# · z96z Ma1'ch z6. r96I P. V. Bheemsena Rao v. Sirigiri Pedda Yella Reddi 6- Others

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 339
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appe11,l No. 752 of 1957
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. WANOHoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/z96z-ma1-ch-z6-r96i-p-v-bheemsena-rao-v-sirigiri-pedda-yella-reddi-6-others-2125
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

lnam grant-Personal, burdened with service-Alienation by
grantee and service discontinued-If resumable by revenue authorities-Madras Hindu Rdigious Endowments Act, No. II of I927,
ss. 44-B(r), 44-B(2)(a)(l) and (ll), Board's Standing Order 54.
·
z96z
Ma1'ch z6.
r96I
P. V.
Bheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Yella Reddi
6- Others
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The property in dispute was granted in inam to the ancestors of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondents
fot the performance of parak service.in certain temples hut the
grantees alienated considerable portion of the property and
ceased to perform the parak service. On being moved by the
trustees under s. 44-B(z)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Madras Hindn Religious Endowments Act, 1927, the revenue authorities after holding an enquiry ordered resumption of the inam lands and regranted them to the temple. The alienees thereupon filed a suit
in which their main contention was that the revenue authorities
had no jurisdiction to order the resumption of the inam under
s. 44-B of the Act which is in these terms:-
" Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage and any lease for
a term exceeding five years, of the whole or any portion of any
inam granted for the performance of a charity or service connected with a math or temple and made, confirmed or recognised
by the British Government, shall be null and void."
Both the trial court and the High Court on appeal held that
the inam was a personal inam burdened with service to the
temple and the case did not fall under s. 44-B of the Act.
On
appeal by the trustees with a certificate of the High Court,
Held, that the distinction between a grant for an office to
be remunerated by the use of land and a grant of land burdened
with service is that the former is a case of service grant and is
resumable when the service is not performed; the latter is not
a service grant as such but a grant in favour of a person though
burdened with service and its resumption will depend upon
whether the circumstances in which the grant was made establish a condition that it was resnmable if the service was not
performed.
Shrimant Lakhamgouda v. Raosaheb Baswantrao, (1931) LXI
M.L.J. 449, referred to.
Though on a wide interpretation s. 44-B(r) might also
include personal inams burdened with service it is really confined to inams directly granted to the temple or service inams
for the purpose of a temple or math or inams the whole income
of which is meant for charity and does not include personal
inams burdened with service. Such inams would continue to be
dealt with under Board's Standing Order 54 class (b) as introduced by the amendment to that order.

## Text

I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
here also. He then says that this rule restricts the
z96x
powers of a managing officer or a managing corporaMajor Gopal
tion in the matter of cancellation of allotment in the Singh & Others
sense that it permits cancellation only on certain speciv.
.
fied grounds and, therefore, it cannot be said that
Custodian,
s. 19(1) of the Act is completely in conflict with s. 10 P
Evacu~ . b
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act in so roper'!:_ un;a
far as the question of cancellation of allotment is conMudholkar J.
cerned. We cannot accept the argument because,
apart from the fact that the acquired properties have
ceased to be evacuee properties, cl. ( d) of r. 102 permits the managing officer or managing corporation to
cancel allotment "for any other sufficient reason to be
recorded in writing". The only effect of r. 102 is to
permit cancellation of an allotment for reasons stated.
,.
That is all. In our opinion, therefore, this rule does
not help the appellants.
Mr. Khanna had raised three other points but upon
the view which we have taken as to the effect of ss. 12
and 19 of the Act, it is not necessary to consider them.
•
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We, however,
make no order as to costs because had there been no
delay on the part of the Custodian General in dealing with the revision application the present situation
would not have arisen.
Appeal dismisserl.
P. V. BHEEMSENA RAO
v.
SIRIGIRI PEDDA YELLA REDDI
AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANOHoo, JJ.)
lnam grant-Personal, burdened with service-Alienation by
grantee and service discontinued-If resumable by revenue authorities-Madras Hindu Rdigious Endowments Act, No. II of I927,
ss. 44-B(r), 44-B(2)(a)(l) and (ll), Board's Standing Order 54.
·
z96z
Ma1'ch z6.
r96I
P. V.
Bheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Yella Reddi
6- Others
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The property in dispute was granted in inam to the ancestors of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondents
fot the performance of parak service.in certain temples hut the
grantees alienated considerable portion of the property and
ceased to perform the parak service. On being moved by the
trustees under s. 44-B(z)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Madras Hindn Religious Endowments Act, 1927, the revenue authorities after holding an enquiry ordered resumption of the inam lands and regranted them to the temple. The alienees thereupon filed a suit
in which their main contention was that the revenue authorities
had no jurisdiction to order the resumption of the inam under
s. 44-B of the Act which is in these terms:-
" Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage and any lease for
a term exceeding five years, of the whole or any portion of any
inam granted for the performance of a charity or service connected with a math or temple and made, confirmed or recognised
by the British Government, shall be null and void."
