# was delivered by Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. The Chairman, Industrial Tribunal DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by special leave is

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 196
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1960
- **Bench:** P. B. G.Ajendr.Ag.Adkar, K. N. W .Anchoo, K. C. D.As GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/was-delivered-by-ram-prasad-vishwakarma-v-the-chairman-industrial-tribunal-das-1957
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Dismissal of workman-Industrial Dispute raised by union-Representation of workman before TribunalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. 2(k), 36.
On the termination of the appellant's services by his
employer an industrial dispute was raised by his union and
the question of his dismissal along with a number of other disputes was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. After several
adjournments of the case the management and the union filed
a joint petition of compromise settling all the points in dispute
out of Court. Prior to this the appellant filed an application
praying that he might be allowed to be represented by two of
his co-workers instead of the Secretary of the Union in whom
he had no faith and who had no authority to enter into the compromise on his behalf. This prayer was not allowed by the
Tribunal which made an award in terms of the compromise.
The appellant. thereupon, made an application to the High Court
praying for a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal disallowing him to be represented by a person of his own choice and
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
also for a direction to the Tribunal not to record the compromise. The High Court summarily dismissed the Writ Petition.
On appeal by special leave,
Held, that the appellant was not entitled to separate representation when already being represented by the Secretary of
the nnion which espoused his cause. A dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute. as defined ins. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it
is taken up by a Union of Workmen or by a considerable number
of workmen. When an individual workman becomes a party to
a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not
independently of the Union which has espoused his cause.
Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gof>al
Patwardhan, [1954] S.C.R. 956, followed.
Although no general rule can be laid down in the matter,
the ordinary rule should be that representation by an officer of
the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in
the absence of exceptional circumstances justifying other representation of the workman concerned.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 31 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 14, 1957, of the Patna High Court
in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 165 of 1957.
P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
S. P. Varma, for respondents Nos. 1 and 4.
Nooni Ooomar Ohakravarti and B. P. Maheshwari,
for respondent No. 2.
1960. December 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Ram Prasad
Vishwakarma
v
The Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal
DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by special leave is
Das Gupta J.
against an order of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna dismissing summarily an application of the present appellant under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the
Constitution. The appellant was a workman employed in the Digha factory of Bata Shoe Company
(Private) Limited, since October, 1943. On January
13, 1954, the management of the company served him
with a charge-sheet alleging that he had been doing
anti-union activities inside the factory during the
working hours and so was guilty under section 12B(l)
of the Standing Orders and Rules of the company. On
Ram Prasad
Vishw~karma
v.
The Chairman,
Indt4strial
Tf'ibunal
Das Gupta ].
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
January 14, he submitted a written reply denying the
charge and asking to be excused. On January 15, the
management made an order terminating his services
with effect from January 18, 1954. An industrial
dispute was raised on this question of dismissal by
the Union and was referred along with a number of
other disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, by a
notificatiou dated April 29, 1955. After written statements were filed by the Union and the management,
February 20, 1956, was fixed for hearing at Patna.
Thereafter numerous adjournments were given by the
Tribunal on the joint petition f

## Text

196
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
z96o
reached by any writ of the Allahabad High Court. In
-
view of our conclusion that the application under
Ths J. K. Cotton 1 5(. )
t
• t . bl
th
J]
t
spinnin
&
c. a was no mam ama e,
e appe an was on
Weaving ~ills merits not entitled to any writ and on that ground the
co., Ltd.
appeal against the High Court's order must also be
v.
dismissed.
The State 01
It is unnecessary to consider the question whether
Uttar Pt'adesh
& ors.
the High Court was right in its view as regards the
preliminary objection and we express no opinion on
Das Gupta J. the same.
December ra.
Both the appeals are accordingly dismissed with
costs to the contesting respondent, There will be one
set of hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
RAM PRASAD VISHWAKARMA
v.
