# WORKERS EMPLOYED IN HIRAKUD DAM v. STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1971] 3 S.C.R. 646
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-02-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1492 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, V. Bhargava, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/workers-employed-in-hirakud-dam-v-state-of-orissa-and-anr-5222
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Ceritra/ Public. Works Department Code,
Paragraph 11-Word 'disniissed'. in paragrf!-Ph;· . '!leaning of-Whether means dismissal for serious
misconduct onlv or include~, ~erminatioli simp/ic:iter.
The construction of the Hitakud Dam was entrusted by the State
of Orissa to the Central Water Irrigation anc!o Navigation Commission
as their agent.
The
Commission tor
this purpose employed a large
number of persons in the worked-charged establishment 0.1 scales
of
remuneration at the rate paid by the Central Public Works Depart•
ment. Their service conditions were to be governed by the Central Public
Works Department Code of 1929.
After completion of the firs( stage
of the Hirakud project the State Government took it over from the
aforesaid Commission.
The employees of the work charged establishment ,were given an option to work for the State on the scales of remuneration and the conditions of service in the Code.
However, since
there was wide disparity between the,e employees and the work charged
employees of the State's own Public Works Department, the services of
the fo:mer wert" terminateC.
Such of then1 who a-;cepted re-employment
were employed by ·the State on the ·terms and conditions of service
of t'1e State Public .Works Department.
They were given compensation
for termination of service and one month's salary in lieu of notice.
Subsequently they raised a dispute contesting the termination of their services bv the State.
The Iodustr;al Tribunal held that
under
paragraph . J l of the Central Public Works De~artment Code which applied
to them at the relevant time the emoloyees were entitled to ren:ain, in
service till the completion of the Project.
The High Court in petitions
under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution bv the State held the termination justified under paragraph 11 of the CO<'e because it provided
inter alia that the members of the·
work charged
establishment
\Vere
entitled if diSmissed otherwise than for serious misconduct. before the
completion of the work in which thev were engaged, to a month's notice
or a month's pay in lieu of notice.
Paragraph 11 also pro,;ded that the
workers could resign after a month's notice or forfeiture of pay in lieu
of one month's notice.
In appeal by the employees against the High
Court"s judgment it was contended before this Court
that
'dismissal'
within the meaning ·of paragraph · 11 was to be underst~od only as d.ismissaJ for seriOtis misconduct and not dlismissal sitnpliciter.
Support
for this contention was sought fi:_om the fact that ·the word
'dismissal'
as used in the Governmenf of India Act, 1935, and In Art. 311 of the
Constitution as well as the Service Rules had been interpreted bY the
Courts to mean only dismissal by way of punishment.
HELD : The word 'dismissal' used in the Government of India .t.ct,
1935 as also in Art. 311 of the Constitution an& the Senice Rules has
no doubt beeri interpreted' to mean ti::rmination of a person's ser:vices by
wav of punishment. But there is clear indication in paragraph 11 of .the
Cod'-' that the word 'dismissal' has not been used to denote the term~na
tion of the services of an employee only as and by wav of punIShment.[654 Fl
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WORKERS OF HJRAKUD DAM v. ORISSA (Vaidialingam, J.) 647
Having made provisions for the automatic termination of the services of an employee when the work comes to an end it is but natural
that provisions should be made to terminate the ::icrvices of an
em~
ployee even when the work has not been completed If tho employee
wants to give up the job then under paragraph 11 he has to give a
month's notice, tailing which he forfeits a month's pay in lieu or such
notice. Having provided ·for the
voluntary resignation ,by an employee
even when the work has not been completecl, it will be odd to hold that
a similar right has not been given to the employer to terminate the •ervices
of a workman, even
though
the work has not finished.
It
will again be incongruous to hold that when a person
is

## Text

646
WORKERS EMPLOYED IN HIRAKUD DAM
v.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.
February 2, 1971
[J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
Ceritra/ Public. Works Department Code,
Paragraph 11-Word 'disniissed'. in paragrf!-Ph;· . '!leaning of-Whether means dismissal for serious
misconduct onlv or include~, ~erminatioli simp/ic:iter.
