# YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN - **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 1006 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1975-12-12 - **Bench:** H. R.· Khana, P. N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/yaish-college-v-lakshmi-narain-6691 - **Pages:** 28 ## Headnote Master and servant-Managing Committee of a college terminating ser- ~ c D E F G H vices of Principal of college_..:..Violatio11 of rule requiring Vice-Chancellor's approval-Rights of Principal. Specific Relief-Declaration dfi continuing in service when may be granted. The appellant is the Executive Committee of an Educational Institution (a college) registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act, and the college was affiliated to a University. The provisions of the University Act require that every decisiun of the management of an affiliated college to remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith to the Vice-Chancellor and subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes made by the University, shall not take effect unless approved by the' Vice.Chancellor. The respondent was appointed by the appellant as a Principal of the college but no agreement, as prescribed by the University Act, and the Statutes, was executed between the parties. Two 'years after his appointment, the appellant served a notice on the Principal directing him not to discharge the duties of the Principal and shortly thereafter terminated his services. Thereafter, the respondent did not work as Principal. The respondent filed a suit contending that he must be deemed to be continuing in service, as there was no sanction of the Vice-Chancellor for the termination of his services, a,nd prayed for an injunetion restraining the appellant from interfering with his duties as Principal of the institution. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the first appellate Court reversed the decision and the High Court affirmed the' decision of the first appellate Court. In appeal to ibis Court, it was contended that : (1) the appellant was no~ a statutory body; (2) in the absence of an agreement the requirement regarding the approval by the Vice-Chancellor would not apply and the termination of the respondent's services would be governed by the usual master and servant relntionship; (3) there are no special circumstances for enforcing the contract of personal service; and ( 4) the present case was not a fit one for granting the relief<> prayed for, they being equitable reliefs and in the discretion of the Court. Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD: (Per Khanna and Fazal Ali, JJ.). ( 1) Merely because the appellant followed certain statutory provisions of the University Act or the Statutes made thereunder, it cannot be held to be a statutory body. [1014 A-Bl (a) Before an institution can be a statutory body, it must be created by or under the statute a'!ld owe its existence to a statute. There is a well-marked dis'linction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which, after having come into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned. but is merely governed by the statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be a statutory body. [1013 D-1014 Al ; x YAISH COLLEGE V. LAKSHMI NARAIN 100 7 Suk/1dev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Others, A {1975] 3 S.C.R. 619, followed. ( b) Mwely because it was affiliated to the University; that there were certain mandatory provision9 of the University Act which were binding. on .the appellant; and the appellant was governed by the Statutes of the Umvers1ty. would not be sufficient ta alter the ·character and nature of the appellant and 'convert it into a statutory body. [1014 B-C] (i) The appellant had an independent status having been registered under B the Registration of Co-operative. Societies Act and was a self-governed or an autonomous body. It was affiliated to the University merely for the sake of convenience and mainly for the purpose of recogni ## Text _Characters 0–39,911 of 87,949. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39911 for what follows._ 1006 A EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF V AISH DEGREE COLLEGE, SHAMLI AND OTHERS \.', LAKSHMI NARAIN AND ORS. December 12, 1975 B [H. R.· KHANA, P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J Master and servant-Managing Committee of a college terminating ser- ~ c D E F G H vices of Principal of college_..:..Violatio11 of rule requiring Vice-Chancellor's approval-Rights of Principal. Specific Relief-Declaration dfi continuing in service when may be granted. The appellant is the Executive Committee of an Educational Institution (a college) registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act, and the college was affiliated to a University. The provisions of the University Act require that every decisiun of the management of an affiliated college to remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith to the Vice-Chancellor and subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes made by the University, shall not take effect unless approved by the' Vice.Chancellor. The respondent was appointed by the appellant as a Principal of the college but no agreement, as prescribed by the University Act, and the Statutes, was executed between the parties. Two 'years after his appointment, the appellant served a notice on the Principal directing him not to discharge the duties of the Principal and shortly thereafter terminated his services. Thereafter, the respondent did not work as Principal. The respondent filed a suit contending that he must be deemed to be continuing in service, as there was no sanction of the Vice-Chancellor for the termination of his services, a,nd prayed for an injunetion restraining the appellant from interfering with his duties as Principal of the institution. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the first appellate Court reversed the decision and the High Court affirmed the' decision of the first appellate Court. In appeal to ibis Court, it was contended that : (1) the appellant was no~ a statutory body; (2) in the absence of an agreement the requirement regarding the approval by the Vice-Chancellor would not apply and the termination of the respondent's services would be governed by the usual master and servant relntionship; (3) there are no special circumstances for enforcing the contract of personal service; and ( 4) the present case was not a fit one for granting the relief<> prayed for, they being equitable reliefs and in the discretion of the Court. Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD: (Per Khanna and Fazal Ali, JJ.). ( 1) Merely because the appellant followed certain statutory provisions of the University Act or the Statutes made thereunder, it cannot be held to be a statutory body. [1014 A-Bl (a) Before an institution can be a statutory body, it must be created by or under the statute a'!ld owe its existence to a statute. There is a well-marked dis'linction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which, after having come into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned. but is merely governed by the statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be a statutory body. [1013 D-1014 Al ; x YAISH COLLEGE V. LAKSHMI NARAIN 100 7 Suk/1dev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Others, A {1975] 3 S.C.R. 619, followed. ( b) Mwely because it was affiliated to the University; that there were certain mandatory provision9 of the University Act which were binding. on .the appellant; and the appellant was governed by the Statutes of the Umvers1ty. would not be sufficient ta alter the ·character and nature of the appellant and 'convert it into a statutory body. [1014 B-C] (i) The appellant had an independent status having been registered under B the Registration of Co-operative. Societies Act and was a self-governed or an autonomous body. It was affiliated to the University merely for the sake of convenience and mainly for the purpose of recognition of its courses of study by the University. [1014 C-D] · (ii) All that Statute, 14A of the University required was that the Managing Committee of the college must co-opt the Principal of the college and a repre • . sen!ative of the. teachers. By co-opting them the appellant did not lose its inde· pendent status but continued to remain a non-statutory and autonomous C body. [1014 F-G] (iii) Similarly, the fact that the Statutes of the University were adopted by the appellant and it was, as a matter of convention, bound to follow the provision~ of the University Act, would not clothe the appellant with a statutory status or character. The adoption of the Statutes was only for better governance and administration and extension of the educational activities of the institution. [1014 G-H] Sabhajit Tewc:•·y v. Union of lni:lia· &. Ors. [1975] 3 S.C.R. 616 and Kumari Repina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School & Anr. [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 6, followed. (2) The case of P. R. Jodh v. A. L. Pcmde [1965] 2 S.C.R. 713, on which the High Court relied, is distingui9hable. The High Court has not considered the basic facts present in that case, but which are not present in· the instant case, namely, (a) the governin_~ body in Jodh's case was itself a creature of the statute; (b) in tl)e instant case the Statutes did not apply pronio vigore but only after an agreement was executed between the employer and the employee as required by those provisions; and ( c) no agreement was ever executed between the parties in the prescribed form. [1018 C-D] Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Ne-rain College, [1972] 3 S.C.R. 320, 326, followed. (3 )(a) A contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court, normally, would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and that the employee even after having been removed from service, ca~ be de~med ~o be in service ag~inst the will and consent of the employer; This rule 1s snbiect to three exceptions, (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from. service in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311 · (ii) '\\~1ere a worker after dismissal is sought to be rein9tated under Industrial Law; and (iii) Where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the man. datory provisions of the Act. [1020 E-G] D E F Sirsi Municipality v. Kam Francis [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348;; Indian Airlines CorG poration v. Sukhdeo Rai [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 510, 514; S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra and Anr" [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55, 59, Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250, 265 and Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra [1970] 2 L.L.J. 54, 55, referred to. . ~ince the appellant is not a statutory body, the present case does not fall w1thm any of the excepted categories and the respondent is not entitled to any declaration or injunction. [1020 G-H] H (b) Assuming .that the Sirsi ¥unicipa!ity case has extended the scope of the exceptions to public or local lliodies even 1f they are non-statutory bodies so that, the appellant though a non-statutory body, will still be bound by the statutory A B 1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. provisions of law, in view of the special circumstances of this case, it wilt not be a prope1r exercise of discretion to grant a decree for declaration and injunction in favour of the respondent. The grant of specific relief is, under ss. 20 and 34 of the Specific Relief Ac'!, 1963 as well as under the Commori Law, purely di~crctionary and can be refus~d where .. the end> of justice do not require the relief to be granted. The exercise of' discretion applies as much to a Court exercising writ jurisdiction as well as in suits. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound legal principles and ex debito justitiae. The Court has to administer justice between the .varties and cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or an engine of oppression. The Cmtrt must keep in mind the well-settled principles of justice and fairplay and should exerci>e the discretion only if the ends of justice require it. [1021 C-D; 1022 A;. 