 23.
The appellant was a tenant originally iri the old building but
after it was purchased by the respondent he vacated it and
became a tenant under the respondent in the new premises. In
the old building the appellant had sub-tenants, who shifted to the
new premises along with the appellant when the latter occupied
those premises. One of the terms of the lease which were contained in a letter dated June 7, 1948, written by the respondent
to the appellant provided: "In the shops in the old chaw]
which are with you, you have kept sub-tenants. We are permitting you to keep sub-tenants in the same manner, in this
place also." On April 20, 1949, the respondent brought a suit
for ejectment against the appellant on the ground, inter alia,
that s. 15 of the Bombay Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947, prohibited_sub-letting and under s. 13(1)(e) of the
Act the landlord has the right to evict -the tenant on account of
sub-letting. The appellant's -defence was (1) that s. 15 of the
Act was confined to" any other law", that it did not apply to
contracts between the landlord and tenant and therefore.it did not
preclude an agreement between the parties as to sub-letting, (2)
that the parties were in pari delicto and therefore the respondent
could not succeed, and (3) that the right of the respondent to
sue for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting being a personal
right for his benefit, he must be taken to have waived it as he
had allowed the appellant to sub-let and, consequently, he could
not evict him under s. 13(1)(e) of the Act.
Held: (1) that the non-obstante clause "Notwithstanding
anything contained in any Jaw" ins. 15 of the Bombay Hotel
and Lodging Rates Control Act, 1947, applies to contracts also
as they would fall under the provisions of the law relating to
contracts;
(2) that the respondent was entftled to sue for ejectment,
though the agreement recognised sub-letting, as the suit was
brought not for the enforcement of the agreement but to enforce
the right of eviction which flowed directly from an infraction of
the provisions of s. 15 of the Act and for which the Act itself
28
1959
February I6.
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
z959
provided a remedy. The section is based upon public policy,
and where public policy demands, even an equal participant in
Waman
an illegality is allowed relief by way of restitution or rescission,
Shriniwas Kini though not on the contract; and,
v..
(3) .that the plea of waiver which the appellant relied on
Ratilal
cannot be sustained because as a result of giving effect to that
Bhagwandas & Co. plea the court would be enforcing an illegal agreement and thus
contravene the statutory provisions of s. IS of the Act.
An
agreement to waive an illegality is void on grounds of public
policy and would be unenforceable.
Kapu1 ].
Case law reviewed.

## Text

(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
217
W AMAN SHRINIW AS KINI
v.
RATILAL BHAGWANDAS & CO.
(JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Landlord and Tenant-Ejectment-Agreement of lease allowing sub-letting-Sub-letting prohibited by statute-Landlord's suit
for ejectment-Right of ejectment under statute-Equal participant
in illegality-Plea of Waiver-Agreement to waive an illegalityBombay Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, r947 (Bom.
57 of r947), ss. r3(r)(e), r5-Jndian Contract Act, r872 (9 of r872),
s. 23.
The appellant was a tenant originally iri the old building but
after it was purchased by the respondent he vacated it and
became a tenant under the respondent in the new premises. In
the old building the appellant had sub-tenants, who shifted to the
new premises along with the appellant when the latter occupied
those premises. One of the terms of the lease which were contained in a letter dated June 7, 1948, written by the respondent
to the appellant provided: "In the shops in the old chaw]
which are with you, you have kept sub-tenants. We are permitting you to keep sub-tenants in the same manner, in this
place also." On April 20, 1949, the respondent brought a suit
for ejectment against the appellant on the ground, inter alia,
that s. 15 of the Bombay Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947, prohibited_sub-letting and under s. 13(1)(e) of the
Act the landlord has the right to evict -the tenant on account of
sub-letting. The appellant's -defence was (1) that s. 15 of the
Act was confined to" any other law", that it did not apply to
contracts between the landlord and tenant and therefore.it did not
preclude an agreement between the parties as to sub-letting, (2)
that the parties were in pari delicto and therefore the respondent
could not succeed, and (3) that the right of the respondent to
sue for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting being a personal
right for his benefit, he must be taken to have waived it as he
had allowed the appellant to sub-let and, consequently, he could
not evict him under s. 13(1)(e) of the Act.
Held: (1) that the non-obstante clause "Notwithstanding
anything contained in any Jaw" ins. 15 of the Bombay Hotel
and Lodging Rates Control Act, 1947, applies to contracts also
as they would fall under the provisions of the law relating to
contracts;
(2) that the respondent was entftled to sue for ejectment,
though the agreement recognised sub-letting, as the suit was
brought not for the enforcement of the agreement but to enforce
the right of eviction which flowed directly from an infraction of
the provisions of s. 15 of the Act and for which the Act itself
28
1959
February I6.