The construction of the Hitakud Dam was entrusted by the State
of Orissa to the Central Water Irrigation anc!o Navigation Commission
as their agent.
The
Commission tor
this purpose employed a large
number of persons in the worked-charged establishment 0.1 scales
of
remuneration at the rate paid by the Central Public Works Depart•
ment. Their service conditions were to be governed by the Central Public
Works Department Code of 1929.
After completion of the firs( stage
of the Hirakud project the State Government took it over from the
aforesaid Commission.
The employees of the work charged establishment ,were given an option to work for the State on the scales of remuneration and the conditions of service in the Code.
However, since
there was wide disparity between the,e employees and the work charged
employees of the State's own Public Works Department, the services of
the fo:mer wert" terminateC.
Such of then1 who a-;cepted re-employment
were employed by ·the State on the ·terms and conditions of service
of t'1e State Public .Works Department.
They were given compensation
for termination of service and one month's salary in lieu of notice.
Subsequently they raised a dispute contesting the termination of their services bv the State.
The Iodustr;al Tribunal held that
under
paragraph . J l of the Central Public Works De~artment Code which applied
to them at the relevant time the emoloyees were entitled to ren:ain, in
service till the completion of the Project.
The High Court in petitions
under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution bv the State held the termination justified under paragraph 11 of the CO<'e because it provided
inter alia that the members of the·
work charged
establishment
\Vere
entitled if diSmissed otherwise than for serious misconduct. before the
completion of the work in which thev were engaged, to a month's notice
or a month's pay in lieu of notice.
Paragraph 11 also pro,;ded that the
workers could resign after a month's notice or forfeiture of pay in lieu
of one month's notice.
In appeal by the employees against the High
Court"s judgment it was contended before this Court
that
'dismissal'
within the meaning ·of paragraph · 11 was to be underst~od only as d.ismissaJ for seriOtis misconduct and not dlismissal sitnpliciter.
Support
for this contention was sought fi:_om the fact that ·the word
'dismissal'
as used in the Governmenf of India Act, 1935, and In Art. 311 of the
Constitution as well as the Service Rules had been interpreted bY the
Courts to mean only dismissal by way of punishment.
HELD : The word 'dismissal' used in the Government of India .t.ct,
1935 as also in Art. 311 of the Constitution an& the Senice Rules has
no doubt beeri interpreted' to mean ti::rmination of a person's ser:vices by
wav of punishment. But there is clear indication in paragraph 11 of .the
Cod'-' that the word 'dismissal' has not been used to denote the term~na
tion of the services of an employee only as and by wav of punIShment.[654 Fl
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WORKERS OF HJRAKUD DAM v. ORISSA (Vaidialingam, J.) 647
Having made provisions for the automatic termination of the services of an employee when the work comes to an end it is but natural
that provisions should be made to terminate the ::icrvices of an
em~
ployee even when the work has not been completed If tho employee
wants to give up the job then under paragraph 11 he has to give a
month's notice, tailing which he forfeits a month's pay in lieu or such
notice. Having provided ·for the
voluntary resignation ,by an employee
even when the work has not been completecl, it will be odd to hold that
a similar right has not been given to the employer to terminate the •ervices
of a workman, even
though
the work has not finished.
It
will again be incongruous to hold that when a person
is
dismissed,
though .not for a serious misconduct, the workman will be entitled to
a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice, if otherwise there
can be dismissal for a minor misconduct as and by way of punishment.
No 'decision has laid down that even in case of dismissal a workman
will be entitled to a months notice ur a month's pay.
