# ( Z71 BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS. • v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 271
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-08-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. I 278 Of 1978
- **Bench:** V. R. Kiushna Iyer, D. A. Desai, 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/z71-banarsi-dass-chadha-bros-v-lt-governor-delhi-admn-ors-7578
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)-
Brick-earth. whether a minor mineral, within the meaninR of that expression
'Minor Mineral', as defined ins. 3(e).
S. 3(e) of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development)
Act,
1957 defiues "'Minor Mineral' as meaning building stones, gravel, ordinary
clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and
any
other mineral which the Central Government may, by Notification in the offi·
cial Gazette declare to be a minor mineral". In exercise of the power conferred by s. 3 (e) of the Act the Central Government declared inter-alia brick·
earth as a 'minor mineral'.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court
HEID : (!) The word 'mineral' has no fixed but a contextual connotation. If 'mineral' is not a term of art it is a word of common parlance,
capable of multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. The word
A
ll
c
D
is occaaionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that is
E
neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense to mean
no more than precious metals like gold and silver. Again the word 'minerals'
is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of
the earth by digging or quarrying, though it is not always so. [273 A-C, 274 Fl
In the context of the 'Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, the 1rord Mineral is of sufficient amplitude to include brick-earth. If the
expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act, includes 'ordinary clay' and
'ordinary sand', there is no earthly rea.son why brick-earth sbOuld not be held
to be 'any other mineral' which may be declared as a 'minor mineral'. [275 B-C]
Rhagwu11 Dais v. State of U.P., [1976] 3 SCR 869, applied.
Laddu ·Mal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Pat. 491; Amar Modilaf Siugh v.
State of Haryana, AIR 1972 Punjab <.nd Haryana 356; Sharnia & Co. v. State
G
of U.P., AIR 1975 All. 386 approved.
State of West Bengal v. Jagdamba Prasad, AIR 1969 Cal. 281; overruled.
Todd Birlesto11 & Co. v. The North Eastern Railway. Co., [1903] 1 K.B.
603; qaotcd with approval.
(2) A substance must first be a mineral before it can be notified as
a
H
minor n1ineral pursuant to the power vested in the Central Governn1ent under
s. 3(e) of the Act.
Brick-earth being a mineral, the Central Government has
correctly notified it as a 'minor mineral'. [272 G-H]
272
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I S.C.R.

## Text

.,
(
Z71
BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS.
•
v.
LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS.
August 21, 1978
[V. R. KIUSHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)-
Brick-earth. whether a minor mineral, within the meaninR of that expression
'Minor Mineral', as defined ins. 3(e).
S. 3(e) of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development)
Act,
1957 defiues "'Minor Mineral' as meaning building stones, gravel, ordinary
clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and
any
other mineral which the Central Government may, by Notification in the offi·
cial Gazette declare to be a minor mineral". In exercise of the power conferred by s. 3 (e) of the Act the Central Government declared inter-alia brick·
earth as a 'minor mineral'.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court
HEID : (!) The word 'mineral' has no fixed but a contextual connotation. If 'mineral' is not a term of art it is a word of common parlance,
capable of multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. The word
A
ll
c
D
is occaaionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that is
E
neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense to mean
no more than precious metals like gold and silver. Again the word 'minerals'
is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of
the earth by digging or quarrying, though it is not always so. [273 A-C, 274 Fl
In the context of the 'Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, the 1rord Mineral is of sufficient amplitude to include brick-earth. If the
expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act, includes 'ordinary clay' and
'ordinary sand', there is no earthly rea.son why brick-earth sbOuld not be held
to be 'any other mineral' which may be declared as a 'minor mineral'. [275 B-C]
Rhagwu11 Dais v. State of U.P., [1976] 3 SCR 869, applied.
Laddu ·Mal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Pat. 491; Amar Modilaf Siugh v.
State of Haryana, AIR 1972 Punjab <.nd Haryana 356; Sharnia & Co. v. State
G
of U.P., AIR 1975 All. 386 approved.