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
z959
provided a remedy. The section is based upon public policy,
and where public policy demands, even an equal participant in
Waman
an illegality is allowed relief by way of restitution or rescission,
Shriniwas Kini though not on the contract; and,
v..
(3) .that the plea of waiver which the appellant relied on
Ratilal
cannot be sustained because as a result of giving effect to that
Bhagwandas & Co. plea the court would be enforcing an illegal agreement and thus
contravene the statutory provisions of s. IS of the Act.
An
agreement to waive an illegality is void on grounds of public
policy and would be unenforceable.
Kapu1 ].
Case law reviewed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
674 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree dated August 10, 1955, of the Bombay High
Court in C. R. Application No. 1213 of 1953, arising
out of the judgment and decree dated April 25, 1953,
of the Assistant Judge, Thana, in C. A. No. 97 of 1952,
against the judgment and decree dated January 31,
1952, of the Court of the Civil Judge, J. D. Kalyan, in
Suit No. 153of1949.
PurBhottam TricumdaB, RameBhwar Nath and S. N.
Andley, for the appellant.
H.J. Umrigar, Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind and
W. P. Oka, for the respondent.
1959. February 16.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay
confirming the order of ejectment passed by the Assistant Judge, Thana. The tenant who was the defendant in the suit is the appellant and the landlord
who was the plaintiff is the respondent.
The facts giving rise to this litigation shortly stated
are that the appellant was a tenant for about 20 years
in the premises known as " Fida Ali Villa "in Kalyan.
This building was purchased by the respondent who
gave notice to the appellant to vacate, as he wanted
to construct a new building on the site of the old building. The appellant agreed to vacate and the respondent let to him a portion of his new building which
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
was not far from "Fida Ali Villa". The appellant had
four sub.tenants, three of them also shifted to the new
I959
Waman
premises which were let to the appellant by the res.
Shriniwas Kini.
pondent. Although it was disputed, the courts below
v.
have found that they occupied the same. position qua
Ratilal
the appellant. The 4th, a Bohri, was fixed up by the Bhagwandas & Co.
respondent in some other place. There was some dispute as to the date when these new premises were let
to the appellant, the appellant alleging that they were
let on July 1, 1948, and the respondent that they were
let on June 1, 1948. The trial Court found that they
were let on June 1, 1948. The terms of the lease are
contained in a document dated June 7, 1948, which is a
letter in Marathi written by the respondent to the appellant and contains the following terms as to sub-tenancy:
"In the shops in the old chawl which are with
you you have kept sub-tenants. We are permitting
you to keep sub-tenants in the same manner, in this
place also ".
The parties were not agreed as to the correctness of
the translation of this term. The submission of the
appellant was that the word 'sub-tenant' should be
in the plural and of the respondent that it should be
in the singular but whether it is in the singular or
plural it does not make any difference to the principal
argument advanced in this Court. On January 3,
1949, the respondent gave notice to the defendant to
vacate the premises on the ground of non-payment of
rent and sub-letting which it was alleged had resulted ·
in the termination of the tenancy.
On April 20, 1949, the respondent brought a suit for
ejectment on the grou~d of non-payment of rent and
sub-letting of the premises. The defence of the appellant was that under the terms of the lease he had the
right to sub-let the premises.
As to the claim on the
ground of non-payment of rent be deposited the arrears of rent in court. The trial Court held that subletting was lawful in spite of s. 15 of Bombay Hotel
and Lodging Houses R,ates Control Act, 1947 (Born. 57
of 1947)~ He also held that the appellant did not
occupy he premises on the same terms and conditions
on whic he occupied the old premises in "Fida Ali
Kapur].
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'959
Villa". He passed a decree for Rs. 445 on account of
rent remaining due and dismissed the respondent's
Waman
Sh.iniwas J{ini suit for ejectment. On appeal the Assistant Judge at
v.
Thana reversed the decree holding that s. 15 of the
Ratilal
Act com.pletely prohibited sub-letting and under
Bhagwandas & Co. s. 13(l)(e) of the Act the landlord had the right to evict
-
the tenant on account of sub-letting. The appellant
I<apur j.
h
t en went in revision to the High Court of Bombay,
but it affirmed the order of ejectment. The appellant
has come to this Court by special leave.