The fact that
paragraph 11 provides for giving a month's notice or a month's pay
when a workman is dismissed otherwise than for serious
misconduct
indicates that the work 'dismissed' has not been used in the sense of
termination of service by way of punishment alone but it covers also
other cases of termination 0f the services of an employee even before
the completion of the work. [654 H-655 GJ
The word 'dismissed' according to its dictionary meaning is 'to send
away, to discard, to remove from office or employment ........ '. The
dictionary meaning makes it clear that in substance the word means •termination of service'. The High Court was therefore right in holding that
the expression 'dismissed' irr paragraph 11 of the Code, has been
used
to take in the termination of the services of the employees mentioned
therein , both as a measure of punishm1,,.nt for serious misconduct as well
as terinination simpliciter of the services of an employee in \vhich con·
tingency one month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of noti.ce is obli·
gatory.[656 B; 658 Dl
Dr. Boal Chand v. Chancellor,
Kurukshetra
University,
[1968]
1
S.C.R. 434, applied,
Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Unio11 of India, [1958) S.C.R. 828, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1492 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and Qrder dated
April 5, 1968 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 58 of 1965.
G
M. K. Ramamurthi, A. K. Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta,
e
for the appellants.
M .. C. Bhandare, Santosh Chatterjee and R. N. Sachthey, for
respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
· Vaidialingam, J.-In this appeal by special leave the short
question that arises for consideration is whether the State has got
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971]3 S.C.R.
power to terminate the services of any member of the work-charged
establishment under paragraph 11 of the Central Public Works Department Code (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) on giving
one month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice.
The circumstances leading up to this appe.al may be stated :
A decision was taken to construct three dams right across the
Mahanadi river, one at Hirakud, the second at Tikerpara and the
third al Naraj as a miiltipurpose measure tor preventing flood
ravage in the Delta area, generating electricity. and providing irri;
gation
The construction of Hirakud Dam was entrusted by the
~le ~ssa to the Central Waterivays, Irrigation and Navigation
C"otnmission as their agent. For the purpose of the construetion
o.f Hirakud Dam, the C.W.I.N. Commission employed a large number of persons in the work-charged establishment on scales of
remuneration at the rate paid by the Central Public Works Department and ·the service conditions of the persons so employed were
governed by the provisions contained in the Code.
After completion of the first stage of the Hirakud Dam project,
the State of Qrissa decided to take over the said project from their
agent the C.W.LN. Commission with effect from April 1, 1960.
The State further decided to proceed with the construction of sec0nd
stage of the project through its own Public Works Department.
An option was given by the State to the employees in the workcharged establishment to decide whether they would conti.nue to
work under the State on the same pay and allowances and subject
to other conditions of service provided in the Code for the said
work-charged establishment.
The employees agreed to work ur,der
the State of Orissa and accordingly the employees were allowed
to continue under the State Government.
The State, however, later on found tha1 the pay,. allowances
and conditions of service between the work-cha~ged personnel of
the Hirakud Dam project who had bien allowed to be continued
and the work-charged perspnnel in the establishment of the State
Public Works Department showed a marked difference giving rise
to various complications.
The Hirakud Control Board recommended to the State Government to terminate the services of the workcharged personnel of the Hirakud Dam by giving one month's
notice with effect from March 31, 1963. Accordingly the State
Government terminated the services of the said personnel with effect
from March 31, 1963 by giving one month's notice; but the State
also made it clear that ~uch of those who elected to be re-employed
on the scales of pay and conditions of service of the State Public
Works Department would be so re-employed.
On the issue of the
notice by the State, 1200 out of2300 personnel who had continued
from before in the work-charged establishment left their services
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WORKERS OF H!RAKUD DAM v. OR!SSA (Vaidia!ingam, J.)
649
and the remaining ll 00 agreed to be re-employed on scales of pay
a.nd conditions of service of the State Public Work Department. The
employees were paid an amount equal to .what they would have
received by way of retrenchment compensation or by way of wages
in lieu of notice.
• Subsequently the p~rsonnel of the ~ork-char~ed est.ablislunent
raised a dispute contestmg the termmation of their services by the
State. As conciliation failed, the Government by its order dated
February 13, 19?4 ~eferred, the d!spute to the Industrial .Tr!bu~al,
Orissa for adjudication.
