# WARD·G, AHMEDABAD & ANR v. INDUPRASAD DEVSHANKAR BRA TT .1 ugust 20, 1968

- **Citation:** [1969] 1 S.C.R. 714
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 972 of 1967
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. JlAMASWAM! ASO A. N. GROVER
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ward-g-ahmedabad-anr-v-induprasad-devshankar-bra-tt-1-ugust-20-1968-4473
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

/ncom•-tax Act (43 o/ 1961). ss. 148 and 297 (2)(d)(ii)-Right of
ltu:onJe-J'ax Officer to reopen assessment under s. 34 of the Income-tax
Act, 1922, barred on the date of commencement of thl!
1961
Act--
JVherher notice under s. 148 to reopen assessment rould be issued.
Under s. 297(2) (d) (ii) Of the Income.tax Act, 1961. dealing with
repeals and sa\ings, notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922-Act, where
in r""pect of any assc&smcnt year afte'r the year ending on 31st day of
March. 1940. any income had escaped assessment and no proe<>edings
under s. 34 of the repealed Act are pending at the commencement of the
1961-Act, a notice under s. 148 of the 1961-Act may be issued
for reopening the assessment.
'fhe respondent was
a~sesscd to income-tax for the assessment year
1947~8.
Thereafter the Income-Tax Officer issued a notice under s.
34( 1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, for reassessment. There was no
proper 5crvice of the notice, and despite the respondent's objection, the
Income-tax Officer determined the total income o'f the re;pondcnt at Rs.
~9.000.
The Appellate Assistant Commi&•ioner allowed
the
resnondent"s appeal by order dated 5th January. 1963 on the ground that there
was no valid service of the notice.
On 1st April,
1962 the
1922-Act
was repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961 came into force, and the time
for taking action for reassessment wa~ enlarged from 8 years to 16 years.
By that date, the right of the Income-Tax Officer to reopen the assessment
under s. 34( 1) (a) of the 1922-Act became
barred.
The
Income-Tax
Officer however, issued a notiec under s. 148 of the 1961 Act for reopening the a~essment. llle respondent, thereupon tiled a
v.Tit
petition
in
the High Court for quashing the notice and the petition was allowed.
In appC'.al to this Court.
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HELD: On a proper construction of s. 297(2) (d) (ii) the JncomeTax Officer cannot issue a notiee under s. I 48
in order to reopen the
assessment of an assesscc in a case where the right to reopen the assessment under the 1922-Act was barred at the date when the 1961-Act came
into force. The reason is that unless the statute expressly so provides or
G
there is a necessary implication, retrospcc!ive operation should not be given
to it ~o as to affect, alter or destory any right aJrcadv acquired or to revive
any remedy already lost by efflux of time.
The 1961-Act docs not disclose in express tehns or by ne.ccssary implication that there was a. re\ival
of rhc right of the Income-Tax Officer to reopen an as..o;essmcnt which '\lo'as
already barred under the 1922-Act and if the secti?r:i is .construed .as
reviving such a right ir would be tantamount to
g1v1ng
It retrospcctl~e
H
operation which is not warranted hy its lcinguag,e.
The words 'v.·hcre in
respect of any aS'.'icssment year afler the year ending
on 31st
day
of
~farch. 1940,' in the section. cannot take in their sweep all
asses..~ment
years subsequent to the year ending on 31st March, 1940 without regam
I.T .o. v. INDUPRASAD ( Ramaswami, J.)
715
A . to the question whether the right to reopen the assessment in respect of
any assessment year was or was not barred under the repealed Act:
The
section must be read as applicable orrly to those cases where the nght of
the Income-Tax Officer to reopen the assessment was not barred under
the repealed section. [720 H; 721 A-D; 722 G-H]
S. S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co. (1964) 53 I.T.R. 231 (S.C.), followed.
B

## Text

7 I 4
J. P. JANI, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE IV,
A
WARD·G, AHMEDABAD & ANR.
v.