THE CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
(P. B. G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, K. N. W .ANCHOO and
K. C. D.As GUPTA, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Dismissal of workman-Industrial Dispute raised by union-Representation of workman before TribunalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. 2(k), 36.
On the termination of the appellant's services by his
employer an industrial dispute was raised by his union and
the question of his dismissal along with a number of other disputes was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. After several
adjournments of the case the management and the union filed
a joint petition of compromise settling all the points in dispute
out of Court. Prior to this the appellant filed an application
praying that he might be allowed to be represented by two of
his co-workers instead of the Secretary of the Union in whom
he had no faith and who had no authority to enter into the compromise on his behalf. This prayer was not allowed by the
Tribunal which made an award in terms of the compromise.
The appellant. thereupon, made an application to the High Court
praying for a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal disallowing him to be represented by a person of his own choice and
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
also for a direction to the Tribunal not to record the compromise. The High Court summarily dismissed the Writ Petition.
On appeal by special leave,
Held, that the appellant was not entitled to separate representation when already being represented by the Secretary of
the nnion which espoused his cause. A dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute. as defined ins. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it
is taken up by a Union of Workmen or by a considerable number
of workmen. When an individual workman becomes a party to
a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not
independently of the Union which has espoused his cause.
Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gof>al
Patwardhan, [1954] S.C.R. 956, followed.
Although no general rule can be laid down in the matter,
the ordinary rule should be that representation by an officer of
the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in
the absence of exceptional circumstances justifying other representation of the workman concerned.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 31 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 14, 1957, of the Patna High Court
in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 165 of 1957.
P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
S. P. Varma, for respondents Nos. 1 and 4.
Nooni Ooomar Ohakravarti and B. P. Maheshwari,
for respondent No. 2.
1960. December 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Ram Prasad
Vishwakarma
v
The Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal
DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by special leave is
Das Gupta J.
against an order of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna dismissing summarily an application of the present appellant under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the
Constitution. The appellant was a workman employed in the Digha factory of Bata Shoe Company
(Private) Limited, since October, 1943. On January
13, 1954, the management of the company served him
with a charge-sheet alleging that he had been doing
anti-union activities inside the factory during the
working hours and so was guilty under section 12B(l)
of the Standing Orders and Rules of the company. On
Ram Prasad
Vishw~karma
v.
The Chairman,
Indt4strial
Tf'ibunal
Das Gupta ].
198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
January 14, he submitted a written reply denying the
charge and asking to be excused. On January 15, the
management made an order terminating his services
with effect from January 18, 1954. An industrial
dispute was raised on this question of dismissal by
the Union and was referred along with a number of
other disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, by a
notificatiou dated April 29, 1955. After written statements were filed by the Union and the management,
February 20, 1956, was fixed for hearing at Patna.
Thereafter numerous adjournments were given by the
Tribunal on the joint petition for time filed by both
the parties stating that all the disputes were going to
be compromised. On November 16, 1956, the Tribunal made an order fixing December 20, 1956, "for
filing compromise or hearing". On December 20, 1956,
however a fresh application for time was filed but it
was stated that agreement had already been reached
on some of the matters and opportunity was asked for
to settle the other matters. The case was however
adjourned to January 21, 1957, for filing a compromise
or hearing. On that date a further petition was again
filed and a further extension of time was allowed till
February 1, 1957. On January 31, the parties, that is,
the management and the Union filed a joint petition
of compromise settling all points of disputes out of
court.
Prior to this, on January 12; 1957, the present
appellant had made an application praying that
D. N. Ganguli and M. P. Gupta, two of his co-workers
might be allowed to represent his case before the Tribunal instead of Fateh Singh, the Secretary of the
Union and that he did not want his case to be represented by Fateh Singh as he had no faith in him.