The pomts referred for ad1ud1ca1Jon
were:
1. Whether the Retrenchment of Workmen by the
authorities of Hirakud Dam Project effected in pursuance of the decision taken by the Control Board, Hirakud
Dam Project on the 19th December, 1962, is valid and
legal? If not, to what 1elief the workmen are entitled'?
2. Whether the workers who are proposed to be retrenched in pursuance of the decision of the Control
Board, Hirakud and are still continuing in Employment
are entitled to their original conditions of service ?
3. Whether the workmen, who have completed three
years of services or more should be confirmed in their
respective posts ?
The main stand taken by the employees before the Industrial
Tribunal was that their service conditions being governed by the
Code they are entitled to remain iin service till the termination of
the work connected with the Projects.
The work connected with
the Project not having come to an end, the State has no power to
terminate their services.
On the other hand, the State of Orissa
took up the position that it has power under paragraph 11 of the
Code they are entitled to remain in service 'till the termination of
notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice even before the completion of the work.
.
:nie Industrial
T~bunal recorded broadly the following
findmgs : ( 1) the action of the State cannot be considered to be
by way of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act as this
is not a case of discharge of surplus labour, (2) the mere fact
that the employees have accepted the notice, pay or compensation
~oes not stop them from challenging the legality of their termina-
. uon, ( 3) paragraph 11 of the Code does not authorise the State
to terminate the services of an employee befor!! the work is com·
p1eted.
Th~ said paragraph gives only a limited power to. terminate the services of an employee by way of a punitive action taken
as a measure of punishment.
In this connection the Tribunal has
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 3 S_.i"..R
placed considerable reliance on the expression 'dismissed' used in
paragraph 11 of the Code, ( 4) as the work had not been completed
and as the action had not been taken by way of punishment, the
order of termination is without jurisdiction, ( 5) the termination of
employment is arbitrary and anti-contractual,
( 6) •the order of
termination is invalid and inoperative.
The contention raised ]Jy
the State that the Project was not an industry was also overruled.
The Tribunal ultimately held that the action taken by the
Management of the Hirakud Dam Project· in purs,uance of the
Notice dated February 9, 1963 was invalid and illegal and that
the work-charged employees then working in different divisions of
the Project and who had beeμ recruited prior to April l, 1960 are
entitled to have thi;ir original conditions of service including scales
of pay and dearness allowance.
The Tribunal further held that
the employees are entitled to continuity of service and that their
services cannot be terminated before the comple\ion of.work except
as a measure of punishment.
The State challenged this award before the High Court of Orissa
in Writ Petition (0.J.C. No. 58 of 1965) under Articles 226 and
227 of the con.stitution.
Though the State contended that the
Hirakud Dam Project was not an industry and that the Tribunal
.has acted beyond the scope of reference when it gave certain directions regarding pay and allowances etc., ultimately these contentions were given up.
The only contention pressed before the High
Court was that the Industrial Tribunal had committed an error of
law in construing paragraph 11 of the Code when it held that the
State had no power during the progress of the work to terminate
simpliciter the services of any of 'the work-char~ed employees.
The High Court agreed with the contention of the State and
'held that under paragraph 11 of the Code, the State Government
bad power to terminate the services of an employee even' during
·the progress of the work on giving one month's notice or one
·month's pay in lieu of notice.
Mr. M. K. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the appellants,
contended that the construction placed by the High Court on paragraph 11 of the Code is \ncorrect.
His contentions ran as follows :
The employees in the work-charged establishment were entitled to
continue in service till the work for which they have been employed
was completed.
For serious misconduct the employer has got the
power to dismiss such an employee without giving a month's notice
-or a month's pay in. lieu of notice.
But if an employee was being
dismissed for reasons other than for serious misconduct, the employee is entitled to a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice.
·There is no power in the employer to terminate simpliciter the
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WORKERS m H!RAKUD DAM v. ORISSA (Vaidialingam, /.)
651
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services of an employee so lo,ug as the work has not been cOm·
pleted.
The expression "dismissal" has always been understood
and interpreted by the courts as action taken against an emp1oyee
by way of punishment and that expression can,uot be interprete<!
to include also the termination of the service of an employee
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c:eerwise than by way of punishment.