INDUPRASAD DEVSHANKAR BRA TT
.1 ugust 20, 1968
[J. C. SHAH, .V. JlAMASWAM! ASO A. N. GROVER, JJ.)
/ncom•-tax Act (43 o/ 1961). ss. 148 and 297 (2)(d)(ii)-Right of
ltu:onJe-J'ax Officer to reopen assessment under s. 34 of the Income-tax
Act, 1922, barred on the date of commencement of thl!
1961
Act--
JVherher notice under s. 148 to reopen assessment rould be issued.
Under s. 297(2) (d) (ii) Of the Income.tax Act, 1961. dealing with
repeals and sa\ings, notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922-Act, where
in r""pect of any assc&smcnt year afte'r the year ending on 31st day of
March. 1940. any income had escaped assessment and no proe<>edings
under s. 34 of the repealed Act are pending at the commencement of the
1961-Act, a notice under s. 148 of the 1961-Act may be issued
for reopening the assessment.
'fhe respondent was
a~sesscd to income-tax for the assessment year
1947~8.
Thereafter the Income-Tax Officer issued a notice under s.
34( 1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, for reassessment. There was no
proper 5crvice of the notice, and despite the respondent's objection, the
Income-tax Officer determined the total income o'f the re;pondcnt at Rs.
~9.000.
The Appellate Assistant Commi&•ioner allowed
the
resnondent"s appeal by order dated 5th January. 1963 on the ground that there
was no valid service of the notice.
On 1st April,
1962 the
1922-Act
was repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961 came into force, and the time
for taking action for reassessment wa~ enlarged from 8 years to 16 years.
By that date, the right of the Income-Tax Officer to reopen the assessment
under s. 34( 1) (a) of the 1922-Act became
barred.
The
Income-Tax
Officer however, issued a notiec under s. 148 of the 1961 Act for reopening the a~essment. llle respondent, thereupon tiled a
v.Tit
petition
in
the High Court for quashing the notice and the petition was allowed.
In appC'.al to this Court.
B
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HELD: On a proper construction of s. 297(2) (d) (ii) the JncomeTax Officer cannot issue a notiee under s. I 48
in order to reopen the
assessment of an assesscc in a case where the right to reopen the assessment under the 1922-Act was barred at the date when the 1961-Act came
into force. The reason is that unless the statute expressly so provides or
G
there is a necessary implication, retrospcc!ive operation should not be given
to it ~o as to affect, alter or destory any right aJrcadv acquired or to revive
any remedy already lost by efflux of time.
The 1961-Act docs not disclose in express tehns or by ne.ccssary implication that there was a. re\ival
of rhc right of the Income-Tax Officer to reopen an as..o;essmcnt which '\lo'as
already barred under the 1922-Act and if the secti?r:i is .construed .as
reviving such a right ir would be tantamount to
g1v1ng
It retrospcctl~e
H
operation which is not warranted hy its lcinguag,e.
The words 'v.·hcre in
respect of any aS'.'icssment year afler the year ending
on 31st
day
of
~farch. 1940,' in the section. cannot take in their sweep all
asses..~ment
years subsequent to the year ending on 31st March, 1940 without regam
I.T .o. v. INDUPRASAD ( Ramaswami, J.)
715
A . to the question whether the right to reopen the assessment in respect of
any assessment year was or was not barred under the repealed Act:
The
section must be read as applicable orrly to those cases where the nght of
the Income-Tax Officer to reopen the assessment was not barred under
the repealed section. [720 H; 721 A-D; 722 G-H]
S. S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co. (1964) 53 I.T.R. 231 (S.C.), followed.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 972 of
1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 14, 15,
1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No.
54 of 1964.
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D. Narsaraju, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayar ~dB. D. Sharma, for
the appellants.
S. T. Desai, M. C. Bhandare and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for
the respondent.
·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D .
