# Y.T.S. CAaniar•seltharo Mudcliar v. KulandciHlu Muia,J;,, Subia Rao .1

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 475
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P: B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanohoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, T. L. VENKATARAl\IA AIYAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/y-t-s-caaniar-seltharo-mudcliar-v-kulandcihlu-muia-j-subia-rao-1-2505
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Mines-Acci.Unl-Court of Inquiru-O•der to pay expenses.-;Amovnt
no~ . quantified-Court, · if.
becomes .functus
off•eio on submitting
!~por~-Subs~quent order
quantifying
":mm.ml-If such quantif•cation ''.al•d-A_ssessors, if must join
in alZ ora•rB of th;- Court of Ir:yuiry-Mines Act, 1952 (35 of
1952), s. 24-Mines Rules, 19.<N, r. 22.
The Government of India under s. 24 of the Mines Act
19521 ordered an enquiry into the di.aster in the re<pondent';
~lliery. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on
1962
Y.T.S.
CAaniar•seltharo
Mudcliar
v.
KulandciHlu
Muia,J;,,
Subia Rao .1.
1962
April 26.
1962
8. S. Oar1wal
•••
.llJt. Bhomra
K•drlne1 Coll1ries
' '
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
September 26, 1955, and ,found inter-alia that the accident
was due to the negligence on the part of the pianagement. and
therefore ordered the owners to pay the expenses of the enquiry as provided by ! . 22 of the Mines Rules, 1955
The
amount of the expen~ to be paid were, however, not quantified in the rtport. At the request of Chief Inspector, Mines,
the Judge of the Court of Inquiry after due notice to the parties concerned quantified the expenses by his order dated
September 7, li)56.
The respondents
petitioned
under
Art. 226 of the Constitution 9hallenging the order quantifying
the expenses on three grounds-( 1) the Court of Inquiry beCame fanctus officio after it had'submitted its report,and therefore the Judge had no pqwer left to pass the order <j~antifying
the expenses. Jf the said order was to be treated a;i review of
'the order awarding expenses it would still be void .a~.!herc was
no power of review in the Court of Inquiry:
(3) when th<;:
order quaritifying the expense \vas passed the two assessor
were not present and· were not associated with the enquiry
therefore, the Judge could.not pass the order alone .. The Hig_h
Court allowed the writ.petition adding that it 'was not interfering with the order relating to eitpenses made by the Judge in
his report dated September 26, 1955.
-
•
Held, that when an order to pay expenses is passed without quantifying the amount in a report by a Court of Inquiry,
it necessarily carries with it the impJication that the person
appointed Jo hold the enquiry would quantify the expenses
later in materials heing placed before him as othenvise such
an order would be rendered completely m,igatory.
Where no
time was fixed within \vliich the report had to be made by the
Court of enquiry it cannot be said that the period for which
the Court of enquiry \-Vas appointed necessarily came to an end
with the submitting of the report and this Court of Inquiry
became functua officio.
(
)<..
Held, further, that when the report itself containea the
order for. payment for ~·penses, the later' order is merely a
/:
quantification of the earlier order and would be on a par with
what happens_.everyday i,n courts which pass decrees with
costs. ·when giving judgment, courts do not qllantify cost in
th~ judgment. Therefore the order dated September 7, 1956,
cannot be treated as a review or a'.ny va,:_iation of the otder.
passed in th~ report of September 26, 1955, which th,l'judge
had no powers" to pass.
~
Held, also, that it was open to the Judge 'of the Court of
f'"
inquiry to quantify the ex.pense• and that it '~as not necessary
that at that stage the assessors 'should be a~sociated with 'him.
\Jnder 1. 24il) of the Act, the enquiry is •held by a co Dlfeteμt
•
J
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME (JCJURT REPORTS
4 77 .
person for the purpose, and assessors, are appointed to assist
--.,.
the person to hold the enquiry and the assessors need not be
··associated with him in all orders which are in ·the nature of
ministerial order and quantification of expenses must bt:
treated as an order of a mi~isterial nature.
d

## Text

- -'.