1023 H-1024 D, E-F; 1025 F] · Jerome Francis v. Municipal Council/ors of Kuala Lumpur (1962) W.L.R. 1411: A. Francis v. Municipal Counci/lors of Kuala Lumpur (1962) 3 All. E.R. 633, 637 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L.R. 64 C J.A. 40, 53-54, applied. D E Malumt il!dra Narain Das v. Maham Gc•nga Ram & Anr., AIR 1965 All. 683, 684 and B/wirabendra Narayn Bhup v. State of Assam, A.LR. J 953 Assam 162, 165, referred to. Hill v. C. A. Parsons & Co. Ltd. (1971) 3 All. E.R. 1345, distinguished. rd. Jn the· present case, neither the first appellate Court nor the High Court, while decreeing the respondent's suit, consid~red whether it is a fit case in which the discretion should be exercised in favour of the respondent. [1024 D-E] (i) The respondent served the institution only for two years. If relief as prayed for i~ granted to him, he would have to be paid salary and interest for nine years which: would amount to more than a lakh of rupees, even though he1 had not done any work for the, college during those years; and. (ii) though the respondent is not at fault, the payment of such a large. sum would undoubtedly work s•erious injustice td the appellant because it is likely to destroy the very existence of the Institution. [1024 G-1025 BJ Therefore, instead of' granting the relief to the respondent as prayed for, if he is allowed to withdraw and keep the sum of about Rs. 21,000/- deposited by the appellant by virtue of interlocutory orders towards the salary of the respondent, it will vindicate his stand and compensate him for any hardship caused to him by terminating his services and will put a stamp of finality to any fu_rther litigation between them. [I 025 C-F] F (Per Bhagwati, J.) : G H T!>is Court has laid down three exceptions to the rule under the Common Law that the Cour~ will not ordinarily force an employe•r to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ : (I) In the case of a public servant di9missed from service in contravention of Art. 311; (2) Under the Industrial Law; and (3) When a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. [1030 B-C, F-G] Dr. S. B. Dutta v. University, of Delhi A.T.R. 1958 S.C. 1050; Life f11Surance Corporation of lmf1a v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee A.LR. 1964 S.C. 847; Mafat/al Ba.rdt v. Divi.sional Control/er, State Transport, Mahsana AJ.R. 1966 S.C. 1364; B. N. Tewari v. District Board, Agre.\ A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1680; U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250; bzdian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 510 and Bank! o'f Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra [1970] 2 L.L.J. 54, referred to. But, these 3 exceptions formulated in the statement. of law laid dO\~n ·by this Court, are not intended to be and cannot be exhaus!Ive. The categories of exceptions to the general rule should not be closed, because, ~ny attempt at rigid and exhaustive formulation of legal rules is bound .to sttfle the gr~wth of Jaw and cripple its capacity ta adapt itself ~o the changing needs of. society. In fact, in the Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Francis [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348, this Court JI • + .. • , VAISH COLLEGE V. LAKSHMI NARAIN 1009 pointed out !hat the third exception applied not only to employees in the serA vice oi' "bodie9 created under statutes" but also to those in the employment of '"mher public or local authorities". This exception is really intended to cover cases where by reason of breach of mandatory obligation imposed by law, as distinct from contract, the termination Qf service is null and void so that there is in law no repudiation at all. [1031 C-FJ . Where the relationship between the employer and his employee is gov·erned by statute or statutory regulations the termination of the service of the employee may, in a given situation, be null and void, and in that event, it would not have B ~ the effect of putting an end to the contract .and the employee would be entitled · to a declaration that his service is continuing. What the employee would be claiming in such! a case is not enforcement of contract of personal service· but declaration of statutory invalidity of an acr done by the employer. [1029 A-DJ Jn the present case, it is not necessary to decide whether the appellant is or io; not a statutory body or a publi<; authority or whether the Statutes of the University had the force or law conferring rights on the respondent as in the case of P. R. Jodh v. A. L. Pande [1965] 2 S.C.R. 713, or that they only set out C the terms and condiiions which confe.rred no legal rights unless and until they were embodied in a contract between the appellant and the respondent, as in the case of V. R. Mishra v. Managing Co111111ittee, Slll'i Jai Narain College [1972] 3 SCR 320. n6, because, the termination of the respondent'9 services was ineffective and inoperative as it was not approved by the Vice-ChancelloT as required by the University Act. The· language of the section of the University Act is absolute and peremptory and provides in unambiguous te~ms that the termination ~hall be ineffective and inoperative unless approved by the ViceD Chancellor; and this rule· of law, enacted by the Legislature, operates iTres. pective of whether the management is or is not a statutory body. When the Court refuses to recognise the termination as valid, it only enforces the Jaw and there i~ no question of transgressing the principle that a contract of personal service cannot be •~nforced. [1031 F-10320] Therefore, the termination of the services of the respondent by the appellant was ineffective and void and did not operative to put an end to the employment. Hence, ordinarily the responderit, whose termination of service is thus null and E void or ineffective by reason of a statutory provision or subordinate legislation which has the force of law, should be awarded a declaration that he continues in service and the fact that he was in employment only for a short pe,riod of two years should be no ground for refusing him the declaration. [1032 D-F G~ ' But, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances ot this case and since !he grant of too relief is in the discretion of the Court, it must be he'id that this 1s not a proper case for the grant of such relief. If the relief of declaration and i~junctiop_ is granted to the respondent, it wilJ involve the appellant in a financ1_al ha~1hty o_f more than a lakh of rupees and that would wipe out the educat.1on~I mshtuhon of the_ a~p7llant or in any event seriously cripple it and that, m its turn, would preJud1c1aliy affect the interests or the student community. That· is an important consideration which the Court cannot fail to take into account. in exercising its discretion. Mcy-eover, the aggregate amount of about Rs. 21,000/- deposited by the appellant fo Court would be a fair and just compensation to the respondent. [1032 F,-G, H-1033 BJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 1543 of 1974 . Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th July, 1974 of the Allahab,ad High Court in Second Appeal No. 2973 of 1972. F G S. V. Gupte, .T. P. Goyal, P. C. Gupta and G. S. Chatterjee for the Appellant. · · H M. K. Ramamurthi and 0. P. Rana for Respondent No. I. D. P. Mukherjee for Respondents 3-5. / A ~ B c D E F G H 1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 2 S.C.R. The Judgment of H. R. Khanna and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ. was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., P. N. Bhagwati, J. gave a separate opinion. FAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave js directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the deci:ee of the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar by which the plaintiff/respondent's suitfor injunction was decreed. The appeal arises in the follo..ying circumstances. The appellant · which is the Executive Committee of Yaish Degree College in the District of Muzaffarnagar was registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act as an institution for imparting education. The affairs of the College were managed by the Executive Committee of the Yaish College which is the appellant in this case. In the year 1957 the Yaish Degree College was affiliated to the Agra University and as a consequence thereof the College agreed to be governed by the provisions of the Agra University Act and the satutes and ordinances made thereunder. With the establishment of the Meerut University some time in the year 1965 the Yaish Degree College got affiliated to the Meerut University. The plaintiff/respondent was appointed as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from July 1, 1964 and his appointment as Principal was formally approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University. 'iwo years later it appears that differences arose between the Executive Committee of the College and the plaintiff/respondent resulting in allegations and coun- · ter-allegations and culminating in a notice served by the Executive Committee on October 24, 1966 on the plaintiff/respondent directing him not to discharge the duties of the Principal and another letter was sent to defendant No. 4 a member of the staff of the College to officiate as Principal in place of the plaintiff/respondent. This was followed up by a counter-notice by the plaintiff/respondent to the Executive Committee that the notice sent to him was illegal and the respondent also asked defendant No. 4 not to assume charge of the Principal. On March 12, 1967, the Executive Committee by a resolution terminated the services of the plaintiff/ respondent with effect from October 24, 1966 and this resolution was amended by another resolution on March 29, 1967. Even before the formal resolution terminating the services of the plaintiff/respondent was passed it appears that the plaintiff had filed the present suit on October 28, 1966 before the Court of the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar which was transferred for disposal to the Court of the Munsif, Kairana. The plaintiff's case was that on being affiliated to the Agra. University and thereafter to the Meerut University and adopting the provisions of the Acts and the statutes of the said Universities the appellant College became a statutory body and had no jurisdiction to terminate the services of the plaintiff/respondent without seeking the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The plaintiff furth~r submitted t~at after his appointment he entered into an agreement with the Executive Committee in accordance with the statutes of the University and the appellant was bound by the terms and provisions of the statutes under • "· ' YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Fazal, Ali. J.) 10 11 which his services could not be terminated without the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The plaintiff therefore contended that his removal from service was without jurisdiction and he must be deemed to have continued in service. He also made some allegations of bias and mala fides against the Executive Committee and some other persons with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The plaintiff. accordingly prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his duties as the Principal of the College. It appears, however, from the record that after the notice given to the plaintiff/ respondent by the Executive Committee the plaintiff was bereft of all his powers and in spite of his attempts to get into the College and work as Principal he was not allowed to do so which led to some criminal proceedings also. It is, therefore, clear that at least after the resolution of the Executive Committee was passed tenninatin:i, the services of the plaintiff he· has not been working as Principal of the College uptil now. This position is not disputed before us by counsel for the parties. The defence was that the Executive Committee was not a statutory_ body and therefore was not bound by the statutes and the provisions of the University Acts although as a matter of convention it had agreed to follow the same. The defendant/appellant also denied the allegations of the plaintiff/ respondent that the Executive Committee had entered into any agreement or contract