Mr. Bhandari, learned cou.nsel for the State, on the other hand,
urged that paragraph 11 is really intended to govern the relationship
between the employer and the elJl.ployees of the work-charged
establishment and the expression "dismissal" has not been used in
the sense ·that action should necesswly have been only as and
by way of punishment.
According to the learned counsel the
expression "dismissal" has been used in a loose sense meaning
termination of the services of an employee either by way of
punishment for misconduct or for any other reason.
We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Ramamurthy
that the expression "dismissal" in paragraph 11 has been
used to 'denote only action taken against a workman as and by way
of punishment.
No doubt, the expression has not been very happily used in the said paragraph.
Paragraph 11 of the Code is as
follows:
"l L Members of the temporary and work-charged
establiShments, who are engaged locally, are on the footing of monthly servants. If they are engaged for a
specific work, their e,ngagement Jasts only for the period
during which the work lasts. If dismissed, otherwise than
for serious misconduct, before the completion of the work
for which they were engaged, they are entitled to a
month's ·notice or a month's pay in lieu -Of, notice;
but other.wise, with o.r ;without aotice, their engagement
terminates when the work ·en'.ds. · If they desire to resign
their appointments they inUSt give a month's notice of
their intention to do so, failing which they will be required to forfeit a month's pay in lieu of such notice. The
terms of engage.inent should be clearly. explained to men
employed in the circumstances mentioned above."
The following aspects emerge from paragraph 11 of the Code :
(i) the members of the temporary and work-charged
establishments. are treated to be on the footing of
monthly servants;
(ii) if they are engaged for specific M>rk, their ser •
vices last only for the period during which the
12-918 Sup Cl/71
652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971 J 3 S.C.R.
work lasts.
To put it differently there will be
automatic termination of the services of an employee when the specific work for which he was
engaged is completed;
(iii) before the completior. of a work, a workman can
be dismissed for serious misconduct. In such a
case no question of giving a month's notice or a
month's pay in lieu of notice arises;
(iv) before the completion of the work, the workman
can also be dismissed otherwise than for serious
misconduct, i'l which case the workman will be
entitled to a month's notice or a month's pay in
lieu of notice;
(v) in other cases the workman's services terminate
when the work ends;
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(vi) if the workman desires to resign his appointment,
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he must give one month's notice of his intention
to do so, failing which he will be required to
forfeit a month's pay in lieu of such notice.
That the above are terms of engagement of a workman, is c:ear
from the concluding part of paragraph 11 to the effect that "the
terms of engageme.nt should be clearly explained to men employed
in the circumstances mentioned above."
The question that arises for consideration is about the connotation of the expression "dismissed" used in paragraph 11. The
contention of Mr. Ramamurthy that the expression "dismissed"
has reference only to termination of the services of an employee
as and by way of punishment is largely based upon the provisions
contained in the Governmi<nt of India Act and in Art. 3 li of the
Constitution.
Based upon those provisions
Mr.
Ramamurthy
claims that the expression "dismissal" is a technical word used in
cases in which a person's services are terminated by way of punishment. Quite natural!y he r~lied upon the Service Rules where the
word "dismissal" has been used to denote a major punishment
inflicted upon an employee for misconduct.
Mr. Ramamurthy,
no doubt, is well-founded in his contention that the word
"dismissal" used in the Gove~nment of India Act as also in the
Constitution and the Service Rules has been interpreted to mean
termination of a person's service by way of punishment.
Bv section 45 of the Government of 1,ndia Act, 1919 read with
Part I of the second schedule to that Act, several sections includE
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WORKERS OF HIRAKUD DAM v. ORISSA (Vaitlialingam. J.)
1151
ing s. 9613 were introduced in the Government of India Act, 1915.
Among other things s. 96B provided that no person in the civil
service of the Crown in India may be dismissed by any authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
Section 96-B for
the first time gave statutory recognition and force to the English
Common Law rule that the servants of the Crown held their Offices
during the pleasure of the Crown. It also at the same time imposed one important qualification upon the exercise of the Crown's
pleasure, namely, that a servant might not be dismissed by un
authority subordinate to that by which he had been appointed.
