# YOGENDRA NATH NASKAR v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 742
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-02-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 690 • 694 of 1968
- **Bench:** I. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/yogendra-nath-naskar-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-calcutta-4636
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

8
Income-tax A.ct (11 of 1922)-Hindu Deity-If can be tax.<d througlt
shebtlits.
Finding that the assessments of the income from the properties of two
Hindu. deities in the hands of its shebaits as trustees were set aside on th~
footing that the status of the assessees had not been correctly determined,
the Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings for the assessments again!ft th~
shebaita of the deities and c:Ompleted the assessments on the deities in th!!
statuo of an individual and through the shebaits. On the question wh<ther
tlae auessments on the deities through the i;hebaits were in accordance
with law,
HELD : The Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property
and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusteJ with the possession and management of its proper.ty.
A Hindu deity fell within the meaning of the word 'individual' under
s. 3 of the Act ;,.ind couid be treated as a unit of assessment undl!r the
section and was capable of being taxed through its shebaits.
Tne word
'individual' in s. 3 of the 1922 Act included within its connotation al!
artificial juridical persons and this legal position was n1ade explicit and
beyond challenge in the 1961 Act. (750 C; 751 DJ
Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law.
But liO far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of rh.:-
particular purpose whic.in is indicated by the donor; it can figure as a legat
persoo and in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it. Th,:-r~
is no principle why a deity as such a legal person should not bt! taxed
if such a legal person is allowed in law to own property even though in
·the ideal sense and to sue, for the prvperty, to realise rer..t and to dcfen\.~
such property in a court of law again in the ideal sense. [749 F]
Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmira1n, I.L.R. 12 Born. 247;
Vidyap1!l'J11!
Tirtha Swami v. Vi<l,vo·nldhi Tirtha Swami & Ors., !.L.R. 27 ~fad. 435;
.Maharan~t Shibessouree Dehia v. Mothocrariath Acharjo, 13 1\1.L:A. 270;
./'rosanna Kw:ir.ri Dcbya v. Golab Chand Baboo,
L.R.
2
I.A.
145;
l'ramotha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick & Ors., 52 I.A.
c
D
E
F
245; Bhupati v. Ram/al, 10 C.L.J. 355; Hindu Law of Religious & Clra1·i1G
·ahl~ Trust by Mr. B. K. 1\lukherjea; The Commissioner of lncome•tax,
Madhya Pradesh & JJhopal v. Sodra Devi, (1958] S.C.R. I; Cape Br«ndy
Syndical~ v. l.R.C., (1921] 2 K.B. 403 and Attorney General v. Clarkson,
.(1900] 1 Q.B. 156. referred to.
·

## Text

YOGENDRA NATH NASKAR
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA
February 18, 1969
A
{I. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.)
8
Income-tax A.ct (11 of 1922)-Hindu Deity-If can be tax.<d througlt
shebtlits.
Finding that the assessments of the income from the properties of two
Hindu. deities in the hands of its shebaits as trustees were set aside on th~
footing that the status of the assessees had not been correctly determined,
the Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings for the assessments again!ft th~
shebaita of the deities and c:Ompleted the assessments on the deities in th!!
statuo of an individual and through the shebaits. On the question wh<ther
tlae auessments on the deities through the i;hebaits were in accordance
with law,
HELD : The Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property
and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusteJ with the possession and management of its proper.ty.
A Hindu deity fell within the meaning of the word 'individual' under
s. 3 of the Act ;,.ind couid be treated as a unit of assessment undl!r the
section and was capable of being taxed through its shebaits.
Tne word
'individual' in s. 3 of the 1922 Act included within its connotation al!
artificial juridical persons and this legal position was n1ade explicit and
beyond challenge in the 1961 Act. (750 C; 751 DJ
Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law.