State of West Bengal v. Jagdamba Prasad, AIR 1969 Cal. 281; overruled.
Todd Birlesto11 & Co. v. The North Eastern Railway. Co., [1903] 1 K.B.
603; qaotcd with approval.
(2) A substance must first be a mineral before it can be notified as
a
H
minor n1ineral pursuant to the power vested in the Central Governn1ent under
s. 3(e) of the Act.
Brick-earth being a mineral, the Central Government has
correctly notified it as a 'minor mineral'. [272 G-H]
272
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
I 278
Of
1978.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order l 5-11-1976
of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 96 of 1971.
B. Dutta for the Appellant.
B
Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. General and R. N. Sachthey for Respondents I and 2.
The Jud~ment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J._:_We granted special leave and heard arguments on the limited que<stion whether "brick-earth" is a 'minor mineral'
within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 3 ( e) of
·the Mine<s and Minerals (Regulation a'nd Development) Act, I 957.
The definition is as follows :
"Minor mineral' means building stones, gravel, ordinary
clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purD
poses, and any other mineral which the Central Government
may, by Notification in the official Gazette declare to be a
minor mineral;"
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G
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In exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 ( e) of the Act, the
Central Government declared the following minerals to be minor
minerals :
"Boulder, Shingle, Chalcedony pebbles used for ball mill
purposes only, limesbel! kanker and limestone used for limeburning, murrum, brick-earth, fuller's earth, bentonite road
metal, reh-matti, slate and shale when used
for
building
material;"
The submission of the leamod Counsel for the appellant was that
a substance had to be a mineral before it could be notified as a minor
mineral pursuant to the power under Section 3 ( e) of the Mi'nes and
Minorals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.
He urged that
brick-earth was not a mineral and, therefore, it could not be notified
a minor mineral.
We agree with the learned Counsel that a substance musL first be
a mineral before it ca'n be notified as a minor mineral pursuant to the
power vested in the Central Government under Section 3 ( e) of the
Act.
The question, therefore, is whether brick-earth is a mineral.
The expression "Minor Mineral" as defined in Section 3 ( e) includes
'Ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand'. If the expression "minor mineral"
as defined in Section 3 ( e) of the Act includes 'ordinary clay' and
•
B. !), CHADHA v. LT. GOVERNOR DELHI (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 273
'ordinary sand', there is no reason why earth used for the purpose
of making bricks should not be comprehended within the meaning of
the word "any other mineral" which may be declared as a "minor
mineral" by the Government. The word "mineral" is not a term of
art.
It is a word of common parlance, capable of a multiplicity of
meanings
depending upon the context.
For example the word is
occasionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that
is '.neither animal nor vegetable.
Sometimes it is used in a narrow
sense to m~an no more than precious metals like gold and silver.
Again, the word "minerals" is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying.
But this is not always so as pointed out by Chandrachud, J (as he
then was) in Bhagwan Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(') where the
learned judge said (at p. 87 4) :
·'It was urged that the sand and gravel are deposited on
the surface of the land and not under the surface of the soil
and ther~fore they cannot be called minerals and equally so,
any operation by which they are collected or gathered cannot
properly be called a mini'ng operation. It is in the first place
wrong to assume that mi11es and minerals mU1St always be
sub-soil and that there can be no minerals on the surface of
the earth. Such an assumption is contrary to informed experience.
In any case, the definition of mining operations
and minor minerals in section 3 ( d) and ( e) of the Act of
1957 and Rule 2(5) and (7) of the Rules of 1963 shows
that min~rals need not be subterranean and that mining operations cover every operation undertaken for the purpose of
"winning" any minor mineral.
"Winni'ng" does not imply
a hazardous or perilous activity.
The word simply means
"extracting a mineral" and is used generally to indicate auy
activity by which a mineral is secured. "Extracting" in tum
means drawing out or obtaining. A tooth is 'extracted' as
much as the fruit juice and as much as a mineral. Only that
the effort varies from tooth to tooth, from fruit to fruit and
from mineral to mineral".