Section 96-B(l) waveproduced as sub-sections (1) and (2)
of section 240 of.the Government of India Act, 1935 and a new
section was adde'd to section 240 as ~uh-section ( 3). Sub-section
( 2) of section 240 provided that no person referred to in subsection (1) shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty
by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
Sub-section (3) provided that no such person shall be dismissed
or reduced ~n rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in
regard to him.
Then came our Constitution on January 26, 1950.
Articles
311 (I ) and ( 2) provided as follows :
"311 (I ) No person who is a member of a civil service
of the Union or an all-India service or a civil
service of a State or holds a civil post under the
Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed
by an authority subordinate to that by which. he
was appointed.
( 2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed
or removed or reduced in rank except after a'n
inquiry in which he has been infonru:d of the
charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity .of being heard in respect of those charges
and where i1 is proposed, after such inquiry, to
impose on him any such penalty, until he has
been given a reasonable opportunity of making
representation on the penalty proposed, but only
on the basis of the evidence adduced during such
inquiry :"
It will be 'l!oted that Art. 311 gives a twofold protection to
persons who come within the article, namely, (i) against dismissal
or removal by an authority subordinate to that by which they were
appointed and (ii) as against dismissal or removal or reduction
in rank without giving them a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them.
li54
Mil'kl!ME 'C'OllkT REPORTS
[197 ! J .l S,C.k
Discussing the above~provisions in Parshotam L(1/ Dhiugm v.
Union of India('), this Court obsqrved as follows:
"It foilQW.s from the above discussion that both at
the date of \he commencement of the 1935 Act and of
our CQnstitution the words "dismissed", "removed" and
.. reduced in rank", as used in the service rules, were all
understo<AI as signifying or denoting the three major
punishments which could be inflicted on Government
servants: The protection given by the
rules
to the
Government servants against dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank, which could not be enforced by
action, was Incorporated in sub-ss. ( I ) and· ( 2) of s. 240
to give them a statutory
protection by indicating a
procedure which had to be followi:d before the pu:nishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank could
be imposed on them, and which could be enforced in
law.
These protections have now been incorporated in
Art. 311 ot our Constitution . . . . . . . . . .
Thus under
Art. 311 (I) the punishments of dismissal, or re1noval
cannot be inflicted by an authority subordinate to that
by which the servant was appointed and under Art.
311 (2) the punishments of dismissal,
removal
and
reduction in rank cannot be meted out to the Government servants without giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself."
If the interpretatio:n placed upon the word "dismissal" in the
Government of India Act i11nd the Constitution as
w-;,:I
as
the
service rules is adopted for construing the said wurd in paragraph
11 of the Code, the contention of Mr. Ramamurthy will have to
be accepted.
But there is a clear indication in paragraph I I of
the Code that the word "dismissed" has not been used to denote
the termination of the services of an employee only as and by way
o.f punishment. . Paragraph I I. in our oph:ion, contains the terms
of engagement of the workmen.
In view of the very nature of the
employmeat in the work which may either finish quickly or may
take a considerably long time for completion, Paragraph I. I has
been tncorporated to govern the relationship between the Central
Public Works Department and a workman. In ~his ca5e there is
no controversy that even after the State took over the construction
of the Project. relationship between the State and the employees
is governed by Paragraph 11.
Having made provisions for the
automatic termination of the services of an employee; when the
work comes to an end. it is but natural that provisions should be
made to terminate the services of an employee even when the work
f II f19S8] S,C.R. 820.
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WORKERS OF HIRAKU[) DAM v. ORISSA (Vaidia/ingam, /.)
H55
has not bee.n completed.
In this connection it. should be. noted
that if the employee wants to give up the job, he has to give a
month's notice, failing which he forfeits a month's pay in lieu of
such notice.