-~-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
475
The fa.ot that he does not believe in such thing does
not make him any the less a Hindu. The nonbelief in rituals or even in some dogmas does not
ipso facto remove him from the fold of Hinduism.
He was born a Hindu and continues to be one till
he takes to another religion. But what is necessary is, being a Hindu, whether he was in a position
to appreciate the question referred to Lim and give
suitable answer to it.
After going through his
evidence, we have no do.ubt that this defendant
had applied his mind to the question before him.
Whatever may be his personal predilections or
views on Hindu religion and its rituals, he is a
Hindu and he disoharged his duty as a guardian of
the widow in the matter of giving his consent. In
the oircumstances of the case, his consent was
sufficient to validate the adoption.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
--
S., S. GAREW AL
v.
MESSRS. BHOWRA KANKANEE COLLERIES
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P: B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANOHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
T. L. VENKATARAl\IA AIYAR, JJ.)
Mines-Acci.Unl-Court of Inquiru-O•der to pay expenses.-;Amovnt
no~ . quantified-Court, · if.
becomes .functus
off•eio on submitting
!~por~-Subs~quent order
quantifying
":mm.ml-If such quantif•cation ''.al•d-A_ssessors, if must join
in alZ ora•rB of th;- Court of Ir:yuiry-Mines Act, 1952 (35 of
1952), s. 24-Mines Rules, 19.<N, r. 22.
The Government of India under s. 24 of the Mines Act
19521 ordered an enquiry into the di.aster in the re<pondent';
~lliery. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on
1962
Y.T.S.
CAaniar•seltharo
Mudcliar
v.
KulandciHlu
Muia,J;,,
Subia Rao .1.
1962
April 26.
1962
8. S. Oar1wal
•••
.llJt. Bhomra
K•drlne1 Coll1ries
' '
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
September 26, 1955, and ,found inter-alia that the accident
was due to the negligence on the part of the pianagement. and
therefore ordered the owners to pay the expenses of the enquiry as provided by ! . 22 of the Mines Rules, 1955
The
amount of the expen~ to be paid were, however, not quantified in the rtport. At the request of Chief Inspector, Mines,
the Judge of the Court of Inquiry after due notice to the parties concerned quantified the expenses by his order dated
September 7, li)56.
The respondents
petitioned
under
Art. 226 of the Constitution 9hallenging the order quantifying
the expenses on three grounds-( 1) the Court of Inquiry beCame fanctus officio after it had'submitted its report,and therefore the Judge had no pqwer left to pass the order <j~antifying
the expenses. Jf the said order was to be treated a;i review of
'the order awarding expenses it would still be void .a~.!herc was
no power of review in the Court of Inquiry:
(3) when th<;:
order quaritifying the expense \vas passed the two assessor
were not present and· were not associated with the enquiry
therefore, the Judge could.not pass the order alone .. The Hig_h
Court allowed the writ.petition adding that it 'was not interfering with the order relating to eitpenses made by the Judge in
his report dated September 26, 1955.
-
•
Held, that when an order to pay expenses is passed without quantifying the amount in a report by a Court of Inquiry,
it necessarily carries with it the impJication that the person
appointed Jo hold the enquiry would quantify the expenses
later in materials heing placed before him as othenvise such
an order would be rendered completely m,igatory.
Where no
time was fixed within \vliich the report had to be made by the
Court of enquiry it cannot be said that the period for which
the Court of enquiry \-Vas appointed necessarily came to an end
with the submitting of the report and this Court of Inquiry
became functua officio.
(
)<..
Held, further, that when the report itself containea the
order for. payment for ~·penses, the later' order is merely a
/:
quantification of the earlier order and would be on a par with
what happens_.everyday i,n courts which pass decrees with
costs. ·when giving judgment, courts do not qllantify cost in
th~ judgment. Therefore the order dated September 7, 1956,
cannot be treated as a review or a'.ny va,:_iation of the otder.
passed in th~ report of September 26, 1955, which th,l'judge
had no powers" to pass.