Both the trial court and the High Court on appeal held that
the inam was a personal inam burdened with service to the
temple and the case did not fall under s. 44-B of the Act.
On
appeal by the trustees with a certificate of the High Court,
Held, that the distinction between a grant for an office to
be remunerated by the use of land and a grant of land burdened
with service is that the former is a case of service grant and is
resumable when the service is not performed; the latter is not
a service grant as such but a grant in favour of a person though
burdened with service and its resumption will depend upon
whether the circumstances in which the grant was made establish a condition that it was resnmable if the service was not
performed.
Shrimant Lakhamgouda v. Raosaheb Baswantrao, (1931) LXI
M.L.J. 449, referred to.
Though on a wide interpretation s. 44-B(r) might also
include personal inams burdened with service it is really confined to inams directly granted to the temple or service inams
for the purpose of a temple or math or inams the whole income
of which is meant for charity and does not include personal
inams burdened with service. Such inams would continue to be
dealt with under Board's Standing Order 54 class (b) as introduced by the amendment to that order.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appe11,l No.
752 of 1957.
,•
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 8, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Second
Appeal No. 312 of 1949..
~
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for
the appellant.
•
)
.
~ I
...
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
P. Somasundaram and T. Satyanarayana, for the
respondents.
1961. March 16. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This appeal on a certificate granted
by the Andhra Pradesh High Court raises the question
of the interpretation of s. 44-B(l) of the Madras
Hindu Religious Endowments Act, No. II of 1927
(hereinafter called the Act). The point arises in this
way. The property in dispute was originally granted
in inam to the ancestors of the predecessors-in-interest
of the plaintiffs-respondents for the performance of
parak service in the pagodas (temples) of village
Panyam in Nandyal Taluk of the Kurnool District.
The grantees of the land in this inam alienated a
considerable portion of it and also ceased to perform
the parak service. In consequence, the trustees of the
temples at Panyam applied to the Sub-Collector under
s. 44-B (2) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act for the resumption
of the lands and their re-grant to the temples on the
ground that the holders of the inam had alienated the
property and had failed to perform the service required of them.
An inquiry was conducted into these
allegations, and it was held by the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Nandyal, that the inam had been granted on
the condition of parak service being rendered and that
there had been breach of the condition on failure to
perform the service and also that the lands comprised
in the inam had been alienated in a manner falling
withins. 44-B (2) (a) (i) of the Act. On these findings
the resumption of the inam lands was ordered and
the inam was re-granted to the temples in Panyam
village. The alienees took the matter in appeal to the
Collector but failed. Thereupon they filed the suit out
of which the present appeal has arisen; and their
main contention was that the revenue authorities had
no jurisdiction to order the resumption of the inam
under s. 44-B. The suit was resisted by the trustees
who were defendants to it and their case was that the
inam was a religious service inam in the sense of
being emoluments for the performance of service and
z96I
P. V.
Bheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Yella Reddi
& Others
Wanchoo ].
'
,
P. V.
Bheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Y 8lla Reddi
6' Others
Wanchoo ].
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
alternatively that even if the grant was a personal
inam, burdened with the performance of parak service,
the grant was conditional on the performance of the
service and as there was breach of this obligation, the
resumption and re-grant were justified under s. 44-B.
Certain preliminary facts are not in dispute now.
It has been found by all the courts that the inam
grant comprised both the warams. It has also been
found that the grant to the inamdar was personal to
him though burdened with parak service and not a
service inam in the sense of the inam constituting
emoluments of any office. On the finding that the
inam was a personal inam burdened with service to
the temple the trial court held that the case did not
fall within s. 44-B of the Act. On appeal the district
court confirmed the decree of the trial court. In the
High Court on second appeal the finding as to the
inam being of both warams was not contested and it
was conceded that it was a personal inam burdened
with service. The only question that was agitated
there was whether the case would fall within the four
corners of s. 44-B even if the inam which was granted
in the present case was a personal inam of both
warams burdened with service to the temple. The
High Court held against the trustees and dismissed
the appeal. Thereupon the trustees who are the
appellants before us applied for a certificate which
was granted to them; and that is how the matter has
come up before us.