Having provided for the voluntary resignation by an
employee even when the work has not been-=p'.eted, it will he
odd to hold that a similar right has not been gi
to an employer
to terminate the services of a workman, even tho
. the work has
not finished.
It is quite understandable that provisions should be
made for dismissing an employee even before the completion of
. the work, for serious misconduct. In such a case, it is.admitted
.by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the question of giving
a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice does not arise.
In that cQhtingency, it is easy to hold that the termination of the
services of an employee is dismi§sal as and by way of puni-hment.
Paragraph 11 further provides that if an employee is dismissed
before the completion of the work otherwise than for serious misconduct, he; wiir be entitled to a month's notice or a month's pay
in lieu of notice.
According to Mr. Ramamurthy, there is nothing
incongruous in holding that when a workman is dismissed for a
minor misconduct he will be entitled to a month's notice or a
month's pay in lieu of notice. In our opinion it will be incongruous
to hold that whe>n a person is dismissed, though not for a serious
misconduct but even for a minor misconduct, the werkman will be
entitled to a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice, if
otherwise there can' be a dismissal for a minor misconduct as and
by way of punishment.
So far as. we dmld see no decision has
laid down that even in cases of dismissal a workman will be entitled
to a month's notice or a month's pay. If it is· a dismissal by way
of punishment, no question of a month's notice or a month's pay
in lieu of notice ever arises. The fact that Para~raph 11 provide•.
for giving a month's notice or a month's pay when ·a workman is
dismissed otherwi~~ than for. serious misccinduci indicates that ·the
word "dismissed" has not been used in the sense of termination of
service by Y<ay of punishment alone but it covers also other cases
of termination of the services of an employee even before. the
completion of the work.
Interpreted in this manner, the position
will be that the services of an emplovee can be terminated as
punishment for serious misconduct and the services of an employee
can be terminated also for other reasons.
If the services are terminated for other reasons. Paragraph 1 t provides for giving a
month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notiC'e.
From the above reasoning it is clear tliat the word "dismissed;'
has been used loosely to denote both termination of service for
misconduct by way of punishment ~ind also tennination of service
11mpliriltr.
656
Sl!PRF.ME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 3 s.c.R.
It must also be noted that the Code has been framed in 1929
A
long before the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force.
In Burrows "Words and Phrases" the word "dismissal" has been
stated to be a word of very ambiguous meaning and that it is merely
a convenient expression for the termination of an employment.
whatever its nature may be.
The word "dismissed" according to
i.ts dictionary meaning is "to send away, to discard, to remove from
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office or employment ........ "
The dictionary, mea,ning makes
it clear that in substunce the word means "termination of service."
In Dr. Boo/ Chand v.
The Chancei/or, Kurukshetra University( 1 ), the import of the expression "dismissed" came up for consideration oofore this· Court.
The appellant in that case, who wi1s
Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science in the
Punjab University, was appointed on June 18, 1965, as the ViceChancellor of the Kurukshetra University.
On March 31, 1966,
the Chancellor of the University suspended the appellant from the
office of Vice-Chancdlor and by another order the appellant was
required to show cause why his services as Vice-Chancellor be not
terminated.
The appellant after submitting his representation, filed
a writ petition in the Pm.jab High Court for quashing the order
dated March 31, 1966.
On May 8, 1966, the Chancellor of the
University, in ex.ercise of the power under sub-cl. (vi) of cl. 4 of
Sch. I to the Kurukshetra University Act, 1956, read with s. 14
of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, passed an order terminating the services of the appellant as Vice-Chancellor with jmmediat, effect.
The writ petition was suitably amended challenging
this order terminating the appellant's service as Vic~-C'hancellor.
The relevant sub-clause of Cl. 4 of Schedule I of the Kurukshetra
University Act provided that the Vice-Chancellor will held the
office ordinarily for a period of three years.