We may also refer to Northern Pacific Railway Company· v. John
A. Sodrberg( 2 ) where the Supreme Court of United States observed
as follows (at page 581) :
"The word 'mineral' is used in so many senses, depenA
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dant upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the
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dictionary throw but little light upon its significance in a
--·----
(1)
[1976] 3 S.C.R. 869.
(2) 47 L. Ed. 575.
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274
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I S.C.R.
given case.
Thus, the scientific division of all matter into
the animal, vegetable. or mi!l'oral ki·ngdom would be absurd
as applied to a grant of lands, since all lands belong to the
mineral kingdom, and therefore, could not be excepted from
the grant without being d•::structive of it.
Upon the other
hand, a definition
which would co"nfine it to the precious
metals-gold and silver-would so limit its application as to
destroy at once half the value of the exception. Equally BUbversive of the grant would be the definition of minerals found
in the Century Dictionary : as "any constituent of the earth's
crust"; and that of Beinbridge on Mines :
"All the substances that now form, or which once formed, a part of the
solid body of the earth". Nor do we approximate much more
closely to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as
substances which are "mi"ned" as distinguished from those
are "quarried", since many valuable deposits of gold, copper,
iron, and coal lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and
some of the most valuable building stone, such for instance,
as the Caen stone in France, is excavated from mines ru"nning
far beneath the surface.
This distinction betwe>~n underground mines and open workings was expressly repudiated in
Midland R.C. v. Haunchwood Brick & Tile Co. IL.R. 10
Ch. Div. 552) and in Hext v. Gill (L.R. 7 Ch. 699)".
•
The Supreme Court of United States also referred to several Englilih
cases where stone for road making or paving was held to be 'minerals'
as also granite, sandstone, flint stone, gravel. marble, fire clay, brickclay, a"nd the like. It is clear that the word 'mineral' has no fixed but
a contextual connotation.
The learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Todd Birleston and Co. v. The
North Eastern Railway Co.(') and to Stoud's Judicial Dictionary to
urge that clay, brick-earth and the like have sometimes been bold not
to he minerals by English Courts.
As we said earlier the word mineral is an elastic word whose meaning depends upon the setting in
which it is used.
For instance, in the case cited, the question was
whether clay forming the surface or subsoil, and constituting the "land"
compulsorily taken for the purposes of a railway, was not a mineral
within the meaning of Sections 77, 78 or 79 o1 the Railway Clauses
Consolidation Act. The answer was that 'clay' was not a mineral for·
the purposes of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act.
Any other
conclusion, in the context of the Act, would have led to the absurd
(1) [1903] I K.B. 60~.
,
· IB. D. CHADHA v. LT. GOVERNOR DELIIl (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 275
result that the original owner whose land had been taken would
be A
·entitled to dig and take away the clay from the land on which the
Railway was constructed, thus defe_ating the very object of the compulsory taking.
On the other hand, as noticed by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in several English cases clay, gravel, sand, stone etc.
had been held to be minerals.
That is why we say the word mineral
has no definite meaning but has a variety of meanings, depending on B
the context of its use.
In the context of the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation & Development) Act, we have no' doubt that the word
'mineral' is of sufficient amplitude to include 'brick-earth'.
As already
·observed by us, if the expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act
include' 'ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand'. there is no earthly reason
C
why 'brick-earth' should not be held to be 'any other mineral' which
may he declared as 'minor mineral..
We do not think it necessary to
pursue the matter further except to sa~ that this was lhe view taken
in Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar,(I) Amar Singh Modilal v. State of
Haryana(2) and Sharma & Co. v. State of U.P.(8). We do not agree
with the view of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v.
D
!agadamba Prasad(') that because speaks of 'ordinary e~h' as a
mineral it is not a minor mineral as defined in the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation & Development) Act.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
'S.R.
{I) A.l.R. 1965 Patna 491.
{2) A.l.R. 1972 Punj. & Har. >56.
(3) A.LR. 1975 All. 86.
{4) A.l.R. 1969 Cal. 281.
Appeal disn11:1sed.