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate against
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the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 14th/15th
December 1964 in Special Civil Application No. 54 of 1964
whereby a writ of mandamus was issued to quash the notices
issued under sections 147, 148 and 142(1) of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 against the respondent.
The respondent was assessed by the Income Tax Officer,
Ward E, Circle 11, Ahmedabad for the assessment year 1947-48
by an assessment order dated 31-1-1952.
The Income Tax
Officer thereafter received information that a certain profit ma.de
by the assessee in the name of Natwarlal Manila! Pandit who was
a benamidar of the respondent had escaped assessment by reason
of the respondent not having disclosed it at the time of the original assessment.
The Income Tax Officer, therefore, after obtaining the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax issued a
notice dated 27th March, 1956 under s. 34(1) (a) of the· Income
Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act).
The
notice could not be served personally, and, therefore, was served
by affixing on a conspicuous part of the respondent's house.
The
respondent objected to the service of the notice and did not file
a return stating that there had been no valid service.
When the
Income Tax Officer threatened to proceed ex parte, a return was
filed under protest on 16-1-1957 and in that return the respondent showed the same amount of income which was determined
in the original assessment.
Despite the objection of the respondent that there was no proper service of notice under s. 34(1) (a),
the Income Tax Officer proceeded to assess the income of the
res~ndent for the assessment year 1947-48 and made an order
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716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.CR.
dated 29th March, 1957 <lelcrmining the total income of the respondent at Rs. 89,000 by including the profit alleged to have
been earned by Natwarlal Manila! Pandit.
The respondent preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who
allowed the appeal and set aside the order of assessment on the
ground that there was no valid service of the notice.
The decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was given on
5-1-1963 by which time the Income Tax Act, 1922 had been
repealed. and the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the
New Act) had come into force with effect from !st April, 1962.
The time for taking action for assessment or reassessment in
case of escaped income exceeding Rs.
50,000 but less than
Rs. 1,00,000/- was enlarged from 8 years to 16 years under the
new Act.
On 4-1-1963 the Income Tax Officer, Circle IV,
Ward G, Ahmedabad issued a notice calling upon the respondent
to show cause why proceedings should not be taken
under
s.
147(a) of the new Act for bringing to tax the escaped profit of
the respondent.
The respondent
protested
against
the
new
notice on the ground that action under the old Act had become
time barred and the new Act had no application to his case.
Subsequently, a notice under s. 148 of the new Act was issued on
13-11-1963 and this notice was followed by another notice dated
9-1-1964 issued under s. 142(1).
The respondent, therefore, preferred Special Civil Application
No. 54 of 1964 in the Gujarat High Court praying for a writ of
certiorari to quash the notices dated 13-11-1963 and 9-1-1964
by the first appellant.
The High Court took the view that on a
true construction of s. 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act the Income
Tax Officer could not issue a notice under s. 148 in order to
reopen the <Lssc.ssment in a case where the right to reopen the
assessment was barred under the old Act at the date when the
new Act c.ame into force.
The High Court observed that the right
of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment of the respondent in the present case was admittedly barred under s.
34(1 )(a) of the old Act at the commencement of the new Act
and it was, therefore, not competent to the Income Tax Officer to
is.sue a notice under s. 148 of the new Act in order to reopen the
assessment of the respondent and to reassess the income of the re.spondent relying on the provisions enacted under s. 297(2)(d)(ii)
of the new Act.
The High Court accordingly allowed the Special
Civil Application preferred by the respondent and set aside the
notices dated 13-11-1963 and 9-1-1964.
It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions
of the two statutes.
Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922
(No. 11 of 1922) as it stood immediately prior to its amendment
by the Finance Act, 1956 is in the following terms :-
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'-~.
I.T.O. v. !NDUPRASAD (Ramaswami, J.)