~
Held, also, that it was open to the Judge 'of the Court of
f'"
inquiry to quantify the ex.pense• and that it '~as not necessary
that at that stage the assessors 'should be a~sociated with 'him.
\Jnder 1. 24il) of the Act, the enquiry is •held by a co Dlfeteμt
•
J
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME (JCJURT REPORTS
4 77 .
person for the purpose, and assessors, are appointed to assist
--.,.
the person to hold the enquiry and the assessors need not be
··associated with him in all orders which are in ·the nature of
ministerial order and quantification of expenses must bt:
treated as an order of a mi~isterial nature.
d
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 526/59.
, ,
Appeal by special leave from the judgement
and order dated March 3, 1958, of the Patna High
Court in Misc. Judi. case No. 94Q of 1956.
-
B. K. Khnnno. and P. D. Me:non for the
appellant.
P. I{. Chatterjee, for the respondents.
1962. April 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave- against the judgment of the Patna High
Court. The brief facts necessary
for present
purposes a.re these. There is a colliery in the
district of Dhanbad known as Arlabad colliery of
which the
respondents
are
the owners. On
February 5, 1955, there was an accident in the
colliery as a result of which 52 persons lost their
lives. In consequence, the Government of India
ordered an inquiry into the disaster under s. 24 of
the Mines Act, No. 35 of 1962, (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). The court of inquiry contained of
Mr. Justice B. P. Jamuar and two persons were
appointed to assist him as assessors. The court of
inquiry submitted its report on September 26, 1955,
which was published on December 17, 1955.
A
question was raised before the court of inquiry
whether the management should be ordered to pay
the expenses of the inquiry as. provided by r. 22 of
the Mines Rules, 1955,
(hereinafter referred to as
the Rules), which lays down that "if a court of
\
S. 8. Garewnl
••
M/s. Bhowra
Kanlcanet Colltrie•
WanchooJ .
•
1912
S.S. G•reu.el
••
Jt/ / 6 • ,B'°"U•
K.,,._,,• Collni••
•78
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
inquiry finds that the accident was due to any carelessness or negligenoe oa the part of the management the court may direct the owners of the mine
to pay all or any part of the expenses of the
inquiry in such manner and within such time as the
court may specify. The court of inquiry found iu
its report that the accident was due to negligence
on the part of the management and therefore ordered the owners to pay the expenses of tho inquiry.
The amount of the expenses to be paid were however not quantified in the report of September
26, 1955.
On July 27,1956, the Chief Inspector of Mines
requested Mr. Justice Jamuar that tho amount of
expenses should be specified and the manner in
which it should be paid and the time within which
the payment might be
made, might be fixed.
Notices were issued to tho parties concerned thereafter and on September
7, 1956, Mr. Justice
Jamua.r ordered the owners to pay Rs. 17, 778/2/-
as expenses of the inquiry within t.wo months of
tho date of the order.
Thereupon a petition was
filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the
respondents challenging the order of September
• 7, 1956. It was conceded therein that r. 22 of the
Rules conferred power on the court of inquiry to
diroClt the owner to pay all or any part of the
expenses of inquiry within such time as the court
may spec>ify.
But the order passed in this case
was challenged on three grounds, firstly that the
court of inquiry btlcame f1trrntus officio aftC'r it had
eubmitwd its report on September 26, 1955 and
therefore Mr. Justice Jamuar had no
power left
to pa88 the order of September 7, 1959. It was
also contended that if the order of Sept.ember 7,
1956, be treated as a review of the order of September 26, l!Jfi6 it would still be void, as there was no
power of review in t.bo eourt of inquiry. · Le.stly,
it was urged that when the order of September
,
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i2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
7, 1956, was passed, the assessors were not present
and were not associated with the inquiry and there·
fore Mr. Justice Jamuar could not· pass the order
alone. All these three contention• w.ere aooepted
by the High Court and it allowed the writ petition
adding that it was not interfering with the order
relating to expenses made by Mr. Justice Jamuar
in his report of September 26, 1955. It is ·this
order of the High Court, which is being challenged
before us.