One of the contentions raised before this Court was that the
Chance!1or of the University had no power to terminate the services
of a Vice-Chancellor before the expiry of the period for which he
was app0inted and that s. 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act,
1898, while providing for .dismissal did not empower the appointing
authority to terminate the services of an officer. While holding that
there was no express provision in the Kurukshetra University Act
or the statutes thereunder dealing with the termination of the tenure
of office of the Vice-Chancellor, this Court held :
"But on that account we are unable to accept the plea
of the appellant that the tenure of office of a ViceC'hancellor under the Act cannot be determined before
(I) [1%8] 1 S.C.R. 434.
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WORKERS OF HIRAKUD DAM v. ORISSA ( Vaidia/ingam, J.)
6 57
the expiry of •the period for which he is appointed. A
power to appoint ordinarily implies a power to determine
the employment."
Regarding the further contention that s. 14 of the Punjab
General Clauses Act only empowers the appointing autho~ity to
dismiss an officer by way of punishment, but not to determine an
employment this Court after referring to s. 14 observe as follows :
"But s. 14 of the General Clauses Act is a genetal
provision : it does not merely deal with ~he appointment
of public servants. It deals with all appointments, anti
there is no reason to hold, having regard to the context in
which. the expression occurs, th~ the authority invested
with the power of appointment has the power to determine employment as a penalty, but not otherwise.
The
expression 'dismiss' does not in rts etymological sense
necessarily involve any such meaning as is urged by counsel for the appellant.
The implication that dismis:lal of
a servant involves determination of employment as a
penalty has been a matter of recent development since
the Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted.
By
that Act certain restrictions were imposed upon the
power o~ the authorities to dismiss or remove members
of the civil service, from employment. There is no warrant however for assuming that in the General Clauses
Act, 1898, the expressicm "dismiss" which was generally
used in conneaion with the termination· of appointments
was intended to be used only in the s-;mse of determination of employment as a measure of punishment."
From the above extract it is clear that the word "dismissal" has
to be understood in the context in which it occurs and that it denotes
the determination of an employment as a penalty is a matter of
recent development since the Government of ln"Clia Act, 1935 was
enactert.
In the case before us, we have already pointed out that
the Cc•de has l:ieen framed as early as 1929 and there is no warrant
tor assuming that the expression "dismissed" has been used in the
sense that the word was understood since the Government of India
Act. 1935. Further the word 'dismissed' occurring in the context in which the said expression occurs in paragraph 11, as pointed
out by us earlier. clearly denotes the termination of the services of
an employee f~r serious misconduct and for other reasons. That
expression is not used in the sense only to denote determination of
employment as and by way of punhhment.
Mr. Ramamurthy raised the contention that even if there is a
power of termination simp/iciter in the emoloyer uμder Paragra?h
11. the High Court should R,Ot have interfered with the award of
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 3 S.C.R.
the Industrial Tribunal as the Tribunal has recorded a finding that
the State has not acted bona fide. In support of this contention,
the learned counsel relied on the reasoning contained in paragraph
18 of the award.
We have gone through the reasoning contained
in the said paragraph and we do not find any finding recorded by
the Tribunl\l that the State has not acted bona fide, when it passed
an order terminating the services of the employees.
On _the other
hand, what the Tribunal has held in the said paragraph is that the
termination of the ser'Vices of the employees is invalid and illegal
as it is not warranted by Paragraph 11 of the Code and hence the
·.order of termination is/ invalid i;n law and inoperative.
There is
absolutely no basis 'for the contention that these findings are to the
effect that the action df the State is not bona fide. Thus the findings recorded by the Tribunal are fin~ngs on the basis of the interpretation placed by it on Paragraph 11 that the State has no powe.r
to terminate simpliciter the services of a work-charged establishment. The(efore, this contention of Mr. Ramamurthy has to be
rejected.
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To conclude we are in agreement with the High Court in holdD
ing that the expression "dismissed" in Paragraph · 11 of the Code,
has been used to take in the termination of the services of the
employees mentione.d therein both as a measure of punishment for
serious misconduct as well as termination simpliciter of the servies
of an employee in which conti:ngency one month's notice or a
month's pay in lieu of notice is obligatory.
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In the result the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstaucr~
without any order as to costs.
G.C.
Appeal. dismissed.