of service wiih the plaintiff/ respondent. The defendant further alleged that as the plaintiff/ respondent remained habitually and perpetually absent from his duties, without the permission of the concerned authority the cleiendant/ appellant was compelled to dispense with the services of the plaintiff/respondent. In fact the plea taken by the defendant was that the plaintiff himself by his remaining perpetually absent from duties abandoned the service and had put an end to the contract of service and therefore he could riot be heard to say that the contract of service still subsisted. The Trial Court of Munsif, Kairana, framed a number of issues and after considering the evidence and the circumstances, found--(i) that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he ever executed any agreement with the defendant/appellant; and (ii) that the defendant/appellant was not a statutory body and therefore was not bound by the provisions of the University Acts or the statutes made thereunder. The learned Munsif therefore found that a case for declaration or injunction had npt been made out and he accordingly dismi:;sed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff/respondent went up in appeal against the judgment and decree of the Munsif and the appeal was heard by the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, who by his order dated December 3, 1971, reversed the decision of the Munsif and decreed the plaintiff's snit and granted the injunction prayed for. It may be noticed that so far as the plea of the plaintiff/respondent that be had executed an agreement with the Executive Committee of_ the College which formed the basis of the terms of his ccntract of service was concerned the learned Additional Civil & Sessions Judge abo affirmed the finding of the Munsif on this point and held that there was no such A B c D E F G H A 1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R, agreement. Even before us this finding was not disputed by the learn· cd coun~el for the plaintiff/respondent who has proceeded on the ~ssumpt10n that there was no agreement executed between the plaintiff and the defendant as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendant/appellant filed a second appeal in the High Court of Allahabad against the decision of the First Additional Civil & B Sessions Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The matter was heard by a single Judge who, however, referred the case (<) a Full Bench framing the following issue : f c D E F G H "Can the Civil Court grant the relief of injunction in view of the facts and circumstances. of the present case ?" Consequently the matter was placed before the Full Dench of _ the Allahabad High Court which after hearing the arguments decided the following points 'in favour of the plaintiff/respondent : ( 1) That the defendant/ appellant being a stautory body was· bound by the provisions of the University Acts and the statutes made thereunder and therefore the termination of the services of the plaintiff/ respondent without obtaining the sanction of the Vice-Chancellor was illegal & invalid; and (2) That in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to the injunction as prayed for. / The case then came back before the Single Judge who in view of the decision of the Full Bench affirmed the decree of the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit with the modification that the suit was decreed only against defendants 2, 4, 6 & 7 but dismissed as against defendants 1 & 5. Hence this appeal by special leave before us. Mr. Gupte learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that it was not necessary to go into the complicated facts of t}le case, because he adumbrated three propositions of law before us, which in his opinion were sufficient to decide the case. In the first place it was contended that the finding of the Full Bench which formed the basis of tile judgment of the High Court appealed against that the defendant/ appellant was a statutory body was legally erroneous; secondly the counsel submitted that even if the appell!i:nt was a statutory body as no agreement was executed between the respondent and the appellant the statutes passed by the University would not apply and the termination of the services of the respondent would be governed by the usual master and servant relationship; and thirdly, it was contended that it is well settled that the courts do not enforce a contract of personal service in the absence of special circumstances as laid by several decisions of this Court, and the case in hand does not fall within any of the exceptions laid down by this Court. Mr. Ramamurthi learned counsel for the respo11dent rebutted the arguments of Mr. Gupte and supported the judgment of .the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the appellant was a statutory body , ,. YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Faza/, Ali. /.) 1013 and therefore the termination of the servi-;es of the respondent was A legally invalid. It was further contende.d that in view of the decision of this Court in Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Farncis( 1) the scope of the ' exception laid down by this Court in various cases has been extended even to include within its fold non-statutory· bodies provided they are public or local bodies which the appellant/defendant was undoubtedly one. Lastly it was submitted that once it is established that the termination of thtt services of the respondent was legally invalid inasmuch :S. as the sanction of the Vice-Chancellor was not obtained, the declaration that the plaintiff/respondent continued in service and injunction prayed for must be granted as a matter of law. In the course of the arguments, however, the learned counsel for the appdlant also suggested that the relief of injunction or declaration being an equitable relief and in the discretion of this Court this was not a li.t case in which this discretion should be exercised in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. C We would first deal with the important question, which has been the sheet-anchor of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent as also the main basis of the judgment of tl\c Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, as to whether or not the appellant Executive Committee can be said to be a statutory body in the circumstances of the present case. · It seems to us that before an institution can be a statutory body it must be created by or under the statute and owe its existence to a statute. This must be the primary thing which has got to be established. 