The main contention on behalf of the respondents is that as the court of inquiry became functus
officio after the report of SP-ptember 26, 1955, it
was not open to Mr. Justice Jamuar to quantify the
expenses by the order of September 7, 1956:
Before we deal .with this main argument we should
like to dispose of briefly the other two submissions
made before the High Court which were also
accepted by it. The first of these contentions is
that the order of September 7, 1957 is an order of
review and as there is no power of review granted
to the court of inquiry. Mr. Justice J amuar had no
power to pass that order. It is enough to say that
the order of September 7, 1956, cannot lie called an
order of review. We have already pointed out that
the order that the owners should pay · the expenses
of the inquiry was already incorporated- ·in the
report of September 26, 1955, ·though it was not
quantified. All that the order of September
7, 1956, has done is to quantify the amount
of expenses. Therefore, this order cannot be treated as a review or any variation of the order passed
in the report of September 26, 1955. It would
have been a different matter if no order as to the·
payment of expenses had been made in the report
of September 26, 1955 .. In that case it may have
. ·-'1; . been possible for the respondents to argue that the
later order was an order reviewing the failure to
pass an orclor q.s to expenses io. the .report. But
1962
S. S. (J41ewal
••
M/s. Bhowra
Kenlanee Colleries
Wane.'1011 J.
111(1!
S. S. G"''wtl
••
M/1. BhotDN
KrJn4-aiv1 CPil«its
Ir r4nclioo J.
480
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
when the report itself contained the order for payment of expenses, the Inter order is merely a quantifiCl\tion of that. order and would be on a par with
what happeriH every day in courts which
pBBS
decrees with oosts. When giving judgment, courts
do not quantify costs in the judgment. This quantification is done later in the office of ~he court and
if there is any dispute about it the court settles
'
that dispute and then includes the cost in the decree
or final order. What has happened in the present
case is something similar and the order of Mr.
Justice Jamuar dated Septrmber 7, 1956, cannot in
" -
the circumstances be called an order· of review
which he had no power to p1188.
The contention
therefore under this head must fail.
Turning now to the other contention, namely,
that the order of September 7, I9r>6, was bad because the two assessors were not associated with
Mr .• Justice Jamuar wheu the order WM passed, it is
.,uough to say that under s. 24 (I) the inquiry is
held hy a compd,ent person appointed for the purpose and assessor are appointed to assist tho pnson
appointed to hold the inquiry.
Even so, the person
who holdll the inquiry is the person appointed to
do Hu and the assessors need not in our opinion be
aSMoci .. 100 wiLl1 him in all orders whiob are in the
nature of mini8terial orders and quantification of
expenses must be treated as an or !er of a minist,..,rial nature. It is not disputed that tlie asseBl!ors
were as•nciatod with Mr. J usticti .Jamuar when the
report of Septem her 26, l9ii5, wll.ll made and it was
ordered that the owners should pay th" expenses
of the ;nquiry. That was in 1.ur opinion the order
of th•• court of inquiry M to payment of expenses
and in that tho asaossors were associated. The
later ord•,r wo.~ mere quantific,.tion of that and it ,.-
was in our opinion not nccePMry that th•· !\HRC8~0r• •
sht.ultl hb IMll!ocia.t.od a.t thu.t blago u.luo, f1,r t.h,,
..
;
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l
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
order of quantification is more or less of a. ministerial nature and w&s made by the pel'!lon who was
appointed to hnld the inquiry. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the fac~ that the order
of Septe-r1ber 7, 1956, was p~ssedonly by Mr. Justice
Ja.muar and the assessors were not associated with
him would not make it invalid for this was merely
carrying out the order in the report of September 26,
1956 by which the owners were ordered to pay the
expenses of the inquiry and in that order the assessors were associated .. The contention on this head
also must therefore fail.