But liO far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of rh.:-
particular purpose whic.in is indicated by the donor; it can figure as a legat
persoo and in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it. Th,:-r~
is no principle why a deity as such a legal person should not bt! taxed
if such a legal person is allowed in law to own property even though in
·the ideal sense and to sue, for the prvperty, to realise rer..t and to dcfen\.~
such property in a court of law again in the ideal sense. [749 F]
Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmira1n, I.L.R. 12 Born. 247;
Vidyap1!l'J11!
Tirtha Swami v. Vi<l,vo·nldhi Tirtha Swami & Ors., !.L.R. 27 ~fad. 435;
.Maharan~t Shibessouree Dehia v. Mothocrariath Acharjo, 13 1\1.L:A. 270;
./'rosanna Kw:ir.ri Dcbya v. Golab Chand Baboo,
L.R.
2
I.A.
145;
l'ramotha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick & Ors., 52 I.A.
c
D
E
F
245; Bhupati v. Ram/al, 10 C.L.J. 355; Hindu Law of Religious & Clra1·i1G
·ahl~ Trust by Mr. B. K. 1\lukherjea; The Commissioner of lncome•tax,
Madhya Pradesh & JJhopal v. Sodra Devi, (1958] S.C.R. I; Cape Br«ndy
Syndical~ v. l.R.C., (1921] 2 K.B. 403 and Attorney General v. Clarkson,
.(1900] 1 Q.B. 156. referred to.
·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 690 •
694 of 1968.
Appeals from the i.udgment and order dated April 3
4, 5.
1965 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference 1'1o. 50
of 1961.
ff
-·
Y. N, NASKAR v. C,I.T. (Ramaswami, I.)
743
A
M. c. Chagla and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant (i;n all
·C
D
E
F
G
H
the appeals).
S. T. Desai, G. C. Sharma and B. D. Sharma, for the ·reopondent (in all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J.
These appeals are brought from the judg-
:11.cnt of the Calcutta High CoUrt dated 3rd, 4th and 5th April,
1965 in Income Tax Reference No. 50 ot 1961 on a certificate
granted under section 66A of the Iμdian Income Tax, Act, 1922
(hereinafter called the Act).
One Ram Kristo Naskar left a will dated 17th May, 1899
by which he left certain properties as debuttar to two deities Sri
Sri Iswar Kubereswar Mahadeb Thakur and Sri Sri Anandamoyee Kalimata in the land adjoining hi.s residential house at
7 4 /7 5 Beliaghata Main Road.
He appointed his two adopted
sons Hem Chandra Naskar (since deceased) and Yogendra Nath
N askar as the shebaits. Elaborate provision was made as to the
liWmer in which the income from the property was to be spent.
For a long time the income from the property was assessed in
the hands of the shebaits as trustees. In respect of the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52, the two shebaits contended
that there was no trust executed ~n the case and as such the
income from the property did ·not attract liability to tax and
particularly the assessments made in the name of Hem Chandra
]'(askar and his brother Yogendra Nath Naskar as
trustees of
the debuttar estate could not
be sustained.
The Appellate
Assistant Commissioner accepted this contention oo appeal and
set aside the assessments.
finding that the
assessments have
been set aside on the footing that the status of the assessee.; had
aot been correctly determined the Income Tax Officer initiated
proceecliiugs for the assessment years
1952-53
and
1953-54
a!Jlinst Hem Chandra Naskar and Yogendra Nath Naskar, the
shebaits of the two deities and completed the assessments on the
deities in the status of an individual and through the shebaits.
The claim for exemption under the proviso to section 4(3)(i)
of the Income Tax Act was rejected. On appeal the Appell.ate
Assistant Commissiqner upheld the assessment orders of the
Income· Tax Officer.
The assessee appealed to the Appellate
Tribunal and coatended that the deities were not chargeable·
to tax under s. 3 of the Act; that section 41 of the Act did not
apply to the facts of the case.
Though the shebaits were the
managers who could come under the ambit of section 41, they
had not been appointed by or under lli!l!y order of the court and
dlercfore the assessments were invalid and should be set aside.