'Here a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. There have been a number of institutions which though not created by or under any statute have adopted certain statutory provisions, but that by itself is not, in our opinion, sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory character. In Sukhdev Si11gh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raglzuvanshi & others('.!) this Court clearly pointed out as to what constitutes a statutory body. In this connection my Lord A. N. Ray, C. J., observed as follows : " A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not a ~tatu tory body because it is not created by the statute. It is a body created in accordance with the provisions of the statute." D E F It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked Jistinction between G a body which is created by the statute and a body whid1 after having· come into exist~nce is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountain-head of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked ·is, if there is no statute would the institution have anv legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, H but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any (I) [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348. (2) fl 975] 3 S.C.R. 619. A ·C 10 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. reference to the statute ceonccrned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body. The High Court, in our opinion, was in error in holding that merely because the Executive Committee followed certain statutory provisions of the University Act or the statutes made thereunder it must be deemed to be a statutory body. In fact the Full Bench of the High Court relied on three circumstances in order to hold that the Executive Committee was a statutory body, viz., (i) that it was affiliated to the Agra University which was established by the statute; (ii) that there were certain mandatory provisions in the Agra University Act which were binding on the Executive Committee; and (iii) that the Executive Committee was governed by the statutes framed by the Agra University. In .our opinion, none of these factors would be sufficient to alter the character and nature of the Executive Committee and conwrt it into a fullfiedged statutory body. To begin with the Executive Committee had an independent status having been registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and was a self-governed or an autonomous body. It was affiliated fo the Agra University merely for the sake of convenience and mainly for the purpose that the courses of studies prevalent in t)'ie College may be recognised by the University. Statute 14-A of the Agra University Hand-Book (1965-66) runs thus: "Each College, already affiliated or when afliliatcd, wbich is not maintained exclusively by Government must be under the Management of a regularly constituted Governing body (which term includes Managing Committee) on which the staff of the college shall be represented by the Principal of the college and at least one representative of the teachers of the .:ollege to be appointed by rotation in order of seniority determined by length of service in the college, who shall hold office for one academic year.'' All that the statute of the Agra University required was that the Managing Committee of the College must co-opt the Principal of the College and one representative of the teachers of the college by rotation as members of the Committee. It is manifest that by co-opting these members the Managing Committee did not lose its independent status but continued to remain a non-statutory and autonomous body. Similarly the mere fact that the statutes of the University were adopted by the Managing Committee and it was as a matter of convention bound to follow the statutory provisions of the Act wouid not clothe the Managing Committee with a statutory status or character. ln fact the adoption of the statutes was agreed to by the appellant Executive Comrnittee for the better governance, administration and extension of the educational activities of the institution. In fact an identical argument which forms the basis of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court had been advanced before this Court and rejected outright. For instance in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India & Ors.( 1) the question was whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which (I) [1975] 3 S.C.R. 616. r , VAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Fazal Ali, J.) 1015 was a society registered under the Societies Regi~tration Act, as the A present appellant is, was a statutory body. It was urged that becaus.e the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research had government nominees as the President of the body and derived guidance and 11nancial aid from the Government, it was a statutory body A. N. Ray, C.J., rebutted these arguments and observed as follows : "The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the. Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to spec;ial institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner." Similar view was taken by this Court in· Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School & Anr.(1) where this Court observed as follows: "But it cannot also be gainsaid that as the Government has ·the power, to admit schools to recognition and grantsin-aid, it can, de hors the Act, lay down conditions under which it would grant recognition and aid. To achieve uniformity and certainty in the exercise of such executive .power and to avoid discrimination, the Government would have to frame rules which, however, would be in the form of administrative instructions to its .officers, dealin