Section 44-B (1) is in these terms:-
"Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage, and any
lease for a term exceeding five years, of the whole
or any portion of any inam granted for tho pcrfor.
mance of a charity or service connected with a
math or temple and made, confirmed or recognised
by the British Government, shall be null and void."
The question for consideration is whether a personal
inam burdened with service to a temple can be said to
come within the meaning of the words "any inam
crranted for the performance of a service connected
';;,,ith a temple". It is urged that the words used in
s. 44-B (1) are of very wide import and any personal
•
•
•
•
- '
I
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
grant of land howsoever large, if it is burdened with
some service to a tern pie howsoever small, would be
within tho meaning of these words and would therefore come within the terms of s. 44-B (1).
The High
Court has repelled this wide construction of the words
used ins. 44-B (1), and we think rightly. The distinction between a grant for an office to be remunerated
by the use of land and a grant of land burdened with
service is well known in Hindu law.
The former is a
case of a service grant and is resumable when the
service is not performed. The latter is not a service
grant as such but a grant in favour of a person though
burdened with service and its resumption will depend
upon whether the circumstances in which the grant
was made establish a condition that it was resumable
if the service was not performed: (see Shrimant Lakhamgouda Basavprabhu Sardesai v. Raosaheb Baswantrao alias Annasaheb Subedar and Others (1)).
The
question therefore is whether s. 44- B covers only the
first type of grant, (namely, a service grant) and not a
personal grant burdened with service .
Prior to the introduction of s. 44-B in the Act, the
enforcement of a condition of a grant in favour of
charitable and religious institutions in Madras was by
taking recourse to Board's Standing Order 54. Under
para. 1 of this Order, a duty was laid on the revenue
officers to see that inams confirmed by the Inam
Commissioner for the benefit of or for services to be
rendered to any religious and charitable institution
are not enjoyed without the terms of the grant being
fulfilled. Under para. 2 thereof, religious and charitable inams were liable to be resumed on the ground
that the whole or a portion of the land had been alienated or lost to the institution or service to which it
once belonged or that the terms of the grant were not
observed. Provision was also made in the Order for
the authorities which would exercise the power to
resume. Further provisions in that Order show that
the intention normally was not to dispossess the
inamdar even in the event of failure to perform the
conditions of the grant but the land was subjected to
(1) (1931) LXI M.L.J. 449.
P. V.
Rheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Yc?_la Reddi
& Others
Wanchoo ].
P. V.
Bke1.1tnsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Yelta Re1di
& Others
Wanchoo ].
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
full assessment and the assessment was made available to the institution in lieu of the service lost. In the
case of personal inams burdened with service in particular what was usually resumed in the event of nonperformance of service with or without alienation
was that portion of the grant which represented the
value of the service burdened and not that which was
personal and there was no injustice in this course for
as we have already said a personal inam burdened
with service was granted to an individual for himself
though he was required to perform certain services to
the temple. Therefore, in case he failed to do so there
might be resumption of such portion of the inam as
would represent the burden of the service leaving the
rest to him.
It is in this background that we have to examine
s. 44-B (1) introduced in the Act in 1934 and see whether personal inams burdened with service are included within its ambit. It may be mentioned that on
the introduction of s. 44-B (1) in the Act., B.S.O. 54
was amended and religious and charitable inams
which were all governed till then by it were divided
into two classes, namely-
(a) inams granted for the performance of a
charity or service connected with a Hindu math or
temple; and
(b) inams not falling under class (a).
In ams falling under class (a) were to be governed
by the provisions of the Act while inams falling under
class (b) were to be governed by B.S.O. 54 as heretofore.
This amendment would also show that all
religious inams, i.e., inams which had some connection
howsoever slight with a temple or other religious
institution were not to be governed by s. 44-B and
only those inams which were granted for the performance of a charity or service connected with a Hindu
math or temple were to be dealt with under s. 44-B
while others would still be governed by B.S.O. 54.
We therefore agree with the High Court that this
history affords a clue to the interpretation of s. 44-B
(1) and suggests that though the words used ins. 44-B
are open to a wide interpretation, the intention was to
•
;
\ ..
•
•
' .,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
bring within its purview only those inams which w~re
granted directly to the temple and also those inams
which were granted for the performance of a charity
or service connected with a math or temple, i.e., service inams or such inams the whole income of which
was for charity and not those inams which were personal inams though burdened with some service to a
temple or math. As we have already said the land
granted under a personal inam burdened with service
may be very large and the service expected may be
very slight, and it could not be the intention of the
legislature when it enacted s. 44-B (1) that large personal inams with slight service attached to them
should be resumed and re-granted to the temple under
s. 44-B (1) for failure to perform the service with
which the grant was burdened. It would make no
difference to the validity of this argument even if
the service attached absorbed a larger portion of the
inam leaving only a smaller portion to the grantee.