717
"34. ( 1) If-
( a) the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe
that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of
an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all
material facts necessary for his assessment for that year,
income, profits or gains chargeable for that year or have
been underassessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or
have been made the subject of excessive relief under the
Act or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been
computed, or
(b) notwithstanding that there has been 1lo omission
or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the
assessee, the Income Tax Officer has in consequence of
information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have
escaped assessment for any year, or have been underassessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been
made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or
that excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been
computed, he may in cases falling under clause (a) at
any time within eight years and in cases falling under
clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of
that year, serve on the assessec, or if the assessee is a
company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22
and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits
or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance
and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be
apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued
under that sub-section :
Provided that :-
( 1) the Income Tax Officer shall not issue a notice
under this sub-section, unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so and the Commissioner is satisfied on
such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue
of such notice.
.
Provided further that nothing in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken, or
any order, assessment or reassessment may be made,
shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or
•
to an assessment or reassessment made on the assessee
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 969] I SC.R.
or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any
finding or direction contained in an order under section
31, section 33, section 33A. section 33B, section 66 or
section 66A ".
By the Finance Act, 1956 certain amendments we1'e made in
section 34 with effect from !st April, 1956.
The time limit of
8 years in sub-section (I) in respect of cases
falling within
clause (a) was removed and the follov.ing provisos were substituted for the existing proviso in sub-section (I) :-
"Provided that the Income Tax Officer shall not
issue a notice under clause (a) of sub-section ( 1 )-
(i) for any year prior to the year ending on the
31st day of March, 1941 :
I ii) for any year, if eight years have elapsed after
the expiry of that year, unless the income, profits or
gains chargeable to income-tax which have escaped
assessment or have been underasscsscd or assessed at
too low a rate or have been made the subjeci of excessive relief under this Act, or the loss or depreciation
allowance which has been computed in excess, amount
to, or arc likely to amount to, one lakh of rupees, or
more in the aggregate, either for that year, or for that
year and any other year or years after which or after
each of which eight years have elapsed, not being a year
or years ending before the 31st day of March. 1941;
(iii) for any year, unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and, in any case falling under clause
(ii), unless the Central Board of Revenue, and, in any
other case, the Commissioner is satisfied on such reasons
recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice;
The focome Tax Act, 1961 (Jl.io. 43 of 1961) came into force
from !st April. 1962.
Sub-section (I) of section 297 of the new
Act repealed the old Act and hy sub-section (2) of that section
the new Act enacted certain saving provisions consequent upon
the repeal of the old Act.
The material provision is set out in
clause (d) :
"297._ Repeals and savin)!s :-
( I )
(2) notwithstanding the
repeal
of. the
Indian
Income Tax Act 11 of 1922 (hereinafter referred to as
the repealed Act):-
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I.T.O. V. INDUPRASAD (Ramaswami, J.)
( d) where in respect of any assessment year after
the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940-
( i) a notice under section 34 of the repealed Act
had been issued before the commencement of this Act,
the proceedings in pursuance of such notice may be
continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been
passed;
(ii) any income chargeable to tax had escaped
assessment within the meaning of that expression, in
section l:P and no proceedings under section 34 of
the repealed Act in respect of any such income are
pending at the commencement of this Act, a notice
under section 148 may, subject to the provisions contained in section 149 or section 150, be issued with respect to that assessment year and all the provisions of
this Act shall apply accordin_gly".
71 !)
Sections 147 to 150 referred to in section 297(2)(d)(ii) and
sections 151 to 153 were the provisions of the new Act corresponding to section 34 of the old Act.
In the new Act, section
34 of the old Act was split up into sections 147 to 153. Section
14 7 empowered the Income Tax Officer to assess or reassess
escaped income in the same kind of cases in which he could do
so under section 34 but that right could be exercised subject to
the provisions of sections 148 to 153.
Sub-section (1) of section
148 provided that before making any assessment or rea<;&essment
under s. 14 7, the Income Tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a
notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be
included in a notice under section 139(2) and sub-section (2) of
that section imposed an obligation on the Income Tax Officer
before issuing such notice, to record his reasons for doi.ng so.