Counsel for the appellant urged that there was no
new tenancy after the coming into force of the Act
and therefore ss. 13(l)(e) and 15 of the Act did not
apply; (2) that the tenant had not sub,let the premises
to the sub-tenants and they were merely licensees of
the landlord; (3) that no new sub-tenancy had been
created; (4) that s. 15 was confined to 'any other law';
it did not apply to contracts between the landlord and
tenant and therefore it did not preclude an agreement
between the parties as to sub-letting; (5) that the parties were in pari delicto -and therefore the plaintiff-respondent could not succeed. He also raised a new
ground which had not been raised in the courts below
or in the grounds of appeal or in the statement of case
in this Court, that the. respondent had waived his
right in regard .to the prohibition against sub-tenancy
and the provision in s. 13(l)(e) was for the protection
of his rights which he was entitled to waive.
The courts below have held that the tenancy by the
letter of June 7, 1948, was a new tenancy and not a
continuation of the old and that the sub-tenants were
tenants of the appellant and not licensees of the respondent and in this Court no serious argument was
addressed on these points. The previous tenancy was
of a different building called 'Fida Ali Villa' which
came to an end when the appellant vacated those premises and entered into a new agreement of lease in
regard to the premises in dispute. There was no privity between the respondent and the sub-tenants of
the appellant and they could not be termed his licensees.
These contentions are without substance and
have rightly been rejected.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
It was then argued that under s. 15 of the Act there
'959
is no prohibition against a contract of sub-letting, the
Waman
non-obstante clause being confined to other laws. The Shriniwas Kini
section when quoted runs as follows :-
v.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law
Ratilal
it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation Bhagwandas & Co.
of this Act for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any
Kapur J.
part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer
in any other manner his interest therein :
Provided that the (State) Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, permit in any area the
transfer of interest in premises held under such leases
or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified ill the notification".
This section prohibits sub-letting and makes it unlawful for a tenant to assign or to transfer his interest
in the premises let to him. The non-obstante clause
would mean that even if any other law allowed subletting, e. g., s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act,
the sub-letting would, because of s. 15, be unlawful.
This would appy to contracts also as all contracts would
fall under the provisions of the law relating to contracts, i.e., Contract Act. An agreement contrary to the
provisions of that section (s. 15) would be unenforceable as being in contravention of the express provision
of the Act which prohibits it. It is not permissible to
any person to rely upon a contract the making of
which the law prohibits (s. 23 of the Contract Act).
Counsel for the appellant contended that the view
of the Bombay High Court in P. D. Aswani v. Kavashah Dinshah Mulla (1) was erroneous and that the
correct rule was laid down by that Court in Cooper
v. Shiavax Cam.batta {2}.· That was a case under s. 10
of Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging Houses
Rates (Control) Act (Born. VII of 1944) which in express terms allowed sub-letting as follows:-
" Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
any law for the time being in force, a tenant may sublet any portion of his premises to a sub-tenant, provided be forthwith intimates in writing to his landlord
(1)
(1953) 56 Born. L.R. 467.
(2)
A.LR. I949 Born. 131.
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
1959
the fact.of his having so sub-let the premises and also
;,;;;;'an
the rent at wb'ich t4ey have.been sub-let".
Shdniwas_Kini It was contended tliat the non-obstante clauses in s.10'
v.
of Act VII of 1944 and of s. 15 of the Act being simiRalilal
lar in language must be similarly interpreted. The
Bh~gwanaas & Co.non-obstante clause has to be read in conjunction --with
Kapur;.
the rest of the section. Section 10 of the Act of 1944
·
- ---permitted sub-letting on certain conditions. By s. 9 of
tnat Act provision was made for a contract between
the landlord ·and the tenant prohibiting sub-letting and
in Cooper v. Shiavax·Oam_batia (') the 'two provisions
were reconci!Efd by saying that a contract under s. 9 ·
prevailed over the permission.given-by s. 10. Buts. 15
expressly prohibits sub-letting and therefore a contract to the contrary cannot neutralise its prohibitory
effect. The non-obstante clause of the two sections,
s. 10 of the Act of 1944 and of s. 15 of the Act there- ·
fore cannot be ·said to have the same effect.
The respondent's suit for ejectment was brought
unaer s. 13(l)(e) whiqh provides:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act
(but subject to the provisions of section 15), a land- ,
lord shall be erttitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied
................................................................. '·
...................... ~ ........................ · .................. .
(e) that the tenant has, since the coming into
operation of this Act, sub-let the whole or part of the
premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein ; ".
·
It was contended that s. 13(l)(e) had to be read
separately and not in conjunction with s. 15 of the Act.