This cone! nsion is in our opinion enforced if we look
at cl. (iii) of s. 44-B (2)(a) which permits resumption
of an inam on the ground that either the math or
temple has ceased to exist or the service in question has in any way become impossible of performance. Now it could not be the intention of the
legislature, where an inam was granted as a personal
inam though burdened with some service to a temple
or math, that such inam should be resumed simply
because the math or temple has ceased to exist or for
some other reason the service has become impossible of
performance. The nature of a personal inam burdened with service is that it is meant for the individual
to whom it is granted though the individual is required to perform some service to the temple also.
The
legislature could not have intended when it enacted
s. 44-B (2)(a)(iii) that even such an inam should be
resumed when the math or temple ceases to exist.
But this would be the result if the wide interpretation contended for by the appellants is accepted. In
such a case obviously the personal portion of the
grant has to be separated from the service portion
44
r96z
P. V.
Bheemsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Y1lta Reddi
&- Others
Wanj;hQo J.
P. V.
Bheernsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pedda
Vella Reddi
& Others
Hlanchoo J.
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
and if the service is not performed it is only the service portion that is liable to resumption. Further if
we look at s. 44-B (2)(f)(i), it provides that where an
inam is resumed under s. 44-B (1) it shall be re-granted as an endowment to the temple or math concerned.
In the case of a personal inam burdened with service
it will mean that if the service is not performed the
whole inam would be liable to resumption and would
be re-granted to the temple, though the inam was
granted to an individual and the service with which
it was burdened might have been slight, the remaining income of the inam being intended as a personal
grant to the individual. Therefore whens. 44-B(2)(f)(i)
provides for re-grant of the resumed inam to the
temple it presumes that the whole of the inam resumed was meant for service of the temple and there was
no element of personal grant in it. It is on that basis
that we can understand the re-grant of the resumed
inam to the tern ple, the idea behind the word "regrant" being that originally also it was granted for
the temple though as a service inam.
Similarly,
s. 44-B(2)(f)(ii) provides that where the math or temple has ceased to exist and an inam is resumed on
that ground it shall be re-granted as an endowment
to the Board for appropriation to such religious,
educational or charitable purposes not inconsistent
with the objects of such math or temple, as the Board
may direct. Here again it seems to us that the legislature could not have intended that a personal inam
granted to an individual though burdened with service should be resumed when the temple has ceased
to exist and the service could not be performed and
should be taken over by the Board as an endowment
for such purposes as the Board may direct. Such a
provision would completely overlook the personal
part of a personal inam burdened with service. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court that s. 44-B(l),
though on a wide interpretation it might also inClude
personal inams burdened with service, is really
confined to inams directly granted to the temple
or service inams for the purpose of a temple or
math or inams the whole of the income of which
•
L
..
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
is meant for charity and does not include personal inams burdened with service, is correct. Such
inams would continue to be dealt with under B.S.O.
54,, class (b) as introduced by the amendment to that
Order. In this view, there is no force in this appeal
and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SINGHAI AJIT KUMAR & ANOTHER
v.
UJAYARSINGH AND OTHERS
(K. SUBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Hindu Law-Sudras-Inheritence-Self-acquired property of
father-Illegitimate son and widow inheriting half share eachWidow dying-Illegitimate son, if entitled to succeed to widow's
half.
A Sudra Hindu died leaving two widows and an illegitimate
son by a continuously and exclusively kept concubine. The son
succeeded to a moiety of the estate and the widows succeeded to
the other moiety. The widows died without leaving any daughter
or daughter's son. The reversioners filed a suit for recovery of
possession of the estate. The illegitimate son contended that on
the death of his father he was entitled to succeed to half the
estate the other going to the widows and that on the death of
the widows he was entitled to the half share held by them.
Held, that the illegitimate son succeeded to half the estate
upon the death of the father and succeeded to the other half on
the death of the widows.
An illegitimate son has the status of
a son under the Hindu Law; but he has no rights by birth and
cannot claim partition during his father's lifetime. On the
father's death he takes his father's self-acquired property along
with the legitimate son and in case the legitimate son dies, he
takes the entire property by survivorship. If there is no legitimate son, he would be entitled only to a half share when there
is a widow, daughter or daughter's son of the last male holder.
In the absence of any one of these three heirs, he succeeds to the
entire state. If the widow succeeds to half the estate, upon her
death succession again opens to half the estate of the last male
P. V.
BheeJnsena Rao
v.
Sirigiri Pidda
Yella Reddi
& Others
Wanchoo ].
MaYch z6.