Section 149 laid down different time limits for issuing notices
and in cases falling within clause (a) af section 147 corresponding.to clause (a) of sub-section (1) af section 34 the time limits
were prescribed as follows :-
"149. Time limit for notice :-(a) No notice under
section 1.48 shall be issued,
·
(a) in cases falling under clause (a)
of section
147-
( i) for the relevant assessment year, if eight years
have elapsed from the end of that year, unless the case
falls under sub-clause· (ii);
(ii) for the relevant assessment year, where eight
• years, but not more than sixteen years, have elapsed
from the end of that year, unless the income chargeable
720
SUPREME COCRT REPORTS
( 1969] I S.C.R.
to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is
A
likely to amount to rupees fifty thousand or more for
that year;
"
Section 150( I) 111akes an exception in cases where :'.'S~ssment or
reassessment is sought to be made in consequence of or to give
effect to any tinding or direction contained in an order p~.~sed by
any authority in any proceeding under the Act by way of appea;,
reference or revision and provided th~t in such cases there should
be no time limit and notice under section 148 may be issued .at
any time unless of course the case fell within sub-section (2) of
section 150.
Section 151 made it a condition precedent to the
issue of the notice under section 148 that the l ncome Tax Officer
should obtain the previous sanction of the Central
Board of
Revenue or the Commissioner of Income Tax according as the
notice is proposed to be issued after the expiry of 8 years from
the end of the relevant assessment year or after the expiry of 4
years from the end of the relevant asse-'5ment year.
On behalf of the appellants Mr. Narasaraju stressed the argument that the High Court was in error in holding that the provisions of the new Act of 1961 were not applicable in cases where
the time limit fixed in the old Act had expired before the coming
into force of the new Act.
It was
contended
that
section
297(2) (d)(ii) of the new Act was wide in its sweep and it took
in all assessment years after the year ending on 3 lst March, 1940
irrespective of the question whether the right to reopen the assessment in respect of any such assessment years was barred or not
lmder the old Act at the date when the new Act came into force.
According to Mr. Narasaraju the legislative intention was that
Qncc the new Act came into for~e. the question
whether the
assessment in respect of any assessment year aft.er the year ending on 31st March, 1940 was liable to be reopened or not should
be decided with reference to the provisions of the new Act. It
was argued that the new Act authorised such assessment to be
reopened whatever might be the position in regard to the right to
reopen such a'Scssmcnt under the old Act.
In our opinion. the
argument put forward by Mr. Narasaraju is not warranted. It is
adnitted in this case that th~ right of the Income Tax Officer to
reopen the a~sessment for the year 1947-48 was barred under the
old Act before the new Act came into force.
In our opinion, it
is not permissible to construe section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new
Act as reviving the right of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the
assessment which was already barred under the old Act.
The
rea<;0n is that such a constmction of section 297(2)(d)(ii)
would be tantamount to giving of retrospective operation to tkat
section which is not warranted either by the express language of
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I.T.O. V. INDUPRASAb (Ramaswami, J.)
721
the section or by necessary implication.
The principle is based
on the well-known rule of interpretation that unless the terms of
the statute expressly so provide or unless there is
a necessary
implication, retrospective operation should not be given to the
statute so as to affect, alter or destroy any right already acquired
or to revive any remedy already lost by efflux of time.
On behalf
of the appellants reference was made to the opening phrase
"where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on
the 31st day of March 1940" occurring in section 297(2)(d)(ii)
of the new Act, but these general words cannot take in their sweep
all assessment years subsequent to the year ending on 31st March,
1940 without regard to the question whether the right to reopen
the assessment in respect of any assessment year was or was not
barred under the repealed Act.
We consider that the language
of the new section must be read as applicable only to those cases
where the right of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment was not barred. under the repealed section.
In our view,
the new statute does .not disclose in express terms or by necessary
implication that there was a revival of the right of the Income
Tax Officer to reopen an assessment which was already barred
under the old Act.