The section itself makes it quite clear that it is subject to the provision of s. 15 and the two sections
must therefore be read together. The appellant pleaded
that -under the agreement between him and the respondent he was entitled to sub-let the premises. Such an
agreement, in our opinion, is void because of the provisions of s. 15 of the Act ands. 23 of the Contract Act
and enforcement of the agreement would produce the
(1) A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 131.
(2) S.C.lt.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
I959
very result which the law seeks to guard against and
to prevent and by sustaining the plea of the appellant
Waman
the Court would be enforcing an agreement which is
Shriniwas Kini
prohibited and. made illegal.
v.
The appellant relied on the maxim in pari delicto
Ratilal
potior est conditio posidentis to support his plea that Bhagwandas & Co.
the respondent could not enforce his right under s. 13
(l)(e).
But this maxim "must not be understood as
meaning that where a transaction is vitiated by illegality the person left in possession of goods after its
completion is always and of necessity entitled to keep
them. Its true meaning is that, where the circumstances are such that the Court will refuse to assist
either party, the consequence must, in fact, follow
that the party in possession will not be disturbed".
(Per Du Parcq, L. J., in Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet
Instruments Ltd. (1).
The respondent
in the present case did not call upon the Court to enforce
any agreement at all.
When the instrument of lease
was executed and possession given and sub-letting
done it received its full effect ; no aid of the Court was
required to enforce it. The respondents' suit for ejectment was not brought for the enforcement of the
agreement which recognised sub-letting but he asked
the Court to enforce the right of eviction which flows
directly from an infraction of a provision of the Act
(s. 15) and for which the Act itself provides a remedy.
There is thus a manifest distinction between this case
where the plaintiff asked the Court to afford him a
remedy against one who by contravening s. 15 of the
Act has made himself liable to eviction and those
cases where the Court was called upon to assist the
plaintiff in enforcing an agreement the object of which
was to do an illegal act. The respondent is only seeking to enforce his rights under the statute and the
appellant cannot be permitted to assert in a Court of
justice any right founded upon or growing out of an
illegal transaction. Gibbs &: Sterr et Manufacturing Co.
v. Brucker (2). In our opinion s. 15 of the Act is based
on public policy and it has been held that if public
policy demands it even an equal participant in the
(I) [1945] I K.B. 65, 72.
(2) (1884) III U.S. 5'!J7 i 28 L. Ed. 534•
Kapur ].
224
SUP:REM:ln COtJR'r REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z959
illegality is allowed relief by way of restitution of rescission, though not on the contract.
Waman
It was next contended that s. 13(1)(e) is a provision
Shriniwas J(ini
v.
for the protection of private rights of the landlord and
Ratilal
unless there is in the Act itself any provision to the
Bhagwandas & ca. contrary such rights as far as they were personal
rights may be parted with or renounced by the landKapm f.
lord. In other words the right of the respondent to
sue for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting being a
personal right for his benefit, the landlord must be.
taken to have waived it as by an express contract he
had allowed the tenant to sub-let and consequently he
could not evict the appellant under s. 13(1)(e) of the
Act.
The plea of waiver was taken for the first time in
this Court in arguments. Waiver is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact.
This plea was neither raised nor considered by the
courts below and therefore ought not to be allowed to
be taken at this stage of the proceedings. But it was·
argued on behalf of the appellant that according to
the law of India the duty of a pleader is to set up the
facts upon which he relied and not any legal inference
to be drawn from them and as he had set up all the
circumstances from which the plea of waiver could be
inferred he should be allowed to raise and argue it at
this stage even though it had not been raised at any
previous stage not even in the statement of case filed
in this Court and he relied upon Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lal
l!'irm v. Madho Prasad {1).
Assuming that to be so
and proceeding on the facts found in this case the
plea of waiver cannot be raised because as a result of
giving effect to that plea the Court would be enforcing
an illegal agreement and· thus contravene the statutory provisions of s. 15 baseq on public policy and
produce the very result which the statute prohibits and
makes illegal. In Surafinull Nargoremull v. Triton
Insurance Go. ('), Lord Sumner said:-
"No Court can enforce· as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid,
nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from
(1) A.I.R. 1943 P. C. 147.
(2) (1924) L.R. 52 I. A. 126.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
225
which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the
I959
Parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point
Waman
at the outset: Nixon v. Albion Marine Insurance Go. (1).
Shriniwas Kini
The enactment is prohibitory. It is not confined to
v.
affording a party a protection of which he may avail
Ratilal
himself or not as he pleases. It is not framed solely for Bhagwandas &- Co.
the protection of the revenue and to be enforced solely
at the instance of the revenue officials, nor is the prohibition limited to cases for which a penalty is exigible ".