It was also contended that the case of the trustee having been
1pccifically giwn . up it would not be open to the Income Tax
7H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] 3 S.C.R.
Department to bring the shebaits upder any of the
categori~
mentioned in section 4 L
The departmental representative
contended that the assessments bad been made on the shebaits
not under section 41 as trustees or managers but that the deities
had beem assessed as individuals and that section 41
was a
surplusage in. making the assessments. The Tribunal held that
though the shebaits were the managers for the purpose of
section 41, they were not so appointed by or under any order
of ·the court, and, .therefore, the second condition required by
· section 41 was not fulfilled, and the shebaits could pPt be proceeded against.
The' Appellate Tribunal added that the specific
provision which the Tribunal first relied. was that of trustees
under section 41, but that case having been given up the further
attempt to a5sess the shebaits as managers .under section 41
could not be upheld .. At the insta,nce of the Commissioner of
Income Tax, the Appellate Tribunal referred the _ followin~ ·
question of law for the opinion of the High Court 'Q,rider section
66(1) of the Act:
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case, the assessment on the deities through the
shebaits under the provisions of section 41
of the
·Indian Income Tax Act were in accordance ··with
law?"
After having heard learned cOunSel for both the parties we
B
c
D
are satisfied that in the question referred by . the Appellate
E
Tribunal the words 'under the provisions of section 41 of the
,
Indian Income Tax Act' should be deleted as superfluous and
the question' should be modified in the follo,wing manner to
bring out the question in real controversy between the parties :
"Whether ari the facts and in the
circumstances
of the case, the assessments on the deities through the
F .
shebaits were in accordance with law."
The main question hence presented for determination in
these appe'als is whether a Hindu deity can be treated aS a unit .
of assessment under section 3 mid 4 of the Income Tax Act,
1922.
G
It is well. established by high authorities that a Hindu idol
is. a juristic person in whom the dedicated property vests. In
\
Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram(') called the Dakor temple case,
\
West and Birdwood, JJ. state:
.
.
. ·
·
·
' "The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those
derived from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies
H
with rights of property vested m the corporation apart
(1) I.L.R. 12 Born. 247.
A
I
c
D
E
F
G
H
Y. N. NASKAR v. C,I.T. (Rnmaswami, J.)
745
from its individual members but also juridical persons
called foundations.
A Hindu who wishes to establish
a religious or charitable institution may according to
his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler
will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far
at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conceptiQll or morality. A trust is not required for the
purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the
English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the
Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with
the grants having been made to the juridical person
symbolised or pernonified in the iclol".
The same view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in
Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors. ( 1)
ill which Mr. Justice Subrahmania Ayyar stated :
"It is to give due effect to such a sentiment, widespread and deep-rooteq as it has always been, with
reference to something not capable of holding property
·as a natural per.;on, that the laws of most countries
have sanctioned the creation ol a fictitious person in
the matter as is implied in the felicitous observation
made in the work already cited "Perhaps the oldest of
all juristic pernons is the God, hero or the saint"
(Pollock and Maitla.nd's History of English Law,
Volume I, 481).
That the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple
is
a juridical pernon has been expl'a%1y laid down in
Manohar Ganesh's
case('),
which Mr.
Prannath
Saraswati, the author of the 'Tagore Lectures on
Endowments' rightly enough speaks ol as one ranking
as the leading case on the subject, and in which West
J., discusses the whole matter with much erudition.
And in more than one case, the decision of the Judicial Committee proceeds on precisely the same footing
(Maharanee Shibessouree
Dehia v.
Mothocrapath
Acharjo(1 )
and Pr0sanna Kumari Debya v. Golab
Chand Baboo(•). Such ascription of legal personality
to a,n idol must however be incomplete unless it be Jinked
of human guardians for them variously designated in
Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo(•) the Judicial Committee observed thus : 'It is only in an ideal sense that
(t) I.LR. 27 Mad. 435.
(2) 1.l.R. 12 Born. 247.
(3) 13 M.l.A. 270.