This brings us to the main contention raised
on behalf of the respondents, namely, that the
court of inquiry became functus officio when the
report was made on September 26, 1955, and thereafter it was not open to Mr. Justice Jamuar to p<iss
any order quantifying the expenses. Now it is not
in dispute that there was no time fixed within which
the report had to be made by the cqurt of inqniry.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the period for
which the court of inquiry was appointed came
necessarily to an end on September 26, 1955, and
so the court of inquiry became functus officio on
that dat~. If the court of inquiry when it submitted its report in this case on September 26, 1955
had ordered the owners to pA.y the expenses of the
inquiry and had added further that expenses would
be quantified later by the person holding the inquiry
it could not possibly be argued that it was not open
to the person appointed to hold the inquiry to
quantify the expenses later. But it is said that in
thid case though the court of inquiry ordered that
the expenses should be paid by the owners it did
not say in the report that the expenses to be paid
would be quantified later by the person appointed
to hold the inquiry.
·rhat is undoubtedly so.
But
we ha.ve to see what the order in the report of
September 26, 1955 by which the owners were
19112
S. S. GM<Wal
••
M/•.Bhouwa
Kankdflle c.lleritlJ
wa~ehar .T,
S.8.Gan1Ml
Y.
Mfs. Rhowra
Kakantt c.Jlnits
w .... 1too .1.
482 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
ordered to pa.y the expenses of the inquiry, necessarily implies. It is obvious thi.t the intention of
tne court of inquiry was that the owners should pa.y
the expenses. Generally it may not be poSBible to
quantify the expenses incurred in the inquiry a.t
that !ltage and a quantification of expenses would
ordinarily take place after the report is submitted.
It seems to us therefore clear that when a. court of
inquiry orders that the ownen1 shall pay the expenses such an order necessa.rily carries with it the
implication that the person appointed to hold the
inquiry would later quantify the expenses after
necessary materials a.re put before him. This is
exactly what happened in thie oa.se.
After the
order of the court of inquiry that the owners should
pay the expenses was known to the Chief Inspector
of Mines, he applied that the expenses should be
quantified and Mr. Justice Ja.mua.r passed the order
doing so.
The order therefore that was passed on
September 7, 1956, was merely a.
consequential
order to what the court of inquiry had decided on
:September 26, Hl55 a.nd in our view the earlier
order of September 26, 1955, had neoessarily implicit in it that the person appointed to hold the
inquiry would quantify the expenses as soon as the
materials for that purpose a.re placed before him.
It was not nece888ry therefore to aa.y in so many
words in the report of September 26, 1955, that the
expenses would be quantified by the person appointed to hold the inquiry later on mR teria\s being
placed before him. If this were not to be implicit
in the order that was ·p&88ed on September 26, 1955,
that order would be completely useleBS for it does
not specify the a.mount which could be recovered e.s
expenses. We a.re therefore of opinion tba.t when
such a.n order is pe.ssed in a report of a court of
inquiry it nece868rily ca.rries with it the imp\io'!.tion
that thA person appointed to hold the inquiry would
quantify the expeD86s later on materials being
'
·'
• '
't
2 s.c.R. ; SUPREME OOUR.T REPORTS
483
placed before him, as · otherwise such an order
would be rendered completely nugatory. Therefore, tmless we find anything in s; 24 which pre·
vents such an order of quantification being passed
later .. by the person appointed to hold tht> inquiry,
we see no reason why such a qu:mtification should
not be made later. We have also pointed out that
the order appointing the court of inquiry in this
::J.. case did not fix a date by which the report was to
be made. Therefore, in these circumstances we are
of opinion that It was open to Mr. Justice Jamuar
to quantify the expenses and that it was not necessary that at that stage the assessors should be
associated with him. We are therefore of opinion
that it cannot be said that the person appointed to
hold the inquiry was f unctus officio in this case and
could not quantify the expenses in accordance with
the direction contained in the report of September
26, 1955. The appeal is hereby allowed and the
'i
order of the High Court is set aside. The High
~ Court has allowed no costs in its order; in the
circumstances we think that the parties should bear
their own costs of this Court.
Appeal all.owe</, •
1962
S.S. GarWJal
v.
M/s. Bhowa
Kankanu Colleries
Wa11choo J.