In the instant case the question is not merely of waiver of statutory rights enacted for the benefit of an
individual but whether the Court would aid the appellant in enforcing a term of the agreement which s. 15
of the Act declares to be illegal. By enforcing the
contract the consequence will be the enforcement of an
illegality and infraction ofa statutory provision which
cannot be condoned by any conduct or agreement of
parties. Dhanukudhari Singh v. Nathima Sahu (2). In
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 92, at p. 1068, the law as
to waiver is stated as follows:-
" ............ a waiver in derogation of a statutory
right is not favoured, and a waiver will be inoperative
and void. if it infringes on the rights of others, or
would be against public policy or mo'rals ............ ".
In Bowmakers Limited v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. (3)
the same rule was laid down. Mulla in his Contract
Act at page 198 has stated the law as to waiver of an
illegality as follows:-
"Agreements which seek to waive an illegality
are void on grounds of public policy. Whenever an
illegality appears, whether from the evidence given by
one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the
case.
A stipulation of the strongest form to waive the
objection would be tainted with the vice of the original contract and void for the same reasons. Wherever
the contaJDination reaches, it destroys".
This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the law
and is supported by high authority. Field, J., in
\l) \1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 338.
(2) (1907) n C. W. N. 848, 852.
(3) [1945] 1 K.B. 65, 72.
29
Kapur].
I959
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
Oscanyan v. Winchester Arms Company(') quoted with
approval the observation of Swayne, J., in Hall v.
Waman
Shriniwas ]{ini Coppell(') :-
v.
" The principle is indispensable to the purity of
Ratilat
its administration. It will not enforce what it has
Bhagwandas <~Co.forbidden and denounced. The maxim Ex dolo malo
]{apur j.
non oritur actio, is limited by no such qualification. The proposition to the· contrary strikes us as
hardly worthy of serious refutation. Wherever the
illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one
side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case.
No consent of the defendant can neutralise its effect.
A stipulation in the most solemn form, to waive the
objection; would be taiuted with the vice of the original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever
the contamination reaches, it destroys ".
Waiver is the abandonment of a right which normally
every body is at liberty to waive. A waiver is nothing
unless it amounts to a release. It signifies nothing
more than an intention not to insist upon the right.
It may be deduced from acquiescence or may be
implied. Chitty on Contract, 21st Ed., p. 381 : Stackhouse v. Barnston ('). But an agreement to waive an
illegality is void on grounds of public policy and would
be unenforceable.
In Mytton v. Gilbert (4) Ashurst, J., said:-
"Besides, there is still further reason why the
trustees should not be estopped ; for this is a public
Act of Parliament, and the Courts are bound to take
notice that the trustees under this Act had no power
to mortgage the toll-houses.
This deed therefore cannot operate in direct opposition to an Act of Parliament, which negatives the estoppel ".
Vaughan Williams, L. J., in Norwich Corporation v.
Norwich Electric Tramways Company(') said :-.
" The case is not like that of a provision in an
agreement which is for the benefit of one of the parties and which he may waive. This is a provision in
an Act of Parliament, wh_ich, though to some extent
(1) (1881) 103 U.S. 261; 26 L. Ed. 539.
(2) 7 Wallace 542.
(3) (1805) 10 Ves. 453; 32 E.R. 921.
(4) (1787) 2 T.R. 171; 100 E.R. 91.
(5) [1906] 2 K.B. II9, 124.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
I959
it may be for the benefit of the parties to the difference, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of
the public also".
Waman
Shriniwas Kini
In that case there was a provision made by the Legisv.
lature that disputes mentioned in the section of the
Ratilal
Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by Bhagwandas & Co.
the Board of Trade and it was contended that though
not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a
waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute
for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was
a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction
but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver
of a statutory provision inserted in public interest.
Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable.
In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High
Court is sound and the appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
M/S. RAMAN & RAMAN LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS
(JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR and SuBBA RAo, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles-Legislation empowering State Government to
issue orders and directions-Interpretation-Nature of jurisdiction
conj erred-Such orders and directions, if law regulating rights of
parties-Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, z948 (XX of
I948), s. 43A.
The appellant and the fourth respondent along with others
were applicants for a stage carriage permit.
The Regional
Transport Authority after hearing the applicants granted the
permit to the appellant. On appeal by the fourth respondent, the
Central Road Traffic Board set aside the order of the Regional
Transport Authority and granted the permit to the fourth respondent. The appellant moved the State Government in revision but to no effect. He thereafter moved the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board and the State
Government. The single Judge who heard the matter quashed
Rapur J.
I959
February xB.