This application was dismissed by the Tribunal by an
order dated February 26, 1957. On March 7, 1957,
the appellant filed a fresh petition stating that he had
not authorised Fateh Singh to enter into any agreement in his case and praying that the agreement filed
in respect of his case should not be accepted and that
he and his agents should be heard before the disposal
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
of the case. This prayer was not allowed by the Tribunal and by an order dated March 11, 1957, an award
in terms of the petition of compromise was made.
The appellant filed his application to the Patna
High Court on March 13, 1957, praying for an issue of
an appropriate writ or direction quashing the Tribunal's order of February 26, 1957, by which the Tribunal had rejected his prayer for representation by a
person of his own choice in place of ]'ateh Singh, the
Secretary of the Union. Prayer was made in this petition also for a direction on the Tribunal not to record
the compromise in so far as it related to the appellant's
case and to give its award without reference to the
settlement and on proper adjudication of the matter.
The High Court dismissed this application summarily.
lt is against that order of dismissal that the present
appeal by special leave has been preferred.
On behalf of the appellant it is argued that the Tribunal committed a serious error in rejecting his application to be represented by a person of his own choice
instead ofFateh Singh, the Secretary of the Union and
thereafter in making an award on the basis of the
reference. It has to be noticed that on the date the
application was made before the High Court 'the
award had already been made and so there could be
no direction asfrayed for on the Tribunal not to make
the award. I
however the appellant's contention
that the Tribunal erred in rejecting his application
for separate representation was sound he would have
been entitled to an order giving him proper relief on
the question of representation as well as regarding
the award that had been made.
The sole question. that arises for our determination
therefore is whether the appellant was entitled to
separate representation in spite of the fact that the
Union which had espoused his cause was being represented by its Secretary, Fateh Singh. The appellant's
contention is that he was a party to the dispute in his
own right and so was entitled to representation according to his own liking. The question whether when a
dispute concerning an individual workman is taken up
by the Union, of which the workman is a member, as
Ram Prasad
Vishwakarma
v.
The Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal
Das Gupla J,
Ram Prasad
Vi.shwakarma
v.
The Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal
Das Gupta ].
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
a matter affecting workmen in general and on that
basis a reference is made under the Industrial Disputes Act the individual workman can claim to be
heard independently of the Union is undoubtedly of
some importance. The question of representation of
a workman who is a party'to a dispute is dealt with
by section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. That
section provides that such a workman is entitled to be
represented in any proceeding under the Act, by (a)
an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a
member, (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions
to which the trade union of which he is a member is
affiliated and (c) where the workman concerned is not
a member of any trade union by an officer of any
trade union concerned with the industry, or by any
other workman employed in that industry. The appellant was the member of a trade union; and he was
actually represented in the proceedings before the Tribunal by an officer of that Union, its Secretary, Fateh
Singh. The Union through this officer, filed a written
statement on his behalf. Upto January 12, 1957,
when the appellant filed his application for separate
representation, this officer, was in charge of the conduct
of the proceedings on behalf of the appellant. Never
before that date, the appellant appears to have raised
any objection to this representation. The question is,
whether, when thereafter he thought h[s interests were
being sacrificed by his representative, he could claim
to cancel that representation, and claim to be represented by somebody else. In deciding this question, we
have on the one hand to remember the importance of
collective bargaining in the settlement of industrial disputes, and on the other hand, the principle that the party to a di8pute should have a fair hearing. In assessing
the requirements of this principle, it is necessary and
proper to take note also of the fact that when an
individual workman becomes a party to a dispute
under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not
independently of the Union which has espoused his
cause.
It is now well-settled that a dispute between an
individual workman and an employer cannot be an
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
201
industrial dispute as defined in section 2(k) of the
Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by a
Union of the workmen or by a considerable number of
workmen. In Central Provinces Transport Service
Ltd~ v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan (') Mr. Justice
V enkatarama Ayyar speaking for the Court pointed
out after considering numerous decisions in this matter
that the preponderance of judicial opinion was clearly
in favour of the view that a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an
industrial dispute but it may become one if it is taken
up by an Union or a number of workmen. "Notwithstanding that the language of section 2(k) is wide
enough to cover disputes between an employer and a
single employee", observed the learned Judge, "the
scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to
contemplate that the machinery provided therein
should be set in motion to settle only disputes which
involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a
dispute touching the individual rights of a. workman
was not intended to be the subject of adjudication
under the Act, when the same had not been taken up
by the Union or a number of workmen".