This view is borne out by the decision· of
this Court in S. S. Gadgil v. Lal & Company('). In that case,
a notice was issued against the assessee as an agent of a non-resident on 27th March, 1957 and that notice related to the assessment year 1954-55.
Under clause (iii) of the proviso to sectiqn
34( 1) as it stood prior to its amendment by the Finance Act,
1956, a notice of assessment or reassessment could not be issued
against a person deemed to be an agent of a non-resident after
the expiry of one year from the end of the year of assessment.
The right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the
assessee as agent of a non-resident for the assessment year 1954-55
therefore ended on 31st March, 1956 under the new Act before
its amendment in 1956. This provision was, however, amended
by the Finance Act, 1956 and under the amendefi provision the
period of limitation was extended to two years from the end of
the assessment year.
The amendment was made on 8th September, 1958 but was given effect from 1st April, 1956.
Since the
time within which notice could be issued against a person deemed
to be an agent of a non-resident was extended to two years from
the end of the assessment year, it was contended on behalf of the
Income Tax Officer that the notice issued by him was within the
terms of the amended provision and was, therefore, a valid notice.
N<>r the notice issued on 27th March, 1957 was clearly within a
penod of two years from the end of the assessment year '1954-55
and if the amended provision applied, the notice would be a
valjd notice. It was, however, held by this Court that notice was
(l) (1964) 53 !.T.R. 231.
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969] I S.C.R.
not a valid notice inasmuch as the right of the Income Tax
Officer to reopen the assessment of the assessec under the unamended provision became barred on 31st March, 1956 and the
amended provision did not operate against him so as to authorise
the Income Tax Officer to commence proceedings for reopening
the assessment of the asses.o;ee in a case where before the amended provision came into force, the proceedings had become barred
under the unamended provision.
At page 240 of the Report.
Shah, J. speaking .for the Court observed as follows :-
"As we have already pointed out. the right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the w;sesscc
an agent of a non-resident party under the Income Tax
Act before it was amended. ended on March 31, 1956.
It is true that under the amending Act by section 18 of
the Finance Act 1956, authority was conferred upon
the Income Tall OJficer to assess a person as an agent
of a foreign party under section 43 within two year.;
from the end of the year of assessment.
But authority
of the Income Tax OJficc'r under the Act before it was
amended by U1e Finance Act of 1956, having already
come to an end, the amending provision will not assist
him to commenco a proceeding even though at the date
when he i5sucd the notice it is v.ithin the period provided by that amending Act.
This will be so, notwithstandjng the fact that there has been no detenninable
point of time between the expiry of the time provided
under the old Act and
the commencement of the
amending Act.
The legislature has given to section 18
of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective
operation, i.e. up to April I, 1956 only.
That provision must be read subject to U1e rule tliat in the absence
of an express provLsion or clear implication, the legislature docs not intend to attribute to the amending provi-
. sion a greater retrospcctivity than is expressly mentioned. nor to authorLse the Income Tax Officer to com-
.men~ proceedings which before the new Act came into
force had by the expiry of the period provided become barred".
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In our. opinion, the principle of this decision applies in the
present case and it must be held that on a proper construction of
section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act. the Income Tax Officer
cannot issue a notice under section 148 in order to reopen the
as.qessment of an asses.see in a case where the right to reopen the
H
assessment was barred under the old Act at the date when the
new Act came into force.
It follows therefore that the notiees
dated 13-11-1963 and 9-1-1964 Lssued
by the Income Tax
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I.T.O. v. INDUPRASAD (Ramaswami, J.)
723
A
Officer, Ahmedabad were illegal and ultra vires and were rightly
quashed by the Gujarat High Court by the grant of a writ.
B
For the reasons expre-o>sed, we hold that the judgment of the
High Court of Gujarat dated 14th/ 15th December, 1964 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
V.P.S .
Appeal dismissed.
•
13 Sup Cl/68-15