(4) L.R. 2 I.A. 145.
746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C. R.
property can be said to belong to an idol and the
possession and managemi;nt must in the nature of things
be entrusted with some person as shebait or manager.
It would seem to follow that the person so entrusted
must be necessity be empowered to do whatever may
be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit
and preservation of its property at least to as great a
degree as the manager of an infant heir'-words which
seem to be almost on echo of what was said in relation
to a church in a judgment of the days of Edward I :
'A church is always under age and is to be treated as
an infant and it is not according to law that infants
should be disinherited by the negligence of their guar-
. / dians or be barred of an action in case th_ey
would
./ complain of things wrongfully done by their guardians
while they
are under ·age' (Pollock and Maitland's
'History of English Law', Volume I, 483".
In Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick &:
Ors.( 1) Lord Shaw observed:
."A Hindu idol is, according to long . established
authority, founded upon the religious customs of the
Hindus, and the recog1tiition thereof by Courts of law,
a 'juristic entity'. It has a juridical status with the
power of suing and being sued.
Its interests are
attended to by the person who has the deity in his
charge and who -is in law its manager with all the
powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an
infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities; .
- for this doctrine thus simply stated, is
firmly estal>-
lished".
It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the
idol is· not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that
the image itself develops. into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is _111ot
also correct that the supreme being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
This is clearly laid down in authoritative Sanskrit Texts. Thus,
in his Bhashya on the Purva Mimamsa, Adhyaya 9, Pada I, Sabara
Swami states :
·
~T ~'l:r'1';'1fa,
'3"'!'11('11\'lli._ I
'IT
'Rf>r~a'
f<tf~ifl[frr,
~
'i'!'). I 'f 'I" m1f mf
"IT
(1) 52 I.A. 245.
A
c
n.
F
G
II
•
•
\.
\
,/
J
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Y. N. NASKAR v. C.I.T, (Ramaswami, J.)
747·
'f'nfmn<f
fef;p:r'f'T~ ~T I
ffi'l1A
<f5flf"<!i'l'olcf 11
..:>
..:>·
•
~'l'IJ<." I«· I ujj a <HT 'ITf<Nefa, ~<rarrf'tll'f 'fa <'f'R!lf I
"Words such as 'village of the Gods', 'land d the.Gods; are used.
in a figurative sense. That is property which c;¢ be said to
belong to a person, which he can make use of as he desires. God.
however does not make use of the village or lands, according to
its desires". Likewise, Medhathithi in commenting on the expression 'Devaswam' in Manu, Chapter XI, Verse 26 writes :
.... ~'fl'ffB<>:r,
.. llT'!TlG'
f'l"IT<l
<!'if
~·.
"'
"' "'"'
d~'lf'l'l ,' lf"'1<'! f'lffif!f<f'Flm', ~00 om'1'11?: I
...
"'
...
'
"Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means· whatever is abaindoned ..
for Gods, for. purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between
· the owner and the property owned, is 'impossible of application._
to Gods". Thus, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, 'aJ!ld they can be described
as their owners only in a figurative sense ( Gaunartha).
The
correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person._
recognised by law and in this juristic persOJil the dedicated pro- -
perty vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B. K. Mukherjea :
"With regard to Debutter, the position seems to be
somewhat different. What is personified here is not the
entire property which is dedicated to the deity but the
deity itself which is the central part of the foundation
and stands as the material symbol and embodiment of
the pious purpose which the dedicator has in view.
"The dedicatioin to deity", said Sir Lawrence Jenkins
in Bhupati v. Ram/a/(1 ) "is nothing but a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which · the
dedication is designed". It is not only a compendious
expression but a material embodiment: of the- pious
purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that
property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it
would be quite cQ'1Sistent with sound principles of
Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a· particular purpose can be given
the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of
the property which is dedicated to it."(2)
The legal position is comparable in many respects to the ·
development in Roman Law. So far as charitable endowment is
concerned Romalll. Law. as later developed recognised two kinds
of juristic persons.