This view which has been re-affirmed by the Court
in several later decisions recognises the great importance in modern industrial life of collective bargaining between the workman and the employers. It is
well known how before the days of collective bargaining labour was at a great disadvantage in obtaining
reasonable terms for contracts of service from his employer. As trade unions developed in the country and
collective bargaining became the rule the employers
found it necessary and convenient to deal with the
representatives of workmen, instead of individual
workmen, not only for the making or modification of
contracts but in the matter of taking disciplinary
action against one or more workmen and as regards a.II
other disputes.
·
The necessary corollary to this is that the individual
workman is at no stage a. party to the industrial dispute independently of the Union. The Union or those
(1) [19,f] S.C.R. 956.
26
1960
Ram P,-asad
Vishwaharma
v.
1'he Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal
Das Gupta J.
Ram Prasad
Yishwakarmii
v.
TAe Cluiirman,
/11duslrial
l'ribunal
Das Gupta j,
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
workmen who· have by their sponsoring turned the
individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can
therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the
proceedings before the Tribunal.
It is not unreasonable to think that s. 36 of the
Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by
providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an officer
of a registered trade union of which he is a member.
While it will be unwise and indeed impossible to try
to lay down a general rule in the matter, the ordinary
rule should in our opinion be that such representation
by an officer of the trade union should continue
throughout the proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances which may justify the Tribunal
to permit other representation of the workman concerned. We are not satisfied that in the present case,
there were any such exceptional circumstances. It
has been suggested that the Union's Secretary Fateh
Singh himself had made the complaint against the
appellant which resulted in the order of dismissal. It
has to be observed however that in spite of everything, the Union did take up this appellant's case
against his dismissal as its own. At that time also,
F'ateh Singh was the Secretary of the Union. If the
Union had not taken up his cause, there would not
have been any reference. In view of all the circumstances, we are of opinion, that it cannot be said that
the Tribunal committed any error in refusing the
appellant's prayer for representation through representatives of his own choice in preference to Fateh
Singh, the Secretary of the Union.
As a last resort, learned counsel for the appellant
wanted to urge that the Secretary of the Union had
no authority to enter into any compromise on behalf
of the Union. We find that no such plea was taken
either in the appellant's application before the Tribunal or in his application under Arts. 226 and 227 of
the Constitution to the High Court. Whether in fact
the Secretary had any authority to com promise is a
question of fact which cannot be allowed to be raised
at this stage.
' •
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
203
In the application before the High Court a.'statement was also made that the compromise was collusive
and mala fide.
The terms of the compromise of the
dispute regarding the appellant's dismissal were that
he would not get re-employment, but by way of
"humanitarian considerations the company a.greed
without prejudice to pay an ex-gratia a.mount of
Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand) only" to him.
There is no material on the record to justify a conclusion that this compromise was not entered in what
was considered to be the best interests of the workman himself.
In our opinion, there is notlting that would justify
us in interfering· with the order of the High Court
rejecting the appellant's application for a. writ. The
appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no
order as to costs.
·
During the hearing Mr. Chakrava.rty, learned
counsel for the company, made a. statement on behalf
of the company that in addition to the sum of Rs.
1,000 which the company had a.greed to pay to the
appellant as a. term of settlement the company will
pay a further sum of Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred)
only ex-gra.tia. and without prejudice. We trust "that
this statement by the counsel will be honoured bythe
company.
Appe.al diBmwsed
Ram Pfasad
V isllwakarma
v.
The Chaitman,
Industrial
Tribunal
Das G•PI• J.