# Western India Automobile Associ'f labour, of any person. The first part obviously 2'Ao m::::::" refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second 2'• •- part to the parties to the dispute; and the third to the subject 8. x. Dru J. matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any of two matters-(i) employment or non-employment, and (ii) terms of empll>yment or conditions of labour, of any person. On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakucbl tea estate on one side. and its workmen on the other. even taking the expression "workmen" in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act. The real diffi. culty arises when we come to the third part of the definition clause. Leai:ned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the expression "of any person" occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an expression of very wide impl)rt and there are no reasons why the words "any person" should be equated with "any workman", as the Tribunals below have done. The argument is that inasmuch as the dispute or difference between the employer and the workmen is connected with the non-employment of a person called Dr. K. P. Banerjee (even though he was not a workman). the dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the definition clause. At first sight, it does appear that there is Cl>nsiderable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression "any person" occurring in the third part, and if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed. they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provision of the Act. ::>CR SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1163 A little careful consideration will show, however, that 1968 the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the Wore.en of Dimafcuclt i definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this 'l'fa Eatau wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must T' 11 "· ,1 . l ("") f 11e ma....,....U o1 relate to (1) employment or non-emp oyment or n terms o Di1na"1i of mdustnal disputes. A Board of onc1 iat10n may a so Tto E.,,,.. constituted for the same purpose, namely, for promoting the s. K. IJa• J. settlement of an industrial dispute. A Court of Enquiry may be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Section 7 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to constitute one or more Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Chapter III ~ontains provisions relating to the reference of industrial disputes to Boards of Conciliation. Courts of Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals, and the reference in the present case was made under s. 10 of that Chapter. Under s. IO(c) of the Act where an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial disputes exist or are apprehend· ed, it may. at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant 1tl the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. Chapter IV of the Act deals with procedure. powers and duties of the au· thorities set up under the Act. Where an industrial dispute has heen referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, s. 15 re· quires that the Tribunal shall bold its proceedings expeditiously and shall as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. Section 17 lays down inter alia that the award of a Tribunal shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks fit. Section 17-A lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under s. 17; it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appro· priate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18 is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates ta awards it states that an award which has become enforce· able shall be binding on- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPCRTS 1165 (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; J9S3 . - Wo•hlM of (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proDi111aheAO 1 T«i B~ ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribuna re- .,. cords the opinion that they were so summoned withoitt pro· The~ el per cause; T111 Biia# (c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or Clause 8· K Dtu J. (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently beoome employed in that establishment or part. Section 19 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards and states inter alia that aiI1 award shall, subject _to the provisions of the section, remain in operation for a period of one year. Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes and lock-outs, Chapter V-A with lay-off and retrenchment, Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter VII with miscellaneous ma.tters. It is important to note that tpough in the definition of "lock-out", s. 2 (1) of the Act, and "strike", s. 2(q). of the Act, the expression 'any person' has been used, in ss. 22(2) and 23 of the Act which deal with 'look-out" and "strike", only the word 'workmen' has been used. Section 33 provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or any proceedings before a tribunal of any industrial dispute, no employer shall (a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, the conditions of their service etc. or (b) discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in the dispute. Section 33 A, however, uses the word 'employee', but read with s. 33, the word employee must mean there a w,orkman. Section 36 which deals with representation of parties ha:s some bearing on the question beft>re us. It lays down that a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by- 1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958] 1968 (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is w..- •! a member; ~ (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which fl< Ma;;,_ 01 the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and D;...ahM. Tw E..;. (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by an officer of any trade union connected with, or &.K.Da•J. th . . hi by any o er workman employed m the industry m w ch the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Act by- (a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of associations of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and (c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in sudh manner as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) of s. 36 states that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states thirt in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer, presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers, employers and workmen or workmen and workmen. Thus, an examination of the salient provisions ·of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are- s.c.R. SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS U67 (1) the promotil:>n of measures for securing and preserv196& ing amity and good relations between the employer and Worhaca o/ workmen; ~-=- (2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, The .If~ of between employers and employers, employers and workmen, Di~ or workmen and wl:>rkmen, with a right of representation by Tea "'* a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or ass. K. Dae J. sociation of employers or a federation of ass1:>ciatio!l8 of emloyers; (3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs; (4) relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off and retrenchment; and (5) collective bargaining. The Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations of employers and workmen-past, present and future. It draws a distinction between 'workmen' as such and the managerial or supervisory staff, and confers benefit on. the former only. It is in the context of all these provisions of the Act that the definition clause in s. 2(k) has to be interpreted. It seems fairly obvious to us that if the expression "any person" is given its ordinary mea!ning, then the definition clause will be so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions 1:>f the Aot, but also with the other parts of that very clause. Let us see how the definition clause works if the expression "any person" occurring therein is given its ordinary meaning. The workmen may then raise a dispute about a person with whom they have no possible Cl:>mmunity of interest; they may raise a dispute about the employment of a person in another industry or a different establishment..;....a dispute in which their own employer is not in a position to give any relief, in the matter of employment or non-employment or the terms 1:>f employment or conditions of labour of such a person. In order to make our meaning clear we may take a more obvious example. Let WI assume that for s1:>me reason or other the workmen of a particular industry raise a dispute with their employer about the employment or terms of employment of the District Map trate or District Judge of the district in which the industry 1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] 1958 is situate. It seems clear to us that though the District Mugis-· Work...,. of trate br District Judge undoubtedly comes within the ex- ~;:;.z: pression "any persbn" occurring in the definition clause, a v. dispute a!bout his employment or tenns of employment is not Ta. :i::z:;.f of an industrial dispute; firstly, because such a dispute does not Tea EJ...,, come within the scope of the Act, having regard to the defis. K. Da• J. nition of the words "emplllyer", "industry", and ·'workman" and also to other p~ovisions of the Act; secondly, there is no possible community of interest between the District Magistrate or District Judge on the bne hand and the disputants, employer and workmen, on the other. The absurd results that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('): "If "any person" were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even. any territorial restriction on that expression. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves, not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment of people employed in our country, but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world. The proposition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is." Take, for example, anbther case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without claiming any benefit fur themselves, and let us assume that a dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side and the employer on the other over such an objection. If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is referred to an industria 1 tribunal for adjudication, the parties (r) [1953] 55 Born. L.R. 125, 129, 130. S.C.-R SUPR.EMB COURT REPORTc 116!1 to the dispute will be the employer on one side and his work1958 men ·on the other. The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer ll'