One was a corporation or aggregate · of·
(I) JO C.L.J. 355 at 369.
(2) Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trust by M·r. B.K. lvfukherjee.
748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 s.c.R.
persons which owed its juristic personality to State sancti~n. A
private person might make over property by way . of gift or
legacy to a corporation already in existence and might at the
sa.me time prescribe the particular purpose for which the property
wu to be employed e.g. feeding the poor, or giving relief to the
poor or distressed. The recipient corporatiqib wpuld be in a
position of a trustee and would be legally bound to spend the
funds for the particular purpose. The other alternative was for
the donor to create an institution or foundation himself. This
would be a j!lew juristic person which depended for its origin
upon nothing else but the will of the founder provided it was
directed to a charitable purpose. The foundation would be the
owner of the dedicated property in the eye of law and the administrators would be in the position of trustees bound to carry
out the object of the foundation.
As observed by Sohm :
"During the later Empire-from the fifth
century
onward&--foundations created by private
individuals
came to be recognised as foundations in the true legal
iense, but only Ji they took the form of a ipia causli
('pium corpus') i.e. were devoted
to 'pious
uses',
only in short, if they
were
charitable institutions.
Wherever a person dedicated property-whether by
gift inter vivos or by will-ijll favour of th!l poor, or
the sick, or prisoners, orphans, or aged
people,
be
thereby created ipso facto a new subject of legal rights
-the poor-house, the hospital, and so forth-and the
dedicated property became the sole property of this
new subject; it became the sole property of the
new juristic person whom the founder had called into
being.
Roman Jaw, however, took the view that the
endowments ,of charitable fobndations were a species
of Church property. Pioe causae were subjected to
the control of the Church, that is, of the bishop or the
ecclisiastical administrator, as the case might be. A pitz
causa was regarded as an ecclisiastical, and consequently, as a public institution, and as such it shared that
corporate capacity which belonged ·to all ecclisiastical
institutions by virtue of a general rule of law.
A pia
causa did not require to have a juristic personality
expressly confered upon it.
According
to
Roman
law the act-whether a gift inter vivos or a testamentary disposition-whereby the founder dedicated property to charitable uses was sufficient, without more,
to constitute the pia causa a foundatioo in the legal
sense, to make it, in other words, a new subject o.f
legal rights"(').
(1) 111''.:i·ute of Roman L~w. 3rd Edition pp. 197-198.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Y. N. NASKAR v. C,I.T. (Ramaswami, J.)
749
A
We should, in this context, make a distinction between the
spiritual and the legal aspect of the llindu idol which is installed
and worshipped.
From the spiritual standpoint the idol may
be to the worshipper a symbol (pratika) of the Supreme Godhead intended to invoke a sense of the .vast and intimate reality,
and suggesting the essential truth of the R~ that is beyond
B all name or fonn.
It is basic postulate of Hindu religion that
different images do 'not represent different divinities, they are
really symbols of One Supreme Spirit and in whichever name
or fonn the deity is invoked, the Hindu worshipper purports to
worship the Supreme Spirit and nothing else.
c
D
~>it
fir.I ~ 3ff"111;
3\1§1 " ......
q;'!i ~ f'fl!T
qg~T <Rfli'I' I (Rig Veda I. 164)
(They have spoken of Him as Agni, Mitra, Varuna, Indra; the
one Existence the sages speak of in many) .
The Bhagavad
Gita echoes this verse when it says :
'"'!'
<r•ftsfr.i<:
~:
mrr~=
llorN~ <ii llf<r~ I (Chap. xi-3 9)
(Thou art Vayu and Yama, Agni, Varuna and Moon: Lord of
creation art Thou, and Grandsire).
Samkara, the great philosopher, refers to the one Reality, who,
E
owing to the diversity or intellects ( matibheda) is conventionally
spoken of (parikalpya) in various ways as Brahma, Visnu and
Mahesvara.
It is however possible that the founder of the endowment of the_ worshipper may not conceive on this highest
spiritual plane but hold that the idol is the very embodiment of
a' personal God, but that is not a matter with which the law is
concerned.
Neither God nor any supernatural being could be
F
a person in Jaw. But so far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated by
the donor, it can figure as a legal person. The true legal view
is that in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it.
There is no principle why a deity as such a legal person
should not be taxed if such a legal person is allowed in law to
G
own property even though in the ideal sense and to sue for the
property, to realise rent and ti> defend such property in a court
of law again in the ideal sense. -Our conclusion is that the
Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property and
of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusted with the
possession and management of its property. It was argued on
behalf of the appellant that the word 'individual' in s. 3 of the
H
Act should not be construed as including a Hindu deity because it
was not a real but a juristic person. We are unable to accept
this argument as correct. We see no reason why the meaning
LIOSup./69-13
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
of the word 'individual' in section 3 of the Act should be restricted to human being and not to juristic entities. In The Com-
.mlsioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh & Bhopal v. Sodra
Devi(') Mr. Justice Bhagwati pointed out as follows :
"the word 'individual' has not been defined in the
Act and there is authority, for the proposition that the
word 'individual' does not mean only a human being
but is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a unit. It has b~ held that the word 'individual'
includes a Corporation created by a statute, e.g., a
University or a Bar Council, or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated by a Baronetcy A.ct".
We are accordingly of opinion that a Hindu deity falls within
the meaning of the word fadividual" under section 3 of the Act
and can be treated as a unit of assessment under that section.
On behalf of the appellant Mr. Chagla referred to section 2
.sub-section (31) of the Income Tax Ad, 1961 (Act No. 49 of
A
B
c
1961 ) which states :
·
D
''2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires-
( 31) 'person' includes-
(i) an individual,
(ii) a Hindu undivided family,
(iii) a company,
(iv) a firm,
(v) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
(vi) a local authority, and
(vii) every artificial juridical
person,
not falling
within any of the preceding sub-clauses".
E
·Counsel, ~so referred to s. 2 ( 9) and s. 3 of the Income Tax Act,
G
1922 which state :
.
"2. In .this Act, unless th~re is anything repugnant
m the subject or context-
( 9) 'person' includes Hindu undivided family and
H
local authority".
(I) (1958] s.c.R. 1a1p,6.
Y. N. NASKAR v. C.I.T. (Ramaswami, !.)
751
A
"3. Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax
shall be charged for any year at ,any
rate or
rates,
tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that
year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions
of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family,
·B
company and local authority, and of every firm and
other association of persons or the partners of the
firm or the members of the association individually".
On a comparison of the provisions of the two Acts counsel on
behalf of the appellant contended that a restricted meaning
C
should be given to the word 'individual' in section 3 of the
earlier Act. We see no justification for this argument. On the
other hand, we are of the opinion that the language employed
in 1961 Act may be relied upon as a Parliamentary exposition
of the earlier Act even on the assumption that the language
employed in section 3 of the earlier Act is ambiguous.
It is
clear that the word 'individual' in section 3 of the
1922 Act
D
includes within its connotation all artificial juridical persons and
this legal position is made explicit and beyond challenge in the
1961 Act. ln Cape Brandy Synilicate v. I.R.C.(1), Lord Sterndale
M.R. sfild:
'
E
F
"I think it is clearly established in A. ttorney Gen·
era! v. Clarkson(') that subsequent legislation may be
looked at in order to see the proper construction to be
put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous.
I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it
proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous
legislation cannot alter that previous legislation; but if
there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then
the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier Act".
For the reasons expressed we hold that the question of law relerred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and as modified by
us should be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the
Commissioner of Income-tax.
We accordingly dismiss
these
G
appeals. with costs.
One hearing fee.
Y.P.
Appeals dismissed.
(1) (1921) 2 K.B. 403.
(2) (1900) I Q.B. IS6, 163, l64.